ERBERT 
^  ADAMS  r 
GlhBONS 


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THE 
NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2011  with  funding  from 

Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


http://www.archive.org/details/newmapofeuro1900gibb 


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NEW  MAP  OF  ElJfe^^ 
(1911-1914) 

THE   STORY    OF    THE    RECENT    EUROPEAN 

DIPLOMATIC  CRISES  AND  WARS  AND  OF 

EUROPE'S  PRESENT  CATASTROPHE 


BY 


HERBERT  ADAMS  GIBBONS,  Ph.D. 

AUTHOR  OF  "THE  FOUNDATION  OF  THE  OTTOMAN  EMPIRE' 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1914 


Copyright,  1914,  by 
THE    CENTURY    CO. 


Published,  November,  1914 


^0    ■ 

MY  CHILDREN 

Christine  Este  of  Adana, 

Lloyd  Irving  of  Constantinople, 

and 
Emily  Elizabeth  of  Paris. 

Born  in  the  midst  of  the  wars  and  changes  that  this  book  describes, 
may  they  lead  lives  of  peace  ! 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I.  Germany  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine    .         i 

II.  The  "  Weltpolitik  "  of  Germany      .       21 

III.  The  "Bagdadbahn"  ...       58 

IV.  Algeciras  and  Agadir       .         .         .71 
V.  The  Passing  of  Persia     ...       84 

VI.    The  Partitioners  and  their  Poles  .      96 

VII.     Italia  Irredenta       .         .         .         .119 

VIII.     The  Danube  and  the  Dardanelles  .     131 

IX.     Austria-Hungary    and     her     South 

Slavs      ......     142 

X.     Racial  Rivalries  in  Macedonia        .     161 

XI.     The    Young    Turk    Regime    in    the 

Ottoman  Empire    .  .  .  .180 

XII.    Crete  and  European  Diplomacy       .     220 

XIII.  The  War  between  Italy  and    Tur- 

key        ......     241 

XIV.  The    War     between     the     Balkan 

States  and  Turkey        .         .         .     263 

XV.     The  Rupture  between  the  Allies    .     319 


viii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

XVI.    The    War    between     the     Balkan 

Allies 330 

XVII.    The  Treaty  of  Bukarest         .         .  343 

XVIII.    The  Albanian  Fiasco        .         .         .351 

XIX.    The    Austro-Hungarian    Ultimatum 

to  Servia       .....  368 

XX.    Germany   Forces  War  upon  Russia 

AND  France    .....  386 

XXI.    Great  Britain  Enters  the  War      .  399 
MAPS 

TO    FACE    PAGE 

I.    The  Political  Distribution  of  Poland  .  104 

II.     Europe  in  191  i       .....  200 

III.  Europe  in  Africa  in  1914      .         .         .  296 

IV.  Balkan  Peninsula    after    the    Treaty 

OF  Bukarest        .....  344 

V.     Belgium     and     the      Franco  -  German 

Frontier    ......  392 

VI.    Europe  in  1914 408 


FOREWORD 

ON  a  July  day  in  1908,  two  American  students, 
who  had  chosen  to  spend  the  first  days  of  their 
honeymoon  in  digging  the  musty  pamphleteers 
of  the  Ligue  out  of  the  Bodleian  Library,  were  walking 
along  the  High  Street  in  Oxford,  when  their  attention 
was  arrested  by  the  cry  of  a  newsboy.  An  ha'penny 
invested  in  a  London  newspaper  gave  them  the  news 
that  Niazi  Bey  had  taken  to  the  Macedonian  highlands, 
and  that  a  revolution  was  threatening  to  overthrow 
the  absolutist  regime  of  Abdul  Hamid.  The  sixteenth 
century  was  forgotten  in  the  absorbing  and  compelling 
interest  of  the  twentieth. 

Two  weeks  later  the  students  were  entering  the  har- 
bour of  Smyrna  on  a  French  steamer  which  was  bringing 
back  to  constitutional  Turkey  the  Young  Turk  exiles, 
including  Prince  Sabaheddine  Effendi  of  the  Royal  Otto- 
man House.  From  that  day  to  this,  the  path  of  the  two 
Americans,  whose  knowledge  of  history  heretofore  had 
been  gained  only  in  libraries,  has  led  them  through 
massacres  in  Asia  Minor  and  Syria,  and  through  mobili- 
zations and  wars  in  Constantinople,  Bulgaria,  Macedonia, 
Greece,  and  Albania,  back  westward  to  Austria,  Italy, 

is 


X  FOREWORD 

and  France,  following  the  trail  of  blood  and  fire  from  its 
origin  in  the  Eastern  question  to  the  great  European 
conflagration. 

On  the  forty-fourth  anniversary  of  Sedan,  when 
German  aeroplanes  are  fljang  over  Paris,  and  the  distant 
thunder  of  cannon  near  Meaux  can  be  heard,  this  book 
has  been  begun  in  the  Bibliotheque  Nationale  by  one  of 
the  students,  while  the  other  has  yielded  to  the  more 
pressing  call  of  Red  Cross  work.  It  is  hoped  that  there 
is  nothing  that  will  offend  in  what  is  written  here.  At 
this  time  of  tension,  of  racial  rivalry,  of  mutual  recrimin- 
ation, the  writer  does  not  expect  that  his  judgments  will 
pass  without  protest  and  criticism.  But  he  claims  for 
them  the  lack  of  bias  which,  under  the  circumstances, 
only  an  American — of  this  generation  at  least — dare 
impute  to  himself. 

The  changes  that  are  bringing  about  a  new  map 
of  Europe  have  come  within  the  intimate  personal 
experience  of  the  writer. 

If  foot-notes  are  rare,  it  is  because  sources  are  so 
numerous  and  so  accessible.  Much  is  what  the  writer 
saw  himself,  or  heard  from  actors  in  the  great  tragedy, 
when  events  were  fresh  in  their  memory.  The  books  of 
various  colours,  published  by  the  Ministries  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  the  various  countries  interested,  have  been 
consulted  for  the  negotiations  of  diplomats.  From 
day  to  day  through  these  years,  material  has  been 
gathered  from  newspapers,  especially  the  Paris  Temps, 
the  London  Times,  the  Vienna  Freie  Press,  the  Constanti- 
nople Orient,  and  other  journals  of  the  Ottoman  capital. 


FOREWORD  xi 

The  writer  has  used  his  own  correspondence  to  the  New 
York  Herald,  the  New  York  Independent,  and  the  Phila- 
delphia Telegraph.  For  accuracy  of  dates,  indebtedness 
is  acknowledged  to  the  admirable  'Biiiish.  Annual  Register. 

Paris,  September,  1914. 


There  are  general  causes,  moral  or  physical,  which  act  in 
each  State,  elevate  it,  maintain  it,  or  cast  it  down;  every 
accident  is  submitted  to  these  causes,  and  if  the  fortune  of 
a  battle,  that  is  to  say  a  particular  cause,  has  ruined  a  State, 
there  was  a  general  cause  which  brought  it  about  that  that 
State  had  to  perish  by  a  single  battle. 

Montesquieu. 


THE 
NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 


The  New  Map  of  Europe 

CHAPTER  I 
GERMANY   IN    ALSACE    AND    LORRAINE 

THE  war  of  1870  added  to  the  German  Confed- 
eration Alsace  and  a  large  portion  of  Lorraine, 
both  of  which  the  Germans  had  always  con- 
sidered theirs  historically  and  by  the  blood  of 
the  inhabitants.  In  annexing  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 
the  thought  of  Bismarck  and  von  Moltke  was  not 
only  to  bring  back  into  the  German  Confederation 
territories  which  had  formerly  been  a  part  of  it, 
but  also  to  secure  the  newly  formed  Germany  against 
the  possibility  of  French  invasion  in  the  future. 
For  this  it  was  necessary  to  have  undisputed  posses- 
sion of  the  valley  of  the  Rhine  and  the  crests  of  the 
Vosges. 

From  the  academic  and  military  point  of  view, 
the  German  thesis  was  not  indefensible.  But  those 
who  imposed  upon  a  conquered  people  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort  forgot  to  take  into  account  the  senti- 
ments of  the  population  of  the  annexed  territory. 
Germany  annexed  land.     That  was  possible  by  the 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

right  of  the  strongest.  She  tried  for  over  forty  years 
to  annex  the  population,  but  never  succeeded.  The 
makers  of  modem  Germany  were  not  alarmed  at  the 
persistent  refusal  of  the  Alsatians  to  become  loyal 
German  subjects.  They  knew  that  this  would  take 
time.  They  looked  forward  to  the  dying  out  of  the 
party  of  protest  when  the  next  generation  grew  up, — 
a  generation  educated  in  German  schools  and  formed 
in  the  German  mould  by  the  discipline  of  military 
service. 

That  there  was  still  an  Alsace-Lorraine  "question" 
after  forty  years  is  a  sad  commentary  either  on  the 
justice  of  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  by 
Germany  or  on  the  ability  of  Germany  to  assimilate 
that  territory  which  she  felt  was  historically,  geo- 
graphically, and  racially  a  part  of  the  Teutonic 
Empire.  In  1887,  when  "protesting  deputies"  were 
returned  to  the  Reichstag  in  overwhelming  numbers, 
despite  the  governmental  weapons  of  intimidation, 
disenfranchisement,  and  North  German  immigration, 
Bismarck  was  face  to  face  with  the  one  great  failure 
of  his  career.  He  consoled  himself  with  the  firm 
belief  that  all  would  be  changed  when  the  second 
generation,  which  knew  nothing  of  France  and  to 
which  the  war  was  only  a  memory,  peopled  the 
unhappy  provinces. 

But  that  second  generation  came.  Those  who 
participated  in  the  war  of  1870,  or  who  suffered  by 
it,  were  few  and  far  between.  The  hotheads  and 
extreme  francophiles  left  the  country  long  ago,  and 
their  place  was  taken  by  immigrants  who  were  sup- 
posed to  be  loyal  sons  of  the  Vaterland.    Those  of 

2 


GERMANY  IN  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

the  younger  indigenous  brood,  whose  parents  had 
brought  them  up  as  irreconcilables,  ran  away  to 
serve  in  the  French  foreign  legion,  or  went  into  exile, 
and  became  naturalized  Frenchmen  before  their  time 
of  military  service  arrived.  And  yet  the  imrest 
continued.  Strasbourg,  Metz,  Mulhouse,  and  Col- 
mar  were  centres  of  political  agitation,  which  an 
autocratic  government  and  Berlin  police  methods 
were  powerless  to  suppress. 

The  year  1910  marked  the  beginning  of  a  new 
period  of  violent  protest  against  Prussian  rule. 
Not  since  1888  was  there  such  a  continuous  agitation 
and  such  a  continuous  persecution.  The  days  when 
the  Prussian  police  forbade  the  use  of  the  French 
language  on  tombstones  were  revived,  and  the  num- 
ber of  petty  police  persecutions  recorded  in  the  local 
press  was  equalled  only  by  the  number  of  public 
demonstrations  on  the  part  of  the  people,  whose 
hatred  of  everything  Prussian  once  more  came  to  a 
fever-heat. 

Let  me  cite  a  few  incidents  which  I  have  taken 
haphazard  from  the  journals  of  Strasbourg  and  Metz 
during  the  first  seven  months  of  19 10.  The  Turn- 
verein  of  Robertsau  held  a  gymnastic  exhibition  in 
which  two  French  societies,  those  of  Belfort  and 
Giromagny,  were  invited  to  participate.  The  police 
refused  to  allow  the  French  societies  to  march  to  the 
hall  in  procession,  as  was  their  custom,  or  to  display 
their  flags.  Their  two  presidents  were  threatened 
with  arrest.  A  similar  incident  was  reported  from 
Colmar.  At  Noisseville  and  Wissembourg  the  for- 
tieth annual  commemoration  services  held  by  the 

3 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

French  veterans  were  considered  treasonable,  and 
they  were  informed  that  they  would  never  again 
be  allowed  to  hold  services  in  the  cemetery.  At 
Mulhouse  the  French  veterans  were  insulted  by  the 
police  and  not  allowed  to  display  their  flags  even  in 
the  room  where  they  held  their  banquet.  At  the 
college  of  Thann  a  young  boy  of  twelve,  who  curi- 
ously enough  was  the  son  of  a  notorious  German 
immigrant,  whistled  the  Marseillaise  and  was 
locked  up  in  a  cell  for  this  offence.  The  conferring 
of  the  cross  of  the  Legion  of  Honour  on  Abbe  Faller, 
at  Mars-la-Tour,  created  such  an  outburst  of  feel- 
ing that  the  German  ambassador  at  Paris  was  in- 
structed to  request  the  French  Government  to  refrain 
from  decorating  Alsatians.  A  volunteer  of  Mul- 
house was  reprimanded  and  refused  advancement 
in  the  army  because  he  used  his  mother-tongue  in 
a  private  conversation.  On  July  ist,  twenty-one 
border  communes  of  Lorraine  were  added  to  those 
in  which  German  had  been  made  the  official  language. 
On  July  25th,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of 
the  University  of  Strasbourg,  a  professor  was  hissed 
out  of  his  lecture  room.  He  had  said  that  the  Prus- 
sians could  speak  better  French  than  the  Alsatians. 
The  most  serious  demonstration  which  has  oc- 
curred in  Metz  since  the  annexation,  took  place  on 
Sunday  evening,  January  8,  1910,  when  the  police 
broke  up  forcibly  a  concert  given  by  a  local  society. 
The  newspapers  of  Metz  claimed  that  this  was  a 
private  gathering,  to  which  individual  invitations 
had  been  sent,  and  was  neither  public  not  political. 
The  police  invaded  the  hall,  and  requested  the  audi- 

4 


GERMANY  IN  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

ence  to  disband.  When  the  presiding  officer  refused, 
he  and  the  leader  of  the  orchestra  were  arrested. 
The  audience,  after  a  Hvely  tussle,  was  expelled 
from  the  hall.  Immediately  a  demonstration  was 
planned  to  be  held  around  the  statue  of  General  Ney. 
A  large  crowd  paraded  the  city,  singing  the  Sambre- 
et-Meuse  and  the  Marseillaise.  When  the  police 
found  themselves  powerless  to  stop  the  procession 
without  bloodshed,  they  were  compelled  to  call  out 
the  troops  to  clear  the  streets  with  fixed  bayonets. 

These  incidents  demonstrated  the  fact  that  French 
ideals,  French  culture,  and  the  French  language  had 
been  kept  alive,  and  were  still  the  inspiration  of  the 
unceasing — and  successful — protest  of  nearly  two 
million  people  against  the  Prussian  domination.  The 
effervescence  was  undoubtedly  as  strong  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  "forty  years  after"  as  it  had  been  on  the 
morrow  of  the  annexation.  But  its  francophile 
character  was  not  necessarily  the  expression  of 
desire  for  reunion  with  France.  The  inhabitants 
of  the  "lost  provinces"  had  always  been,  racially 
and  linguistically,  as  much  German  as  French. 
Now  that  the  unexpected  has  happened,  and  reunion 
with  France  seems  probable,  many  Alsatians  are 
claiming  that  this  has  been  the  unfailing  goal  of 
their  agitation.  But  it  is  not  true.  It  would  be  a 
lamentable  distortion  of  fact  if  any  such  record  were 
to  get  into  a  serious  history  of  the  period  in  which 
we  Uve. 

The  political  ideal  of  the  Alsatians  has  been  self- 
government.  Their  agitation  has  not  been  for 
separation  from   the    German    Confederation,    but 

5 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

for  a  place  in  the  German  Confederation.  A  great 
number  of  the  immigrants  who  were  sent  to  "ger- 
manize"  Alsace  and  Lorraine  came  to  side  with  the 
indigenous  element  in  their  political  demands.  If 
the  question  of  France  and  things  French  entered 
into  the  struggle,  and  became  the  heart  of  it,  two 
reasons  for  this  can  be  pointed  out:  France  stood 
for  the  realization  of  the  ideals  of  democracy  to  the 
descendants  of  the  Strasbourg  heroes  of  1793;  and 
the  endeavour  to  stamp  out  the  traces  of  the  former 
nationality  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  provinces  was 
carried  on  in  a  manner  so  typically  and  so  foolishly 
Prussian  that  it  kept  alive  the  fire  instead  of  extin- 
guishing it.  Persecution  never  fails  to  defeat  its 
own  ends.  For  human  nature  is  keen  to  cherish 
that  which  is  difficult  or  dangerous  to  enjoy. 

To  understand  the  Alsace-Lorraine  question,  from 
the  internal  German  point  of  view,  it  is  necessary 
to  explain  the  political  status  of  these  provinces 
after  the  conquest,  and  their  relationship  to  the 
Empire,  in  order  to  show  that  their  continued  unrest 
and  unhappiness  were  not  due  to  a  ceaseless  and 
stubborn  protest  against  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort. 

When  the  German  Empire  was  constituted,  in 
1872,  it  comprehended  twenty-five  distinct  sovereign 
kingdoms,  duchies,  principalities,  and  free  cities, 
and,  in  a  subordinate  position,  the  territory  ceded 
by  France,  which  was  made  a  Reichsland,  owned  in 
common  by  the  twenty-five  confederated  sovereign- 
ties. The  King  of  Prussia  was  made  Emperor  of 
the  Confederation,  and  given  extensive  executive 
powers.     Two  assemblies  were  created  to   legislate 

6 


GERMANY  IN  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

for  matters  affecting  the  country  as  a  whole.  The 
Bimdesrath  is  an  advisory  executive  body  as  well  as 
an  upper  legislative  assembly.  It  is  composed  of 
delegates  of  the  sovereigns  of  the  confederated  states. 
The  lower  imperial  house,  or  Reichstags  is  a  popular 
assembly,  whose  members  are  returned  by  general 
elections  throughout  the  Empire.  In  their  internal 
affairs  the  confederated  states  are  autonomous, 
and  have  their  own  local  Parliaments.  This  scheme, 
fraught  with  dangers  and  seemingly  unsvu^mount- 
able  difficulties,  has  survived;  and,  thanks  to  the 
predominance  of  Prussia  and  the  genius  of  two  great 
emperors,  the  seemingly  heterogeneous  mass  has 
been  moulded  into  a  strong  and  powerful  Empire. 

In  such  an  Empire,  however,  there  never  has  been 
any  place  for  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  conquered  ter- 
ritory was  not  a  national  entity.  It  had  no  sov- 
ereign, and  could  not  enter  into  the  confederacy  on 
an  equal  footing  with  the  other  twenty-five  states. 
The  Germans  did  not  dare,  at  the  time,  to  give  the 
new  member  a  sovereign,  nor  could  they  conjointly 
undertake  its  assimilation.  Prussia,  not  willing  to 
risk  the  strengthening  of  a  south  German  state  by 
the  addition  of  a  million  and  a  half  to  its  population, 
took  upon  herself  what  was  the  logical  task  of  Baden 
or  Wurtemberg  or  Bavaria. 

So  Alsace-Lorraine  was  an  anomaly  under  the 
scheme  of  the  organization  of  the  German  Empire. 
During  forty  years  the  Reichsland  was  without  re- 
presentation in  the  Bundesrath,  and  had  thus  had 
no  real  voice  in  the  management  of  imperial  affairs. 
By    excluding    the    "reconquered    brethren"    from 

7 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

representation  in  the  Bundesrath,  Germany  failed  to 
win  the  loyalty  of  her  new  subjects.  Where  petty 
states  with  a  tithe  of  her  population  and  wealth 
have  helped  in  shaping  the  destinies  of  the  nation, 
the  Reichsland  had  to  feel  the  humiliation  of  "taxa- 
tion without  representation."  It  was  useless  to 
point  out  to  the  Alsatians  that  they  had  their  vote 
in  the  Reichstag.  For  the  Bundesrath  is  the  power 
in  Germany. 

Nor  did  Alsace-Lorraine  have  real  autonomy  in 
internal  affairs.  The  executive  power  was  vested 
in  a  Statthalter,  appointed  by  the  Emperor,  and 
supported  by  a  foreign  bureaucracy  and  a  foreign 
police  force.  Before  the  Constitution  of  191 1,  there 
was  a  local  Parliament,  called  the  Landesausschuss, 
which  amounted  to  nothing,  as  the  imperial  Parlia- 
ment had  the  privilege  of  initiating  and  enacting 
for  the  Reichsland  any  law  it  saw  fit.  Then,  too, 
the  delegates  to  the  Landesausschuss  were  chosen 
by  such  a  complicated  form  of  siiffrage  that  they 
represented  the  Statthalter  rather  than  the  people. 
And  the  Statthalter  represented  the  Emperor! 

In  the  first  decade  after  the  annexation,  Prussian 
brutality  and  an  unseemly  haste  to  impose  military 
service  upon  the  conquered  people  led  to  an  emigra- 
tion of  all  who  could  afford  to  go,  or  who,  even  at  the 
expense  of  material  interest,  were  too  high-spirited 
to  allow  their  children  to  grow  up  as  Germans. 
This  emigration  was  welcomed  and  made  easy,  just 
as  Austria-Hungary  encouraged  the  emigration  of 
Moslems  from  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  For  it 
enabled  Bismarck  to  introduce  a  strong  Prussian 

8 


GERMANY  IN  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

and  Westphalian  element  into  the  Reichsland  by 
settling  immigrants  on  the  vacant  properties.  But 
most  of  these  immigrants,  instead  of  prussianizing 
Alsace,  have  become  Alsatians  themselves.  Some 
of  the  most  insistent  opponents  of  the  Government, 
some  of  the  most  intractable  among  the  agitators, 
have  been  those  early  immigrants  or  their  children. 
This  is  quite  natural,  when  we  consider  that  they 
have  cast  their  lot  definitely  with  the  country,  and 
are  just  as  much  interested  in  its  welfare  as  the 
indigenous  element. 

The  revival  of  the  agitation  against  Prussian 
Government  in  1910  was  a  movement  for  autonomy 
on  internal  affairs,  and  for  representation  in  the 
Bundesrath.  The  Alsatians  wanted  to  be  on  a  foot- 
ing of  constitutional  equality  with  the  other  German 
States.  One  marvels  at  the  Prussian  mentality 
which  could  not  see — either  with  the  Poles  or  with 
the  Alsatians — that  fair  play  and  justice  would 
have  solved  the  problems  and  put  an  end  to  the 
agitation  which  has  been,  during  these  past  few 
years  especially,  a  menace  on  the  east  and  west  to 
the  existence  of  the  Empire. 

Something  had  to  be  done  in  the  Reichsland. 
The  anomalous  position  of  almost  two  million  Ger- 
man subjects,  fighting  for  their  political  rights,  and 
forming  a  compact  mass  upon  the  borders  of  France, 
was  a  question  which  compelled  the  interest  of 
German  statesmen,  not  only  on  account  of  its  inter- 
national  aspect,  but  also  because  of  the  growing 
German  public  sentiment  for  social  and  political 
justice.     The  Reichstag  was  full  of  champions  of  the 

9 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

claims  of  the  Alsatians, — champions  who  were  not 
personally  interested  either  in  Alsace- Lorraine  or  in 
the  influence  of  the  agitation  in  the  Reichsland  upon 
France,  but  who  looked  upon  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
question  as  a  wrong  to  twentieth-century  civilization. 

On  March  14,  1910,  Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  announced  to  the  Reichstag  that  the 
Government  was  preparing  a  constitution  for  Alsace- 
Lorraine  which  would  give  the  autonomy  so  long  and 
so  vigorously  demanded.  But  he  had  in  his  mind, 
not  a  real  solution  of  the  question,  but  some  sort  of 
a  compromise,  which  would  satisfy  the  confederated 
states,  and  mollify  the  agitators  of  the  Reichsland, 
hut  at  the  same  time  preserve  the  Prussian  domination 
in  Alsace-Lorraine.  In  June,  Herr  Delbriick,  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  the  Interior,  was  sent  to  Strasbourg 
to  confer  with  the  local  authorities  and  representa- 
tives of  the  people  concerning  the  projected  con- 
stitution. It  was  during  this  visit  that  the  Alsatians 
were  disillusioned.  A  dinner,  now  famous  or 
notorious,  whichever  you  like,  was  given  by  the 
Statthalter,  to  which  representative  (!)  members  of 
the  Landesausschuss  were  invited.  At  this  dinner 
the  real  leaders  of  the  country,  such  as  Wetterle, 
Preiss,  Blumenthal,  Weber,  Bucher,  and  Theodor, — 
the  very  men  who  had  made  the  demand  for  au- 
tonomy so  insistent  that  the  Government  could  no 
longer  refuse  to  entertain  it — were  conspicuous  by 
their  absence.  Those  bidden  to  confer  with  Herr 
Delbriick  in  no  way  represented,  but  were  on  the 
other  hand  hostile  to,  the  wishes  of  the  people. 

We  cannot  go  into  the  involved  story  of  the  fight 

10 


GERMANY  IN  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

in  the  Reichstag  over  the  new  Constitution.  The 
Delbriick  project  was  approved  by  the  Bundesrath 
on  December  i6,  1910,  and  debated  in  the  following 
spring  session  of  the  Reichstag.  Despite  the  warnings 
of  the  deputies  from  the  Reichsland,  and  the  brilliant 
opposition  of  the  Socialists,  the  Constitution  given 
to  Alsace-Lorraine,  on  May  31st,  was  a  pure  farce. 
In  no  sense  was  it  what  the  people  of  the  Reichsland 
had  wanted,  although  representation  in  the  Bundes- 
rath was  seemingly  given  to  them.  The  new  Con- 
stitution preserved  the  united  sovereignty  of  the 
confederated  states,  and  its  delegation  to  the  Emperor, 
who  still  had  the  power  to  appoint  and  recall  at  will 
the  Statthalter,  and  to  initiate  legislation  in  local 
matters.  A  Landtag  took  the  place  of  the  Lan- 
desausschuss.  The  Upper  Chamber  of  the  Landtag 
consists  of  thirt3^-six  members,  representing  the 
religious  confessions,  the  University  and  other 
bodies,  the  supreme  court  of  Colmar,  and  the  muni- 
cipalities and  chambers  of  commerce  of  Strasbourg, 
Mulhouse,  Metz,  and  Colmar,  to  the  number  of 
eighteen ;  and  the  other  eighteen  chosen  by  the  Emperor. 
The  Lower  Chamber  has  sixty  members,  elected  by 
direct  universal  suffrage,  with  secret  ballot.  Elect- 
ors over  thirty-five  possess  two  votes,  and  over 
forty-five  three  votes. 

By  forcing  this  Constitution  upon  Alsace-Lorraine, 
the  interests  of  Prussia  and  of  the  House  of  Hohen- 
zollem  were  considered  to  the  detriment  of  the 
interests  of  the  German  Empire.  A  glorious  oppor- 
tunity for  reconciliation  and  assimilation  was  lost. 
The  Emperor  would  not  listen  to  the  admission  of 

II 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Alsace-Lorraine  to  the  Bundesrath  in  the  only  logical 
way,  by  the  creation  of  a  new  dynasty  or  a  republican 
form  of  government,  so  that  the  Alsatian  votes 
would  represent  a  sovereign  state.  Prussia  in  her 
dealings  with  Alsace-Lorraine,  has  always  been 
afraid,  on  the  one  hand,  of  the  addition  of  Bundes- 
rath votes  to  the  seventeen  of  Bavaria,  Saxony, 
Baden,  and  Wurtemberg,  and  on  the  other  hand,  of 
the  repercussion  upon  her  internal  suffrage  and  other 
problems  with  the  Socialists. 

Since  191 1,  the  eyes  of  many  Alsatians  have  been 
directed  once  more  towards  France  as  the  only — if 
forlorn — hope  of  justice  and  peace.  What  words 
could  be  f  oimd  strong  enough  to  condemn  the  suicidal 
folly  of  the  German  statesmen  who  allowed  the  dis- 
appointment over  the  Constitution  to  be  followed  by 
a  series  of  incidents  which  have  been  like  rubbing 
salt  into  a  raw  woimd? 

The  first  Landtag,  in  conformity  to  the  Consti- 
tution of  191 1,  was  elected  in  October.  It  brought 
into  life  a  new  political  party,  called  "The  National 
Union,"  led  by  Blumenthal,  Wetterle,  and  Preiss, 
who  united  for  the  purpose  of  demanding  what  the 
Constitution  had  not  given  them — the  autonomy  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine.  This  party  was  badly  beaten 
in  this  first  election.  But  its  defeat  was  not  really 
a  defeat  for  the  principles  of  autonomy,  as  the  Ger- 
man press  stated  at  the  time.  The  membership  of 
the  new  Landtag  was  composed,  in  majority,  of  men 
who  had  been  supporters  of  the  demand  for  au- 
tonomy, but  who  had  not  joined  the  new  party  for 
reasons  of  local  politics.     Herr  Delbriick  had  given 

12 


GERMANY  IN  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

universal  suffrage  (a  privilege  the  Prussian  electorate 
had  never  been  able  to  gain  in  spite  of  its  reiterated 
demands)  to  the  Reichsland  in  the  hope  that  the 
Socialists  would  prevent  the  Nationalists  from  con- 
trolling the  Alsatian  Landtag.  Many  Socialists,  how- 
ever, during  the  elections  at  Colmar  and  elsewhere, 
did  not  hesitate  to  cry  in  French,  "  Vive  la  France! 
A  has  la  Prusse  /" 

The  Prussian  expectations  were  bitterly  deceived. 
The  Landtag  promptly  showed  that  it  was  merely 
the  Landesaiisschuss  under  another  name.  The 
nationalist  struggle  was  revived;  the  same  old  ques- 
tions came  up  again.  The  Government's  appropria- 
tion "for  purposes  of  state"  was  reduced  one-third, 
and  it  was  provided  that  the  Landtag  receive  com- 
munication of  the  purposes  for  which  the  money 
was  spent.  The  Statthalier's  expenses  were  cut  in 
half,  and  a  bill,  which  had  always  been  approved  in 
previous  years,  providing  for  the  payment  of  the 
expense  of  the  Emperor's  hunting  trips  in  the  Reichs- 
land, failed  to  pass. 

In  the  spring  of  19 12,  the  Prussians  showed  their 
disapproval  of  the  actions  of  the  new  Landtag  by 
withdrawing  the  orders  for  locomotives  for  the 
Prussian  railways  from  the  old  Alsatian  factory 
of  Grafenstaden  near  Strasbourg.  This  was  done 
absolutely  without  any  provocation,  and  aroused 
a  violent  denunciation,  not  only  among  the  purely 
German  employes  of  the  factory  and  in  the  news- 
papers, but  also  in  the  Landtag,  which  adopted  an 
order  of  the  day  condemning  most  severely  the 
attitude  of  the  Imperial  Government  towards  Alsace- 

13 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Lorraine,  of  which  this  boycott  measure  was  a  petty 
and  mean  illustration. 

The  indignation  was  at  its  height  when  Emperor 
Wilhelm  arrived  in  Strasbourg  on  May  13th.  Instead 
of  acting  in  a  tactful  manner  and  promising  to  set 
right  this  wrong  done  to  the  industrial  life  of  Stras- 
bourg, the  Emperor  addressed  the  following  words 
to  the  Mayor: 

"Listen.  Up  to  here  you  have  only  known  the 
good  side  of  me:  you  might  be  able  to  learn  the 
other  side  of  me.  Things  cannot  continue  as  they 
are:  if  this  situation  lasts,  we  will  suppress  your 
Constitution  and  annex  you  to  Prussia." 

This  typically  Prussian  speech,  which  in  a  few 
lines  reveals  the  hopelessly  unsuccessful  tactics  of 
the  German  Government  towards  the  peoples  whom 
it  has  tried  to  assimilate  the  world  over,  only  served 
to  increase  the  indignation  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Reichsland;  in  fact,  the  repercussion  throughout 
all  Germany  was  very  serious. 

The  arbitrary  threat  of  the  Emperor  was  badly 
received  in  the  other  federated  states,  whose  news- 
papers pointed  out  that  he  had  exceeded  his  author- 
ity. It  gave  the  Socialists  an  opportunity  to  attack 
Emperor  Wilhelm  on  the  floor  of  the  Reichstag. 
Four  days  after  this  threat  was  made,  an  orator  of 
the  Socialist  party  declared  • 

"We  salute  the  imperial  words  as  the  confession, 
full  of  weight  and  coming  from  a  competent  source, 
that  annexation  to  Prussia  is  the  heaviest  punish- 
ment  that   once   can   threaten   to   impose   upon   a 

14 


GERMANY  IN  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

people  for  its  resistance  against  Germany.  It  is  a 
punishment  like  hard  labour  in  the  penitentiary 
with  loss  of  civil  rights." 

This  speech  caused  the  Chancellor  to  leave  the 
room  with  all  the  Ministry.  On  May  226.,  the 
attack  upon  Emperor  Wilhelm  for  his  words  at 
Strasbourg  was  renewed  by  another  deputy,  who 
declared  that  if  such  a  thing  had  happened  in  Eng- 
land, "the  English  would  shut  up  such  a  King  at 
Balmoral  or  find  for  him  some  peaceful  castle,  such 
as  that  of  Stemberg  or  the  Villa  Allatini  at  Salonika." 

The  answer  of  the  Landtag  to  Emperor  Wilhelm  *s 
threat  was  the  passing  of  two  unanimous  votes: 
one  demanding  that  hereafter  the  Constitution  could 
not  be  modified  except  by  the  law  of  the  country  and 
not  by  the  law  of  the  Empire,  and  the  other  demanding 
for  Alsace-Lorraine  a  national  flag. 

One  could  easily  fill  many  pages  with  illustrations 
of  senseless  persecutions,  most  of  them  of  the  pettiest 
character,  but  some  more  serious  in  nature,  which 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  have  had  to  endure  since  the 
granting  of  the  Constitution.  Newspapers,  illus- 
trated journals,  clubs  and  organizations  of  all  kinds 
have  been  annoyed  constantly  by  police  interference. 
Their  editors,  artists,  and  managers  have  been  brought 
frequently  into  court.  Zislin  and  Hansi,  celebrated 
caricaturists,  have  found  themselves  provoked  to 
bolder  and  bolder  defiances  by  successive  condemna- 
tions, and  have  endured  imprisonment  as  well  as 
fines.  Hansi  was  sentenced  to  a  year's  imprison- 
ment by  the  High  Court  of  Leipsic  only  a  month 

15 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

before  the  present  war  broke  out,  and  chose  exile 
rather  than  a  Prussian  fortress. 

The  greatest  effort  during  the  past  few  years  has 
been  made  in  the  schools  to  influence  the  minds  of 
the  growing  generation  against  the  ^^  souvenir  de 
France,'"  and  to  impress  upon  the  Alsatians  what 
good  fortune  had  come  to  them  to  be  born  German 
citizens. 

Among  the  boys,  the  influence  of  this  teaching 
has  been  such  that  over  twenty-two  thousand  fled 
from  home  during  the  period  of  1 900-1913  to  enlist 
in  the  Foreign  Legion  of  the  French  Army.  The 
campaign  of  the  German  newspapers  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and,  in  fact,  throughout  Germany,  was 
redoubled  in  191 1.  Parents  were  warned  of  the 
horrible  treatment  accorded  to  the  poor  boys  who 
were  misguided  enough  to  throw  away  their  citizen- 
ship, and  go  to  be  killed  in  Africa  under  the  French 
flag.  The  result  of  this  campaign  was  that  the  For- 
eign Legion  received  a  larger  number  of  Alsatians 
in  1 91 2  than  had  enlisted  during  a  single  year  since 
1871! 

Among  the  girls,  the  German  educational  system 
flattered  itself  that  it  could  completely  change  the 
sentiments  of  a  child,  especially  in  the  boarding- 
schools.  Last  year  the  Empress  of  Germany  visited 
a  girls'  school  near  Metz,  which  is  one  of  the  best 
German  schools  in  the  Reichsland.  As  she  was  leav- 
ing, she  told  the  children  that  she  wanted  to  give 
them  something.  What  did  they  want?  The  answer 
was  not  sweets  or  cake,  but  that  they  might  be 
taught  a  little  French ! 

16 


GERMANY  IN  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

Since  1910,  the  German  war  budget  has  carried 
successively  larger  items  for  the  strengthening  of 
forts  and  the  building  of  barracks  in  Metz,  Colmar, 
MuUiouse,  Strasbourg,  Neuf-Brisach,  Bischwiller, 
Wissembourg,  Mohrange,  Sarrebourg,  Sarregue- 
mines,  Saarbruck,Thionville,  Molsheim,and  Saverne. 
The  former  French  provinces  have  been  flooded 
with  garrisons,  and  have  been  treated  just  as  they 
were  treated  forty  years  ago.  The  insufferable 
spirit  of  militarism,  and  the  arrogance  of  the  Prussian 
officers  in  Alsatian  towns,  have  served  to  turn  against 
the  Empire  many  thousands  whom  another  policy 
might  have  won.  For  it  must  be  remembered  that 
by  no  means  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  Reichsland 
have  been  by  birth  and  by  home  training  French 
sympathizers.  Instead  of  crushing  out  the  ''souvenir 
de  France,'"  the  Prussian  civil  and  military  officials 
have  caused  it  to  be  born  in  many  a  soul  which  was 
by  nature  German. 

The  most  notorious  instance  of  military  arrogance 
occurred  in  the  autumn  of  1913  in  Saverne.  Lieu- 
tenant von  Forstner,  who  was  passing  in  review 
cases  of  discipline,  had  before  him  a  soldier  who  had 
stabbed  an  Alsatian,  and  had  been  sentenced  to  two 
months'  imprisonment.  "Two  months  on  account 
of  an  Alsatian  blackguard!"  he  cried.  "I  would 
have  given  you  ten  marks  for  your  trouble."  The 
story  spread,  and  the  town,  tired  of  the  attitude  of 
its  garrison,  began  in  turn  to  show  its  contempt  for 
the  Kaiser's  soldiers.  Windows  in  von  Forstner's 
house  were  broken.  Every  time  officers  or  soldiers 
appeared  on  the  streets  they  were  hooted.  Saverne 
2  17 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

was  put  under  martial  law.  Threats  were  made  to 
fire  upon  the  citizens.  One  day  Lieutenant  von 
Forstner  struck  a  lame  shoemaker  across  the  fore- 
head with  his  sword.  The  affair  had  gone  so  far 
that  public  sentiment  in  Germany  demanded  some 
action.  Instead  of  adequately  punishing  von  Forst- 
ner and  other  officers,  who  had  so  maddened  the 
civil  population  against  them,  the  German  military 
authorities  gave  the  guilty  officers  nominal  sentences, 
and  withdrew  the  garrison. 

All  these  events  had  a  tremendous  repercussion 
in  France.  It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  ill- 
feeling  aroused  on  both  sides  of  the  Rhine,  in  Ger- 
many, in  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  in  France  by  the  per- 
secutions in  the  Reichsland.  Only  one  who  knows 
intimately  the  French  can  appreciate  their  feeling — 
or  share  it — over  the  ZisHn  and  Hansi  trials,  the 
Saveme  affair,  the  suppression  of  the  Souvenir 
Frangais,  the  Lorraine  Sportive  and  other  organiza- 
tions, and  the  campaign  against  the  Foreign  Legion. 
It  has  given  the  French  soldiers  in  the  present  war 
something  to  fight  for  which  is  as  sacred  to  them  as 
the  defence  of  French  soil.  The  power  of  this  senti- 
ment is  indicated  by  the  invasion  of  Alsace,  the 
battle  of  Altkirk,  and  the  occupation  of  Mulhouse  at 
the  beginning  of  August.  The  French  could  not  be 
held  back  from  this  wild  dash.  Strategy  was  power- 
less in  the  face  of  the  sentiment  of  a  national  army. 

The  Alsatian  leaders  themselves  have  seen  the 
peril  to  the  peace  of  Europe  of  the  German  attitude 
towards  their  country.  They  did  not  want  France 
drawn  into  a  war  for  their  liberation.     They  were 

i8 


GERMANY  IN  ALSACE  AND  LORRAINE 

alarmed  over  the  possibility  of  this,  and  desired  it 
to  be  understood  that  their  agitation  had  nothing 
international  in  it.  The  attitude  of  all  the  anti- 
Prussian  parties  may  be  summed  up  in  the  words  of 
Herr  Wolff,  leader  of  the  Government  Liberal  party, 
who  declared  that  "all  the  inhabitants  of  the  Reichs- 
land  had  as  their  political  ambition  was  only  the 
elevation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  the  rank  of  an  inde- 
pendent and  federated  state,  like  the  other  twenty- 
five  component  parts  of  the  German  Empire."  Their 
sincerity  and  their  desire  to  preserve  peace  is  proved 
by  the  motion  presented  by  the  leaders  of  four  of  the 
political  groups  in  the  Reichsland,  which  was  voted 
on  May  6,  1912,  without  discussion,  by  the  Landtag: 

"The  Chamber  invites  the  Statthalter  to  instruct 
the  representatives  of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  the  Bun- 
desrath  to  use  all  the  force  they  possess  against  the 
idea  of  a  war  betweeen  Germany  and  France,  and 
to  influence  the  Bundesrath  to  examine  the  ways 
which  might  possibly  lead  to  a  rapprochement  be- 
tween France  and  Germany,  which  rapprochement 
will  furnish  the  means  of  putting  an  end  to  the  race 
of  armaments." 

The  mismanagement  of  the  Reichsland  has  done 
more  than  prevent  the  harmonious  union  of  the 
former  French  provinces  with  Germany.  It  has 
had  an  effect,  the  influence  of  which  cannot  be  exag- 
gerated, upon  nourishing  the  hopes  of  revenge  of 
France,  and  the  resentment  against  the  amputation 
of  1870.  On  neither  side  of  the  Vosges  has  the 
wound  healed.  The  same  folly  which  has  kept  alive 
a  Polish  question  in  eastern  Prussia  for  one  hundred 

19 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

and  twenty-five  years,  has  not  failed  to  make  impos- 
sible the  Prussianizing  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  The 
Prussian  has  never  understood  how  to  win  the  con- 
fidence of  others.  There  has  been  no  Rome  in  his 
political  vision.  As  for  conceptions  of  toleration, 
of  kindness,  and  of  love,  they  are  non-existent  in 
Prussian  officialdom.  Nietzsche  revealed  the  char- 
acter of  the  Prussian  in  his  development  of  the  idea 
of  the  iihermensch.  The  ideal  of  perfect  manhood 
is  the  imposition  of  one  will  on  another  will  by  force. 
Mercy  and  pity,  according  to  Nietzsche,  were  signs 
of  weakness,  the  symbols  of  the  slave. 

Under  the  circumstances,  then,  we  are  compelled 
after  forty-five  years  to  revise  our  estimate  of  Bis- 
marck's sagacity.  His  genius  was  limited  by  the 
narrow  horizon  of  his  own  age.  He  did  not  see  that 
the  future  Germany  needed  other  things  that  France 
could  give  far  more  than  she  ijeeded  Alsace  and 
Lorraine.  In  posterity,  Bismarck  would  have  had 
a  greater  place  had  he,  in  the  last  minutes  of  the 
transactions  at  Versailles,  given  back  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  to  France,  waived  the  war  indemnity,  and 
asked  in  return  Algeria  or  other  French  colonies. 

But  would  it  have  been  different  with  the  French 
colonies?  It  is  impossible  to  write  this  chapter, 
and  have  faith  in  the  success  of  a  German  weltpolitik. 


20 


CHAPTER   II 
THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

WHEN  the  transrhenane  provinces  of  the  old 
German  Empire  were  added  to  France  in 
the  eighteenth  century,  the  assimilation 
of  these  territories  was  a  far  different  proposition  from 
their  refusion  into  the  mould  of  a  new  German  Empire 
in  1 87 1.  In  the  first  place,  the  old  German  Empire 
was  a  mediceval  institution  which,  in  the  evolution 
of  modem  Europe,  was  decaying.  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine were  not  taken  away  from  a  political  organism 
of  which  they  were  a  vital  part.  The  ties  severed 
were  purely  dynastic.  In  the  second  place,  the 
consciousness  of  national  life  was  awakened  in 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  during  the  time  that  they  were 
under  French  rule,  and  because  they  shared  in  the 
great  movement  of  the  birth  of  democracy  following 
the  French  Revolution. 

France,  then,  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  believed 
that  she  had  been  robbed  of  a  portion  of  her  national 
territory.  The  people  of  the  annexed  provinces,  as 
was  clearly  shown  by  the  statement  of  their  repre- 
sentatives at  Bordeaux,  did  not  desire  to  enter  the 
German  Confederation. 

21 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Germany  failed  to  do  the  only  thing  that  could 
possibly  have  made  her  new  territories  an  integral 
part  of  the  new  Empire,  i.  e.  to  place  Alsace-Lorraine 
upon  a  footing  of  equality  with  the  other  states  of 
the  Confederation,  and  make  their  entry  that  of  an 
autonomous  sovereign  state.  Consequently,  neither 
in  France  nor  in  the  Reichsland  was  the  Treaty  of 
Frankfort  accepted  as  a  permanent  change  in  the 
map  of  Europe.  Germany  has  always  been  com- 
pelled, in  her  international  politics,  to  count  upon  the 
possibility  of  France  making  an  attempt  to  win  back 
the  lost  provinces.  She  has  sought  to  form  alliances 
to  strengthen  her  own  position  in  Europe,  and  to 
keep  France  weak.  France,  the  continued  object 
of  German  hostility,  has  found  herself  compelled  to 
ally  herself  with  Russia,  with  whom  she  has  never 
had  anything  in  common,  and  to  compound  her 
colonial  rivalries  in  Africa  with  her  hereditary  enemy, 
Great  Britain.  This  is  the  first  case  of  the  unrest  in 
Europe  that  has  culminated  in  a  general  European 
war. 

The  second  cause  is  the  Weltpolitik  of  Germany 
which  has  brought  the  German  Empire  into  conflict 
with  Great  Britain  and  France  outside  of  Europe, 
and  with  Russia  in  Europe. 

On  the  map  of  Europe,  Russia,  Great  Britain,  and 
France  are,  in  19 14,  practically  what  they  were  in 
1815.  The  changes,  logical  and  in  accordance  with 
the  spirit  of  centralization  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
have  transformed  middle  and  south-eastern  Europe. 
The  changes  in  south-eastern  Europe  have  been 
effected  at  the  expense  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and 

22 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

have  been  a  gradual  development  throughout  the 
century,  from  the  outbreak  of  the  Greek  revolution 
in  1822  to  the  Treaty  of  London  in  191 3.  In  middle 
Europe,  during  the  twelve  years  between  1859  ^^^ 
1 87 1,  the  three  Powers  whose  national  unity,  racially 
as  well  as  politically,  was  already  achieved  at  the 
time  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  were  brought  face  to 
face  with  three  new  Powers,  united  Germany,  united 
Italy,  and  the  Dual  Monarchy  of  Austria-Hungary. 

The  nineteenth  century  has  been  called  the  age  of 
European  colonization.  Europe  began  to  follow  its 
commerce  with  other  continents  by  the  imposition  of  its 
civilization  and  its  political  system  upon  weaker  races. 
Checked  by  the  rising  republic  of  the  United  States 
from  encroaching  upon  the  liberties  of  the  peoples 
of  North  and  South  America,  there  have  been  no 
acquisitions  of  territory  by  European  nations  in  the 
western  continents  since  the  Congress  of  Vienna. 
European  expansion  directed  itself  towards  Africa, 
Asia,  and  the  islands  of  the  oceans.  There  was  no 
Oriental  nation  strong  enough  to  promulgate  a 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

In  extra-European  activities,  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Russia  were  the  pioneers.  That  they  succeeded 
during  the  nineteenth  century  in  placing  under  their 
flag  the  choicest  portions  of  Africa  and  the  backward 
nations  of  Asia,  was  due  neither  to  the  superior  enter- 
prise and  energy,  nor  to  the  greater  foresight,  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon,  French,  and  Russian  nations.  They 
had  achieved  their  national  unity,  and  they  were 
geographically  in  a  position  to  take  advantage  of  the 
great  opportunities  which  were  opening  to  the  world 

23 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

for  colonization  since  the  development  of  the  steam- 
ship and  the  telegraph. 

But  the  other  three  Powers  of  Europe  came  late 
upon  the  scene.  It  has  only  been  within  the  last 
quarter  of  a  century  that  Germany  and  Italy  have 
been  in  the  position  to  look  for  overseas  possessions. 
It  has  only  been  within  the  last  quarter  of  a  century 
that  Austria,  finding  her  union  with  Hungary  a 
durable  one,  has  been  able  to  think  of  looking  beyond 
her  limits  to  play  a  part,  as  other  nations  had  long 
been  doing,  in  the  history  of  the  outside  world. 

By  every  force  of  circumstances,  the  three  new 
States — threatened  by  their  neighbours,  who  had 
looked  with  jealous,  though  powerless,  eyes  upon 
their  consolidation — were  brought  together  into  a 
defensive  alliance.  The  Triple  Alliance,  as  it  is 
called,  has  drifted  into  a  spirit  of  common  general 
aims  and  ambitions,  if  not  of  particular  interests, 
against  their  three  more  fortunate  rivals,  who  had 
been  annexing  the  best  portions  of  the  Asiatic  and 
African  continents  while  they  were  struggling  with 
internal  problems. 

Oceans  of  ink  have  been  wasted  upon  polemics 
against  the  peace-disturbing  character  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  Especially  has  Germany  and  her  growing 
Weltpolitik  been  subject  to  criticism,  continuous  and 
untiring,  on  the  part  of  the  British  and  French  press. 
But  the  question  after  all  is  a  very  simple  one:  the 
three  newer  Powers  of  Europe  have  not  been  willing 
to  be  content  with  an  application  in  practical  world 
politics  of  the  principle  that  "to  him  that  hath  shall 
be  given. "     Germany  and  Italy,  transformed  under 

24 


THE  "  WELTPOLITIK  "  OF  GERMANY 

modem  economic  conditions  into  industrial  states, 
have  been  looking  for  outside  markets,  and  they  have 
wanted  to  enjoy  those  markets  in  regions  of  the  globe 
either  actually  under  their  flag  or  subjected  to  their 
political  influence.  In  other  words,  they  have 
wanted  their  share  in  the  division  of  Africa  and  Asia 
into  spheres  under  the  control  of  European  nations. 

Is  a  logical  and  legitimate  ambition  to  play  a  part 
in  the  world's  politics  in  proportion  to  one's  popula- 
tion, one's  wealth,  one's  industrial  and  maritime 
activity,  necessarily  a  menace  to  the  world's  peace? 
It  has  always  been,  and  I  suppose  always  will  be, 
in  the  nature  of  those  who  have,  to  look  with  alarm 
upon  the  efforts  of  those  who  have  not,  to  possess 
something.  Thus  capital,  irrespective  of  epoch  or 
nationality  or  of  religion,  has  raised  the  cry  of  alarm 
when  it  has  seen  the  tendency  for  betterment,  for 
education,  for  the  development  of  ideals  and  a  sense 
of  justice  on  the  part  of  labour.  In  just  the  same  way, 
Russia  with  her  great  path  across  the  northern  half 
of  Asia  and  her  new  and  steadily  growing  empire  in 
the  Caucasus  and  central  Asia;  France  with  the 
greater  part  of  northern  and  central  Africa,  and  an 
important  comer  of  Asia  under  her  flag;  and  Great 
Britain  with  her  vast  territories  in  every  portion  of 
the  globe,  raised  the  cry  of  "Wolf,  Wolf!"  when  the 
Powers  of  the  Triple  Alliance  began  to  look  with 
envious  eye  upon  the  rich  colonies  of  their  neighbours, 
and  to  pick  up  by  clever  diplomacy — and  brutal  force, 
if  you  wish — a  few  crumbs  of  what  was  still  left  for 
themselves. 

The  result  of  these  alarming  ambitions  of  the 

25 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Triple  Alliance  has  been  the  coming  together  of 
Russia,  France,  and  England,  hereditary  enemies  in 
former  days  but  now  friends  and  allies,  in  the  main- 
tenance of  the  colonial  "trust." 

The  great  cry  of  the  Triple  Entente  is  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  European  equilibrium.  For  this  they  have 
reason.  Europe  could  know  no  lasting  peace  under 
Teutonic  aggression.  But  is  there  not  also  to  the 
account  of  the  Triple  Entente  some  blame  for  the 
imrest  in  Europe  and  for  the  great  catastrophe  which 
has  come  upon  the  world?  For  while  their  policy  has 
been  the  maintenance  of  the  European  equilibrium, 
it  has  been  coupled  with  the  maintenance  of  an  ex- 
tra-European balance  of  power  wholly  in  their  favour. 

The  sense  of  justice,  of  historical  proportion,  and 
the  logic  of  economic  evolution  make  one  sym- 
pathize, in  abstract  principle,  not  only  with  the 
Weltpolitik  of  Germany,  but  also  with  Austria- 
Hungary's  desire  for  an  outlet  to  the  sea,  and  with 
Italy's  longing  to  have  in  the  Mediterranean  the 
position  which  history  and  geography  indicated 
ought  to  be,  and  might  again  be,  hers. 

But  sympathy  in  abstract  principle  is  quite  another 
thing  from  sympathy  in  fact.  In  order  to  appreciate 
the  Weltpolitik  of  Germany,  and  be  able  to  form  an 
intelligent  opinion  in  regard  to  it — for  it  is  the  most 
vital  and  burning  problem  in  the  world  to-day — we  must 
consider  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  full  signi- 
ficance in  practice  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

Bismarck  posed  as  the  disinterested  "honest 
courtier"  of  Europe  in  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  The 
declaration  he  had  made,  that  the  whole  question 

26 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

of  the  Orient  "was  not  worth  the  finger  bone  of  a 
Pomeranian  grenadier, "  was  corroborated  by  his 
actions  during  the  sessions  of  the  Congress.  We  have 
striking  illustrations  of  this  in  the  memoirs  of  Kara- 
theodory  pasha,  who  recorded  from  day  to  day, 
during  the  memorable  sessions  of  the  Congress,  his 
astonishment  at  the  indifference  which  Bismarck 
displayed  to  the  nationalities  of  the  Balkans,  and  to 
the  complications  which  might  arise  in  Europe  from 
their  rivalries. 

Bismarck  did  not  see  how  vital  was  to  be  the  Bal- 
kan question  with  the  future  of  the  nation  he  had 
built.  Nor  did  he  see  the  intimate  relationship 
between  the  economic  progress  of  united  Germany 
and  the  question  of  colonies.  One  searches  in  vain 
the  speeches  and  writings  of  the  Iron  Chancellor 
for  any  reference  to  the  importance  of  the  two  pro- 
blems, in  seeking  the  solution  of  which  the  fabric  of 
his  building  is  threatened  with  destruction. 

Perhaps  it  is  easy  for  us,  in  looking  backwards,  to 
point  out  the  lack  of  foresight  which  was  shown  by 
Bismarck  in  regard  to  the  future  of  Germany. 
Forty-five  years  later,  we  are  able  to  pass  in  review 
the  unforeseen  developments  of  international  politics 
and  the  amazing  economic  evolution  of  contemporary 
Europe.  Perhaps  it  is  unreasonable  to  expect  that 
much  attention  and  thought  should  have  been  given 
by  the  maker  of  modem  Germany  to  the  possible 
sphere  that  Germany  might  be  called  upon  to  play 
in  the  world  outside  of  Europe. 

For  we  must  remember  that  the  new  Germany, 
after  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  was  wholly  in  an 

27 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

experimental  stage,  and  that  the  duty  at  hand  was 
the  immediate  consolidation  of  the  various  states 
into  a  political  and  economic  fabric.  There  was 
enough  to  demand  all  the  attention  and  all  the  genius 
of  Bismarck  and  his  co-workers  in  solving  these 
problems.  Cordial  relationship  with  Austria  had 
to  be  reestablished.  The  dynasties  of  the  south 
German  kingdoms  and  of  the  lesser  potentates, 
whose  names  still  remained  legion  in  spite  of  the 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss  of  1803,  had  to  be 
carefully  handled.  There  were  four  definite  internal 
problems  which  confronted  Bismarck:  the  relation- 
ship of  the  empire  to  the  Catholic  Church;  the 
reconciliation  of  the  different  peoples  into  a  har- 
monious whole;  the  establishment  of  representative 
government  without  giving  the  strong  socialistic 
elements  the  upper  hand;  and  the  development  of 
the  economic  wealth  of  Germany. 

There  was  little  time  to  think  of  Germany's  place 
in  the  world's  politics.  In  foreign  affairs,  it  was 
considered  that  the  exigencies  of  the  moment  could 
be  met  by  adopting  a  policy  of  conciliation  towards 
both  Russia  and  Austria,  and  the  winning  of  the 
friendship  of  Italy.  The  KuUurkampf,  the  creation 
of  the  Bundesrath  under  Prussian  hegemony,  and  the 
formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  events 
connected  with  them,  are  important  in  an  analysis 
of  Germany's  international  politics.  Unfortunately 
we  cannot  bring  them  into  the  scope  of  this  book. 
We  can  mention  only  the  various  factors  that  have 
been  directly  responsible  for  giving  birth  to  what  is 
called  the  Weltpolitik. 

28 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

These  factors  are  the  beHef  of  the  German  people 
in  the  superiority  of  their  race  and  its  world-civiHzing 
mission;  their  connotation  of  the  word  "German"; 
the  consciousness  of  their  mihtary  strength  being  dis- 
proportionate to  their  political  influence;  the  rapid 
increase  of  the  population  and  the  development  of  the 
industrial  and  commercial  prosperity  of  the  empire; 
and  the  realization  of  the  necessity  of  a  strong  navy, 
with  naval  bases  and  coaling-stations  in  all  parts  of 
the  world,  for  the  adequate  protection  of  commerce. 

The  belief  of  the  German  people  in  the  superiority  of 
their  race  and  its  world-civilizing  mission  is  a  sober 
fact.  It  pervades  every  class  of  society  from  the 
Kaiser  down  to  the  workingman.  It  is  heralded  from 
the  pulpit,  taught  in  the  schools,  and  is  a  scientific 
statement  in  the  work  of  many  of  Germany's  leading 
scholars.  The  anthropologist  Woltmann  said  that 
"the  German  is  the  superior  type  of  the  species 
homo  sapiens,  from  the  physical  as  well  as  the  intel- 
lectual point  of  view."  Wirth  declared  that  "the 
world  owes  its  civilization  to  Germany  alone"  and 
that  "the  time  is  near  when  the  earth  must  inevitably 
be  conquered  by  the  Germans. "  The  scientific 
book — a  serious  one — in  which  these  statements  occur 
was  so  popular  that  it  sold  five  editions  in  three  years ! 
Paulsen  remarked  that  "humanity  is  aware  of,  and 
admires,  the  German  omnipresence."  Hartmann 
taught  that  the  European  family  is  divided  into  two 
races,  male  and  female,  of  which  the  first,  of  course, 
was  exclusively  German,  while  the  second  included 
Latins,  Celts,  and  Slavs.  "Marriage  is  inevitable." 
Goethe  expressed  in  Faust  the  opmion  that  the  work 

29 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

of  the  Germans  was  to  make  the  habitable  world 
worth  living  in,  while  Schiller  boasted,  "  Our  language 
shall  reign  over  the  whole  world,"  and  that  "the 
German  day  lasts  until  the  end  of  time."  Schiller 
also  prophesied  that  "two  empires  shall  perish  in 
east  and  west,  I  tell  you,  and  it  is  only  the  Lutheran 
faith  which  shall  remain."  Fichte,  one  hundred 
years  ago,  exhorted  the  Germans  to  be  "German 
patriots,  and  we  shall  not  cease  to  be  cosmopolitan. " 
Heine  believed  that  "not  only  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 
but  all  France  shall  be  ours. " 

To  show  the  German  state  of  mind  towards  those 
whom  they  have  not  hesitated  to  provoke  to  arms, 
the  remarkable  teaching  of  Hummel's  book,  which 
is  used  in  the  German  primary  schools,  is  a  convincing 
illustration.  Frenchmen  are  monkeys,  and  the  best 
and  strongest  elements  in  the  French  race  asserted 
to  be  German  by  blood.  The  Russians  are  slaves, 
as  their  name  implies.  Treitschke's  opinion  of  the 
British  is  that  "  among  them  love  of  money  has  killed 
all  sentiment  of  honour  and  all  distinction  of  just  and 
unjust.  Their  setting  sun  is  our  aurora."  One  of 
the  leading  newspapers  of  Germany  recently  said: 
"The  army  of  the  first  line  of  which  Germany  will 
dispose  from  the  first  day  of  the  mobilization  will  be 
sufficient  to  crush  France,  even  if  we  must  detach  a 
part  of  it  against  England.  If  England  enters  the 
war,  it  will  be  the  end  of  the  British  Empire,  for 
England  is  a  colossus  with  feet  of  clay." 

The  Kaiser  has  been  the  spokesman  of  the  nation 
in  heralding  publicly  the  belief  in  the  superiority 
of  the  German  people,  and  its  world  mission.     It  was 

30 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

at  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the  founding  of  the 
Empire  that  the  scope  of  the  Weltpolitik  was  an- 
nounced by  Wilhelm  II.     He  said : 

"The  German  Empire  has  become  a  world  empire 
{ein  Weltreich).  Everywhere,  in  the  most  distant 
lands,  are  established  thousands  and  thousands  of  our 
compatriots.  German  science,  German  activity,  the 
defenders  of  the  German  ideal  pass  the  ocean.  By 
thousands  of  millions  we  count  the  wealth  that 
Germany  transports  across  the  seas.  It  is  your  duty, 
gentlemen,  to  aid  me  to  establish  strong  bonds  be- 
tween our  Empire  of  Europe  and  this  greater  German 
Empire  {dieses  grossere  Deutsche  Reich)  .  .  . 
May  our  German  Fatherland  become  one  day  so 
powerful  that,  as  one  formerly  used  to  say,  Civis 
romanus  sum,  one  may  in  the  future  need  only  to  say, 
Ich  bin  ein  deutscher  Burger.'' 

At  Aix-la-Chapelle,  on  June  20,  1902,  he  revealed 
his  ambition  in  one  sentence,  ^'  It  is  to  the  empire  of  the 
world  that  the  German  genius  aspires.''  Just  before 
leaving  for  the  visit  to  Tangier  in  1905 — the  visit 
which  was  really  the  beginning  of  one  of  the  great 
issues  of  the  present  war — he  said  at  Bremen:  "If 
later  one  must  speak  in  history  of  a  universal  domina- 
tion by  the  Hohenzollem,  of  a  universal  German 
empire,  this  domination  must  not  be  established  by 
military  conquest ....  God  has  called  us  to  civilize 
the  world:  we  are  the  missionaries  of  human  progress." 
This  idea  was  developed  further  at  Miinster,  on 
September  i,  1907,  when  the  Kaiser  proclaimed: 
"The  German  people  will  be  the  block  of  granite  on 
which  our  Lord  will  be  able  to  elevate  and  achieve 
the  civilization  of  the  world!" 

31 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

This  attitude  of  mind  is  as  common  among  the 
disciples  of  those  wonderful  leaders  who  founded  the 
international  movement  for  the  solidarity  of  interests 
of  labour,  as  it  is  among  the  aristocratic  and  intellect- 
ual elements  of  the  nation.  The  German  Socialist 
has  proclaimed  the  brotherhood  of  man,  and  the 
common  antagonism  of  the  wage-earners  of  the  world 
against  their  capitalistic  oppressors.  But,  for  all 
his  preachng,  the  German  Socialist  is  first  of  all  a 
German.  He  has  come  to  believe  that  the  mission  of 
Socialism  will  be  best  fulfilled  through  the  triumph 
of  Germanism.  This  belief  is  sincere.  It  is  a  far 
cry  from  Karl  Marx  to  the  militant — or  rather  mili- 
tarist— German  Socialist,  bearing  arms  gladly  upon 
the  battlefields  of  Europe  to-day,  because  he  is 
inspired  by  the  thought  that  the  triumph  of  the  army 
in  which  he  fights  will  aid  the  cause  of  Socialism.  ^ 

There  is  a  striking  analogy  between  the  German 
Socialist  of  the  present  generation  and  the  Jacobins  of 
1793.  The  heralders  of  Liberte,  Egalite  et  Fraternite 
fought  for  the  spread  of  the  principles  of  the  Revolu- 
tion through  God's  chosen  instruments,  the  armies 
of  France,  and  were  carried  away  by  their  enthusiasm 
until  they  became  the  facile  agents  for  saddling 
Europe  with  the  tyranny  of  Napoleon.     Love  for 


'  While  the  Landtage  of  the  German  states  are  mostly  controlled 
by  Conservative  elements,  owing  to  restricted  suffrage,  the  Reichstag 
is  one  of  the  most  intelligently  democratic  legislative  bodies  in  the 
world.  Its  social  legislation  is  surpassed  by  that  of  no  other  country. 
During  thirty  years  the  Socialist  vote  in  Germany  has  increased  one 
thousand  per  cent.  It  now  represents  one-third  of  the  total  elec- 
torate.    But  the  SociaUsts  are  to  a  man  behind  the  war. 

32 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

humanity  was  turned  into  blood-lust,  and  fighting  for 
freedom  into  seeking  for  booty  and  glory.  Are  the 
profound  thinkers  of  the  German  universities,  and 
the  visionaries  of  the  workingmen's  forums  following 
to-day  the  same  path?  Does  the  propagation  of  an 
ideal  lead  inevitably  to  a  blind  fanaticism,  where  the 
dreamer  becomes  in  his  own  imagination  a  chosen 
instrument  of  God  to  shed  blood? 

There  is  undoubtedly  an  intellectual  and  idealistic 
basis  to  German  militarism  and  to  German  arrogance. 

Their  connotation  of  the  word  "  German  ^^  has  led 
the  Germans  to  look  upon  territories  outside  of  their 
political  confines  as  historically  and  racially,  hence 
rightfully,  virtually,  and  eventually  theirs.  A  geo- 
graphy now  in  its  two  hundred  and  forty-fifth  edition 
in  the  public  schools  (Daniel's  Leitfaden  der  Geo- 
graphie)  states  that  "  Germany  is  the  heart  of  Europe. 
Around  it  extend  Austria,  Switzerland,  Belgium, 
Luxemburg,  and  Holland,  which  were  all  formerly 
part  of  the  same  state,  and  are  peopled  entirely  or  in 
the  majority  by  Germans." 

When  German  children  have  been  for  the  past 
generation  deliberately  taught  as  a  matter  of  fact — 
not  as  an  academic  or  debatable  question — that 
Deutschland  ought  to  be  more  than  it  is,  we  can 
understand  how  the  neutrality  of  their  smaller 
neighbours  seems  to  the  Germans  a  negligible 
consideration.  No  wonder  the  soldiers  who  ran  up 
against  an  implacable  enemy  at  Liege,  Namur,  and 
Charleroi  thought  there  must  be  a  mistake  some- 
where, and  were  more  angered  against  the  opposition 
of  those  whom  they  regarded  as  their  brothers  of 
3  ■  33 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

blood  than  they  later  showed  themselves  against  the 
French.  No  wonder  that  the  sentiment  of  the  whole 
German  nation  is  for  the  retention  of  Belgium, 
their  path  to  the  sea.  It  was  formerly  German.  Its 
inhabitants  are  German.  Let  it  become  German 
once  more! 

But  to  the  Germans  there  are  other  and  equally 
important  elements  belonging  to  their  nation  outside 
of  the  states  upon  the  confines  of  the  empire.  These 
are  the  German  emigrants  and  German  colonists  in 
all  portions  of  the  world.  In  recent  years  there  has 
come  to  the  front  more  than  ever  the  theory  that 
German  nationality  cannot  he  lost  by  foreign  residence 
or  by  transference  of  allegiance  to  another  State:  once 
a  German,  always  a  German. 

Convincing  proof  of  this  is  found  in  the  new  citizen- 
ship law,  sanctioned  with  practical  unanimity  by  the 
Reichstag  and  Bundesrath,  which  went  into  effect  on 
January  i,  1914.  According  to  Article  XIII  of  this 
law,  "a  former  German  who  has  not  taken  up  his 
residence  in  Germany  may  on  application  be  natur- 
alized."  This  applies  also  to  one  who  is  descended 
from  a  former  German,  or  who  has  been  adopted  as  the 
child  of  such!  According  to  Article  XIV,  any  former 
German  who  holds  a  position  in  the  German  Empire 
in  any  part  of  the  world,  in  the  service  of  a  German 
religious  society  or  of  a  German  school,  is  looked  upon 
as  a  German  citizen  "by  assumption."  Any  for- 
eigner holding  such  a  position  may  be  naturalized 
without  having  a  legal  residence  in  Germany.  The 
most  interesting  provision  of  all  is  in  Article  XXV, 
section  2  of  which  says:  "Citizenship  is  not  lost  by 

34 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

one  who  before  acquiring  foreign  citizenship  has 
secured  on  appHcation  the  written  consent  of  the 
competent  authorities  of  his  home  state  to  retain  his 
citizenship." 

Germany  allows  anyone  of  German  blood  to  be- 
come a  German  citizen,  even  if  he  has  never  seen 
Germany  and  has  no  intention  of  taking  up  his 
residence  there;  and  Germans,  who  have  emigrated 
to  other  countries,  secure  the  amazing  opportunity 
to  acquire  foreign  citizenship  without  losing  their 
German  citizenship. 

The  result  of  this  law,  since  the  war  broke  out,  has 
been  to  place  a  natural  and  justifiable  suspicion  upon 
all  Germans  living  in  the  countries  of  the  enemies  of 
Germany.  It  is  impossible  to  overestimate  the 
peril  from  the  secret  ill-will  and  espionage  of  Germans 
residing  in  the  countries  that  are  at  war  with  Ger- 
many. There  are  undoubtedly  many  thousands  of 
cases  where  Germans  have  been  honest  and  sincere 
in  their  change  of  allegiance,  but  how  are  the  nations 
where  they  have  become  naturalized  to  be  sure  of 
this?  A  legal  means  has  been  given  to  these  natural- 
ized Germans  to  retain,  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
nation  where  their  oath  of  allegiance  has  been  received 
in  good  faith,  citizenship  in  Germany. 

German  emigration  and  colonization  societies,  and 
many  seemingly  purely  religious  organizations  for 
"the  propagation  of  the  faith  in  foreign  lands,"  have 
been  untiring  in  their  efforts  to  preserve  in  the  minds 
of  Germans  who  have  left  the  Fatherland  the  prin- 
ciple, "once  a  German  always  a  German."  The 
Catholic  as  well  as  the  Lutheran  Church  has  lent 

35 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

itself  to  this  effort.  Wherever  there  are  Germans, 
one  finds  the  German  church,  the  German  school, 
the  Zeitung,  the  Bierhalle,  and  the  Turnverein.  The 
Deutschtum  is  sacred  to  the  Germans.  One  cannot 
but  have  the  deepest  respect  for  the  pride  of  Germans 
in  their  ancestry,  in  their  language,  in  their  church, 
and  in  the  preservation  of  traditional  customs. 
There  is  no  better  blood  in  the  world  than  German 
blood,  and  one  who  has  it  in  his  veins  may  well  be 
proud  of  it :  for  it  is  an  inheritance  which  is  distinctly 
to  a  man's  intellectual  and  physical  advantage.  But, 
in  recent  years,  the  effort  has  been  made  to  confuse 
Deutschtum  with  Deutschland.  Here  lies  a  great 
danger.  We  may  admire  and  reverence  all  that 
has  come  to  us  from  Germany.  But  the  world  can- 
not look  on  impassively  at  a  propaganda  which  is 
leading  to  Deutschland  ilher  alles! 

When  we  take  the  megalomania  of  the  Germans, 
their  ambition  to  fulfil  their  world  mission,  their 
belief  in  their  peculiar  fitness  to  fulfil  that  mission, 
and  their  idea  of  the  German  character  of  the  neigh- 
bouring states,  and  contrast  the  dream  with  the 
reality,  we  see  how  they  must  feel,  especially  as  they 
are  conscious  of  the  fact  that  they  dispose  of  a  military 
strength  disproportionate  to  their  position  in  mondial 
politics.  Great  Britain,  with  one-third  less  popula- 
tion, "the  colossus  with  the  feet  of  clay,"  owns  a 
good  fourth  of  the  whole  world;  France,  the  nation 
of  "monkeys,"  which  was  easily  crushed  in  1870, 
holds  sway  over  untold  millions  of  acres  and  natives 
in  Africa  and  Asia;  while  Russia,  the  nation  of 
"slaves, "  has  a  half  of  Europe  and  Asia. 

36 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

The  most  civilized  people  in  the  world,  with  a 
world  mission  to  fulfil,  is  dispossessed  by  its  rivals 
of  inferior  races  and  of  inferior  military  strength! 
The  thinking  German  is  by  the  very  nature  of  things 
a  militarist. 

But  even  if  the  logic  of  the  Weltpolitik,  under  the 
force  of  circumstances,  did  not  push  the  German  of 
every  class  and  category  to  the  belief  that  Germany 
must  solve  her  great  problems  of  the  present  day  by 
force  of  arms,  especially  since  her  military  strength 
is  so  much  greater  than  that  of  her  rivals,  the  nature 
of  the  German  would  make  him  lean  towards  force 
as  the  decisive  argument  in  the  question  of  extending 
his  influence.  For  from  the  beginning  of  history  the 
German  has  been  a  war  man.  He  has  asserted  him- 
self by  force.  He  has  proved  less  amenable  to  the 
refining  and  softening  influences  of  Christianity  and 
civilization  than  any  other  European  race.  He  has 
worshipped  force,  and  relied  wholly  upon  force  to 
dominate  those  with  whom  he  has  come  into  contact. 
The  leopard  cannot  change  his  spots.  So  it  is  as 
natural  for  the  German  of  the  twentieth  century  to 
use  the  sword  as  an  argument  as  it  was  for  the 
German  of  the  tenth  century,  or,  indeed,  of  the  first 
century.  We  cannot  too  strongly  insist  upon  this 
fatal  tendency  of  the  German  to  subordinate  natural, 
moral,  legal,  and  technical  rights  to  the  supremacy  of 
brute  force.  There  is  no  conception  of  what  is 
called  "moral  suasion"  in  the  German  mind.  Al- 
though some  of  the  greatest  thinkers  of  the  world 
have  been  and  are  to-day  Germans,  yet  the  German 
nation  has  never  come  to  the  realization  that  the  pen 

37 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

may  be  mightier  than  the  sword.  Give  the  German 
a  pen,  and  he  will  hold  the  world  in  admiration  of  his 
intellect.  Give  him  a  piano  or  a  violin,  and  he  will 
hold  the  world  in  adoration  of  his  soul.  But  give  him 
a  sword,  and  he  will  hold  the  world  in  abhorrence  of 
his  force.  For  there  never  was  an  ubermensch  who 
was  not  a  devil.     Else  he  would  be  God. 

But  the  Weltpolitik  has  had  other  and  more 
tangible  and  substantial  causes  than  the  three  we 
have  been  considering.  It  is  not  wholly  the  result  of 
the  German  idea  that  Germany  can  impose  her  will 
upon  the  world  and  has  the  right  to  do  so.  The 
power  of  Germany  comes  from  the  fact  that  her 
people  have  been  workers  as  well  as  dreamers. 
The  rapid  increase  of  the  population  and  development 
of  the  industrial  and  commercial  prosperity  of  the 
empire  have  given  the  Germans  a  wholly  justifiable 
economic  foundation  for  their  Weltpolitik. 

United  Germany,  after  the  successful  war  of  1870, 
began  the  greatest  era  of  industrial  growth  and  pro- 
sperity that  has  ever  been  known  in  the  history 
of  the  world.  Not  even  the  United  States,  with  all 
its  annual  immigration  and  opening  up  of  new  fields 
and  territories,  has  been  able  to  show  an  industrial 
growth  comparable  to  that  of  Germany  during  the 
past  forty  years.  In  this  old  central  Europe  cities 
have  grown  almost  over  night.  Railways  have  been 
laid  down,  one  after  the  other,  until  the  whole  empire 
is  a  network  of  steel.  Mines  and  factories  have 
sprung  into  being  as  miraculously  as  if  it  had  been 
by  the  rubbing  of  Aladdin's  lamp.  The  population 
has  increased  more  than  half  in  forty  years. 

38 


THE  ''WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

It  was  as  her  population  and  her  productive  power 
increased  far  more  quickly  and  far  beyond  that  of  her 
neighbours,  that  Germany  began  to  look  out  into  the 
extra-European  world  for  markets.  She  had  reached 
the  point  when  her  productivity,  in  manufacturing 
lines,  had  exceeded  her  power  of  consumption. 
Where  find  markets  for  the  goods?  German  mer- 
chants, and  not  Prussian  militarists,  began  to  spread 
abroad  in  Germany  the  idea  that  there  was  a  world 
equilibrium,  as  important  to  the  future  of  the  nations 
of  Europe  as  was  the  European  equilibrium.  Ger- 
many, looking  out  over  the  world,  saw  that  the  pros- 
perity of  Great  Britain  was  due  to  her  trade,  and  that 
the  security  and  volume  of  this  trade  were  due  to  her 
colonies. 

Who  does  not  remember  the  remarkable  stamp 
issued  by  the  Dominion  of  Canada  to  celebrate  the 
Jubilee  of  Queen  Victoria?  On  the  mercatorial 
projection  of  the  world,  the  British  possessions  were 
given  in  red.  One  could  not  find  any  corner  of  the 
globe  where  there  were  not  ports  to  which  British 
ships  in  transit  could  go,  and  friendly  markets  for 
British  commerce.  The  Germans  began  to  compare 
their  industries  with  those  of  Great  Britain.  Their 
population  was  larger  than  that  of  the  great  colonial 
power,  and  was  increasing  more  rapidly.  Their 
industries  were  growing  apace.  For  their  excess 
population,  emigration  to  a  foreign  country  meant 
annual  loss  of  energetic  and  capable  compatriots. 
Commerce  had  to  meet  unfair  competition  in 
every  part  of  the  world.  Outside  of  the  Baltic 
and  North  Seas,  there  was  no  place  that  a  Ger- 

39 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

man  ship  could  touch  over  which  the  German  flag 
waved. 

It  was  not  militarism  or  chauvinism  or  megalo- 
mania, but  the  natural  desire  of  a  people  who  found 
themselves  becoming  prosperous  to  put  secure  and 
solid  foundations  under  that  prosperity,  that  made 
the  Germans  seek  for  colonies  and  launch  forth  upon 
the  Weltpolitik. 

The  first  instance  of  the  awakening  on  the  part  of 
the  German  people  to  a  sense  that  there  was  some- 
thing which  interested  them  outside  of  Europe,  was 
the  annexation  by  Great  Britain  in  1874  of  the  Fiji 
Islands,  with  which  German  traders  had  just  begun, 
at  great  risk  and  painstaking  efforts,  to  build  up  a 
business.  This  was  the  time  when  the  Government 
was  engaged  in  its  struggles  with  the  Church  and 
socialism,  and  when  the  working  of  the  Reichstag 
and  the  Bundesrath  was  still  in  an  experimental 
stage.  Nothing  could  be  done.  But  there  began  to 
he  a  feeling  among  Germans  that  in  the  future  Ger- 
many ought  to  be  consulted  concerning  the  further 
extension  of  the  sovereignty  of  as  European  nation 
over  any  part  of  the  world  then  unoccupied  or  still 
independent.  But  Germany  was  not  in  a  position 
either  to  translate  this  sentiment  into  a  vigorous 
foreign  policy,  or  to  begin  to  seize  her  share  of  the 
world  by  taking  the  portions  which  Great  Britain 
and  Russia  and  France  had  still  left  vacant. 

German  trade,  still  in  its  infancy,  received  cruel 
setbacks  by  the  British  occupation  of  Cyprus  in 
1878  and  of  Egypt  in  1883,  the  French  occupation 
of  Tunis  in  188 1 ,  and  the  Russian  and  British  dealings 

40 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

with  central  Asia  and  Afghanistan.  The  sentiment 
of  the  educated  and  moneyed  classes  in  Germany 
began  to  impose  upon  the  Government  the  necessity 
of  entering  the  colonial  field.  The  action  in  Egypt 
and  in  Tunis  brought  about  the  beginning  of  German 
colonization.  Bismarck  had  just  finished  success- 
fully his  critical  struggle  with  the  socialists.  The 
decks  were  cleared  for  action.  In  1882,  a  Bremen 
trader,  Herr  Liidritz,  by  treaties  with  the  native 
chiefs,  gained  the  Bay  of  Angra-Pequefia  on  the  west 
coast  of  Africa.  For  two  years  no  attention  was 
paid  to  this  treaty,  which  was  a  purely  private  com- 
mercial affair.  In  1884,  shortly  after  the  occupation 
of  Egypt,  a  dispute  arose  between  the  British  author- 
ities at  Cape  Town  and  Herr  Liidritz.  Bismarck  saw 
that  he  must  act,  or  the  old  story  of  extension  of 
British  sovereignty  would  be  repeated.  He  tele- 
graphed to  the  German  Consul  at  Cape  Town  that 
the  Imperial  Government  had  annexed  the  coast  and 
hmterland  from  the  Orange  River  to  Cape  Frio. 

Other  annexations  in  Africa  and  the  Pacific  fol- 
lowed in  the  years  1 884-1 886.  In  Africa,  the 
German  flag  was  hoisted  over  the  east  coast  of  the 
continent,  north  of  Cape  Delgado  and  the  river 
Rovuma,  and  in  Kamerun  and  Togo  on  the  Gulf  of 
Guinea.  In  the  Pacific,  Kaiser  Wilhelm's  Land  was 
formed  of  a  portion  of  New  Guinea,  with  some  adja- 
cent islands,  and  the  Bismarck  Archipelago,  the 
Solomon  Islands,  and  the  Marshall  Islands  were 
gathered  in.  Since  those  early  years  of  feverish 
activity,  there  have  been  no  new  acquisitions  in 
Africa,  other  than  the  portion  of  French  Congo  ceded 

41 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

in  1 91 2  as  "compensation"  for  the  French  protecto- 
rate of  Morocco.  In  the  Pacific,  in  1899,  after  the 
American  conquest  of  the  PhiHppines,  the  Caroline, 
Pelew,  and  Marianne  groups  and  two  of  the  Samoan 
Islands  were  added. 

In  China,  Germany  believed  that  she  had  the  right 
to  expect  to  gain  a  position  equal  to  that  of  Great 
Britain  at  Hongkong  and  Shanghai,  of  France  at 
Tonkin,  and  Russia  in  Manchuria.  She  believed 
that  it  was  just  as  necessary  for  her  to  have  a  forti- 
fied port  to  serve  as  a  naval  base  for  her  fleet  as  it 
was  for  the  other  Powers,  and  that  by  a  possession  of 
territory  which  could  be  called  her  own  she  would 
be  best  able  to  get  her  share  of  the  commerce  of  the 
Far  East.  From  1895  to  1897,  Germany  examined 
carefully  all  the  possible  places  which  would  serve 
best  for  the  establishment  of  a  naval  and  commercial 
base.  At  the  beginning  of  1897,  after  naval  and 
commercial  missions  had  made  their  reports,  a 
technical  mission  was  sent  out  whose  membership 
included  the  famous  Franzius,  the  creator  of  Kiel. 
This  mission  reported  in  favour  of  Kiau-Chau  on  the 
peninsula  of  Shantung  in  north  China. 

When  negotiations  were  opened  with  the  Chinese, 
the  answer  of  the  Chinese  Government  was  to  send 
soldiers  to  guard  the  bay!  The  Kaiser,  in  a  visit  to 
the  Czar  at  Peterhof  in  the  summer  of  1897,  secured 
Russian  "benevolent  neutrality."  The  murder  of 
two  missionaries  in  the  interior  of  the  province,  on 
November  ist  of  the  same  year,  gave  Germany  her 
chance.  Three  German  war  vessels  landed  troops 
on  the  peninsula,  and  seized  Kiau-Chau  and  Tsing- 

42 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

Tau.  After  five  months  of  tortuous  negotiations,  a 
treaty  was  concluded  between  Germany  and  China 
on  March  6,  1899.  Kiau-Chau  with  adjacent 
territory  was  leased  to  Germany  for  ninety-nine 
years.  To  German  capital  and  German  commerce 
were  given  the  right  of  preference  for  every  industrial 
enterprise  on  the  peninsula,  the  concession  for  the 
immediate  construction  of  a  railway,  and  the  exclu- 
sive right  to  mining  along  the  line  of  the  railway. 
Thus  the  greater  part  of  the  province  of  Shantung 
passed  under  the  economic  influence  of  Germany. 

The  entry  of  Japan  into  the  war  of  1914  is  due  to 
her  desire  to  remedy  a  great  injustice  which  has  been 
done  to  Japanese  commerce  in  the  province  of 
Shantung  by  the  German  occupation,  to  her  fear  of 
this  naval  base  opposite  her  coast  (just  as  she  feared 
Port  Arthur),  and  probably  to  the  intention  of  oc- 
cupying the  Marianne  Islands,  the  Marshall  Islands, 
and  the  Eastern  and  Western  Carolines,  in  order 
that  the  Japanese  navy  may  have  important  bases 
in  a  possible  future  conflict  with  the  United  States. 

When  Germany  leased  Kiau-Chau,  she  declared 
solemnly  that  the  port  of  Tsing-Tau  would  be  an 
open  port,  ein  fret  Hafen  fur  alien  Nationen.  But 
Japanese  trade  competition  soon  caused  her  to  go 
back  on  her  word.  She  conceived  a  clever  scheme 
in  1906,  by  which  the  Chinese  customs  duties  were 
allowed  to  be  collected  within  the  Protectorate  in 
return  for  an  annual  sum  of  twenty  per  cent,  upon  the 
entire  customs  receipts  of  the  Tsing-Tau  district. 
In  this  way,  she  is  more  than  recompensed  for  the 
generosity  displayed  in  allowing  German  goods  to 

43 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

be  subject  to  the  Chinese  customs.  She  reimburses 
herself  at  the  expense  of  the  Japanese !  BerHn  could 
not  have  been  astonished  at  the  ultimatum  of  August 
15th  from  Tokio. 

There  has  always  been  much  opposition  in  Ger- 
many to  the  colonization  policy  of  the  Government. 
The  dissatisfaction  over  the  poor  success  of  the 
attempts  at  African  colonization  led  Chancellor 
Caprivi  to  state  that  the  worst  blow  an  enemy  could 
give  him  was  to  force  upon  him  more  territories  in 
Africa!  The  Germans  never  got  on  well  with  the 
negroes.  Their  colonists,  for  the  most  part  too  poor 
to  finance  properly  agricultural  schemes,  lived  by 
trading.  Like  all  whites,  they  cheated  the  natives 
and  bullied  them  into  giving  up  their  lands.  In 
South-West  Africa,  a  formidable  uprising  of  the 
Herreros  resulted  in  the  massacre  of  all  the  Germans 
except  the  missionaries  and  the  colonists  who  had 
established  themselves  there  before  the  German 
occupation.  The  suppression  of  this  rebellion  took 
more  than  a  year,  and  cost  Germany  an  appalling 
sum  in  money  and  many  lives.  But  it  cost  the 
natives  more.  Two  thirds  of  the  nation  of  the  Her- 
reros were  massacred:  while  only  six  or  seven  thou- 
sand were  in  arms,  the  German  official  report  stated 
that  forty  thousand  were  killed.  The  Germans 
confiscated  all  the  lands  of  the  natives. 

In  1906,  after  twenty-one  years  of  German  rule, 
there  were  in  South-West  Africa  sixteen  thousand 
prisoners  of  war  out  of  a  total  native  population  of 
thirty-one  thousand.  All  the  natives  lived  in  con- 
centration camps,  and  were  forced  to  work  for  the 

44 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

Government.  In  commenting  upon  the  Herrero 
campaign,  Pastor  Frenssen,  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
writers  of  modem  Germany,  put  in  the  mouth  of  the 
hero  of  his  colonial  novel  the  following  words:  " God 
has  given  us  the  victory  because  we  were  the  most 
noble  race,  and  the  most  filled  with  initiative.  That 
is  not  saying  much,  when  we  compare  ourselves  with 
this  race  of  negroes;  but  we  must  act  in  such  a  way 
as  to  become  better  and  more  active  than  all  the  other 
people  of  the  world.  It  is  to  the  most  noble,  to  the 
most  firm  that  the  world  belongs.  Such  is  the  justice 
of  God." 

German  opposition  has  been  bitter  also  against  the 
occupation  of  Kiau-Chau.  For  traders  have  claimed 
that  the  political  presence  of  Germany  on  the  Shan- 
tung peninsula  and  the  dealings  of  the  German  dip- 
lomats with  the  Pekin  court  had  so  prejudiced  the 
Chinese  against  everything  German  that  it  was 
harder  to  do  business  with  them  than  before  the 
leasehold  was  granted.  They  actually  advocated 
the  withdrawal  of  the  protectorate  for  the  good  of 
German  commerce! 

But  German  pride  was  at  stake  in  Africa  after 
the  Herrero  rebellion.  And  in  China,  Kiau-Chau 
was  too  valuable  a  naval  base  to  give  up.  In  1907, 
a  ministry  of  colonies  was  added  to  the  Imperial 
Cabinet.  Since  then  the  colonial  realm  has  been 
considered  an  integral  part  of  the  Empire. 

At  every  point  of  this  colonial  development, 
Germany  found  herself  confronted  with  open  opposi- 
tion and  secret  intrigue.  The  principal  strategic 
value  of  south-west  Africa  was  taken  away  by  the 

45 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

British  possession  of  Walfisch  Bay,  and  of  east 
Africa  by  the  protectorate  consented  to  by  the  Sultan 
of  Zanzibar  to  the  British  Crown.  Togoland  and 
Kamerun  are  hemmed  in  by  French  and  British 
possession  of  the  hinterland.  The  Pacific  islands  are 
mostly  "left-overs,"  or  of  minor  importance.  In 
spite  of  the  unpromising  character  of  these  colonies, 
the  commerce  of  Germany  with  them  increased  from 
1908  to  1912  five  hundred  per  cent.,  and  the  com- 
merce with  China  through  Kiau-Chau  from  1902 
to  1912  nearly  a  thousand  per  cent. 

And  yet,  in  comparison  to  her  energies  and  her 
willingness — let  us  leave  till  later  the  question  of 
ability  and  fitness — Germany  has  had  little  oppor- 
tunity to  exercise  a  colonial  administration  on  a  large 
scale.  She  must  seek  to  extend  her  political  influence 
over  new  territories.  Where  and  how?  That  has 
been  the  question.  Most  promising  of  all  appeared 
the  succession  to  the  Portuguese  colonies,  for  the 
sharing  of  which  Great  Britain  declared  her  willing- 
ness to  meet  Germany  halfway.  An  accord  was 
made  in  1898,  against  the  eventuality  of  Portugal 
selling  her  colonies.  But  since  the  Republic  was 
proclaimed  in  Portugal,  there  has  been  little  hope 
that  her  new  Government  would  consider  itself 
strong  enough  to  part  with  the  heritage  of  several 
centuries. 

For  the  increase  of  her  colonial  empire,  Germany 
has  felt  little  hope.  So  she  has  tried  to  secure  com- 
mercial privileges  in  various  parts  of  the  world, 
through  which  political  control  might  eventually 
come.    We  have  already  spoken  of  her  effort  in 

46 


THE  "  WELTPOLITIK  "  OF  GERMANY 

China.  Separate  chapters  treat  of  her  efforts  in 
the  three  Moslem  countries,  Morocco,  Persia,  and 
Turkey,  and  show  how  in  each  case  she  has  found 
herself  checkmated  by  the  intrigues  and  accords  of 
the  three  rich  colonial  Powers. 

Long  before  the  political  union  of  the  German 
States  in  Europe  was  accomplished,  there  were 
German  aspirations  in  regard  to  the  New  World, 
when  Pan-Germanists  dreamed  of  forming  states  in 
North  and  South  America. 

These  enthusiasts  did  not  see  that  the  Civil  War 
had  so  brought  together  the  various  elements  of  the 
United  States,  the  most  prominent  and  most  loyal 
of  which  was  the  German  element,  that  any  hope 
of  a  separatist  movement  in  the  United  States 
was  chimerical.  As  late  as  1885,  however,  the  third 
edition  of  Roscher's  Kolonien,  Kolonialpolitik  und 
Auswanderung  stated  that  "it  would  be  a  great  step 
forward,  if  the  German  immigrants  to  North  America 
would  be  willing  to  concentrate  themselves  in  one  of 
the  states,  and  transform  it  into  a  German  state." 
For  different  reasons  Wisconsin  would  appear  to  be 
most  particularly  indicated. 

As  early  as  1849,  the  Germans  commenced  to 
organize  emigration  to  Brazil  through  a  private 
society  of  Hamburg  {Hamburger  Kolonisationverein) , 
which  bought  from  the  Prince  de  Joinville,  brother- 
in-law  of  Dom  Pedro,  vast  territories  in  the  state  of 
Santa  Catharina.  There  the  German  colonization 
in  Brazil  began.  It  soon  extended  to  the  neighbour- 
ing states  of  Parana  and  Rio  Grande  do  Sul.  There 
are  now  about  three  himdred  and  fifty  thousand 

47 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Germans,  forming  two  per  cent,  of  the  population. 
In  no  district  are  they  more  than  fifteen  per  cent. 
However,  in  Rio  Grande,  there  is  a  territory  of  two 
hundred  kilometres  in  which  the  German  language 
is  almost  wholly  spoken;  and  a  chain  of  German 
colonies  binds  Sao  Leopoldo  to  Santa  Cruz. 

Among  the  Pan-Germanists,  the  three  states  oi 
southern  Brazil  have  been  regarded  as  a  zone  par- 
ticularly reserved  for  German  expansion.  The 
colonial  congress  of  1902  at  Berlin  expressed  a  formal 
desire  that  hereafter  German  emigration  be  directed 
towards  the  south  of  Brazil.  An  amendment  to 
include  Argentina  was  rejected.  The  decree  of 
Prussia,  forbidding  emigration  to  Brazil,  was  revoked 
in  1896  in  so  far  as  it  was  a  question  of  the  three  states 
of  Parana,  Santa  Catharina,  and  Rio  Grande  do  Sul. 

It  has  not  been  very  many  years  since  diplomatic 
incidents  arose  between  Brazil  and  Germany  over 
fancied  German  violation  of  Brazilian  territory  by 
the  arrest  of  sailors  on  shore.  But  Germany  has  not 
entertained  serious  hope  of  getting  a  foothold  in 
South  America.  Brazil  has  increased  greatly  in 
strength,  and  there  is  to-day  in  South  America  a 
tacit  alliance  between  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile 
to  support  the  American  Monroe  Doctrine.  Ger- 
many found,  when  she  was  trying  to  buy  a  West  India 
island  from  Denmark,  that  she  had  to  reckon  not 
only  with  Washington,  but  also  with  Buenos  Ayres, 
Rio,  and  Santiago. 

Finding  herself  so  thoroughly  hemmed  in  on  all 
sides,  in  the  New  World  and  in  the  Old  World,  by 
alliances  and  accords  directed  against  her  overseas 

48 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

political  expansion,  modem  Germany  has  repeated 
the  history  of  the  Jews.  Deprived  of  some  senses, 
one  develops  extraordinarily  others.  Deprived  of 
civil  and  social  rights  for  centuries,  the  Jews  de- 
veloped the  business  sense  until  to-day  their  wealth 
and  influence  in  the  business  world  are  far  beyond  the 
proportionate  numbers  of  their  race.  Deprived  of 
the  opportunity  to  administer  and  develop  vast 
overseas  territories,  the  Germans  have  turned  to 
intensive  military  development  at  home  and  exten- 
sive commercial  development  abroad,  until  to-day 
they  are  the  foremost  military  Power  in  Europe,  and 
are  threatening  British  commercial  supremacy  in 
every  part  of  the  globe. 

The  German  counterpart  of  the  British  and  French 
and  Russian  elements  that  are  directing  the  destinies 
of  vast  colonies  and  protectorates  is  investing  its 
energy  in  business.  During  the  past  generation,  the 
German  campaign  for  the  markets  of  the  world  has 
been  carried  on  by  the  brightest  and  best  minds  in 
Germany.  There  have  been  three  phases  to  this 
campaign:  manufacturing  the  goods,  selling  the 
goods,  and  carrying  the  goods.  German  manufac- 
tures have  increased  so  greatly  in  volume  and  scope 
since  the  accession  of  the  present  Emperor  that  there 
is  hardly  a  line  of  merchandise  which  is  not  offered 
in  the  markets  of  the  world  by  German  firms. 

Articles  "made  in  Germany"  may  not  be  as  well 
made  as  those  of  other  countries.  But  their  price 
is  more  attractive,  and  they  have  driven  other  goods 
from  many  fields.  One  sees  this  right  in  Europe  in 
the  markets  of  Germany's  competitors  and  enemies. 
4  49 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Since  the  present  war  began,  French  and  British 
patriots  are  hard  put  to  it  sometimes  when  they  find 
that  article  after  article  which  they  have  been  accus- 
tomed to  buy  is  German.  In  my  home  in  Paris,  the 
elevator  is  German,  electrical  fixtures  are  German, 
the  range  in  my  kitchen  is  German,  the  best  lamps  for 
lighting  are  German.  I  have  discovered  these  things 
in  the  past  month  through  endeavouring  to  have 
them  repaired.  Interest  led  me  to  investigate  other 
articles  in  daily  use.  My  cutlery  is  German,  my 
silverware  is  German,  the  chairs  in  my  dining-room 
are  German,  the  mirror  in  my  bathroom  is  German, 
some  of  my  food  products  are  German,  and  prac- 
tically all  the  patented  drugs  and  some  of  the  toilet 
preparations  are  German.  Curiously  enough,  while 
my  beer  is  French,  my  milk  is  German! 

All  these  things  have  been  purchased  in  the  Paris 
markets,  without  the  slightest  leaning  towards,  or 
preference  for,  articles  coming  from  the  Fatherland. 
I  was  not  aware  of  the  fact  that  I  was  buying  German 
things.  They  sold  themselves, — the  old  combination 
of  appearance,  convenience,  and  price,  which  will  sell 
anything.  That  I  am  unconsciously  using  German 
manufactured  articles  is  largely  due  to  the  genius  of 
the  salesman.  It  is  a  great  mistake  to  believe  that 
salesmanship  is  primarily  the  art  of  selling  the  goods 
of  the  house  you  represent.  That  has  been  the 
British  idea.  It  is  today  exploded.  Is  it  because  the 
same  type  as  the  Britisher  who  is  devoting  his  brains 
and  energy  to  solving  the  problems  of  inferior  people 
in  different  parts  of  the  world  is  among  the  Germans 
devoting  his  energies  to  German  commerce  in  those 

50 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

same  places,  that  the  Germans  have  found  the  fine 
art  of  salesmanship  to  be  quite  a  different  thing? 
It  is  studying  the  desires  of  the  people  to  whom  you 
intend  to  sell,  finding  out  what  they  want  to  buy, 
and  persuading  your  house  at  home  to  make  and 
export  those  articles.  From  the  Parisian  and  the 
Londoner,  and  the  New  Yorker  down  to  the  naked 
savage,  the  Germans  know  what  is  wanted,  and  they 
supply  it.  If  the  British  university  man  is  enjoying 
a  position  of  authority  and  of  fascinating  perplexity 
in  some  colony,  and  feels  that  he  has  a  share  in  shap- 
ing the  destinies  of  the  world,  the  German  university 
man  is  not  without  his  revenge.  Deprived  of  one 
sense,  has  he  not  developed  another — and  a  more 
practical  one? 

The  young  German,  brought  up  in  an  overpopu- 
lated  country,  unable  to  enter  a  civil  service  which 
will  keep  him  under  his  own  flag — and  remember  how 
intensely  patriotic  he  is,  this  young  German,  just  as 
patriotic  as  the  young  Frenchman  or  the  young 
Britisher, — must  leave  home.  He  is  not  of  the  class 
from  which  come  the  voluntary  emigrants.  His  ties 
are  all  in  Germany:  his  love — and  his  move — all 
for  Germany.  So  he  becomes  a  German  resident 
abroad,  in  close  connection  with  the  Fatherland, 
and  always  working  for  the  interests  of  the  Father- 
land. He  goes  to  England  or  to  France,  where  he 
studies  carefully  and  methodically,  as  if  he  were  to 
write  a  thesis  on  it  (and  he  often  does),  the  business 
methods  of  and  the  business  opportunities  among  the 
people  where  he  is  dwelling.  He  is  giving  his  life  to 
put  Deutschland  tiber  alles  in  business  right  in  the 

51 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

heart  of  the  rival  nation,  and  he  is  succeeding.  Dur- 
ing October,  191 4,  when  they  tried  to  arrest  in  the 
larger  cities  of  England  the  German  and  Austrian 
subjects  they  had  to  stop — there  was  not  room  in  the 
jails  for  all  of  them!  And  in  many  places  business 
was  paralyzed. 

In  carrying  the  products  of  steadily  increasing  vol- 
ume to  steadily  growing  markets,  Germany  has  been 
sensible  enough  to  make  those  markets  pay  for  the 
cost  of  transport.  Up  to  the  very  selling  price,  all 
the  money  goes  to  Germany.  The  process  is  simple : 
from  German  factories,  by  German  ships,  through 
German  salesmen,  to  German  firms,  in  every  part  of 
the  world — beginning  with  London  and  Paris. 

Germany's  merchant  marine  has  kept  pace  with 
the  development  of  her  industry.  Essen  may  be  the 
expression  of  one  side  of  modern  Germany,  which  is 
said  to  have  caused  the  European  war.  But  one  is 
more  logical  in  believing  that  Hamburg  and  Bremen 
and  the  Kiel  Canal  have  done  more  to  bring  on  this 
war  than  the  products  of  Krupp.  During  the  last 
twenty-five  years  the  tonnage  of  Germany's  merchant 
marine  has  increased  two  hundred  and  fifty  per  cent., 
a  quarter  of  which  has  been  in  the  last  five  years,  from 
IQ08-IQIS.  There  are  six  times  as  many  steamships 
flying  the  German  flag  as  when  Wilhelm  H  mounted 
the  throne.  In  merchant  ships,  Germany  stands 
today  second  only  to  Great  Britain.  The  larger 
portion  of  her  merchant  marine  is  directed  by  great 
corporations.  The  struggle  against  Great  Britain 
and  France  for  the  freight  carrying  of  outside  nations 
has  been  most  bitter — and  most  successful.     Before 

52 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

the  present  war,  there  was  no  part  of  the  world  in  which 
the  German  flag  was  not  carried  by  ships  less  than  ten 
years  old. 

With  the  exception  of  Kiau-Chau,  the  colonies  of 
Germany  have  never  been  of  much  practical  value, 
except  as  possible  coaling  and  wireless  stations  for  the 
German  fleet.  But  here  also  the  opposition  of  her 
rivals  has  minimized  their  value.  Walfisch  Bay  and 
Zanzibar  have,  as  we  have  already  said,  lessened  the 
strategical  value  of  the  two  large  colonies  on  either 
side  of  the  African  continent.  In  the  division  of  the 
Portuguese  colonies  agreed  to  by  Great  Britain,  it 
was  "the  mistress  of  the  seas"  who  was  to  have  the 
strategic  places — not  part  of  them,  but  all  of  them, 
the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  Madeira,  and  the  Azores. 

As  Germany's  commerce  and  shipping  have  so 
rapidly  developed,  the  seeking  for  opportunities  to 
extend  her  political  sovereignty  outside  of  Europe 
has  not  been  so  much  an  outlook  for  industrial 
enterprise  as  the  imperative  necessity  of  finding 
naval  bases  and  coaling  stations  in  different  parts  of 
the  world  for  the  adequate  protection  of  commerce. 
The  development  of  the  German  navy  has  been  the 
logical  complement  of  the  development  of  the  Ger- 
man merchant  marine.  Germany's  astonishing  naval 
program  has  kept  pace  with  the  astonishing  growth 
of  the  great  Hamburg  and  Bremen  lines.  Germany 
has  had  exactly  the  same  argument  for  the  increase 
of  her  navy  as  has  had  Great  Britain.  Justification 
for  the  money  expended  on  the  British  navy  is  that 
Great  Britain  needs  the  navy  to  protect  her  com- 
merce, upon  which  the  life  of  the  nation  is  dependent, 

53 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

and  guarantee  her  food-supplies.  The  industrial 
evolution  of  Germany  has  brought  about  for  her 
practically  the  same  economic  conditions  as  in  Great 
Britain.  In  addition  to  the  dependence  of  her 
prosperity  upon  the  power  of  her  navy  to  protect  her 
commerce,  Germany  has  felt  that  she  must  keep  the 
sea  open  for  the  sake  of  guaranteeing  uninterrupted 
food-supplies  for  her  industrial  population.  It  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  Germany  is  flanked  on  east  and 
west  by  hereditary  enemies,  and  has  come  to  look 
to  the  sea  as  the  direction  from  which  her  food 
supplies  would  come  in  case  of  war. 

This  last  factor  of  the  Weltpolitik,  the  creation  of  a 
strong  navy,  must  not  be  looked  upon  either  as  a 
provocation  to  Great  Britain  or  as  a  menace  to  the 
equilibrium  of  the  world.  If  it  has  brought  Germany 
inevitably  into  conflict  with  Great  Britain,  it  is 
because  the  navy  is  the  safeguard  of  commerce.  The 
Weltpolitik  is  essentially  a  Handelspolitik.  The 
present  tremendous  conflict  between  Great  Britain 
and  Germany  is  the  result  of  commercial  rivalry.  It 
is  more  a  question  of  the  pocket-book  than  of  the 
sacredness  of  treaties,  if  we  are  looking  for  the  cause 
rather  than  the  occasion  of  the  war.  It  has  come  in 
spite  of  honest  efforts  to  bring  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  together. 

Lord  Haldane,  in  February,  1 91 2,  made  a  trip  to 
Berlin  to  bring  about  a  general  understanding  be- 
tween the  two  nations.  But  while  there  was  much 
discussion  of  the  question  of  the  Bagdad  Railway, 
Persian  and  Chinese  affairs,  Walfisch  Bay,  and  the 
division  of  Africa,  nothing  came  of  it.     On  March 

54 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

1 8th,  Mr.  Churchill  said  to  the  House  of  Commons: 
"If  Germany  adds  two  ships  in  the  next  six  years,  we 
shall  have  to  add  four;  if  Germany  adds  three,  we 
shall  have  to  add  six.  Whatever  reduction  is  made  in 
the  German  naval  program  will  probably  be  followed 
here  by  a  corresponding  naval  reduction.  The 
Germans  will  not  get  ahead  of  us,  no  matter  what 
increase  they  make;  they  will  not  lose,  no  matter 
what  decrease  they  make."  This  was  as  far  as 
Great  Britain  could  go. 

In  the  spring  of  191 2,  the  British  fleet  was  con- 
centrated in  the  North  Sea,  and  an  accord  was  made 
with  France  for  common  defensive  action  in  the 
North  Sea  and  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  At  the  same 
time,  during  M.  Poincare's  trip  to  Petrograd,  an 
accord  was  signed  between  France  and  Russia  for 
common  naval  action  in  time  of  war. 

The  Pan-Germanic  movement  in  recent  years  has 
not  been  a  tool  of  the  Government,  but  rather  a  party, 
including  other  parties,  banded  together  more  than 
once  to  oppose  the  German  Government  in  an  hon- 
ourable attempt  to  preserve  peace  with  the  neigh- 
bours in  the  west. 

It  is  a  tremendous  mistake — and  a  mistake  which 
has  been  continuously  made  in  the  French,  British, 
and  American  press  since  the  beginning  of  the  war — 
to  consider  the  WeltpoUtik  as  an  expression  of  the 
sentiments  of  the  German  Emperor  and  his  officials. 
Since  it  was  forced  upon  Bismarck  against  his  will, 
Pan-Germanism  has  been  a  power  against  which  the 
Emperor  William  II  has  had  to  strive  frequently 
throughout  his  reign.     For  it  has  never  hesitated  to 

55 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

force  him  into  paths  and  into  positions  which  were 
perilous  to  the  theory  of  monarchical  authority. 
The  Kaiser  has  resented  the  pressure  of  public  opin- 
ion in  directing  the  affairs  of  the  Empire.  Pan-Ger- 
manism has  been  a  striking  example  of  democracy, 
endeavouring  to  have  a  say  in  governmental  policies. 
The  Naval  and  Army  Leagues,  the  German  Colonial 
Society,  and  the  Pan-Germanic  Society  are  private 
groups,  irresponsible  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
Government.  They  have  declared  the  govern- 
mental programs  for  an  increase  in  armaments  in- 
sufficient, and  have  bitterly  denounced  and  attacked 
them  from  the  point  of  view  exactly  opposite  to  that 
of  the  Socialists.  The  Pan-Germanic  Society  refused 
to  recognize  the  treaty  concluded  between  Germany 
and  France  after  the  Agadir  incident.  Said  Herr 
Klaas  at  the  Hanover  Conference  on  April  15, 
1 91 2:  "We  persist  in  considering  Morocco  as  the 
country  which  will  become  in  the  future,  let  us  hope 
the  near  future,  the  colony  for  German  emigration.  " 
The  same  intractable  spirit  was  shown  in  Dr.  Pohl's 
address  at  the  Erfurt  Congress  in  September,  191 2. 
We  hear  much  about  the  Kaiser  and  the  military 
party  precipitating  war.  A  review  of  the  German 
newspapers  during  the  past  few  years  will  convince 
any  fair-minded  reader  that  German  public  opinion, 
standing  constantly  behind  the  Pan-Germanists,  has 
frequently  made  the  German  Foreign  Office  act  with 
a  much  higher  hand  in  international  questions  than 
it  would  have  acted  if  left  to  itself,  and  that  German 
public  opinion,  from  highest  classes  to  lowest,  is  for 
this  war  to  the  bitter  finish.     It  is  the  war  oj  the 

56 


THE  "WELTPOLITIK"  OF  GERMANY 

people,  intelligently  and  deliberately  willed  by  them. 
The  statement  that  a  revolution  in  Germany,  led 
by  the  democracy  to  dethrone  the  Kaiser  or  to  get 
him  out  of  the  clutches  of  the  military  party,  would 
put  an  end  to  the  war,  is  foolish  and  pernicious. 
For  it  leads  us  to  false  hopes.  It  would  be  much 
nearer  the  truth  to  say  that  if  the  Kaiser  had  not 
consented  to  this  war,  he  would  have  endangered  his 
throne. 

The  principle  of  the  Weltpolitiky  imposed  upon 
European  diplomacy  by  the  German  nation  in  the 
assembling  of  the  Conference  of  Algeciras,  was  that 
no  State  should  be  allowed  to  disturb  the  existing 
political  and  territorial  status  quo  of  any  country 
still  free,  in  any  part  of  the  world,  without  the  consent 
of  the  other  Powers,  This  Weltpolitik  would  have 
the  natural  effect,  according  to  Karl  Lamprecht,  in 
his  Zur  Jilngsten  Deutschen  Vergangenheit,  of  endan- 
gering a  universal  and  pitiless  competition  among 
the  seven  Great  Powers  in  which  the  weakest  would 
eventually  be  eliminated. 


57 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  "BAGDADBAHN" 

IN  the  development  of  her  Weltpolitik,  the  most 
formidable,  the  most  feasible,  and  the  most 
successful  conception  of  modern  Germany  has 
been  the  economic  penetration  of  Asiatic  Turkey. 
She  may  have  failed  in  Africa  and  in  China.  But 
there  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  successful  beginning, 
and  the  rich  promise  for  the  future,  of  German  en- 
terprises in  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

The  countries  of  sunshine  have  always  exercised 
a  peculiar  fascination  over  the  German.  His  litera- 
ture is  filled  with  the  Mediterranean  and  with  Islam. 
From  his  northern  climate  he  has  looked  southward 
and  eastward  back  towards  the  cradle  of  his  race, 
and  in  imagination  has  lived  over  again  the  Cru- 
sades. As  long  as  Italy  was  under  Teutonic  political 
influence,  the  path  to  the  Mediterranean  was  easy. 
United  Italy  and  United  Germany  were  born  at 
the  same  time.  But  while  the  birth  of  Italy  threat- 
ened to  close  eventually  the  trade  route  to  the 
Mediterranean  to  Germany,  the  necessity  of  a  trade 
route  to  the  south  became  more  vital  than  ever  to  the 
new  German  Confederation  from  the  sequences  of 
the  union. 

58 


THE  "BAGDADBAHN" 

When  her  political  consolidation  was  completed 
and  her  industrial  era  commenced,  Germany  began 
to  look  around  the  world  for  a  place  to  expand. 
There  were  still  three  independent  Mohammedan 
nations — Morocco,  Persia,  and  Turkey.  In  Morocco 
she  found  another  cause  for  conflict  with  France  than 
Alsace-Lorraine.  In  Persia  and  Turkey,  she  faced 
the  bitter  rivalry  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain. 

The  rapid  decline  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  the 
fact  that  its  sovereign  was  Khalif  of  the  Moslem 
world,  led  German  statesmen  to  believe  that  Con- 
stantinople was  the  best  place  in  the  world  to  centre 
the  efforts  of  their  diplomacy  in  the  development  of 
the  Weltpolitik.  Through  allying  herself  with  the 
Khalif,  Germany  would  find  herself  able  to  strike 
eventually  at  the  British  occupation  of  India  and 
Egypt,  and  the  French  occupation  of  Algeria  and 
Tunis,  not  only  by  joining  the  interests  of  Pan-Islamism 
and  Pan-Germanism,  but  also  by  winning  a  place  in 
Morocco  opposite  Gibraltar,  a  place  in  Asia  Minor 
opposite  Egypt,  and  a  place  in  Mesopotamia  opposite 
India. 

The  certainty  of  economic  success  helped  to  make 
the  political  effort  worth  while,  even  if  it  came  to 
nothing.  For  Asia  Minor  and  Mesopotamia  are 
countries  that  have  been  among  the  most  fertile  and 
prosperous  in  the  whole  world.  They  could  be  so 
again.  The  present  backward  condition  of  Asia 
Minor  and  Mesopotamia  is  due  to  the  fact  that  these 
countries  have  had  no  chance  to  live  since  they  came 
under  Ottoman  control,  much  less  to  develop  their 
resources   proportionately   to   other   nations.     The 

59 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

natives  have  been  exploited  by  the  Turkish  officials 
and  by  foreign  holders  of  concessions.  Frequently 
concessions  have  been  sought  to  stop,  not  to  further, 
development.  If  there  have  been  climatic  changes 
to  account  for  lack  of  fertility  in  Asia  Minor,  this 
is  largely  due  to  deforestation.  Ibn  Batutah,  the 
famous  Moorish  traveller  of  the  first  half  of  the  four- 
teenth century,  and  vShehabeddin  of  Damascus,  his 
contemporary,  have  left  glowing  accounts  of  the 
fertility  and  prosperity  of  regions  of  Asia  Minor,  now 
hopelessly  arid,  as  they  existed  on  the  eve  of  the 
foundation  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Not  only  have 
all  the  trees  been  cut  down,  but  the  roots  have  been 
torn  up  for  fuel !  One  frequently  sees  in  the  markets 
of  Anatolian  towns  the  roots  of  trees  for  sale.  The 
treatment  of  trees  is  typical  of  everything  else.  The 
country  has  had  no  chance.  In  Mesopotamia,  the 
new  irrigation  schemes  are  not  innovations  of  the 
twentieth  century,  but  the  revival  of  methods  of 
culture  in  vogue  thousands  of  years  before  Christ. 

The  Romans  and  Byzantines  improved  their  in- 
heritance.   The  Osmanlis  ruined  it. 

In  addition  to  sunshine  and  romance,  political 
advantages,  and  prospects  of  making  money,  another 
influence  has  attracted  the  Germans  to  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  There  is  a  certain  affinity  between  German 
and  Osmanli.  The  Germans  have  sympathy  with 
the  spirit  of  Islam,  as  they  conceive  it  to  be  interpreted 
in  the  Turk.  They  admire  the  yassak  of  the  Turk, 
which  is  the  counterpart  of  their  verhoten.  The  von 
Moltke  who  later  led  Prussia  to  her  great  victories 
had  at  the  beginning  of  his  career  an  intimate  know- 

60 


THE  "BAGDADBAHN" 

ledge  of  the  Turkish  army.  He  admired  intensely 
the  blind  and  passive  obedience  of  the  Turk  to  au- 
thority, his  imperturbabiHty  under  misfortune  and 
his  fortitude  in  facing  hardship  and  danger.  "Theirs 
not  to  reason  why:  theirs  but  to  do  and  die"  is  a 
spirit  which  German  and  Turk  understand,  and  show, 
far  better  than  Briton,  with  all  due  respect  to  Tenny- 
son. A  Briton  may  obey,  but  he  questions  all  the 
same,  and  after  the  crisis  is  over  he  demands  a 
reckoning.  Authority,  to  the  Anglo-Saxon,  rests  in 
the  body  poHtic,  of  which  each  individual  is  an 
integral — and  ineffaceable — part. 

The  Turkish  military  and  official  cast  is  like  that 
of  the  Germans  in  three  things:  authority  rests  in 
superiors  unaccountable  to  those  whom  they  com- 
mand; the  origin  of  authority  is  force  upholding 
tradition ;  and  the  sparing  of  human  life  and  human 
suffering  is  a  consideration  that  must  not  be  enter- 
tained when  it  is  a  question  of  advancing  a  political 
or  military  end.  I  have  seen  both  at  work,  and  have 
seen  the  work  of  both;  so  I  have  the  right  to  make 
this  statement.  For  all  that,  I  have  German  and 
Turkish  friends,  and  deep  affection  for  them,  and 
deep  admiration  for  many  traits  of  character  of  both 
nations.  The  trouble  is  that  the  people  of  Germany 
and  the  people  of  Turkey  allow  their  official  and 
military  castes  to  do  what  their  own  instincts  would 
not  permit  them  to  do.  The  passivity  of  the  Turk  is 
natural:  it  is  his  religion,  his  background,  and  his 
climate.  The  passivity  of  the  German  is  inexcusable* 
He  will  not  exorcise  the  devil  out  of  his  own  race.  It 
must  be  done  for  him. 

6i 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

In  1888,  a  group  of  German  financiers,  backed  by 
the  Deutsche  Bank,  which  was  to  have  so  powerful  a 
future  in  Turkey,  asked  for  the  concession  of  a  rail- 
way line  from  Ismidt  to  Angora.  The  construction 
of  this  line  was  followed  by  concessions  for  extension 
from  Angora  to  Csesarea  and  for  a  branch  from  the 
Ismidt-Angora  line  going  south-west  from  Eski  Sheir 
to  Konia.  The  extension  to  Caesarea  was  never 
made.  That  was  not  the  direction  in  which  the 
Germans  wanted  to  go.  The  Eski  Sheir-Konia  spur 
became  the  main  line.  The  Berlin-Bagdad-Bassorah 
"all  rail  route"  was  born.  The  Germans  began  to 
dream  of  connecting  the  Baltic  with  the  Persian  Gulf. 
The  Balkan  Peninsula  was  to  revert  to  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  Asia  Minor  and  Mesopotamia  to  Ger- 
many. The  south  Slavs  and  the  populations  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  would  be  dispossessed  (the  philoso- 
pher Haeckel  actually  prophesied  this  in  a  speech 
in  1905  before  the  Geographical  Society  of  Jena). 
Russia  would  be  cut  off  from  the  Mediterranean. 
This  was  the  Pan-Germanist  conception  of  the 
Bagdadhahn. 

From  the  moment  the  first  railway  concession  was 
granted  to  Germans  in  Asia  Minor,  which  coincided 
with  the  year  of  his  accession,  Wilhelm  H  has  been 
heart  and  soul  with  the  development  of  German 
interests  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  His  first  move  in 
foreign  politics  was  to  visit  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid 
in  1889,  when  he  was  throwing  off  the  yoke  of  Bis- 
marck. This  visit  was  the  beginning  of  an  intimate 
connection  between  Wilhelmstrasse  and  the  Sublime 
Porte  which  has  never  been  interrupted — excepting 

62 


THE  "BAGDADBAHN" 

for  a  very  brief  period  at  the  beginning  of  the  First 
Balkan  War.  The  friendship  between  the  Sultan 
and  the  Kaiser  was  not  in  the  least  disturbed  by  the 
Armenian  massacres.  The  hecatombs  of  Asia  Minor 
passed  without  a  protest.  In  fact,  five  days  after  the 
great  massacre  of  August,  1896,  in  Constantinople, 
where  Turkish  soldiers  shot  down  their  fellow-citizens 
under  the  eyes  of  the  Sultan  and  of  the  foreign 
ambassadors,  Wilhelm  II  sent  to  Abdul  Hamid  for 
his  birthday  a  family  photograph  of  himself  with  the 
Empress  and  his  children. 

In  1898,  the  Kaiser  made  his  second  voyage  to 
Constantinople.  This  voyage  was  followed  by  the 
concession  extending  the  railway  from  Konia  to  the 
Persian  Gulf.  It  was  the  beginning  of  the  Bagdad- 
hahn  in  the  official  and  narrower  sense.  After  this 
visit  of  the  Kaiser  to  Abdul  Hamid,  the  pilgrimage 
was  continued  to  the  Holy  Land.  At  Baalbek,  there 
is  a  stone  of  typically  German  taste,  set  in  the  wall  of 
the  great  temple,  to  commemorate  the  visit  of  the 
man  who  dreamed  he  would  one  day  be  master  of  the 
modem  world.  If  this  inscription  seems  a  sacrilege, 
what  name  have  we  for  the  large  gap  in  the  walls  of 
Jerusalem  made  for  his  triumphal  entry  to  the  Holy 
City?  The  great  Protestant  German  Church,  whose 
comer-stone  was  laid  by  his  father  in  1869,  was 
solemnly  inaugurated  by  the  Kaiser.  As  solemnly, 
he  handed  over  to  Catholic  Germans  the  title  to  land 
for  a  hospital  and  religious  establishment  on  the  road 
to  Bethlehem.  Still  solemnly,  at  a  banquet  in  his 
honour  in  Damascus,  he  turned  to  the  Turkish  Vali, 
and  declared:  "Say  to  the  three  hundred  million 

63 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Moslems  of  the  world  that  I  am  their  .friend. "  To 
prove  his  sincerity  he  went  out  to  put  a  wreath  upon 
the  tomb  of  Saladin. 

Wilhelm  II  at  Damascus  is  reminiscent  of  Na- 
poleon at  Cairo.  Egypt  and  Syria  and  Mesopotamia 
have  always  cast  a  spell  over  men  who  have  dreamed 
of  world  empires;  and  Islam,  as  a  unifying  force  for 
conquest,  has  appealed  to  the  imagination  of  others 
before  the  present  German  Kaiser.  I  have  used  the 
word  "imagination"  intentionally.  There  never  has 
been  any  solidarity  in  the  religion  of  Mohammed; 
there  is  none  now;  there  never  will  be.  The  idea  of 
community  of  aims  and  community  of  interests  is 
totally  lacking  in  the  Mohammedan  mind.  Solidar- 
ity is  built  upon  the  foundation  of  sacrifice  of  self 
for  others.  It  is  a  virtue  not  taught  in  the  Koran, 
nor  ever  developed  by  any  Mohammedan  civiliza- 
tions. The  failure  of  all  political  organisms  of 
Mohammedan  origin  to  endure  and  to  become  strong 
has  been  due  to  the  fact  that  Mohammedans  have 
never  felt  the  necessity  of  giving  themselves  for  the 
common  weal.  The  virility  of  a  nation  is  in  the 
virile  service  of  those  who  love  it.  If  there  is  no 
willingness  to  serve,  no  incentive  to  love,  how  can  a 
nation  live  and  be  strong? 

The  revelation  of  Germany's  ambition  by  the 
granting  of  the  concession  from  Konia  to  the  Persian 
Gulf,  and  the  application  of  the  German  financiers 
for  a  firman  constituting  the  Bagdad  Railway  Com- 
pany, led  to  international  intrigues  and  negotiations 
for  a  share  in  the  construction  of  the  line  through 
Mesopotamia.    It  would  be  wearisome  and  profitless 

64 


THE  "BAGDADBAHN" 

to  follow  the  various  phases  of  the  Bagdad  question. 
Germany  did  not  oppose  international  participation 
in  the  concession.  The  expense  of  crossing  the  Tau- 
rus and  the  dubious  financial  returns  from  the  desert 
sections  influenced  the  Germans  to  welcome  the 
financial  support  of  others  in  an  undertaking  that 
they  would  have  found  great  difficulty  in  financing 
entirely  by  their  own  capital.  The  Bagdadbahn  con- 
cession was  granted  in  1 899 :  the  firman  constituting 
the  company  followed  in  1903. 

Russia  did  not  realize  the  danger  of  German 
influence  at  Constantinople,  and  of  the  eventualities 
of  the  German  "pacific  penetrations"  in  Asia  Minor. 
She  adjusted  the  Macedonian  question  with  Emperor 
Franz  Josef  in  order  to  have  a  free  hand  in  Man- 
churia, and  she  made  no  opposition  to  the  German 
ambitions.  She  needed  the  friendly  neutrality  of 
Germany  in  her  approaching  struggle  with  Japan. 
Once  the  struggle  was  begun,  Russia  found  herself 
actually  dependent  upon  the  goodwill  of  Germany. 
It  was  not  the  time  for  Petrograd  to  fish  in  the 
troubled  waters  of  the  Golden  Horn. 

The  situation  was  different  with  Great  Britain. 
The  menace  of  the  German  approach  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  was  brought  to  the  British  Foreign  Office  just 
long  enough  before  the  Boer  crisis  became  acute  for  a 
decision  to  be  made.  Germany  had  sent  engineers 
along  the  proposed  route  of  her  railway.  She  had 
neglected  to  send  diplomatic  agents! 

The  proposed — in  fact  the  only  feasible — terminus 
on  the  Persian  Gulf  was  at  Koweit.  Like  the  Sultan 
of  Muscat,  the  Sheik  of  Koweit  was  practically  inde- 
s  65 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

pendent  of  Turkey.  While  showing  deference  to  the 
Sultan  as  Khalif ,  Sheik  Mobarek  resisted  every  effort 
of  the  Vali  of  Bassorah  to  exercise  even  the  sem- 
blance of  authority  over  his  small  domain.  In  1899, 
Colonel  Meade,  the  British  resident  of  the  Persian 
Gulf,  signed  with  Mobarek  a  secret  convention  which 
assured  to  him  "special  protection,  *'  if  he  would  make 
no  cession  of  territory  without  the  knowledge  and  con- 
sent of  the  British  Government.  The  following  year, 
a  German  mission,  headed  by  the  Kaiser's  Consul 
General  at  Constantinople,  arrived  in  Koweit  to 
arrange  the  concession  for  the  terminus  of  the  Bag- 
dadbahn.  They  were  too  late.  The  door  to  the 
Persian  Gulf  was  shut  in  the  face  of  Germany. 

Wilhelm  II  set  into  motion  the  Sultan.  The 
Sublime  Porte  suddenly  remembered  that  Koweit 
was  Ottoman  territory,  and  began  to  display  great 
interest  in  forcing  the  Sheik  to  recognize  the  fact. 
A  Turkish  vessel  appeared  at  Koweit  in  1901.  But 
British  warships  and  British  bluejackets  upheld  the 
independence  of  Koweit!  Since  the  Constitution  of 
1908,  all  the  efforts  of  the  Young  Turks  at  Koweit 
have  been  fruitless.    Germany  remains  blocked. 

British  opposition  to  the  German  schemes  was  not 
limited  to  the  prevention  of  an  outlet  of  the  Bagdad- 
hahn  at  Koweit.  Since  1798,  when  the  East  India 
Company  established  a  resident  at  Bagdad  to  spy 
upon  and  endeavour  to  frustrate  the  influence  of  the 
French,  just  beginning  to  penetrate  towards  India 
through  the  ambition  of  Napoleon  to  inherit  the 
empire  of  Alexander,  British  interests  have  not  failed 
to   be   well   looked  after  in   Lower   Mesopotamia. 

66 


THE  "BAGDADBAHN" 

After  the  Lynch  Brothers  in  i860,  obtained  the  right 
of  navigating  on  the  Euphrates,  the  development 
of  their  steamship  Hnes  gradually  gave  Great  Britain 
the  bulk  of  the  commerce  of  the  whole  region,  in  the 
Persian  as  well  as  the  Ottoman  hinterland  of  the 
Gulf.  In  1895,  German  commerce  in  the  port  of 
Bushir  was  non-existent,  while  British  commerce 
surpassed  twelve  million  francs  yearly.  In  1905,  the 
Hamburg-American  Line  established  a  service  to 
Bassorah.  British  merchants  began  to  raise  the 
cry  that  if  the  Bagdadhahn  appeared  the  Germans 
would  soon  have  not  only  the  markets  of  Mesopo- 
tamia but  also  that  of  Kermanshah !  The  Lynch 
Company  declared  that  the  Bagdadhahn  would  ruin 
their  river  service,  and  their  representations  were 
listened  to  at  London,  despite  the  absurdity  of  their 
contention.  The  Lynches  were  negotiating  with 
Berlin  also.  This  mixture  of  politics  and  commerce 
in  Mesopotamia  is  a  sordid  story,  which  does  not 
improve  in  the  telling. 

The  revolution  of  1908  did  not  injure  the  German 
influence  at  Constantinople  as  much  as  has  been 
popularly  supposed.  The  Germans  succeeded  dur- 
ing the  first  troubled  year  in  keeping  in  with  both 
sides  through  the  genius  of  Baron  Marschall  von 
Bieberstein,  in  spite  of  the  Bosnia-Herzegovina  affair. 
Germany  was  fortunately  out  of  the  Cretan  and 
Macedonian  muddles,  in  which  her  rivals  were  hope- 
lessly entangled.  Mahmud  Shevket  pasha  was  al- 
ways under  German  influence,  and  the  Germans  had 
Enver  bey,  "hero  of  liberty,"  in  training  at  Berhn. 
German  influence  at  Constantinople  succeeded  also 

67 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

in  withstanding  the  strain  of  the  TripoUtan  War, 
although  it  grew  increasingly  embarrassing  as  the 
months  passed  to  be  Turkey's  best  friend  and  at  the 
same  time  the  ally  of  Italy!  During  the  first  dis- 
astrous period  of  the  war  of  the  Balkan  Allies  against 
Turkey,  it  seemed  for  the  time  that  the  enemies  of 
Germany  controlled  the  Sublime  Porte.  But  the 
revolver  of  Enver  bey  in  the  coup  d'etat  of  January, 
1913,  brought  once  more  the  control  of  Turkish 
affairs  into  hands  friendly  to  Germany.  They  have 
remained  there  ever  since. 

Germany  strengthened  her  railway  scheme,  and 
her  hold  on  the  territories  through  which  it  was  to 
pass,  by  the  accord  with  Russia  at  Potsdam  in  1910. 
The  last  clever  attack  of  British  diplomacy  on  the 
Bagdadbahn  was  successfully  met.  In  tracing  the 
extension  of  the  railway  beyond  Adana,  it  was  sug- 
gested to  the  Department  of  Public  Works  that  the 
cost  of  construction  would  be  greatly  reduced  and 
the  usefulness  of  the  line  increased,  if  it  passed  by 
the  Mediterranean  littoral  around  the  head  of  the 
Gulf  of  Alexandretta.  Then  the  control  of  the  rail- 
way would  have  been  at  the  mercy  of  the  British 
fleet.  When  the  "revised"  plans  went  from  the 
Ministry  of  Public  Works  to  the  Ministry  of  War,  it 
was  not  hard  for  the  German  agents  to  persuade  the 
General  Staff  to  restore  the  original  route  inland 
across  the  Amanus,  following  the  old  plan  agreed 
upon  in  the  time  of  Abdul  Hamid.  More  than  that, 
the  Germans  secured  concessions  for  a  branch  line 
from  Aleppo  to  the  Mediterranean  at  Alexandretta, 
and  for  the  construction  of  a  port  at  iLlexandretta. 

68 


THE  "BAGDADBAHN" 

The  Bagdadbahn  was  to  have  a  Mediterranean 
terminus  at  a  fortified  port,  and  Germany  was  to  have 
her  naval  base  in  the  north-east  corner  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, eight  hours  from  Cyprus  and  thirty-six 
hours  from  the  Suez  Canal!  This  was  the  revenge 
for  Koweit. 

A  month  before  the  Servian  ultimatum,  Germany 
had  contracted  to  grant  a  loan  to  Bulgaria,  one  of  the 
conditions  of  which  was  that  Germany  be  allowed 
to  build  a  railway  to  the  ^gean  across  the  Rhodope 
Mountains  to  Porto  Laghos,  and  to  construct  a  port 
there,  six  hours  from  the  mouth  of  the  Dardanelles. 
There  was  a  panic  in  Petrograd. 

The  events  in  Turkey  since  the  opening  of  the 
war  are  too  recent  history  and  as  yet  too  little  under- 
stood to  dwell  upon.  But  the  reception  accorded  to 
the  Goeben  and  Breslau  at  the  Dardanelles,  their 
present*  anomalous  position  in  "closed  waters"  in 
defiance  of  all  treaties,  the  abolition  of  the  foreign 
post-offices,  the  unilateral  decision  to  abrogate  the 
capitulations — all  these  straws  show  in  which  direc- 
tion the  wind  is  blowing  on  the  Bosphorus.  A  suc- 
cessful termination  of  the  German  campaign  in 
France,  which  at  this  writing  seems  most  improbable 
(in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Germans  are  at  Com- 
piegne  and  their  aeroplanes  pay  us  daily  visits), 
would  certainly  draw  Turkey  into  the  war — and  to 
her  ruin. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  German  reHance  upon 
embarrassing  the  French  and  British  in  their  Moslem 
colonies  through  posing  as  the  defenders  of  Islam 
and  Islam's  Khalif  has  not  been  well-founded.    On 

•October,  19 14.  69 


THE  NEW  MAP  OP  EUROPE 

the  battlefield  of  France,  thousands  of  followers  of 
Mohammed  from  Africa  and  Asia  are  fighting  loyally 
under  the  flags  of  the  Allies.  The  Kaiser,  for  all  his 
dreams  and  hopes,  has  not  succeeded  in  getting  a 
single  Mohammedan  to  draw  his  sword  for  the  com- 
bineci  causes  of  Pan-Germanism  and  Pan-Islamism. 
Have  the  three  hundred  million  Moslems  forgotten 
the  declaration  of  Damascus? 

In  seeking  for  the  causes  of  the  present  conflict,  it 
is  impossible  to  neglect  Germany  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  As  one  looks  up  at  Pera  from  the  Bos- 
phorus,  the  most  imposing  building  on  the  hill  is  the 
German  Embassy.  It  dominates  Constantinople. 
There  has  been  woven  the  web  that  has  resulted  in 
putting  Germany  in  the  place  of  Great  Britain  to 
prevent  the  Russian  advance  to  the  Dardanelles, 
in  putting  Germany  in  the  place  of  Russia  to  threaten 
the  British  occupation  of  India  and  the  trade  route 
to  India,  and  in  putting  Germany  in  the  place  of 
Great  Britain  as  the  stubborn  opponent  of  the  com- 
pletion of  the  African  Empire  of  France.  The  most 
conspicuous  thread  of  the  web  is  the  Bagdadhahn. 
In  the  intrigues  of  Constantinople,  we  see  develop 
the  political  evolution  of  the  past  generation,  and  the 
series  of  events  that  made  inevitable  the  European 
war  of  1914. 


70 


CHAPTER  IV 
ALGECIRAS  AND  AGADIR 

IN  1904,  an  accord  was  made  between  Great  Bri- 
tain and  France  in  regard  to  colonial  policy  in 
northern  Africa.  Great  Britain  recognized  the 
"special"  interests  of  France  in  Morocco  in  exchange 
for  French  recognition  of  Great  Britain's  "special" 
interests  in  Egypt.  There  was  a  promise  to  defend 
each  other  in  the  protection  of  these  interests,  but 
no  actual  agreement  to  carry  this  defence  beyond 
the  exercise  of  diplomatic  pressure.  The  accord 
was  a  secret  one.  Its  exact  terms  were  not  known 
until  the  incident  of  Agadir  made  necessary  its 
publication  in  November,  191 1. 

But  that  there  was  an  accord  was  known  to  all  the 
world.  Germany,  who  had  long  been  looking  with 
alarm  upon  the  extension  of  French  influence  in 
Morocco,  found  in  1905  a  favourable  moment  for 
protest.  Russia  had  suffered  humiliation  and  defeat 
in  her  war  with  Japan.  Neither  in  a  military  nor  a 
financial  way  was  she  at  that  moment  a  factor  to 
be  reckoned  with  in  support  of  France.  Great 
Britain  had  not  recovered  from  the  disasters  to  her 
military  organization  of  the  South  African  campaign. 
Her  domestic  politics  were  in  a  chaotic  state.     The 

71 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Conservative  Ministry  was  losing  ground  daily  in 
bye  elections;  the  Irish  question  was  coming  to  the 
front  again, 

German  intervention  in  Morocco  was  sudden  and 
theatrical.  On  March  31,  1905,  a  date  of  far-reach- 
ing importance  in  history,  Emperor  William  entered 
the  harbour  of  Tangier  upon  his  yacht,  the  Hohen- 
zollern.  When  he  disembarked,  he  gave  the  cue  to 
German  policy  by  saluting  the  representative  of  the 
Sultan,  with  peculiar  emphasis,  as  the  representative 
of  an  independent  sovereign.  Then,  turning  to  the 
German  residents  in  IMorocco  who  had  gathered  to 
meet  him,  he  said:  "I  am  happy  to  greet  in  you  the 
devoted  pioneers  of  German  industry  and  commerce, 
who  are  aiding  in  the  task  of  keeping  always  in  a 
high  position,  in  a  free  land,  the  interests  of  the 
mother  country." 

The  repercussion  of  this  visit  to  Tangier  in  France 
and  in  Great  Britain  was  electrical.  It  seemed  to  be, 
and  was,  a  direct  challenge  on  the  part  of  Germany 
for  a  share  in  shaping  the  destinies  of  Morocco.  It 
was  an  answer  to  the  Anglo-French  accord,  in  which 
Germany  had  been  ignored.  Great  Britain  was  in  no 
position  to  go  beyond  mere  words  in  the  standing 
behind  France.  France  knew  this.  So  did  Ger- 
many. After  several  months  of  fruitless  negotia- 
tions between  Berlin  and  Paris,  on  June  6th,  it  was 
made  plain  to  France  that  there  must  be  a  conference 
on  the  Moroccan  question. 

M.  Delcasse,  at  that  time  directing  with  consum- 
mate skill  and  courage  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
urged  upon  the  Cabinet  the  necessity  for  accepting 

72 


ALGECIRAS  AND  AGADIR 

Germany's  challenge.  But  the  Cabinet,  after  hear- 
ing the  sorrowful  confessions  of  the  Ministers  of 
War  and  Navy,  and  learning  that  France  was  not 
ready  to  fight,  refused  to  accept  the  advice  of  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  M.  Delcasse  resigned. 
A  blow  had  been  struck  at  French  prestige. 

For  six  months  the  crisis  continued  in  an  acute 
stage.  The  chauvinistic — or  shall  we  say,  patriotic? 
■ — elements  were  determined  to  withstand  what  they 
called  the  Kaiser's  interference  in  the  domestic  affairs 
of  France.  But  France  seemed  isolated  at  that  mo- 
ment, and  prudence  was  the  part  of  wisdom.  M. 
Rouvier  declared  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on 
December  i6th :  "France  cannot  be  without  a  Moroc- 
can policy,  for  the  form  and  direction  which  the  evolu- 
tion of  Morocco  will  take  in  the  future  will  influence 
in  a  decisive  manner  the  destinies  of  our  North  Afri- 
can possessions."  France  agreed  to  a  conference,  but 
won  from  Germany  the  concession  that  France's 
special  interests  and  rights  in  Morocco  would  be 
admitted  as  the  basis  of  the  work  of  the  conference. 

On  January  17,  1906,  a  conference  of  European 
States,  to  which  the  United  States  of  America  was 
admitted,  met  to  decide  the  international  status  of 
Morocco.  For  some  time  the  attitude  of  the  Ger- 
man delegates  was  uncompromising.  They  main- 
tained the  Kaiser's  thesis  as  set  forth  at  Algiers:  the 
complete  independence  of  Morocco,  and  sovereignty 
of  her  Sultan.  But  they  finally  yielded,  and  ac- 
knowledged the  right  of  France  and  Spain  to  organize 
in  Morocco  an  international  police. 

The   Convention   was   signed   on  April   7th.     It 

73 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

provided  for:  (i)  police  under  the  sovereign  authority 
of  the  Sultan,  recruited  from  Moorish  Moslems,  and 
distributed  in  the  eight  open  ports;  (2)  Spanish  and 
French  officers,  placed  at  his  disposal  by  their  govern- 
ments, to  assist  the  Sultan ;  (3)  limitation  of  the  total 
effective  of  this  police  force  from  two  thousand  to 
two  thousand  five  hundred,  of  French  and  Spanish 
officers,  commissioned  sixteen  to  twenty,  and  non- 
commissioned thirty  to  forty,  appointed  for  five 
years;  (4)  an  Inspector  General,  a  high  officer  of 
the  Swiss  army,  chosen  subject  to  the  approval  of 
the  Sultan,  with  residence  at  Tangier;  (5)  a  State 
Bank  of  Morocco,  in  which  each  of  the  signatory 
Powers  had  the  right  to  subscribe  capital;  (6)  the 
right  of  foreigners  to  acquire  property,  and  to  build 
upon  it,  in  any  part  of  Morocco;  (7)  France's  ex- 
clusive right  to  enforce  regulations  in  the  frontier 
region  of  Algeria  and  a  similar  right  to  Spain  in  the 
frontier  region  of  Spain;  (8)  the  preservation  of  the 
public  services  of  the  Empire  from  alienation  for 
private  interests. 

Chancellor  von  Billow's  speech  in  the  Reichstag 
on  April  5,  1906,  was  a  justification  of  Germany's 
attitude.  It  showed  that  the  policy  of  Wilhelm- 
strasse  had  been  far  from  bellicose,  and  that  Ger- 
many's demands  were  altogether  reasonable.  The 
time  had  come,  declared  the  Chancellor,  when 
German  interests  in  the  remaining  independent 
portions  of  Africa  and  Asia  must  be  considered  by 
Europe.  In  going  to  Tangier  and  in  forcing  the 
conference  of  Algeciras,  Germany  had  laid  down  the 
principle  that  there  must  be  equal  opportunities  for 

74 


ALGECIRAS  AND  AGADIR 

Germans  in  independent  countries,  and  had  demon- 
strated that  she  was  prepared  to  enforce  this  principle. 

When  one  considers  the  remarkable  growth  in 
population,  and  the  industrial  and  maritime  evolu- 
tion of  Germany,  this  attitude  cannot  be  wondered 
at,  much  less  condemned.  Germany,  deprived  by 
her  late  entrance  among  nations  of  fruitful  colonies, 
was  finding  it  necessary  to  adopt  and  uphold  the 
policy  of  trying  to  prevent  the  pre-emption,  for  the 
benefit  of  her  rivals,  of  those  portions  of  the  world 
which  were  still  free. 

Neither  France  nor  Spain  had  any  feeling  of 
loyalty  toward  the  Convention  of  Algeciras.  How- 
ever much  may  have  been  written  to  prove  this 
loyalty,  the  facts  of  the  few  years  following  Algeciras 
are  convincing.  After  1908,  Spain  provoked  and 
led  on  by  the  tremendous  expenditures  entailed 
upon  her  by  the  Riff  campaigns  began  to  consider 
the  region  of  Morocco  in  which  she  was  installed  as 
exclusively  Spanish  territory.  French  writers  have 
expended  much  energy  and  ingenuity  in  proving 
the  disinterestedness  of  French  efforts  to  enforce 
loyally  the  decisions  of  Algeciras.  But  they  have 
explained,  they  have  protested,  too  much.  There 
has  never  been  a  moment  that  France  has  not  dreamt 
of  the  completion  of  the  vast  colonial  empire  in 
North  Africa  by  the  inclusion  of  Morocco.  It  has 
been  the  goal  for  which  all  her  military  and  civil 
administrations  in  Algeria  and  the  Sahara  have  been 
working.  To  bring  about  the  downfall  of  the 
Sultan's  authority,  not  only  press  campaigns  were 
undertaken,  but  anarchy  on  the  Algerian  frontier 

75 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

was  allowed  to  go  on  unchecked,  until  military 
measures  seemed  justifiable. 

In  a  similar  way,  the  German  colonists  of  Morocco 
did  their  best  to  bring  about  another  intervention 
by  Germany.  Their  methods  were  so  despicable 
and  outrageous  that  they  had  frequently  to  be  dis- 
avowed officially.  In  1910,  the  German  Foreign 
Office  found  the  claims  of  Mannesmann  Brothers 
to  certain  mining  privileges  invalid,  because  they 
did  not  fulfil  the  requirements  of  the  Act  of  Alge- 
ciras.  But  the  Mannesmann  mining  group,  as 
well  as  other  German  enterprises  in  Morocco,  were 
secretly  encouraged  to  make  all  the  trouble  they 
could  for  the  French,  while  defending  the  authority 
of  the  Sultan.  The  Casablanca  incident  is  only  one 
of  numerous  affronts  which  the  French  were  asked 
to  swallow. 

Great  Britain  had  her  part,  though  not  through 
official  agents,  in  the  intrigues.  There  is  much 
food  for  thought  in  the  motives  that  may,  not  with- 
out reason,  be  imputed  to  the  publication  in  the 
Times  of  a  series  of  accounts  on  Moroccan  anarchy, 
and  on  Muley  Hafid's  cruelties. 

In  the  spring  of  191 1,  it  was  realized  everywhere 
in  Europe  that  the  Sultan's  authority  was  even  less 
than  it  had  been  in  1905.  The  Berber  tribes  were 
in  arms  on  all  sides.  In  March,  accounts  began  to 
appear  of  danger  at  Fez,  not  only  to  European  resi- 
dents, but  also  to  the  Sultan.  The  reports  of  the 
French  Consul,  and  the  telegrams  of  correspondents 
of  two  Paris  newspapers,  were  most  alarming.  On 
April  2d,  it  was  announced  that  the  Berber  tribes 

76 


ALGECIRAS  AND  AGADIR 

had  actually  attacked  the  city  and  were  besieging 
it.  Everything  was  prepared  for  the  final  act  of  the 
drama. 

A  reHef  column  of  native  troops  under  Major 
Bremond  arrived  in  Fez  on  April  26th.  The  very 
next  day,  an  urgent  message  for  relief  having  been 
received  from  Colonel  Mangin  in  Fez,  Colonel  Bru- 
lard  started  for  the  capital  with  another  column. 
Without  waiting  for  further  word,  a  French  army 
which  had  been  carefully  prepared  for  the  purpose, 
entered  Morocco  under  General  Moinier.  On  May 
2 1st,  Fez  was  occupied  by  the  French.  They  found 
that  all  was  well  there  with  the  Europeans  and  with 
the  natives.  But,  fortunately  for  the  French  plans, 
Muley  Hafid's  brother  had  set  himself  up  at  Mequi- 
nez  as  pretender  to  the  throne.  The  Sultan  could 
now  retain  his  sovereignty  only  by  putting  himself 
under  the  protection  of  the  French  army.  Morocco 
had  lost  her  independence! 

Germany  made  no  objection  to  the  French  expedi- 
tionary corps  in  April.  She  certainly  did  not  expect 
the  quick  succession  of  events  in  May  which  brought 
her  face  to  face  with  the  fait  accompli  of  a  strong 
French  army  in  Fez.  As  soon  as  it  was  realized  at 
Berlin  that  the  fiction  of  Moroccan  independence 
had  been  so  skilfully  terminated,  France  was  asked 
"what  compensation  she  would  give  to  Germany 
in  return  for  a  free  hand  in  Morocco."  The  pour- 
parlers dragged  on  through  several  weeks  in  June. 
France  refused  to  acknowledge  any  ground  for  com- 
pensation to  Germany.  She  maintained  that  the 
recent  action  in  Morocco  had  been  at  the  request 

77 


the;  new  map  of  Europe 

of  the  Sultan,  and  that  it  was  a  matter  entirely 
between  him  and  France. 

Germany  saw  that  a  bold  stroke  was  necessary. 
On  July  1st,  the  gunboat  Panther  went  to  Agadir, 
a  port  on  the  Atlantic  coast  of  Morocco.  To  Great 
Britain  and  to  France,  the  dispatch  of  the  Panther 
was  represented  as  due  to  the  necessity  of  protecting 
German  interests,  seeing  that  there  was  anarchy  in 
that  part  of  Morocco.  But  the  German  news- 
papers, even  those  which  were  supposed  to  have 
official  relations  with  Wilhelmstrasse,  spoke  as  if 
a  demand  for  the  cession  of  Mogador  or  some 
other  portion  of  Morocco  was  contemplated.  The 
Chancellor  explained  to  the  Reichstag  that  the 
sending  of  the  Panther  was  "to  show  the  world 
that  Germany  was  firmly  resolved  not  to  be  pushed 
to  one  side." 

But  in  the  negotiations  through  the  German 
Ambassador  in  Paris,  it  was  clear  that  Germany 
was  playing  a  game  of  political  blackmail.  The  Ger- 
man Foreign  Office  shifted  its  claims  from  Morocco 
to  concessions  in  Central  Africa.  On  July  15th, 
Germany  asked  for  the  whole  of  the  French  Congo 
from  the  sea  to  the  River  Sanga,  and  a  renunciation 
in  her  favour  of  France's  contingent  claims  to  the 
succession  of  the  Belgian  Congo.  The  reason  given 
to  this  demand  was,  that  if  Morocco  were  to  pass 
imder  a  French  protectorate,  it  was  only  just  that 
compensation  should  be  given  to  Germany  else- 
where. France,  for  the  moment,  hesitated.  She 
definitely  refused  to  entertain  the  idea  of  compensa- 
tion as  soon  as  she  had  received  the  assurance  of  the 

78 


ALGECIRAS  AND  AGADIR 

aid  of  Great  Britain  in  supporting  her  against  the 
German  claims. 

On  July  1st,  the  German  Ambassador  had  noti- 
fied Sir  Edward  Grey  of  the  dispatch  of  the  Panther 
to  Agadir  "in  response  to  the  demand  for  protection 
from  German  firms  there,"  and  explained  that 
Germany  considered  the  question  of  Morocco  re- 
opened by  the  French  occupation  of  Fez,  and  thought 
that  it  woiild  be  possible  to  make  an  agreement  with 
Spain  and  France  for  the  partition  of  Morocco. 
On  July  4th,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  after  a  consultation 
with  the  Cabinet,  answered  that  Great  Britain  could 
recognize  no  change  in  Morocco  without  consulting 
France,  to  whom  she  was  bound  by  treaty.  The 
Ambassador  then  explained  that  his  Government 
would  not  consider  the  reopening  of  the  question  in 
a  European  conference,  that  it  was  a  matter  directly 
between  Germany  and  France,  and  that  his  overture 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  been  merely  in  the  nature 
of  a  friendly  explanation. 

Germany  believed  that  the  constitutional  crisis 
in  Great  Britain  was  so  serious  that  the  hands  of 
the  Liberal  Cabinet  would  be  tied,  and  that  they 
would  not  be  so  foolhardy  as  to  back  up  France  at 
the  moment  when  they  themselves  were  being  so 
bitterly  assailed  by  the  most  influential  elements  of 
the  British  electorate  on  the  question  of  limiting 
the  veto  power  of  the  House  of  Lords.  It  was  in 
this  belief  that  Germany  on  July  15th  asked  for 
territorial  cessions  from  France  in  Central  Africa. 
Wilhelmstrasse  thought  the  moment  well  chosen, 
and  that  there  was  every  hope  of  success. 

79 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

But  the  German  mentality  has  never  seemed  to 
appreciate  the  frequent  lesson  of  history,  that  the 
British  people  are  able  to  distinguish  clearly  between 
matters  of  internal  and  external  policy.  Bitterly 
assailed  as  a  traitor  to  his  country  because  he  ad- 
vocates certain  changes  of  laws,  a  British  Cabinet 
Minister  can  still  be  conscious  of  the  fact  that  his 
bitterest  opponents  will  rally  around  him  when  he 
takes  a  stand  on  a  matter  of  foreign  policy.  This 
knowledge  of  admirable  national  solidarity  enabled 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  on  July  21st,  the  very  day  on 
which  the  King  gave  his  consent  to  the  creation  of 
new  peers  to  bring  the  House  of  Lords  to  reason,  at 
a  Mansion  House  banquet,  to  warn  Germany  against 
the  danger  of  pressing  her  demands  upon  France. 
The  effect,  both  in  London  and  Paris,  was  to  unify 
and  strengthen  resistance.  It  seemed  as  if  the  Pan- 
ther's visit  to  Agadir  had  put  Germany  in  the  unen- 
viable position  of  having  made  a  threat  which  she 
could  not  enforce. 

But  the  ways  of  diplomacy  are  tortuous.  Through- 
out August  and  September,  Germany  blustered  and 
threatened.  In  September,  several  events  hap- 
pened which  seemed  to  embarrass  Russia  and  tie 
her  hands,  as  in  the  first  Moroccan  imbroglio  of 
1905.  For  Premier  Stolypin  was  assassinated  at 
Kiev  on  September  14th;  the  United  States  de- 
nounced its  commercial  treaty  with  Russia  on  ac- 
count of  the  question  of  Jewish  passports;  and  the 
Shuster  affair  in  Persia  occupied  the  serious  atten- 
tion of  Russian  diplomacy.  Had  it  not  been  for 
the  splendidly  loyal  and  scrupulous  attitude  of  the 

80 


ALGECIRAS  AND  AGADIR 

British  Foreign  Office  towards  Russia  in  the  Persian 
question,  Germany  might  have  been  tempted  to 
force  the  issue  with  France. 

German  demands  grew  more  moderate,  but  were 
not  abandoned.  For  members  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  of  the  extreme  Radical  wing  in  the  Liberal 
party,  began  to  put  the  British  Government  in  an 
uncomfortable  position.  Militarism,  entangling  al- 
liances with  a  continental  Power,  the  necessity  for 
agreement  with  Germany, — these  were  the  subjects 
which  found  their  way  from  the  floor  of  the  House 
of  Commons  to  the  public  press.  A  portion  of  the 
Liberal  party  which  had  to  be  reckoned  with  be- 
lieved that  Germany  ought  not  to  have  been  left 
out  of  the  Anglo-French  agreement.  So  serious 
was  the  dissatisfaction,  that  the  Government  deemed 
it  necessary  to  make  an  explanation  to  the  House. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  explained  and  defended  the  action 
of  the  Cabinet  in  supporting  the  resistance  of  France 
to  Germany's  claims.  The  whole  history  of  the 
negotiation  was  revealed.  The  Anglo-French  agree- 
ment of  1904  was  published  for  the  first  time,  and 
it  was  seen  that  this  agreement  did  not  commit 
Great  Britain  to  backing  France  by  force  of  arms. 

Uncertainty  of  British  support  had  the  influence 
of  bringing  France  to  consent  to  treat  with  Germany 
on  the  Moroccan  question.  Two  agreements  were 
signed.  By  the  first,  Germany  recognized  the 
French  protectorate  in  Morocco,  subject  to  the 
adhesion  of  the  signers  of  the  Convention  of  Alge- 
ciras,  and  waived  her  right  to  take  part  in  the  nego- 
tiations concerning  Moroccan  spheres  of  influence 
6  81 


THE  NEW  MAP  OP  EUROPE 

between  Spain  and  France.  On  her  side,  France 
agreed  to  maintain  the  open  door  in  Morocco,  and 
to  refrain  from  any  measures  which  would  hinder 
the  legitimate  extension  of  German  commercial  and 
mining  interests.  By  the  second  agreement,  France 
ceded  to  Germany  certain  territories  in  the  southern 
and  eastern  Cameroons,  in  return  for  German 
cessions. 

There  was  a  stormy  Parliamentary  and  newspaper 
discussion,  both  in  France  and  Germany,  over  these 
two  treaties.  No  one  was  satisfied.  The  treaties 
were  finally  ratified,  but  under  protest. 

In  France,  the  Ministry  was  subject  to  severe 
criticism.  There  was  also  some  feeling  of  bitter- 
ness— perhaps  a  reaction  from  the  satisfaction  over 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  Mansion  House  speech — in  the 
uncertainty  of  Great  Britain's  support,  as  revealed 
by  the  November  discussions  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons. This  uncertainty  remained,  as  far  as  French 
public  opinion  went,  until  Great  Britain  actually 
declared  war  upon  Germany  in  August,  1914. 

In  Germany,  the  Reichstag  debates  revealed  the 
belief  that  the  Agadir  expedition  had,  on  final  ana- 
lysis, resulted  in  a  fiasco.  An  astonishing  amount 
of  enmity  against  Great  Britain  was  displayed.  It 
was  when  Herr  Heydebrand  made  a  bitter  speech 
against  Great  Britain,  and  denounced  the  pacific 
attitude  of  the  German  Government,  in  the  Reichs- 
tag session  of  November  loth,  that  the  Crown  Prince 
made  public  his  position  in  German  foreign  policy 
by  applauding  loudly. 

The  aftermath  of  Agadir,  as  far  as  it  affected 

82 


ALGECIRAS  AND  AGADIR 

Morocco,  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the  French 
Protectorate,  on  March  30,  191 2.  The  Sultan 
signed  away  his  independence  by  the  Treaty  of  Fez. 
Foreign  legations  at  Fez  ceased  to  exist,  although 
diplomatic  officials  were  retained  at  Tangier.  France 
voted  the  maintenance  of  forty  thousand  troops  in 
Morocco  "for  the  purposes  of  pacification."  The 
last  complications  disappeared  when,  on  November 
27th,  a  Franco-Spanish  Treaty  was  signed  at  Ma- 
drid, in  which  the  Spanish  zones  in  Morocco  were 
defined,  and  both  states  promised  not  to  erect  forti- 
fications or  strategic  works  on  the  Moroccan  coast. 
But  the  aftermath  of  Agadir  in  France  and  Ger- 
many has  been  an  increase  in  naval  and  military 
armaments,  and  the  creation  of  a  spirit  of  tension 
which  needed  only  the  three  years  of  war  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire  to  bring  about  the  inevitable  clash 
between  Teuton  and  Gaul.  Taken  in  connection 
with  the  recent  events  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and 
the  voting  of  the  law  increasing  military  service  in 
France  to  three  years,  the  logical  sequence  of  events 
is  clear. 


83 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  PASSING  OF  PERSIA 

THE  weakness  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  of 
Morocco  served  to  bring  the  colonial  and 
commercial  aspiration  of  Germany  into  con- 
flict with  other  nations  of  Europe.  The  recent 
fortunes  of  Persia,  the  third — and  only  other — 
independent  Mohammedan  state,  have  also  helped 
to  make  possible  the  general  European  war. 

The  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  brought 
about  in  Persia,  as  in  Turkey,  the  rise  of  a  constitu- 
tional party,  which  was  able  to  force  a  despotic 
sovereign  to  grant  a  constitution.  The  Young 
Persians  had  in  many  respects  a  history  similar  to 
that  of  the  Young  Turks.  They  were  for  the  most 
part  members  of  influential  families,  who  had  been 
educated  in  Europe,  or  had  been  sent  into  exile. 
They  had  imbibed  deeply  the  spirit  of  the  French 
Revolution  from  their  reading,  and  had  at  the  same 
time  developed  a  narrow  and  intense  nationalism. 
But  to  support  their  revolutionary  propaganda, 
they  had  allied  themselves  during  the  period  of  dark- 
ness with  the  Armenians  and  other  non-Moslems. 
As  Salonika,  a  city  by  no  means  Turkish,  was  the 
foyer  of   the  young    Turk    movement,   so  Tabriz, 

84 


THE  PASSING  OF  PERSIA 

capital  of  the  Azerbaidjan,  a  city  by  no  means 
Persian,  was  the  centre  of  the  opposition  to  Persian 
despotism. 

Young  Turks,  Young  Persians,  Young  Egyptians, 
Young  Indians,  and  Young  Chinese  have  shown  to 
Europe  and  America  the  peril — and  the  pity — of  our 
western  and  Christian  education,  when  it  is  given  to 
eastern  and  non-Christian  students.  They  are  bom 
into  the  intellectual  life  with  our  ideas  and  are 
inspired  by  our  ideals,  but  have  none  of  the  back- 
ground, none  of  the  inheritance  of  our  national 
atmosphere  and  our  family  training  to  enable  them 
to  live  up  to  the  standards  we  have  put  before  them. 
Their  disillusionment  is  bitter.  They  resent  our 
attitude  of  superiority.  They  hate  us,  even  though 
they  feign  to  admire  us.  Their  jealousy  of  our 
institutions  leads  them  to  console  themselves  by 
singling  out  and  forcing  themselves  to  see  only  the 
weak  and  vulnerable  points  in  our  civilization. 
Educated  in  our  universities,  they  return  to  their 
countries  to  conspire  against  us.  The  illiterate  and 
simple  Oriental,  who  has  never  travelled,  is  fre- 
quently the  model  of  fidelity  and  loyalty  and  af- 
fection to  his  Occidental  master  or  friend.  But  no 
educated  non-Christian  Oriental,  who  has  travelled 
and  studied  and  lived  on  terms  of  equality  with 
Europeans  or  Americans  in  Europe  or  America,  can 
ever  be  a  sincere  friend.  The  common  result  of 
social  contact  and  intellectual  companionship  is  that 
he  becomes  a  foe, — and  conceals  the  fact.  Famil- 
iarity has  bred  more  than  contempt. 

The  Young  Persians  would  have  no  European 

85 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

aid.  They  waited,  and  suffered.  Finally,  after  a 
particularly  bad  year  from  the  standpoint  of  finan- 
cial exactions,  the  Moslem  clergy  of  the  North  were 
drawn  into  the  Young  Persia  movement.  A  revolu- 
tion, in  which  the  Mohammedan  mullahs  took  part, 
compelled  the  dying  Shah,  Muzaffereddin,  to  issue 
a  decree  ordering  the  convocation  of  a  medjliss  (com- 
mittee of  notables)  on  August  5,  1906.  This  impro- 
vised Parliament,  composed  only  of  delegates  of  the 
provinces  nearest  the  capital,  drafted  a  constitution 
which  was  promulgated  on  New  Year's  Day,  1907. 
The  following  week,  Muzaffereddin  died  and  was 
succeeded  by  his  son,  Mohammed  Ali  Mirza,  a 
reactionary  of  the  worst  type. 

Mohammed  Ali  had  no  intention  of  putting  the 
Constitution  into  force.  A  serious  revolution  broke 
out  in  Tabriz  a  few  weeks  after  his  accession.  He 
was  compelled  to  acknowledge  the  Constitution 
granted  by  his  father.  In  order  to  nullify  its  effect, 
however,  the  new  Shah  called  to  the  Grand  Vizierate 
the  exiled  Ali  Asgar  Khan,  whom  he  believed  to  be 
strong  enough  to  overrule  the  wishes  of  the  Parlia- 
ment. The  Constitutionalists  formed  a  society  of 
fedavis  to  prevent  the  return  to  absolutism.  At  their 
instigation,  Ali  Asgar  Khan  was  assassinated.  The 
coimtry  fell  into  an  anarchic  state. 

Constitutional  Persia,  as  much  because  of  the 
inexperience  of  the  Constitutionalists  as  of  the  ill- 
will  of  the  Shah,  was  worse  off  than  under  the  despot- 
ism of  Muzaffereddin.  There  was  no  money  in  the 
treasury.  The  peasants  would  not  pay  their  taxes. 
One  can  hardly  blame  them,  for  not  a  cent  of  the 

86 


THE  PASSING  OF  PERSIA 

money  ever  went  for  local  improvements  or  local 
government.  Throughout  Persia,  even  in  the  cities, 
life  was  unsafe.  The  Persians,  no  more  than  the 
Turks,  could  call  forth  from  the  ranks  of  their  enthu- 
siasts a  progressive  and  fearless  statesman  of  the 
type  of  Stambuloff  or  Venizelos.  In  their  Parlia- 
ment they  all  talked  at  once.  None  was  willing  to 
listen  to  his  neighbour.  It  may  have  been  because 
there  was  no  Mirabeau.  But  could  a  Mirabeau 
have  overcome  the  fatal  defects  of  the  Mohammedan 
training  and  character  that  made  the  Young  Persians 
incapable  of  realizing  the  constitutionalism  of  their 
dreams?  Every  man  was  suspicious  and  jealous  of 
his  neighbour.  Every  man  wanted  to  lead,  and  none 
to  be  led.  Every  man  wanted  power  without  respon- 
sibility, prestige  without  work,  success  without 
sacrifice. 

It  was  at  this  moment  that  one  of  the  most  signi- 
ficant events  of  contemporary  times  was  helped  to 
fruition  by  the  state  of  affairs  in  Persia.  Great 
Britain  and  Russia,  rivals — even  enemies — in  west- 
em  and  central  Asia,  signed  a  convention.  Their 
conflicting  ambitions  were  amicably  compromised. 
Along  with  the  questions  of  Afghanistan  and  Thibet, 
this  accord  settled  the  rivalry  that  had  done  much 
to  keep  Persia  a  hotbed  of  diplomatic  intrigue  like 
Macedonia  ever  since  the  Crimean  War. 

In  regard  to  Persia,  the  two  Powers  solemnly 
swore  to  respect  its  integrity  and  its  independence, 
and  then  went  on  to  sign  its  death  warrant,  by  agree- 
ing upon  the  question  of  "the  spheres  of  influence." 
In  spite  of  all  sophisms,  this  convention  marked  the 

87 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

passing  of  Persia  as  an  independent  state.  Persia  is 
worse  off  than  Morocco  and  Egypt.  For  one  master 
is  better  than  two! 

Here  enters  Germany.  For  many  years  German 
merchants  had  looked  upon  Persia  as  they  looked 
upon  Morocco  and  Turkey.  Here  were  the  legiti- 
mate fields  for  commercial  expansion.  Probably 
there  were  also  dreams  of  political  advantages  to 
be  gained  later.  In  their  dealings  with  the  three 
Moslem  countries  that  were  still  "unprotected" 
when  they  inaugurated  their  Weltpolitik,  the  Germans 
had  been  attentive  students  of  British  policy  in  the 
days  of  her  first  entry  into  India  and  to  Egypt. 
There  were  many  Germans  who  honestly  believed 
that  their  activities  in  these  independent  Moslem 
countries  would  only  give  them  "their  place  under 
the  sun,"  and  a  legitimate  field  for  the  overflow  of 
their  population  and  national  energy,  but  that  it 
would  also  be  a  distinct  advantage  to  the  peace  of 
the  world.  Great  Britain  and  Russia  and  France 
had  already  divided  up  between  them  the  larger 
part  of  Asia  and  Africa.  In  the  process.  Great 
Britain  had  recently  come  almost  to  blows  with  both 
her  rivals.  If  Germany  stepped  in  between  them, 
would  this  not  prevent  a  future  conflict?  But  the 
rivals  "divided  up."  Germany  was  left  out  in  the 
cold.  It  is  not  a  very  far  cry  from  Teheran  and 
Koweit  and  Fez  to  Liege  and  Brussels  and  Antwerp. 
Belgium  is  paying  the  bill. 

The  Anglo- Russian  convention  of  August  31, 
1907,  was  the  first  of  three  doors  slammed  in  Ger- 
many's face.     The  Anglo-French  convention  of  May 

88 


THE  PASSING  OF  PERSIA 

8,  1904,  had  been  an  attempt  to  do  this.  But  by 
Emperor  William's  visit  to  Tangiers  in  1905,  Ger- 
many got  in  her  foot  before  the  door  was  closed! 
In  Persia  there  was  no  way  that  she  could  in- 
tervene directly  to  demand  that  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  bring  their  accord  before  an  international 
congress. 

Germany  began  to  work  in  Persia  through  two 
agencies.  She  incited  Turkey  to  cross  the  frontier 
of  the  Azerbaidjan,  and  to  make  the  perfectly  reason- 
able request  that  the  third  limitrophe  state  should 
be  taken  into  the  pourparlers  which  were  deciding 
the  future  of  Persia.  Then  she  sent  her  agents 
among  the  Nationalists,  and  showed  them  how  ter- 
rible a  blow  this  convention  was  to  their  new  consti- 
tutionalism. Just  at  the  moment  when  they  had 
entered  upon  a  constitutional  life,  Great  Britain 
and  Russia  had  conspired  against  their  independence, 
went  the  German  thesis. 

If  only  there  had  been  a  sincerity  for  the  Consti- 
tution in  the  heart  of  the  Shah,  and  an  ability  to 
establish  a  really  constitutional  regime  in  the  leaders 
of  Young  Persia,  the  Anglo-Russian  accord  might 
have  proved  of  no  value.  But — unfortunately  for 
Persia  and  for  Germany — the  Shah,  worked  upon 
skilfully  by  Russian  emissaries  and  by  members  of 
his  entourage,  who  were  paid  by  Russian  gold,  at- 
tempted a  coup  d'etat  against  the  Parliament  in 
December,  1907.  He  failed  to  carry  it  through. 
With  a  smile  on  his  lips  and  rage  in  his  heart,  he  once 
more  went  through  the  farce  of  swearing  to  be  a  good 
constitutional  ruler.     But  in  June,  1908,  he  succeeded 

89 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

in  dispersing  the  Parliament  by  bombarding  the 
palace  in  which  it  sat. 

It  would  be  wearisome  to  go  into  the  story  of  the 
revolts  and  anarchy  in  all  parts  of  Persia  in  1908 
and  1909.  After  a  year  of  fighting  and  Oriental 
promises,  of  solemn  oaths  and  the  breaking  of  them, 
the  constitutionalists  finally  drove  Mohammed  Ali 
from  Teheran  in  July,  1909.  The  Shah  saved  his 
life  by  taking  refuge  in  the  Russian  legation.  A 
few  days  later,  he  took  the  road  to  exile.  He  has 
since  reappeared  in  Persia  twice  to  stir  up  trouble 
in  the  north.  On  both  occasions,  it  was  when  the 
Russians  were  finding  it  hard  to  justify  their  con- 
tinued occupation  of  the  northern  provinces. 

Mohammed  Ali  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Ali 
Mirza,  a  boy  of  eleven  years,  who  was  still  too  young 
to  be  anything  more  than  a  mere  plaything  in  the 
hands  of  successive  regents. 

The  civil  strife  in  Persia  gave  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  the  excuse  for  entering  the  country.  In 
accord  with  Great  Britain,  Russia  sent  an  expedition 
to  occupy  Tabriz  on  April  29,  1909.  Later,  Russian 
troops  occupied  Ardebil,  Recht,  Kazvin,  and  other 
cities  in  the  Russian  sphere  of  influence.  Owing  to 
the  anarchy  in  the  south  during  1910,  Great  Britain 
prepared  to  send  troops  "to  protect  the  safety  of  the 
roads  for  merchants."  This  was  not  actually  done, 
for  conditions  of  travel  slightly  ameliorated.  But 
Persia  has  rested  since  under  the  menace  of  a  British 
occupation. 

Every  effort  made  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos  in 
Persia   has   failed.     Serious   attempts   at   financial 

90 


THE  PASSING  OF  PERSIA 

reform  were  undertaken  by  an  American  mission, 
under  the  direction  of  a  former  American  official 
in  the  PhiHppine  Islands.  This  mission  failed,  and 
only  increased  the  humiliation  of  the  Persian  Govern- 
ment. The  American  Treasurer- General  had  more 
zeal  than  common  sense.  He  failed  to  recognize 
the  fact  that  the  Anglo-Russian  accord  of  1907  was 
more  than  a  mere  bit  of  writing.  The  sphere  of 
influence  had  become  far  from  imaginary.  One 
day  in  the  summer  of  191 1,  I  was  walking  along  the 
Galata  Quay  in  Constantinople.  I  heard  my  name 
called  from  the  deck  of  a  vessel  just  about  to  leave 
for  Batum.  Perched  on  top  of  two  boxes  containing 
typewriters,  was  a  young  American  from  Boston, 
who  was  going  out  to  help  reform  the  finances  of 
Persia.  I  had  talked  to  him  the  day  before  concern- 
ing the  extreme  delicacy  and  difficulty  of  the  task 
of  the  mission  whose  secretary  he  was.  But  his 
refusal  to  admit  the  political  limitations  of  Oriental 
peoples  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  see  that  con- 
stitutional Persia  was  any  different,  or  should  be 
treated  any  differently,  from  constitutional  Massa- 
chusetts. From  the  sequel  of  the  story,  it  would 
seem  that  the  chief  of  the  mission  had  the  same 
attitude  of  mind  as  his  secretary.  The  American 
Treasurer-General  was  dismissed  because  he  refused 
to  accept  the  reality  of  the  Anglo-Russian  accord. 

When  Germany  saw  that  the  Russian  troops  had 
entered  northern  Persia  with  the  consent  of  Great 
Britain,  and  had  come  to  stay,  there  was  nothing 
for  her  to  do  but  to  treat  with  Russia. 

In  November,  1910,  when  the  Czar  was  visiting 

91 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

the  Kaiser,  Russian  and  German  ministers  exchanged 
views  concerning  the  ground  upon  which  Germany 
would  agree  to  the  fait  accompli  of  Russia's  exclusive 
political  interests  in  Northern  Persia,  and  the  Russian 
military  occupation.  Satisfactory  bases  were  found 
for  an  agreement  between  Russia  and  Germany 
concerning  their  respective  interests  in  Persia  and 
Asiatic  Turkey.  The  Accord  of  Potsdam,  as  it  is 
called,  was  made  in  the  form  of  a  note  presented  by 
the  Russian  Government  to  Germany,  and  accepted 
by  her.  Russia  declared  that  she  would  in  no  way 
oppose  the  realization  of  the  project  of  the  Bagdad 
railway  up  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  that  she  would 
construct  to  the  border  of  Persia  a  railway  to  join  a 
spur  of  the  Bagdad  railway  from  Sadije  to  Khanikin. 
In  return  for  this,  Germany  was  to  promise  not  to 
construct  railway  lines  outside  of  the  Bagdad  railway 
zone,  to  declare  that  she  had  no  political  interest 
in  Persia,  and  to  recognize  that  "Russia  has  special 
interests  in  Northern  Persia  from  the  political, 
strategic,  and  economic  points  of  view."  The  Ger- 
man Government  was  to  abandon  any  intention  of 
securing  a  concession  for  a  trans-Persian  railway. 
On  the  other  hand,  Russia  promised  to  maintain  in 
Northern  Persia  the  "open  door,"  so  that  German 
commercial  interests  should  not  be  injured. 

The  accord  between  Russia  and  Germany  was 
badly  received  everywhere.  France  feared  that 
Germany  was  trying  to  weaken  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance.  Great  Britain  did  not  look  with  favour 
upon  a  recognition  by  Russia  of  German  interests 
in  Asiatic  Turkey.     The  Sublime  Porte  felt   that 

92 


THE  PASSING  OF  PERSIA 

Russia  and  Germany  had  shown  a  disregard  for  the 
elementary  principles  of  courtesy  in  discussing  and 
deciding  questions  that  were  of  tremendous  import- 
ance to  the  future  of  Turkey  without  inviting  the 
Sublime  Porte  to  take  part  in  the  negotiations. 
Turkey  in  the  Potsdam  accord  was  ignored  as  com- 
pletely as  Morocco  had  been  in  the  Algeciras  Con- 
vention and  Persia  in  the  Russo-British  accord. 

The  Potsdam  stipulations  brought  prominently 
before  Europe  the  possible  significance  of  Germany's 
free  hand  in  Anatolian  and  Mesopotamian  railway 
constructions.  It  also  aroused  interest  in  the  pos- 
sibility of  an  all-rail  route  from  Calais  to  Calcutta, 
in  which  all  the  Great  Powers  except  Italy  would 
participate. 

The  trans-Persian  and  all  other  railway  schemes 
in  Persia  came  to  nothing.  Between  1872  and  1890 
twelve  district  railway  projects  had  received  con- 
cessions from  the  Persian  Government.  One  of 
these,  the  Renter  group,  actually  started  the  con- 
struction of  a  line  from  the  Caspian  Sea  to  the  Persian 
Gulf.  A  French  project  for  a  railway  from  Trebizond 
to  Tabriz  had  gained  powerful  financial  support. 
All  these  schemes  were  frustrated  by  Russian  diplo- 
macy. In  1890,  Russia  secured  from  the  Persian 
Government  the  exclusive  right  for  twenty-one  years 
to  construct  railways  in  Northern  Persia.  Needless 
to  say,  no  lines  were  built.  Russia  had  all  she  could 
do  with  her  trans-Siberian  and  trans-Caucasian 
schemes.  But  she  deliberately  acted  the  dog  in 
the  m^anger.  By  preventing  private  groups  from 
building   railways  in    Persia  which   she  would  not 

93 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

build  herself,  Russia  has  retarded  the  economic  pro- 
gress, and  is  largely  responsible  for  the  financial,  mili- 
tary, and  administrative  weakness,  of  contemporary 
Persia.  By  the  accords  of  1907  with  Great  Britain 
and  191 1  with  Germany,  Russia  secured  their  con- 
nivance in  still  longer  continuing  this  shameful 
stagnation.  To  this  day  no  railroad  has  been  built 
in  the  Shah's  dominions. 

Just  a  month  before  the  outbreak  ot  the  European 
war,  the  boy  Shah  of  Persia  was  solemnly  crowned 
at  Teheran.  It  was  an  imposing  and  pathetic  cere- 
mony. The  Russians  and  British  saw  to  it  that 
full  honour  should  be  given  to  the  sovereign  of 
Persia.  The  pathos  of  the  event  was  in  the  fact 
that  the  Russian  and  British  legations  at  Teheran 
paid  the  expenses  of  the  coronation.  The  Shah 
received  his  crown  from  the  hands  of  his  despoilers. 
A  similar  farce  was  enacted  a  little  while  before  in 
Morocco.     Turkey  alone  of  Moslem  nations  remains. 

The  last  effort  of  Persia  to  shake  off  the  Russian 
octopus  was  made  on  October  8,  19 14,  when  Russia 
was  requested  once  more  to  withdraw  her  troops  from 
the  Azerbaidjan.  The  Russian  Minister  at  Teheran, 
without  going  through  the  form  of  referring  the 
request  to  Petrograd,  answered  that  the  interests 
of  Russia  and  other  foreign  countries  could  be  safe- 
guarded only  by  the  continued  occupation.  To  this 
response  his  British  colleague  gave  hearty  assent. 

The  importance  of  the  passing  of  Persia  is  two- 
fold. It  shows  how  in  one  more  direction  Germany 
found  herself  shut  out  from  a  possible  field  of  expan- 
sion.    Through  the  weakness  of  Persia,  Great  Britain 

94 


THE  PASSING  OF  PERSIA 

and  Russia,  after  fifty  years  of  bitter  struggle,  were 
able  to  come  to  a  satisfactory  compromise.  It  was 
in  Persia  that  their  animosity  was  buried,  and  that 
co-operation  of  British  democracy  and  Russian 
autocracy  in  a  war  against  Germany  was  first  en- 
visaged. The  failure  of  the  Persian  constitutional 
Government  was  a  tremendous  blow  to  Germany. 
It  strengthened  the  bases  of  the  Triple  Entente. 
For  the  events  of  1908  and  1909  put  the  accord  to 
severe  test,  and  proved  that  it  was  built  upon  a 
solid  foundation.  The  agony  of  one  people  is  often 
the  joy  of  another.  Has  Persia  suffered  vicariously 
that  France  may  be  saved? 


95 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES* 

WHEN  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia  parti- 
tioned Poland  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  there  were  at  the  most  six  million 
Poles  in  the  vast  territory  stretching  from  the  Baltic 
nearly  to  the  Black  Sea,  Of  these  a  large  number, 
especially  in  Eastern  Prussia  and  in  Silesia,  had 
already  lost  their  sense  of  nationality.  Poland  was 
a  country  of  feudal  nobles,  whose  inability  to  group 
under  a  dynasty  for  the  formation  of  a  modem 
state,  made  the  disappearance  of  the  kingdom  an 
inexorable  necessity  in  the  economic  evolution  of 
Europe,  and  of  ignorant  peasants,  who  were  indiffer- 
ent concerning  the  political  status  of  the  land  in 
which  they  lived. 

To-day  there  are  twenty  million  Poles.  Although 
they  owe  allegiance  to  three  different  sovereigns, 
they  are  more  united  than  ever  in  their  history. 
For  their  national  feeling  has  developed  in  just  the 
same  way  that  the  national  feeling  of  Germans  and 
Russians  has  developed,  by  education  primarily, 
and  by  that  remarkable  tendency  of  industrialism, 

*This  chapter  has  not  been  written  without  giving  consideration 
to  the  Russian  point  of  view.  There  is  an  excellent  book  on  Russia 
since  the  Japanese  War  (from  1906  to  1912)  by  Peter  Polejaieflf. 

96 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

which  has  grouped  people  in  cities,  and  brought 
them  into  closer  association.  This  influence  of  city 
life  upon  the  destinies  of  Poland  comes  to  us  with 
peculiar  force  when  we  realize  that  since  the  last 
map  of  Europe  was  made  Warsaw  has  grown  from 
forty  thousand  to  eight  hundred  thousand,  Lodz 
from  one  thousand  to  four  hundred  thousand,  Posen 
from  a  few  hundreds  to  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand,  Lemberg  and  Cracow  from  less  than  ten 
thousand  to  two  hundred  thousand  and  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  respectively.  These  great  cities 
(except  Lodz,  which  Russia  foolishly  allowed  to  be- 
come an  outpost  of  Pan-Germanism  in  the  heart  of  a 
Slavic  population,  are  the  foyers  of  Polish  nationalism. 
The  second  and  third  dismemberments  of  Poland 
(1793  and  1795)  were  soon  annulled  by  the  Napo- 
leonic upheaval.  The  larger  portion  of  Poland 
was  revived  in  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw.  The 
Congress  of  Vienna,  just  one  hundred  years  ago, 
made  what  the  representatives  of  the  partitioning 
Powers  hoped  would  be  a  definite  redistribution  of 
the  unwelcome  ghost  stirred  up  by  Napoleon.  Poz- 
nania  was  returned  to  Prussia,  and  in  the  western 
end  of  Galicia  a  Republic  of  Cracow  was  created. 
The  greater  portion  of  Poland  reverted  to  Russia, 
not  as  conquered  territory,  but  as  a  separate  state,  of 
which  the  Czar  assumed  the  kingship  and  swore  to 
preserve  the  liberties.  The  unhappiness,  the  unrest, 
the  agitation,  among  the  Poles  of  the  Muscovite 
Empire,  just  as  among  the  Finns,  came  from  the 
breaking  of  the  promises  by  Russia  to  Europe  when 
these  subjects  of  alien  races  were  allotted  to  her. 
7  97 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

The  story  of  modern  Poland  is  not  different  from 
that  of  any  other  nationalistic  movement.  A  sense 
of  nationality  and  a  desire  for  racial  political  unity 
are  not  the  phenomena  which  have  been  the  under- 
lying causes  of  the  evolution  of  Europe  since  the 
Congress  of  Vienna.  In  Italy,  in  Germany,  in 
Poland,  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  in  Finland,  among  the 
various  races  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  and 
the  Balkan  Peninsula,  as  well  as  in  Turkey  and 
Persia,  the  underlying  cause  of  political  agitation, 
of  rebellions  and  of  revolutions  has  been  the  desire 
to  secure  freedom  from  absolutism.  Nationalism 
is  simply  the  tangible  outward  manifestation  of  the 
growth  of  democracy.  There  are  few  national  move- 
ments where  separatism  could  not  have  been  avoided 
by  granting  local  self-government.  Mixed  popula- 
tions can  live  together  under  the  same  government 
without  friction,  if  the  lesser  races  are  granted  social, 
economic,  and  political  equality.  But  nations  that 
have  achieved  their  own  unity  and  independence 
through  devotion  to  a  nationalistic  movement  have 
shown  no  mercy  or  wisdom  with  smaller  and  less  fortu- 
nate races  under  their  domination .  The  very  methods 
that  European  statesmen  have  fondly  believed  were 
necessary  for  assimilation  have  proved  fatal  to  it. 

The  Polish  question,  as  we  understand  it  to-day, 
has  little  connection  with  the  Polish  revolutions  of 
1830  and  of  1863.  These  movements  against  the 
Russian  Government  were  conducted  by  the  same 
elements  of  protest  against  autocracy  that  were  at 
work  in  the  larger  cities  and  universities  throughout 
Europe  during  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

98 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

Nationalism  was  the  reason  given  rather  than  the 
cause  that  prompted.  The  revolutions  were  un- 
successful because  they  were  not  supported  by  the 
nation.  The  mass  of  the  people  were  indifferent  to 
the  cause,  just  as  in  other  countries  similar  revolu- 
tions against  despotism  failed  for  lack  of  real  support. 
The  apathy  of  the  masses  has  always  been  the  bul- 
wark of  defence  for  autocracy  and  reactionary  poli- 
cies. Popular  rights  do  not  come  to  people  until 
the  masses  demand  them.  Education  alone  brings 
self-government.  This  is  the  history  of  the  evolution 
of  modem  Europe. 

The  Poles  as  a  nation  began  to  worry  their  parti- 
tioners  in  the  decade  following  the  last  unsuccess- 
ful revolution  against  Russia.  To  understand  the 
contemporary  phases  of  the  Polish  question,  it  is 
necessary  for  us  to  follow  first  its  three-fold  develop- 
ment, as  a  question  of  internal  policy  in  Russia, 
Germany,  and  Austria.  Only  then  is  its  significance 
as  an  international  question  clear. 

THE  POLES  SINCE  1 864  IN  RUSSIA 

The  troubles  of  Russia  in  her  relationship  to  the 
Poles  have  come  largely  from  the  fact  that  the  distinc- 
tion between  Poland  proper,  inhabited  by  Poles,  and 
the  provinces  which  the  Jagellons  conquered  but 
never  assimilated,  was  not  grasped  by  the  statesmen 
who  had  to  deal  with  the  aftermath  of  the  revolu- 
tion. What  was  possible  in  one  was  thought  to  be 
possible  in  the  other.  What  was  vital  in  one  was 
believed  to  be  vital  in  the  other.     In  the  kingdom 

99 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

of  Poland,  as  it  was  bestowed  upon  the  Russian 
Czar  by  the  Congress  of  \^ienna,  there  were  massed 
ten  million  Poles  who  could  be  neither  exterminated 
nor  exiled.  Nor  was  there  a  sound  motive  for  at- 
tempting to  destroy  their  national  life.  The  king- 
dom of  Poland  was  not  an  essential  portion  of  the 
Russian  Empire,  and  was  not  vitally  bound  to 
the  fortunes  of  the  Empire.  So  unessential  has  the 
kingdom  of  Poland  been  to  Russia,  and  so  fraught 
with  the  possibilities  of  weakness  to  its  owner,  that 
patriotic  and  far-sighted  Russian  publicists  have 
advocated  its  complete  autonomy,  its  independence 
or  its  cession  to  Germany.  Because  it  was  limi- 
trophe to  the  territories  occupied  by  the  Poles  of  the 
other  partitioners,  there  was  constantly  danger  of 
weakening  the  defences  of  the  empire  and  of  inter- 
national complications.  Through  failing  to  treat 
these  Poles  in  such  a  way  that  they  would  be  a  loyal 
bulwark  against  her  enemies,  Russia  has  done  irre- 
parable harm  to  herself  as  well  as  to  them. 

The  Polish  question  in  Lithuania,  Podolia,  and 
the  Ukraine  was  a  totally  different  matter.  These 
provinces  had  been  added  to  Russia  in  her  logical 
development  towards  the  west  and  the  south-west. 
Their  possession  was  absolutely  essential  to  the  ex- 
istence of  the  Empire.  Their  population  was  not 
Polish,  but  Lithuanian,  Ruthenian,  and  Russian. 
From  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea,  the  acquisition 
of  these  territories  made  possible  the  entrance  of 
Russia  into  the  concert  of  European  nations.  They 
had  been  conquered  by  Poland  during  the  period  of 
her  greatness,  and  had  naturally  been  lost  by  her 

100 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

when  she  became  weak.  In  these  portions  of  Greater 
Poland,  the  Poles  were  limited  to  the  landowning 
class,  and  to  the  more  prosperous  artisans  in  the 
cities  and  villages.  They  were  the  residue  of  an 
earlier  conquering  race  that  had  never  assimilated 
the  country.  They  had  abused  their  power,  and 
were  heartily  disliked.  These  provinces  were  vital 
to  Russia,  and  she  was  able  to  carry  out  the  policy 
of  uprooting  the  Poles.  Their  villages  were  burned, 
their  fortunes  and  their  lands  confiscated,  the  landed 
proprietors  deported  to  Siberia,  and  others  so  cruelly 
persecuted  that,  when  their  churches  and  schools 
were  closed  and  they  found  themselves  forbidden  to 
speak  their  language  outside  of  their  own  homes, 
they  emigrated.  In  Lithuania,  the  Lithuanian  lan- 
guage was  also  proscribed.  The  Russians  had  no 
intention  of  blotting  out  a  Polish  question  in  order 
to  make  place  for  a  Lithuanian  one. 

Where  the  Poles  were  few  in  number,  these  meas- 
ures, which  were  exactly  the  same  as  the  Poles  had 
employed  themselves  in  the  same  territories  several 
centuries  before,  were  successful.  The  peasants 
were  glad  to  see  their  traditional  persecutors  get  a 
taste  of  their  own  medicine.  It  was  not  difficult 
to  make  these  provinces  Russian.  They  have 
gradually  been  assimilated  into  the  Empire.  In  all 
fairness,  one  can  hardly  condemn  the  Russian  point 
of  view,  as  regards  the  Poles  in  Lithuania,  Podolia, 
and  the  Ukraine.  Only  youthful  Polish  irredentists 
still  dream  of  the  restoration  of  the  Empire  of  the 
Jagellons. 

In   the   kingdom   of    Poland,    the   situation    was 

lOI 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

entirely  different.  This  huge  territory  had  been 
given  to  Russia  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna  upon  the 
solemn  assurance  that  it  was  to  be  governed  as  a 
separate  kingdom  by  the  Romanoffs.  There  was 
no  thought  in  the  Congress  of  Vienna  of  the  disap- 
pearance of  the  Poles  as  a  separate  nationality  from 
the  map  of  Europe.  But  the  autonomy  of  Poland 
was  suppressed  after  the  rebellion  of  1830. 

After  the  rebellion  of  1863,  Russia  tried  to  as- 
similate the  kingdom  of  Poland  as  well  as  the 
Polish  marches.  The  repression  was  so  severe 
that  Polish  nationalism  was  considered  dead. 
The  peasants  had  been  indifferent  to  the  move- 
ment. Not  only  had  they  failed  to  support  it,  but 
they  had  frequently  shown  themselves  actually  hos- 
tile to  it. 

It  was  because  the  nobles  and  priests  were  be- 
lieved to  be  leaders  of  nationalistic  and  separatist 
movements,  not  only  in  Poland  but  in  other  allo- 
geneous  portions  of  the  composite  Empire,  that 
Czar  Alexander  II  emancipated  the  serfs.  The 
policy  of  every  autocratic  government,  when  it 
meets  the  first  symptoms  of  unrest  in  a  subject  race, 
is  to  strike  at  their  church  and  their  aristocracy. 
The  most  efficient  way  to  weaken  the  power  of  the 
nobles  is  to  strengthen  the  peasants.  Alexander 
himself  may  have  been  actuated  by  motives  of  pure 
humanity,  but  his  ministers  would  never  have  allowed 
the  ukase  to  be  promulgated,  had  they  not  seen  in  it 
the  means  of  conquering  the  approaching  revolution 
in  Poland.  For  the  moment  it  was  an  excellent 
move,  and  accomplished  its  purpose.     The  Polish 

102 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

peasants  were  led  to  believe  that  the  Czar  was  their 
father  and  friend  and  champion  against  the  exactions 
of  the  church  and  landowner.  Was  not  their  emanci- 
pation proof  of  this? 

But  in  the  long  run  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs 
proved  fatal  to  Russian  domination  in  Poland.  For 
the  advisers  of  Alexander  had  not  realized  that  free- 
men would  demand  and  attend  schools,  and  that 
schools,  no  matter  how  careful  the  surveillance  and 
restrictions  might  be,  created  democrats.  Demo- 
crats would  seize  upon  nationalism  to  express  their 
aspiration  for  self-government.  The  emancipation 
of  the  serfs,  launched  as  a  measure  to  destroy  Poland, 
has  ended  in  making  it.  Emancipation  created 
Polish  patriots.  It  was  a  natural  and  inevitable 
result.  The  artificial  aid  of  a  governmental  perse- 
cution helped  and  hastened  this  result.  The  Irish- 
man expressed  a  great  truth  when  he  said  that  there 
are  things  that  are  not  what  they  are. 

A  flock  of  hungry  Russian  functionaries  descended 
upon  Poland  in  1864.  They  took  possession  of  all 
departments  of  administration.  The  Polish  lan- 
guage was  used  in  courts  only  through  an  interpreter, 
and  was  forbidden  as  the  medium  of  instruction 
in  schools.  No  Polish  signs  were  tolerated  in  the 
railways  or  post-offices.  In  the  parts  of  the  kingdom 
where  there  were  bodies  of  the  Lithuanians,  their 
nationalism  was  encouraged,  and  they  were  shown 
many  favours,  in  contradiction  to  the  policy  adopted 
towards  the  Lithuanians  of  Lithuania.  Catholics 
who  followed  the  Western  Rite  were  forced  to  join 
the  national  church.     There  was  a  clear  intention 

103 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

to  assimilate  as  much  as  possible  the  populations  of 
the  border  districts  of  Poland. 

After  thirty  years  of  repression,  Russia  had  made 
no  progress  in  Poland.     In  1897,  Prince  Imeretinsky 
wrote  to  the  Czar  that  the  policy  of  the  Government 
had  failed.     Polish  national  spirit,  instead  of  dis- 
appearing, had  spread  remarkably  among  the  peas- 
ant classes.     The  secret  publication  and  importation 
of  unauthorized  journals  and  pamphlets  had  multi- 
plied.    The   number   of   cases   brought   before   the 
courts  for  infraction  of  the   "law  of  association," 
which    forbade    unlicensed    public    gatherings    and 
clubs,  had  so  increased  that  they  could  not  be  heard. 
Heavy  fines  and  imprisonment  seem  to  have  had  no 
deterring  effect. 
^  Could  Russia  hope  to  struggle  against  the  tenden- 
cies of  modem  life?     Free  press  and  free  speech  are 
the  complement  of  education.     When  men  learn  to 
read,  they  learn  to  think,  and  can  be  reached  by 
propaganda.     When    men    increase    in    prosperity, 
they  begin  to  want  a  voice  in  the  expenditure  of  the 
money  they  have  to  pay  for  taxes.     When  men  come 
together  in  the  industrial  life  of  large  cities,  they 
form  associations.     No  government,  no  system  of 
spies  or  terrorism,  no  laws  can  prevent  propaganda 
in  cities.     From  1864  to  1914,  the  kingdom  of  Poland 
has  become  more  Polish   than   ever  before  in  her 
history.     Instead  of  a  few  students  and  dreamers, 
fascinated  by  the  past  glories  of  their  race,  instead  of 
a  group  of  landowners  and  priests,  thinking  of  their 
private  interests  and  of  the  Church,  there  is  awak- 
ened  a    spirit    of    protest    against    Russian    des- 

104 


East  28"  from       Greenwich         3: 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

potism  in  the  soul  of  a  race  become  intelligently 
nationalistic. 

The  issue  between  Russia  and  her  Poles  has  be- 
come clearer,  and  for  that  reason  decidedly  worse, 
since  the  disastrous  war  with  Japan.  The  Poles 
have  demanded  autonomy  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the 
word.  The  Russians  have  responded  by  showing 
that  it  is  their  intention  to  destroy  Poland,  just  as 
they  intend  to  destroy  Finland.  There  is  an  analogy 
between  the  so-called  constitutional  regimes  in  Rus- 
sia and  Turkey.  In  each  Empire,  the  granting  of  a 
constitution  was  hailed  with  joy  by  the  various  races. 
These  races,  who  had  been  centres  of  agitation,  dis- 
loyalty, and  weakness,  were  ready  to  co-operate  with 
their  governments  in  building  up  a  large,  broad, 
comprehensive,  national  life  upon  the  principles  of 
liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity.  But  in  both  Em- 
pires, the  dominant  race  let  it  soon  be  understood 
that  the  Constitution  was  to  be  used  for  a  destructive 
policy  of  assimilation.  In  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
the  Constitution  was  a  weapon  for  destroying  the 
national  aspirations  of  subject  races.  In  Russia 
it  has  been  the  same. 

After  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  Czar  Nicholas 
and  his  ministers  had  their  great  opportunity  to 
profit  by  the  lessons  of  Manchuria.  But  the  grant- 
ing of  a  constitution  was  a  pure  farce.  Blind  to 
the  fact  that  the  enlightened  Poles  were  interested 
primarily  in  political  reforms,  and  in  securing  equity 
and  justice  for  the  kingdom  of  Poland,  instead  of  for 
the  advancement  of  a  narrow  and  theoretical  nation- 
alistic ideal,   the   Russians  repulsed    the  proffered 

105 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

loyalty  of  the  Poles  to  a  free  and  constitutional 
Russian  Empire.  In  the  second  Duma,  Dmowski  and 
other  Polish  deputies  unanimously  voted  the  sup- 
plies for  strengthening  the  Russian  army.  They 
stated  that  the  Poles  were  willing  to  cast  their  lot 
loyally  and  indissolubly  with  constitutional  Russia. 
Were  they  not  brethren,  and  imbued  with  the  same 
Pan-Slavic  idea?  Was  it  not  logical  to  look  to  Russia 
as  the  defender  of  all  the  Slavs  from  Teutonic 
oppression  ? 

But  Poland,  like  Finland,  was  to  continue  to  be 
the  victim  of  Russian  bureaucracy  and  of  an  intoler- 
ant nationalism  which  the  Russians  were  beginning 
to  feel  as  keenly  and  as  arrogantly  as  the  Prussians. 
Is  the  Kaiser,  embodying  the  evils  of  militarism, 
more  obnoxious  and  more  dangerous  to  civilization 
than  the  Czar,  standing  for  the  horrors  of  bureau- 
cratic despotism  and  absolutism?  Have  not  the 
Armenian  massacres,  ordered  from  Constantinople, 
and  the  Jewish  pogroms,  ordered  from  Petrograd, 
associated  Christian  Czar  with  Mohammedan  Sultan 
at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century? 

The  first  deliberate  violation  of  the  integrity  of 
the  kingdom  of  Poland  was  sanctioned  by  the  Russian 
Duma  in  the  same  session  in  which  it  approved 
violation  of  Russian  obligations  to  Finland.  A  law 
separating  Kholm  from  the  kingdom  of  Poland  was 
voted  on  July  6,  191 2.  The  test  of  the  law  declared 
that  Kholm  was  still  to  be  regarded  as  a  portion  of 
the  kingdom  of  Poland,  but  to  be  directly  attached 
to  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  without  passing  by 
the  intermediary  of  the  Governor- General  of  Warsaw; 

106 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

and  to  preserve  the  Polish  adaptation  of  the  Code 
Napoleon  for  its  legal  administration,  but  to  have 
its  court  of  appeal  at  Kief. 

The  elections  of  191 3  from  the  kingdom  of  Poland 
to  the  Duma  gave  a  decided  setback  to  the  party  of 
Dmowski,  who  had  so  long  and  so  ably  pled  for  a 
policy  of  Pan-Slavism  through  accommodation  with 
Russia.  The  law  concerning  Kholm  had  been  the 
response  of  the  Duma  to  Dmowski's  olive  branch. 
The  moderates  were  discredited.  But  the  failure 
of  the  radical  nationalists  to  conciliate  the  Jewish 
element  caused  their  candidates  to  lose  both  at 
Warsaw  and  Lodz. 

The  birth  of  an  anti-Semitic  movement  has  been 
disastrous  to  Polish  solidarity  during  recent  years. 
The  Polish  nationalists  suspected  the  Jews  of  work- 
ing either  for  German  or  Russian  interests.  They 
were  expecially  bitter  against  the  Litvak,  or  Lithua- 
nian and  south  Russian  Jews,  who  had  been  forced 
by  Russia  to  establish  them.selves  in  the  cities  of 
Poland.  Poland  is  one  of  the  most  important  pales 
in  the  Empire.  The  Jewish  population  is  one-fifth 
of  the  total,  and  enjoys  both  wealth  and  education 
in  the  cities.  Their  educated  youth  had  been  cour- 
ageous and  forceful  supporters  of  Polish  nationalism. 
Before  the  Russian  intrigues  of  the  last  decade  and 
the  introduction  of  these  non-Polish  Jews,  there  had 
never  been  a  strong  anti-Semitic  feeling  in  Poland. 
The  Polish  protests  against  the  encroachment  of 
the  Russians  upon  their  national  liberties  have  been 
greatly  weakened  by  their  antagonism  to  the  Jews. 
The  anti-Semitic  movement,  which  has  carried  away 

107 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

both  the  moderate  party  of  Dmowski  and  the  radical 
nationalists,  as  was  expected,  has  played  into  the 
hand  of  Russia. 

The  Muscovite  statesmen,  while  endeavouring  to 
use  the  Balkan  Wars  for  the  amalgamation  of  south 
Slavic  races  under  the  wing  of  Russia  against  Austria 
have  treated  the  Poles  as  if  they  were  not  Slavs. 
During  1913  and  the  first  part  of  1914,  the  policy 
of  attempting  to  russianize  the  Poles  has  proved 
disastrous  to  their  feeling  of  loyalty  to  the  Empire. 
The  government  announced  definitely  that  the 
kingdom  of  Poland  would  be  "compensated"  for  the 
loss  of  Kholm  by  a  law  granting  self-government  to 
Polish  cities.  This  promise  has  not  been  kept. 
The  municipal  self-government  project  presented  to 
the  Duma  was  as  farcical  in  practical  results  as 
all  democratic  and  liberal  legislation  which  that 
impotent  body  has  been  asked  to  pass  upon. 

THE  POLES  SINCE  1 867  IN  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

The  disappearance  of  Austria  from  Germany  after 
the  battle  of  Sadowa  led  to  the  organization  of  a 
new  state,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  We  must 
divorce  in  our  mind  the  Austria  before  1867  from 
the  Austria-Hungary  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The 
political  situation  changed  entirely  when  Austrians 
and  Hungarians  agreed  to  live  together  and  share 
the  Slavic  territories  of  the  Hapsburg  Crown.  Austria 
no  longer  had  need  of  her  Galicians  to  keep  the 
Hungarians  in  check.  But  there  was  equally 
important  work  for  them  to  do. 

108 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

The  Austrians  have  always  treated  the  Poles  very 
well.  Galicia,  which  had  been  Austria's  share  in 
the  partition  of  Poland,  was  given  local  self-govern- 
ment, with  its  own  Diet,  and  proper  representation 
in  the  Austrian  Reichsrath.  Poles  were  admitted  in 
generous  numbers  to  the  functions  of  the  Empire. 

The  Polish  nationalists  of  Russia  and  Prussia  feel 
very  bitter  about  the  indifference  of  the  Galicians 
to  the  nation  at  large — or  rather  in  captivity.  They 
claim  that  the  lack  of  national  feeling  among  the 
Austrian  Poles  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  have 
been  bribed  by  the  Austrians  to  desert  not  only 
their  brethren  of  Russia  and  of  Prussia,  but  also 
their  fellow-Slavs  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire. 
I  have  heard  this  criticism  ably  and  feelingly  pre- 
sented, but  I  do  not  think  it  just.  Since  national 
aspirations  are  awakened  and  sustained  by  the  effort 
to  secure  political  equality  and  justice,  the  enjoy- 
ment of  these  takes  away  need  or  desire  to  plot 
against  the  Government.  The  Poles  of  Austria  are 
like  the  French  of  Canada.  Their  nationalism  is 
literary  and  religious  in  character.  There  is  no 
reason  for  its  being  anti-governmental. 

Of  late  years,  however,  there  has  been  a  national 
Polish  agitation  in  Galicia.  It  is  directed  not  against 
the  Government,  but  against  the  Ruthenians,  who, 
to  the  number  of  three  millions — nearly  forty  per 
cent,  of  the  total  population — inhabit  the  eastern 
section  of  Galicia.  This  local  racial  conflict,  which 
has  strengthened  rather  than  weakened  the  attach- 
ment "of  the  Poles  to  the  Vienna  Government,  arose 
after  the  introduction  of  universal  suffrage,   when 

109 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

eastern  Galicia  began  to  send  in  large  numbers 
Ruthenian  deputies  to  the  Galician  Diet  and  to  the 
Austrian  ParHament. 

On  April  12,  1908,  Count  Potocki  was  assassinated 
by  a  Ruthenian  student,  whose  death  sentence  was 
commuted  to  twenty  years'  imprisonment.  With 
the  complicity  of  wardens,  the  assassin  escaped  from 
jail  after  three  years.  There  has  never  been  peace 
between  the  Poles  and  the  Ruthenians  since  that 
time.  After  serious  disorders  at  the  University  of 
Lemberg,  where  the  Ruthenian  students  were  treated 
disgracefully,  Polish  and  Ruthenian  leaders  tried 
to  find  common  ground  for  reconciliation  in  Decem- 
ber, 191 1.  The  Ruthenians  demanded  electoral 
reform  with  greater  representation,  and  the  creation 
of  a  Ruthenian  university.  The  imperial  govern- 
ment communicated  to  the  representatives  of  the 
two  nationalities  the  project  of  a  decree  of  public 
instruction  in  Galicia  in  January,  1913.  The  project 
was  a  marvel  of  ingenuity.  A  Ruthenian  university 
was  to  be  established  after  four  years,  but  if  by 
October  i,  191 6,  the  law  voting  credits  for  it  was 
not  yet  passed,  a  special  school  for  Ruthenians 
would  be  attached  to  the  University  of  Lemberg, 
until  their  own  university  was  a  reality.  The  teach- 
ing of  the  Ruthenian  language  would  cease  in  the 
University  of  Lemberg  when  this  "special  school" 
was  inaugurated.  The  Ruthenians  were  suspicious 
of  a  trick  in  the  project.  They  could  not  understand 
its  vagueness.  It  looked  as  if  they  would  be  giving 
up  their  present  rights  in  the  University  of  Lemberg, 
limited  as  they  were,  for  an  uncertainty.     Why  was 

no 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

no  definite  date  for  opening  specified,  or  indication 
given  of  the  new  university's  location?  Would  it 
be  maintained  by  Galicia  with  a  budget  appropria- 
tion in  proportion  to  the  taxes  paid  by  Ruthenians? 

The  Ruthenian  question  in  Galicia  has  been  cited 
here  to  show  how  there  are  wheels  within  wheels 
in  the  complex  questions  of  nationalities.  European 
racial  questions  seem  to  follow  the  law  of  the  animal 
world.  The  littlest  animals  are  eaten  by  little 
animals,  who  in  turn  serve  as  food  for  larger  animals. 
Nations  which  have  suffered  most  cruelly  from  race 
persecution  are  generally  themselves  relentless  and 
fanatical  when  the  power  to  persecute  is  in  their 
hands. 

The  Ruthenian  question  shows  also  how  Poles 
and  Austrians  work  together,  and  are  content  with 
the  mutual  advantages  of  their  union.  I  have  never 
met  an  Austrian  Pole,  who  lived  in  Galicia  and  had 
a  settled  profession  or  business  there,  who  was  not 
a  loyal — even  ardent — supporter  of  the  Hapsburg 
Monarchy.  Austrian  Poles  are  dismayed  as  they 
face  the  terrible  dilemma  of  union  with  Russia  or 
Germany. 

THE  POLES  SINCE  1870  IN  GERMANY 

Germany,  like  Russia,  has  had  a  twofold  Polish 
question:  The  acquisition  of  Polish  territory  on 
either  side  of  the  Vistula  to  the  Baltic  Sea  was  as 
essential  to  the  creation  of  a  strong  Prussian  kingdom 
as  was  the  acquisition  of  Pomerania.  The  portion 
of  Poland  which,  before  the  partition,  cut  off  eastern 

III 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

from  western  Prussia  was  fully  as  much  German  as 
Polish, — in  fact  more  so.  It  became  German  by 
logical  and  natural  conquest  in  the  course  of  Prussia's 
evolution. 

The  situation  was  different  in  Poznania.  This 
territory  of  the  later  partition  reverted  to  Prussia 
at  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  In  1815,  its  population 
was  only  twenty  per  cent.  German.  For  fifty  years 
the  process  of  Germanization  went  on  naturally — 
in  no  way  forced.  When  the  German  Empire  was 
formed,  nearly  half  of  Poznania  was  German.  Many 
of  the  leading  Poles  had  lost  their  sense  of  Polish 
nationality.  They  had  become  German  in  language 
and  in  culture.  How  many  families  there  are  in 
Prussia  whose  Polish  origin  is  betrayed  only  by  their 
names! 

But  the  Germanized  Poles,  for  the  most  part, 
retained  their  religion.  The  notorious  Kulturkampf 
of  Bismarck  aroused  again  the  sense  of  nationality 
which  had  been  lost,  not  only  among  the  prosperous 
Poles  of  Poznania,  but  even  of  Silesia.  Only  the 
bureaucratic  classes  were  unaffected  by  this  renais- 
sance of  nationalism  awakened  by  revolt  against 
religious  persecution. 

Just  after  the  formation  of  the  Empire,  when 
Prussia  needed  all  her  strength  and  force  to  preserve 
her  hegemony  in  the  new  confederation  and  to  lead 
modem  Germany  in  the  path  of  progress  and  civili- 
zation, on  either  side  of  her  kingdom  she  had  to  cope 
with  nationalist  movements  of  Danes  and  of  Poles. 
But  she  did  not  fear  to  undertake  also  the  assimila- 
tion of  Alsace  and  Lorraine ! 

112 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

Since  the  Kulturkampf,  the  PoHsh  renaissance  in 
Prussia  has  thrived  in  spite  of  persecution.  As  in 
Russia,  the  Polish  language  was  banished,  Polish 
teachers  were  transferred  to  schools  in  other  parts 
of  the  Empire,  and  about  forty  thousand  Poles  of 
Russian  and  Austrian  nationality  were  expelled  from 
the  country.  The  persecution  has  been  carried  on 
in  the  schools,  in  the  army,  and  in  the  church. 
School  children  have  been  forbidden  to  pray  in  the 
Polish  language.  Two  unconstitutional  laws  have 
been  passed  by  the  Prussian  Diet.  The  first  of  these 
forbade  the  Poles  to  speak  Polish  in  public  gatherings. 
The  second,  sanctioned  by  the  Landtag  on  March 
8,  1908,  authorized  the  Government  to  expropriate 
land  owned  by  Poles  for  the  purpose  of  selling  it  to 
Germans. 

The  Prussian  scheme  for  getting  rid  of  the  Poles 
was  to  drive  them  from  their  lands  and  instal  German 
colonists.  Private  enterprise  was  first  tried.  A 
"colonization  society"  was  formed,  with  a  large 
capital,  and  given  every  encouragement  by  Prussian 
officialdom.  But  economic  laws  are  not  controlled 
by  politics.  The  colonists  were  boycotted.  Enor- 
mous sums  of  money  were  lost  in  wasted  crops.  The 
farms  of  the  colonists  had  to  be  resold  by  the  sheriff, 
and  were  bought  in  by  Poles.  To  discourage  the 
buying  back  of  the  German  farms,  a  law  was  passed 
forbidding  Poles  to  build  upon  land  acquired  by  them 
after  the  date  of  the  colonization  society's  failure. 
The  Poles  got  aroimd  this  law  most  cleverly.  If  one 
goes  into  Poznania  to-day,  he  will  see  farmhouses, 
bams,  dairies,  stables  —  even  chicken-coops  —  on 
8  113 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

wheels.  The  people  live  in  glorified  wagons.  They 
do  not  build.  Will  there  be  a  law  now  against 
owning  wagons? 

When  the  failure  of  private  enterprise  was  demon- 
strated, the  Prussian  Government  announced  its 
intention  of  applying  the  law  of  expropriation  "for 
the  use  of  the  commission  of  colonization."  This 
was  in  October,  191 2.  At  the  beginning  of  191 3,  the 
Polish  deputies  to  the  Reichstag  brought  before  their 
colleagues  of  all  Germany  the  question  of  the  expro- 
priation of  Polish  lands  in  Prussia.  They  asked  the 
representatives  of  a  supposedly  advanced  and  consti- 
tutional nation  what  they  thought  of  this  injustice. 
Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  tried  to  keep  the 
question  from  being  debated.  He  argued  with 
perfect  reason  that  it  was  a  purely  internal  Prussian 
matter,  which  the  Imperial  Parliament  was  incom- 
petent to  discuss.  But  the  Catholic  centre  and  the 
Socialist  left  combined  to  vote  an  order  of  the  day 
allowing  the  discussion  of  the  Polish  lands  question. 

In  the  history  of  the  German  confederation,  it  was 
the  first  time  that  an  imperial  chancellor  had  received 
a  direct  defiance.  This  vote  is  mentioned  here  to  show 
how  Prussian  dealings  with  the  Poles,  just  as  with 
Alsace-Lorraine,  have  tended  to  weaken  the  purely 
Prussian  substructure  of  the  German  confedera- 
tion, and  to  arouse  a  dangerous  protest  against 
Prussian  hegemony.  Contempt  for  the  elementary 
principles  of  justice  has  been  the  key-note  of  Chan- 
cellor von  Bethmann-Hollweg's  career.  His  mental- 
ity is  typical  of  that  of  German  bureaucracy — no, 
more  than  that,  of  German  statesmanship.     It  is 

114 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

possible  to  have  sympathy  with  German  national 
aspirations,  but  not  with  the  methods  by  which 
those  aspirations  are  being  interpreted  to  the  world. 
To  show  how  little  regard  he  had  for  parliamentary 
opinion  in  the  German  confederation,  the  Chancel- 
lor forced  through  the  Prussian  Landtag,  on  April 
22,  191 3,  only  three  months  after  his  rebuke  from  the 
Reichstag,  an  infamous  law,  voting  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  million  marks  for  German  coloniza- 
tion in  Prussian  Poland.  Shortly  before  the  Euro- 
pean war  broke  out,  another  unconstitutional  law  was 
passed,  which  makes  possible  the  arbitrary  division 
of  large  landed  properties  owned  by  Poles. 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  ASPECT  OF  THE  POLISH  QUESTION 

During  the  war  with  Japan,  the  Czar  and  the 
Kaiser  understood  each  other  perfectly  on  the 
Polish  question.  The  neutrality  of  Germiany  was 
essential  to  Russia  at  that  time.  The  Russians  owe 
much  to  Germany  for  her  benevolent  attitude  of  those 
trying  days.     The  Poles  have  since  paid  the  bill. 

As  in  Prussia,  the  Poles  of  Russia  have  seen  their 
liberties  menaced  more  than  ever  before  during  the 
past  decade,  and  have  had  to  struggle  hopelessly 
against  a  policy  of  ruthless  extermination.  If  on  the 
one  hand  the  Prussian  persecution  is  more  to  be 
condemned  because  Germany  asks  the  world  to 
believe  that  she  is  an  enlightened,  constitutional 
nation,  and  "the  torch-bearer  of  civilization,"  while 
Russia  is  admittedly  reactionary  and  still  half- 
barbarous,  on  the  other  hand  there  is  less  excuse  for 

115 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

the  Russian  persecution  of  the  Poles.  For  in  Russia 
it  is  not  Teuton  against  Slav,  but  Slav  against  Slav. 

Germany  and  Russia  have  had  the  common  inter- 
est of  fellow-criminals  in  their  relation  to  the  Polish 
nation.  Russia  has  not  hesitated  to  co-operate  with 
Germany  through  diplomatic  and  police  channels  in 
riveting  more  securely  the  fetters  of  the  Poles.  Her 
championship  of  the  south  Slavs  against  Teutonic 
aggression  has  been  supposedly  on  the  grounds  of 
"burning  love  for  our  brothers  in  slavery,  in  whose 
veins  runs  the  same  blood  as  ours."  The  sham  and 
hypocrisy  of  this  attitude  is  revealed  when  we  con- 
sider the  fact  that  Russia  has  never  protested  to 
Germany  against  the  treatment  of  the  Poles  of 
Poznania,  nor  shown  any  inclination  to  treat  with 
equity  her  own  Poles.  Here  are  ' '  brothers  in  slavery '  * 
nearer  home.  There  is  ground  for  suspicion  that 
her  interest  in  the  south  Slavs  has  been  purely  be- 
cause they  are  on  the  way  to  Constantinople  and 
the  Mediterranean.  One  who  reads  the  recent 
history  of  Russia  stultifies  himself  if  he  allows  him- 
self to  believe  that  Russia  has  entered  into  the  present 
war  to  defend  Servia  from  Austrian  aggression 
through  any  love  for  or  humanitarian  interest  in  the 
Servians.  If  Russia  gets  the  opportunity,  will  her 
treatment  of  Servian  national  aspirations  be  any 
different  from  that  of  Austria-Hungary?  When  we 
try  to  answer  this  question,  let  us  think  of  Bulgaria 
after  1878  (the  last  "war  of  liberation")  and  of 
Poland  in  IQ14. 

On  August  16,  1 9 14,  when  I  read  the  proclamation 
of  Czar  Nicholas  to  the  partitioned  Poles,  promising 

116 


THE  PARTITIONERS  AND  THEIR  POLES 

to  restore  administrative  autonomy  to  the  kingdom 
of  Poland,  and  posing  as  the  liberator  of  Poles  now 
under  the  yoke  of  Austria  and  of  Prussia,  it  was  hard 
to  be  enthusiastic.  For  the  Jews  of  Odessa  and  Kief, 
and  the  Finns  of  Helsingfors,  rise  up  to  add  their 
cry  of  warning  to  the  bitter  comments  of  Polish 
friends.  Only  two  years  ago  I  saw  in  those  cities 
subjects  of  the  Czar  suffering  cruelly  from  fanaticism 
and  broken  promises,  and  deprived  of  that  which  is 
now  being  held  out  as  bait  to  the  Poles,  and  as  a  sop 
to  Russia's  Allies. 

Austria-Hungary  has  been  able  to  use  the  Russian 
treatment  of  Poland  as  a  means  of  strengthening 
her  own  hold  on  the  border  regions  of  the  Empire. 
It  was  at  the  instigation  of  Ballplatz  that  the  Gali- 
cian  deputies,  on  December  i6,  191 1,  made  a  motion 
in  the  Reichsrath,  inviting  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  "to  undertake  steps  among  the  Powers  who 
signed  the  conventions  at  Vienna  in  181 5  to  assure 
the  maintenance  of  the  frontiers  of  the  kingdom  of 
Poland,  of  which  Russia,  in  violation  of  her  inter- 
national obligations,  was  threatening  the  integrity. 
For  the  separation  of  Kholm  from  Poland  is  an  attack 
upon  Polish  historic  and  national  consciousness." 
It  was  tit  for  tat  with  the  two  Eastern  Powers. 
Russia  burned  with  indignation  for  the  feelings  of 
Servia  when  Austria-Hungary  annexed  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.  Austria-Hungary  burned  with  in- 
dignation for  the  feelings  of  her  own  loyal  Polish 
subjects,  when  Russia  separated  Kholm  from  Poland. 
Both  had  violated  international  treaties.  Russia 
had  no  genuine  interest  in  the  Servians,  and  Austria 

117 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

none  in  the  Poles.  They  merely  seized  upon  weapons 
with  which  to  attack  each  other. 

It  is  a  mystery  how  French  and  British  public 
opinion,  always  so  traditionally  favourable  to  down- 
trodden races,  and  especially  to  the  Poles,  can  hail 
the  Russian  entry  into  Lemberg  as  a  "victory  for 
civilization."  To  the  Austrian  Poles,  the  coming  of 
the  Cossacks  is  as  the  coming  of  the  Uhlans  to  the 
Belgians.  They  look  upon  the  Russian  invasion  of 
Galicia  as  a  calamity  to  their  national  life.  Fight- 
ing with  the  Austrians  are  thirty  thousand  young 
Poles  who  call  themselves  Sokols  (falcons).  Their 
organization  is  something  like  the  German  Turnverein, 
but  more  purely  military.  The  Poles  of  Austria- 
Hungary  are  a  unit  against  Russia. 

One  can  make  no  such  positive  statement  about 
the  attitude  of  the  Poles  of  the  other  two  partition- 
ers.  They  have  little  hope  of  any  amelioration  of 
their  lot  from  a  change  of  masters  through  the  present 
war.  As  I  write,  the  thunder  of  German  cannon  is 
heard  at  Warsaw,  and  the  unhappy  kingdom  of 
Poland  is  the  centre  of  conflict  between  Russia  and 
Germany.  The  Poles  are  fighting  on  both  sides, 
and  Polish  non-combatants  are  suffering  from  the 
brutality  of  both  "liberating "  armies.  The  situation 
is  exactly  expressed  by  a  Polish  proverb  which  is  the 
fruit  of  centuries  of  bitter  experience:  Gdzie  dwoch 
panow  sie,  bije,  Mop  w  skur^,  dostaje — "When  two 
masters  fight,  the  peasant  receives  the  blows." 


ii8 


CHAPTER  VII 
ITALIA  IRREDENTA 

IRREDENTISM  grew  inevitably  out  of  the  deci- 
sions of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  whose  members 
were  subjected  to  two  influences  in  making  a 
new  map  of  Europe.  The  first  consideration,  so 
common  and  so  necessary  in  all  diplomatic  arrange- 
ments, was  that  of  expediency.  The  second  con- 
sideration was  to  prevent  the  rise  of  liberalism  and 
democracy.  The  decisions  on  the  ground  of  the 
first  consideration  were  made  under  the  pressure 
and  the  play  and  the  skill  of  give  and  take  by  the 
representatives  of  the  nations  who  fondly  believed 
that  they  were  making  a  lasting  peace  for  Europe. 
The  decisions  on  the  ground  of  the  second  considera- 
tion were  guided  by  the  idea  that  the  checking  of 
national  aspirations  was  the  best  means  of  preventing 
the  growth  of  democracy. 

The  decisions  of  Vienna,  hke  the  later  modifica- 
tions of  Paris  and  Berlin,  could  not  prevent  the 
development  of  the  national  movements  which  have 
changed  the  map  as  it  was  rearranged  after  the 
collapse  of  the  Napoleonic  regime. 

During  the  past  hundred  years,  ten  new  states 
have    appeared    on    the    map    of    Europe:    Greece, 

119 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Belgium,  Servia,  Italy,  the  German  Confederation, 
Rumania,  Montenegro,  Norway,  Bulgaria,  and — 
possibly — Albania.  With  the  exception  of  Albania 
(and  is  this  the  reason  why  we  have  to  qualify  its 
viability  by  the  word  possibly  ?),  all  of  these  states 
have  appeared  upon  the  map  against  the  will  of,  and 
in  defiance  of,  the  concert  of  the  European  Powers. 
They  have  all,  again  with  the  exception  of  Albania, 
been  born  through  a  rise  of  national  consciousness 
preceded  and  inspired  by  a  literary  and  educational 
revival.  The  goal  has  been  democracy.  None  of 
them,  in  achieving  independence,  has  succeeded 
in  including  within  its  frontiers  all  the  territory 
occupied  by  people  of  the  same  race  and  the  same 
language.  Irredentism  is  the  movement  to  secure  the 
union  with  a  nation  of  contiguous  territories  inhabited 
by  the  same  race  and  speaking  the  same  language.  It  is 
the  call  of  the  redeemed  to  the  unredeemed,  and  of 
the  unredeemed  to  the  redeemed. 

If  we  were  to  regard  the  present  unrest  in  Europe 
and  the  antagonism  of  nations  from  the  standpoint 
of  nationalism,  we  could  attribute  the  breaking  out 
of  contemporary  wars  to  five  causes :  the  desire  of 
nations  to  get  back  what  they  have  lost,  illustrated 
by  France  in  relationship  to  Alsace-Lorraine;  the 
desire  of  nations  to  expand  according  to  their  legiti- 
mate racial  aspirations,  illustrated  by  the  Balkan 
States  in  relationship  to  Turkey  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, and  Italy  in  relationship  to  Austria-Hungary; 
the  desire  of  nations  to  expand  commercially  and 
politically  because  of  possession  of  surplus  popula- 
tion and   energy,   illustrated   by   Germany  in   her 

I20 


ITALIA  IRREDENTA 

Weltpolitik;  the  desire  of  nations  to  prevent  the 
commercial  and  political  expansion  of  their  rivals, 
illustrated  by  Great  Britain  and  Russia;  and  the 
desire  of  nations  to  stamp  out  the  rise  of  national 
movements  which  threaten  their  territorial  integrity, 
illustrated  by  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey. 

The  irredentism  of  the  Balkan  States  led,  first,  to 
their  war  with  Turkey;  second,  to  their  war  with 
each  other;  and  third,  to  Servia  becoming  the  direct 
cause  of  the  European  war.  The  aspirations  of 
none  have  been  satisfied.  Rumanian  irredentism  has 
stood  between  Rumania  and  the  Triple  Alliance. 
The  irredentism  of  Italy  has  not  yet  led  to  anything, 
but  it  is  so  full  of  significance  as  a  possible  factor  in 
bearing  upon  and  changing  the  whole  destinies  of 
Europe  during  the  winter  of  1914-1915,  that  it  can- 
not be  overlooked  in  a  study  of  contemporary  national 
movements  and  wars. 

The  entrance  of  Italy  into  an  alliance  with  the 
Teutonic  Powers  of  Central  Europe  was  believed  by 
her  statesmen  to  be  an  act  of  self-preservation. 

The  opposition  of  the  French  clerical  party  to  the 
completion  of  the  unification  of  Italy  during  the  last 
decade  of  the  Third  Empire  destroyed  whatever 
gratitude  the  Italian  people  may  have  felt  for  the 
decisive  aid  rendered  to  the  cause  of  Italian  unity  at 
Solferino.  On  the  part  of  the  moving  spirits  of  Young 
Italy,  indeed,  this  gratitude  was  not  very  great. 
For  the  first  great  step  in  the  unification  of  Italy 
had  been  accompanied  by  a  dismemberment  of  the 
territories  from  which  the  royal  house  of  Piedmont 
took  its  name.     Young  Italy  felt  that  the  French 

121 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

had  been  paid  for  their  help  against  Austria,  and 
paid  dearly.  The  cession  of  his  birthplace,  at  the 
moment  when  the  nation  for  which  he  had  suffered 
so  terribly  and  struggled  so  successfully  came  into 
being,  hurt  Garibaldi  more  than  the  French  bullets 
lodged  in  his  body  eight  years  later  at  Mentana. 
When  the  French  look  to-day  with  joy  upon  Italian 
irredentism  as  the  hopeless  barrier  between  Italy 
and  Austria-Hungary,  they  should  not  forget  that, 
even  though  fifty  years  have  passed,  Italian  irre- 
dentism includes  also  Savoy  and  Nice. 

After  the  Franco-German  War,  there  were  two 
tendencies  in  the  policy  of  the  Third  Republic  to 
prevent  an  understanding  between  France  and 
Italy.  The  first  of  these  was  the  recurrence  in 
France  of  the  old  bitter  clericalism  of  the  Empire. 
Italy  feared  that  French  soldiers  might  again  come 
to  Rome.  The  second  was  the  antagonism  of  France 
to  the  budding  colonial  aspirations  of  Italy.  When 
France  occupied  Tunis,  Italy  felt  that  she  had  been 
robbed  of  the  realization  of  a  dream,  which  was  hers 
by  right  of  history,  geography,  and  necessity. 

So  Italy  joined  the  Triple  Alliance.  It  is  argued 
with  reason  in  France  that  the  alliance  of  Teuton  and 
Latin  was  unnatural.  Since  Italy  had  become  wholly 
Guelph  to  realize  its  unity,  why  this  sudden  return  to 
Ghibellinism  ?  The  alliance  of  Italy  with  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary,  however,  was  not  more  para- 
doxical than  the  alliance  of  increasingly  democratic 
and  socialistic  and  anti-clerical  France  with  mediae- 
val Russia.  The  reasons  dictating  the  alliance  were 
practically  the  same. 

122 


ITALIA  IRREDENTA 

But  there  was  this  difference.  Italy  entered  into 
an  alliance  with  a  former  enemy  and  oppressor,  who 
was  still  holding  certain  unredeemed  territories  of 
the  united  Italy  as  it  had  existed  in  the  minds  of  the 
enthusiasts  of  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Too  many  books  have  been  written  about  the 
distribution  of  populations  in  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire  to  make  necessary  going  into  the  details  here 
of  the  Italian  populations  of  the  Austrian  Tyrol  and 
of  the  Austrian  provinces  at  the  north  of  the  Adriatic 
Sea.  The  Tyrolese  Italians  are  undoubtedly  Italian 
in  sympathies  and  characteristics.  But  is  their 
union  with  Italy  demanded  by  either  internal 
Italian  or  external  European  political  and  economic 
considerations  more  than  would  be  the  union  with 
Italy  of  the  Italian  cantons  of  the  Swiss  confederation  ? 

Italian  irredentism  in  regard  to  the  Adriatic  lit- 
toral is  a  far  more  serious  and  complicated  problem. 
One  is  struck  everywhere  in  the  Adriatic,  even  as 
far  south  as  Corfu,  by  the  Italian  character  of  the 
cities.  Cattaro,  Ragusa,  Spalato,  Zara,  Fiume, 
Pola,  and  Trieste,  all  have  an  indefinable  Italian 
atmosphere.  It  has  never  left  them  since  the 
Middle  Ages.  It  is  in  the  buildings,  however,  rather 
than  in  the  people.  One  hesitates  to  attribute  even 
to  the  people  of  Fiume  and  Trieste  Italian  char- 
acteristics in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  word.  On 
the  Dalmatian  coast,  the  Slavic  element  has  won  all 
the  cities.  In  Fiume  and  Trieste,  it  is  strong  enough 
to  rob  these  two  cities  of  their  distinctive  Italian 
character.  One's  misgivings  concerning  the  claims 
of  Italian  irredentists  grow  when  he  leaves  the  cities. 

123 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

There  are  undoubtedly  several  hundred  thousands 
of  Italians  in  this  region.  Italian  is  the  language  of 
commerce,  and  on  the  Austrian-Lloyd  and  Hungaro- 
Croatian  steamship  lines,  Italian  is  the  language  of 
the  crews.  But  the  people  who  speak  Italian  are 
not  Italians,  in  every  other  case  you  meet,  nor  do 
they  resemble  Italians.     Why  is  this? 

Nationality,  in  the  twentieth  century,  has  a  mental 
and  civic,  rather  than  a  physical  and  hereditary 
basis.  We  are  the  product  of  our  education  and  of  the 
political  atmosphere  in  which  we  live.  This  is  why 
assimilation  is  so  strikingly  easy  in  America,  where 
we  place  the  immigrant  in  touch  with  the  public 
school,  the  newspaper,  and  the  ballot.  Just  as  the 
Italians  and  Germans  and  French  of  Switzerland  are 
Swiss,  despite  their  differences  of  language,  so  the 
Italians  of  the  Adriatic  littoral  are  the  product  of 
the  dispensation  under  which  they  have  lived.  Un- 
like the  Alsatians,  they  have  never  known  politi- 
cal freedom  and  cultural  advantages  in  common 
with  their  kin  across  a  frontier  forcibly  raised  to  cut 
them  off;  unlike  the  Poles,  they  have  not  been  com- 
pelled to  revive  the  nationalism  of  an  historic  past 
as  a  means  of  getting  rid  of  oppression;  unlike  the 
Slavs  of  the  Balkans,  their  national  spirit  has  not 
been  called  into  being  by  the  tyranny  of  a  race  alien 
in  civilization  and  ideals,  because  alien  in  religion. 

I  have  among  my  clippings  from  French  news- 
papers during  the  past  five  years  a  legion  of 
quotations  from  Vienna  and  Rome  correspondents, 
concerning  the  friction  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Italy,  and  between  the  Italian-speaking  population 

124 


ITALIA  IRREDENTA 

of  Austria  and  the  Viennese  Government,  over  the 
question  of  distinct  Italian  nationaUty  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  subjects.  There  have  been  frontier  inci- 
dents; there  have  been  demonstrations  of  Austrian 
societies  visiting  Italian  cities  and  Italian  soc- 
ieties visiting  Trieste;  there  has  been  much  discus- 
sion over  the  creation  of  an  Italian  Faculty  of  Law 
at  the  University  of  Vienna,  and  the  establishment 
of  an  Italian  University  at  Trieste  or  Vienna;  and 
there  have  been  occasional  causes  of  friction  between 
the  Austrian  Governor  of  Istria  and  the  Italian 
residents  of  the  province.  But  the  general  impres- 
sion gained  from  a  study  of  the  incidents  in  question, 
and  the  effort  to  trace  out  their  aftermath,  leads  to 
the  conclusion  that  these  irredentist  incidents  have 
been  magnified  in  importance.  A  clever  campaign 
of  the  French  press  has  endeavoured  to  detach 
Italian  public  opinion  from  the  Triple  Alliance  by 
publishing  in  detail,  on  every  possible  occasion,  any 
incident  that  might  show  Austrian  hostility  to  the 
Italian  "nation." 

In  1844,  Cesare  Balbo,  in  his  Speranze  d' Italia,  a 
book  that  is  as  important  to  students  of  contempo- 
rary politics  as  to  those  of  the  Risorgimento,  set  forth 
clearly  that  the  hope  of  Italy  to  the  exclusion  of 
Austria  from  Lombardy  and  Venetia  was  most 
reasonably  based  upon  the  extension  of  the  Austrian 
Empire  eastward  through  the  approaching  fall  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  Balbo  was  a  man  of  great  vision. 
He  looked  beyond  the  accidental  factors  in  the  mak- 
ing of  a  nation  to  the  great  and  durable  considera- 
tions of  national  existence.     He  grasped  the  fact 

125 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

that  the  insistence  of  the  Teutonic  race  upon  hold- 
ing in  subjection  purely  Italian  territories,  and  its 
hostility  to  the  unification  of  the  Italian  people,  was 
•based  upon  economic  considerations.  Lombardy 
and  Venetia  had  been  for  a  thousand  years  the  path- 
way of  German  commerce  to  the  Mediterranean. 
If  Austria,  Balbo  argued,  should  fall  heir  to  a  portion 
of  the  European  territories  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
she  would  have  her  outlet  to  the  Mediterranean  more 
advantageously  than  through  the  possession  of 
Lombardy  and  Venetia.  Once  these  Ottoman  terri- 
tories were  secured,  Austria  would  be  ready  to  cede 
Lombardy  and  Venetia  to  a  future  united  Italy. 

After  the  unity  of  Italy  had  been  achieved,  and 
Austria  had  been  driven  out  of  Lombardy  and 
Venetia,  she  did  receive  compensation  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  and,  just  as  Balbo  predicted,  there 
was  born  the  Austrian  ambition  to  the  succession  of 
Macedonia.  That  this  ambition  has  not  been  realized, 
and  that  Russia  was  determined  to  prevent  the  attempt 
to  revive  it,  explains  the  Austro-Hungarian  willingness 
to  fight  Russia  in  the  summer  of  1914. 

Austria  and  Hungary,  from  the  very  beginning 
of  their  existence  as  a  Dual  Monarchy,  have  been 
caught  in  the  vise  between  Italian  irredentism  and 
Servian  irredentism.  They  have  not  been  able  to 
secure  their  outlet  through  Macedonia  to  the  ^gean 
Sea.  They  have  been  constantly  threatened  by  their 
neighbours  on  the  south-east  and  south-west  with 
exclusion  altogether  from  the  Adriatic,  their  only 
outlet  to  the  Mediterranean. 

From  the  economic  point  of   view,   one   cannot 

126 


ITALIA  IRREDENTA 

but  have  sympathy  with  the  determination  of  the 
Austrians  and  Hungarians  to  prevent  the  disaster 
which  would  certainly  come  to  them,  if  the  aspira- 
tions of  Italian  and  Servian  irredentism  were 
realized.  The  severity  of  Hungary  against  Croatia 
and  the  oppression  of  the  Servians  in  Bosnia-Herze- 
govina and  Dalmatia  by  Austria  have  been  dictated 
by  the  same  reasons  which  led  England  and  Scotland 
to  attempt  to  destroy  the  national  spirit  of  Ireland 
for  so  many  centuries  after  they  had  robbed  her  of 
her  independence.  They  could  not  afford  to  have 
their  communications  by  sea  threatened  by  the 
presence  and  growth  of  an  independent  nation, 
especially  since  this  nation  was  believed  to  be 
susceptible  to  the  influence  of  hereditary  enemies. 
It  has  been  fortunate  for  Austria-Hungary  that 
the  claims  of  the  irredentists  at  the  head  of  the 
Adriatic  have  overlapped  and  come  into  conflict  in 
almost  the  same  way  that  the  claims  of  Greece  and 
Bulgaria  have  come  into  conflict  in  Macedonia. 
From  time  immemorial,  the  Italian  and  Greek 
peoples,  owing  to  their  position  on  peninsulas,  have 
been  seafaring.  Consequently,  it  is  they  who  have 
developed  the  commercial  life  of  ports  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean.  Everywhere  along  the  littoral  of  the 
iEgean  and  the  Adriatic,  Greeks  and  Italians  have 
founded  and  inhabited,  up  to  the  present  day,  the 
chief  ports.  But,  by  the  same  token,  those  engaged 
in  commercial  and  maritime  occupations  have  never 
been  excellent  farmers,  shepherds,  or  woodsmen. 
So,  while  the  Italians  and  Greeks  have  held  the 
predominance  in  the  cities  of  the  littoral,  the  hinter- 

127 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

land  has  been  occupied  by  other  races.  Just  as  the 
hinterland  of  Macedonia  is  very  largely  Bulgarian, 
the  hinterland  of  the  upper  end  of  the  Adriatic  is  very 
largely  Slavic.  Just  as  the  realization  of  the  dreams 
of  Hellenic  irredentists  would  give  Greece  a  narrow 
strip  of  coast  line  along  European  Turkey  to  Con- 
stantinople, with  one  or  two  of  the  larger  inland 
commercial  cities,  while  the  Slavs  would  be  cut  off 
entirely  from  the  sea,  the  realization  of  the  dreams  of 
Italian  irredentists  would  give  to  Italy  the  ports  and 
coast  line  of  the  northern  end  of  the  Adriatic,  with  no 
hinterland,  and  the  Slavs,  Hungarians,  and  Germans 
an  enormous  hinterland  with  no  ports. 

Italian  irredentism,  in  so  far  as  the  Tyrol  goes,  is 
not  unreasonable.  But  its  realization  in  Istria  and 
the  Adriatic  littoral  is  impracticable.  Our  modern 
idea  of  a  state  is  of  people  living  together  in  a  political 
union  that  is  to  their  economic  advantage.  Only 
the  thoughtless  enthusiasts  could  advocate  a  change 
in  the  map  of  Europe  by  which  fifty  million  people 
would  be  cut  off  from  the  sea  to  satisfy  the  national 
aspirations  of  a  few  hundred  thousand  Italians. 

The  Italian  Society  Dante  Alighieri  has  gotten  into 
the  hands  of  the  irredentists,  and,  before  the  Tripoli- 
tan  conquest,  was  successful  in  influencing  members 
of  Parliament  to  embarrass  the  Government  by 
interpellations  concerning  the  troubles  of  Italians 
who  are  Austrian  subjects.  This  society  has  advo- 
cated for  Italy  the  adoption  of  a  law  so  modifying 
the  legislation  on  naturalization  that  Italians  who 
emigrate  can  preserve  their  nationality  even  if  they 
acquire  that  of  the  countries  to  which  they  have  gone. 

128 


ITALIA  IRREDENTA 

It  was  a  curious  anticipation  of  the  famous  Article 
XXV,  of  the  German  Citizenship  Law  of  1 914.  In 
191 1,  a  Lombard  deputy  tried  to  raise  the  old  cry 
of  alarm  concerning  German  penetration  into  Italy, 
and  emphasized  the  necessity  of  the  return  to  the 
policy  of  the  Ghibelline  motto,  " Fuori  i  Tedeschi'* 
— "Expel  the  Germans." 

Italian  statesmen,  however,  have  never  given  seri- 
ous attention  to  the  claims  of  the  irredentists.  The 
late  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  deplored  their  senseless 
and  harmful  manifestations.  In  trying  for  the 
impossible,  and  keeping  up  an  agitation  that  tended 
to  make  friction  between  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary, 
he  pointed  out  that  they  harmed  what  were  the  real 
and  attainable  Italian  interests. 

The  antagonism  between  Italy  and  Austria- 
Hungary  has  had  deeper  and  more  logical  and  justi- 
fiable foundation  than  irredentism.  The  two  nations 
have  been  apprehensive  each  about  allowing  the 
other  to  gain  control  of  the  Adriatic.  Up  to  1903, 
Spezzia  was  the  naval  base  for  the  whole  of  Italy. 
Since  that  time,  Tarento  has  become  one  of  the  first 
military  ports,  important  fortifications  have  been 
placed  at  Brindisi,  Bari,  and  Ancona,  and  an  elaborate 
scheme  has  been  drawn  up  for  the  defence  of  Venice. 
The  Venetians  have  been  demanding  that  Venice 
become  a  naval  base. 

Italian  naval  and  maritime  activity  having  in- 
creased in  the  Adriatic,  there  has  naturally  been  more 
intense  opposition  and  rivalry  between  the  two 
Adriatic  Powers  over  Albania.  The  spread  of 
Austro-Hungarian  influence  has  been  bitterly  fought 
9  129 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

by  the  Italian  propaganda.  This  problem  was 
becoming  a  serious  one  for  the  statesmen  of  the  two 
nations  while  Albania  was  still  under  Turkish  rule. 
Since,  at  the  joint  wish  of  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary, 
Albania  has  been  brought  into  the  family  of  European 
nations,  the  question  of  the  equilibrium  of  the 
Adriatic  has  only  become  more  unsettled.  For  free 
Albania  turned  out  to  be  a  fiasco. 

If  the  relations  between  Austria-Hungary,  fighting 
for  life,  and  her  passive  ally  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
have  become  more  strained  since  the  European  war 
began,  let  it  be  hoped  for  the  future  stability  of 
Europe  that  it  has  not  been  because  Italian  irredent- 
ism  has  gained  the  upper  hand  at  Rome.  For  if 
Italy  were  to  intervene  in  the  war  for  the  purpose  of 
taking  away  from  Austria-Hungary  the  Adriatic 
littoral  inhabited  by  Italians,  she  would  be  menacing 
her  own  future,  and  that  of  Switzerland  as  well.  To 
entertain  the  hope  of  taking  and  keeping  Trieste 
would  be  folly. 


130 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  DANUBE  AND  THE  DARDANELLES 

THE  River  Danube  and  the  Straits  leading  from 
the  Black  Sea  to  the  ^gean  Sea  have  been 
the  waterways  of  Europe  whose  fortunes  have 
had  the  greatest  influence  upon  the  evolution  of 
international  relations  during  the  last  half  century. 
The  control  of  these  two  waterways,  as  long  as  the 
Ottoman  Empire  remained  strong,  was  not  a  ques- 
tion of  compelling  interest  to  Europe.  It  was  only 
when  the  decline  of  the  Ottoman  power  began  to 
foreshadow  the  eventual  disappearance  of  the  empire 
from  Europe  that  nations  began  to  think  of  the  vital 
importance  of  the  control  of  these  waterways  to  the 
economic  life  of  Europe. 

There  is  an  extensive  and  interesting  literature  on 
the  history  of  the  evolution  of  international  law  in  its 
relationship  to  the  various  questions  raised  by  the 
necessarily  international  control  of  the  Danube  and 
the  Dardanelles.  In  a  book  like  this,  an  adequate 
statement  of  the  history  and  work  of  the  Danube 
Commission,  and  of  the  various  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions affecting  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles, 
their  freedom  of  passage,  their  fortifications,  their 

131 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

lighthouses,  and  their  life-saving  stations,  cannot  be 
attempted.  It  is  my  intention,  therefore,  to  treat 
these  great  waterways  only  in  the  broader  aspect  of 
the  important  part  that  the  questions  raised  by  them 
have  played  in  leading  up  to  the  gigantic  struggle 
which  foreshadows  a  new  political  reconstruction  of 
the  world. 

The  Danube  is  navigable  from  Germany  all  the 
way  to  the  Black  Sea.  On  its  banks  are  the  capitals 
of  Austria,  Hungary,  and  Servia.  It  traverses  the 
entire  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  forms  a  natural 
boundary  between  Austria  and  Servia,  Rumania 
and  Bulgaria,  and  then  turns  north  across  Rumania 
to  separate  for  a  short  distance  Rumania  and  Russia 
before  finally  reaching  the  Black  Sea. 

The  volume  of  traffic  on  the  Danube  has  increased 
steadily  since  the  Crimean  War.  It  has  become  the 
great  path  of  export  for  Austrian  and  Hungarian 
merchandise  to  the  Balkan  States,  Russia,  Turkey, 
and  Persia,  and  for  Servian,  Bulgarian,  and  Ruman- 
ian products  to  Russia  and  Turkey.  The  passenger 
service  on  the  Danube  has  kept  pace  with  the  com- 
petition of  the  railways.  Eastward,  it  is  frequently 
quicker,  cheaper,  and  more  convenient  than  the  rail- 
way service.  You  can  leave  Vienna  or  Buda-Pesth 
in  the  evening,  and  reach  Buda-Pesth  or  Belgrade  in 
the  morning.  From  Belgrade  to  the  Hungarian  and 
Rumanian  frontier  towns,  the  Danube  furnishes  the 
shortest  route.  From  Bulgaria  to  Russia,  the  Danube 
route,  via  Somovit  and  Galatz  to  Odessa,  is  in  many 
ways  preferable  to  the  through  train  service.  It  is  by 
spending  days  on  the  Danube  that  I  have  come  to 

132 


THE  DANUBE  AND  THE  DARDANELLES 

realize  how  vital  the  river  is  to  freight  and  passenger 
communications  between  Austria-Hungary,  the  Bal- 
kan states,  and  Russia.  Travel  gives  life  and  mean- 
ing to  statistics.    The  Danube  interprets  itself. 

The  Congresses  of  Paris  and  Berlin  considered 
carefully  the  entrance  of  the  Danube  question  into 
international  life  through  the  enfranchisement  of  the 
Balkan  States.  International  laws,  administered  by 
an  international  commission,  govern  the  Danube. 
It  is  a  neutral  waterway.  Problems,  similar  to  those 
of  the  Scheldt,  have  arisen,  however,  in  the  present 
war  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia.  If  Ru- 
mania and  Bulgaria  should  join  in  the  European  war, 
no  matter  on  which  side  they  should  fight,  the  whole 
Danube  question  would  become  further  complicated. 
When  war  actually  breaks  out,  the  rulings  of  inter- 
national law  concerning  neutrality  are  invariably 
violated.    States  act  according  to  their  own  interests. 

In  its  larger  European  aspect,  the  Danube,  as  an 
international  waterway,  is  dependent  upon  the  Dar- 
danelles. Were  Rumania  to  close  the  navigation  of  the 
Danube,  or  were  she  to  preserve  its  neutrality,  she 
would  only  be  preventing  or  assisting  the  commerce 
of  the  riverain  states  with  the  Black  Sea.  Unob- 
structed passage  to  the  outside  world  for  Danube 
commerce  depends  upon  the  control  of  the  outlet 
from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  .^gean  Sea.  The  Hun- 
garian and  Servian  peasant  looks  beyond  his  own 
great  river  to  the  narrow  passage  from  the  Sea  of 
Marmora.  The  question  of  the  Danube  is  sub- 
ordinated to  the  question  of  the  Dardanelles. 

That  the  passage  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  outside 

133 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

world  remain  open  and  secure  from  sudden  stoppage 
or  constant  menace  is  of  vital  importance  to  the 
riverain  Danube  states,  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia, 
to  the  states  bordering  the  Black  Sea,  Russia,  Ru- 
mania, and  Turkey,  and  to  Persia,  whose  nearest 
communications  with  Europe  are  by  way  of  the  Black 
Sea.  Austria-Hungary,  however,  has  another  outlet 
through  the  Adriatic,  Servia  is  pressing  towards  the 
Adriatic  and  the  ^gean,  Bulgaria  has  recently 
secured  an  ^gean  littoral,  Persia  is  dependent  upon 
Russia,  and  Turkey  holds  the  straits.  There  remain 
Russia  and  Rumania,  to  whom  the  question  of  the 
Dardanelles  is  a  matter  of  life  and  death. 

The  international  position  of  Rumania  is  most 
unfortunate.  She  must  make  common  cause  with 
Germanic  Europe  or  with  Turkey  to  prevent  her 
only  waterway  to  the  outside  world  from  falling  into 
the  hands  of  Russia,  or  she  must  ally  herself  with 
Russia,  and,  by  adding  Bukovina  and  Transylvania, 
increase  her  numbers  to  the  point  where  she  can  hope 
to  resist  the  tide  of  Slavs  around  her.  In  discussing 
the  neutrality  of  Rumania,  the  French  and  British 
press  have  given  too  much  emphasis  to  the  loyalty  of 
King  Carol  for  the  Hohenzollem  family,  of  which 
he  was  a  member,  as  the  cause  of  the  failure  of  Ru- 
mania to  join  the  enemies  of  the  Germanic  Powers, 
and  to  the  hope  that  the  death  of  the  sovereign  who 
made  Rumania  may  result  in  a  favourable  change 
in  the  policy  of  the  Bukarest  Cabinet,  The  new 
sovereign.  King  Ferdinand,  is  also  a  Hohenzollem. 
The  hesitation  of  Rumania  has  not  been,  and  is  not, 
primarily  because  of  the  family  ties  of  her  rulers. 

134 


THE  DANUBE  AND  THE  DARDANELLES 

The  Rumanians  in  Hungary  may  call  for  imion  with 
their  enfranchised  brethren,  just  as  the  Italians  in 
Austria  may  call  for  union  with  the  Italians  who 
were  liberated  in  1859  and  1866.  But  is  irredentism 
the  only  factor  in  influencing  the  policy  of  Italy  and 
Rumania?  For  Rumania,  at  least,  the  hope  of  acquir- 
ing Transylvania  and  Bukovina  in  the  international 
settlement  following  the  war  is  offset  by  the  appre- 
hension of  seeing  Russia  at  the  Dardanelles. 

The  Dardanelles  has  been  the  scene  of  struggles  for 
commercial  supremacy  since  the  days  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  wars.  It  was  in  the  Dardanelles  that 
the  great  battle  was  fought  which  brought  about  the 
downfall  of  Athenian  hegemony.  It  was  over  the 
question  of  fortifying  the  island  of  Tenedos  that 
Venice  and  Genoa  in  the  latter  half  of  the  fourteenth 
century  fought  the  war  during  which  the  Genoese 
occupation  of  Chioggia  nearly  caused  the  destruction 
of  Venice.  Then  came  the  Ottoman  occupation  to 
put  a  stop  to  international  jealousies  tmtil  modem 
times. 

The  political  development  of  Russia  from  Moscow 
has  been  a  consistent  forward  march  towards  ocean 
waterways.  There  have  been  six  possible  outlets  for 
Russia,  the  Baltic  Sea,  the  Black  Sea,  the  White  Sea, 
the  Yellow  Sea,  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  the  Adriatic. 
At  different  periods  of  her  history,  Russia  has  ex- 
pended her  efforts  continuously  in  these  various 
directions.  To  reach  the  Baltic,  Peter  the  Great 
built  Petrograd.  One  has  to  stand  on  the  Kremlin 
on  a  beautiful  summer  day  and  look  out  over  the 
sacred  city  of  the  Russians  to  grasp  the  fulness  of 

135 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

the  sacrifice  and  the  marvellous  daring  of  the  man 
who  abandoned  Moscow  to  build  another  capital  on 
piles  driven  into  dreary  salt  marshes.  It  was  for  the 
sea  and  contact  with  the  outside  worid!  To  reach 
the  Pacific  Ocean,  Russia  patiently  conquered  the 
former  empire  of  the  Mongols,  steppe  by  steppe,  and 
when  she  thought  the  moment  of  realization  had 
arrived,  did  not  hesitate  to  throw  a  band  of  steel 
across  the  continent  of  Asia.  To  reach  the  Persian 
Gulf,  she  crossed  the  Caucasus  and  launched  her 
ships  upon  the  Caspian  Sea.  To  reach  the  Black 
Sea,  she  broke  the  military  power  of  the  houses  of 
Jagello  and  Osman,  building  laboriously  upon  the 
ruins  of  Poland  and  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Is  it  to 
reach  the  Adriatic  that  her  forces  are  now  before 
Przemysl? 

In  spite  of  her  struggles  through  three  centuries, 
Russia  is  still  landlocked.  The  ice  is  an  insur- 
mountable barrier  to  freedom  of  exit  from  the  White 
Sea,  her  only  undisputed  outlet.  Japan  has  arisen  to 
shatter  the  dreams  of  the  future  of  Port  Dalny,  and 
make  useless  the  sacrifices  to  gain  the  Pacific.  The 
control  of  Germany  to  the  exit  from  the  Baltic  Sea 
has  been  strengthened  in  recent  years  by  the  con- 
struction and  fortification  of  the  Kiel  Canal.  The 
Persian  Gulf  has  been  given  up  by  the  accord  of  1907 
with  Great  Britain.  There  has  remained  what  has 
always  been  the  strongest  hope,  and  the  one  for  the 
realization  of  which  Russia  has  made  consistent 
and  stupendous  efforts. 

Radetsky,  in  his  memoirs,  has  summed  up  the 
attitude  of  Russia  towards  the  Ottoman  Empire  in 

136 


THE  DANUBE  AND  THE  DARDANELLES 

words  that  give  the  key  to  the  whole  Eastern  Ques- 
tion during  the  past  century : 

"Owing  to  her  geographical  position,  Russia  is 
the  national  and  eternal  enemy  of  Turkey.  .  .  . 
Russia  must  therefore  do  all  she  can  to  take  posses- 
sion of  Constantinople,  for  its  possession  alone  will 
grant  to  her  the  necessary  security  and  territorial 
completeness." 

Three  times  during  the  nineteenth  century  Russia 
endeavoured  to  destroy  the  Ottoman  Empire  in 
Europe  so  that  she  might  gain  control  of  the  exit  to 
the  -^gean  Sea.  In  1828,  her  armies  reached 
Adrianople,  and  half  a  century  later  the  suburbs  of 
Constantinople.  In  both  instances,  especially  the 
second,  it  was  the  opposition  of  Great  Britain  that 
forced  Russia  to  make  peace  without  having  attained 
her  end.  In  1854,  France  and  Italy  joined  Great 
Britain  in  the  invasion  of  the  Crimea  to  preserve 
"the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire."  In  1856, 
at  the  Congress  of  Paris,  Russia  saw  the  western 
Powers  uphold  the  principle  that  the  Czar  had  no 
right  to  sovereignty  even  on  the  Black  Sea,  a  half  of 
which  his  ancestors  had  wrested  from  the  Turks.  It 
was  no  use  for  Russia  to  plead  that  she  had  "  special 
interests"  in  her  own  territorial  waters.  The  Black 
Sea  was  neutralized.  The  expression  "selon  nos 
convenances  et  inter ets'^  was  understood  by  Great 
Britain  to  refer  only  to  British  interests!  It  was  by 
right  of  might  that  Russia  was  held  in  check.  In 
1870,  Bismarck  purchased  the  neutrality  of  Russia 
in  his  war  against  France  by  agreeing  to  Russia's 

137 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

denunciation  of  the  Paris  treaty  clauses  which  held 
her  impotent  in  the  Black  Sea.  But  again,  in  1878, 
Great  Britain  interfered  to  bottle  up  Russia.  Since 
then  the  Russian  navy  has  been  a  prisoner  in  the 
Black  Sea.  Will  it  continue  to  be  so  after  the  war  of 
1914? 

Just  when  Ottoman  power  was  receding,  the  rapid 
development  of  steam  power  began  to  make  southern 
Russia  the  bread  basket  of  Europe.  Steam  machinery 
increased  the  yield  of  these  vast  and  rich  lands,  steam 
railways  enabled  the  farmers  to  send  their  harvests  to 
Black  Sea  ports,  and  steamships  made  possible  the 
distribution  of  the  harvests  throughout  Europe.  I 
used  to  live  on  the  Bosphorus,  and  from  my  study 
window  I  could  see  every  day  the  never-ceasing  pro- 
cession of  grain  ships  of  all  nations  going  to  and  com- 
ing from  the  Black  Sea.  In  May,  1912,  when  the 
Dardanelles  was  closed  for  a  month  during  the 
Italian  war,  two  hundred  steamships  lay  at  anchor  in 
the  harbour  of  Constantinople. 

Another  influence  whose  importance  cannot  be 
overestimated  has  constantly  turned  the  eyes  of 
Russians  towards  Constantinople.  Slavs  are  ideal- 
ists. For  an  ideal  one  makes  sacrifices  that  material 
considerations  do  not  call  forth.  To  the  Russians, 
Constantinople  is  Tsarigrad,  the  city  of  the  Emperor. 
It  is  from  Constantinople  that  the  Russians  received 
their  religion.  Their  civilization  is  imbued  with  the 
spirit  of  Byzantium,  Just  as  one  sees  in  the  Polish 
language  the  influence  of  Latin  in  the  construction  of 
the  sentence,  one  sees  in  the  kindred  Russian  tongue 
the  influence  of  Greek.    I  have  frequently  been  struck 

138 


THE  DANUBE  AND  THE  DARDANELLES 

with  the  close  and  vital  relationship  between  Con- 
stantinople and  Russia  during  the  period  of  the 
development  of  the  Russian  nation.  Now  that 
Russia  seems  to  he  entering  upon  a  period  of  national 
awakening,  the  sentiment  is  hound  to  he  irresistihle 
among  the  Russians  that  they  are  the  rightfid  inheritors 
of  the  Eastern  Empire,  eclipsed  for  so  many  centuries 
hy  the  shadow  of  Islam  and  now  about  to  he  horn  again. 

On  a  July  evening  in  1908,  when  the  constitutional 
revolution  in  Turkey  was  beginning  to  occupy  the 
attention  of  Europe,  I  sat  with  my  wife  in  the  winter 
garden  of  the  Grand  Hotel  in  Paris.  We  were  listen- 
ing to  a  charming  and  intelligent  Russian  gentleman 
explain  to  us  the  aims  of  the  political  parties  in  the 
Duma  of  1907.  A  waiter  came  to  tell  us  that  our 
baggage  was  ready.  "Where  are  you  going?"  asked 
the  Russian.  "To  Constantinople,"  we  answered. 
An  expression  of  wistful  sadness  or  joy — you  can 
never  tell  which  it  is  meant  to  be  with  a  Russian — 
came  across  his  face.  "Constantinople!"  he  mur- 
mured, more  to  himself  than  to  us :  "This  revolution 
will  fail.  You  will  see.  For  we  must  come  into  our 
own." 

The  political  aspect  of  the  question  of  the  Darda- 
nelles has  changed  greatly  since  Great  Britain  and 
France  fought  one  war  with  Russia,  and  Great 
Britain  stood  ready  to  fight  a  second,  in  order  to 
prevent  this  passage  from  falling  into  Russian  hands. 

Almost  immediately  after  the  crisis  of  San  Stefano 
and  the  resulting  revision  of  the  Russo-Turkish 
treaty  at  Berlin,  the  interests  of  Great  Britain  were 
diverted  from  the  north-east  to  the  south-east  Medi- 

139 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

terranean.  She  decided  that  her  permanent  route 
to  India  was  through  the  Suez  Canal,  and  made  it 
secure  by  getting  possession  of  the  majority  of  the 
shares  of  the  Canal  and  by  seizing  Egypt.  The 
Bulgarians  began  to  show  themselves  lacking  in  the 
expected  docility  towards  their  liberator.  British 
diplomats  realized  that  they  had  been  fearing  what 
did  not  happen.  They  began  to  lose  interest  in  the 
Dardanelles.  This  loss  of  interest  in  the  question 
of  the  straits  as  a  vital  factor  in  their  world  interests 
has  grown  so  complete  in  recent  years  that  Russia 
has  no  reason  to  anticipate  another  visit  of  the 
British  fleet  to  Besica  Bay  if — I  refrain  from  pro- 
phesying. It  is  safe  to  say,  however,  that  London 
has  forgotten  Mohammed  Ali,  the  Crimea,  and 
the  Princes'  Islands,  while  the  traditions  of  Unkiar 
Skelessi  are  still  dominating  the  foreign  policy  of 
Petrograd. 

For,  while  the  future  of  the  Dardanelles  has  come 
to  mean  less  to  Great  Britain,  it  means  more  than 
ever  before  to  Russia.  Russia  has  been  turned  back 
from  the  Pacific.  The  loss  of  Manchuria  in  the  war 
with  Japan  caused  her  once  again  to  cast  her  eyes 
upon  the  outlet  to  the  Mediterranean.  To  the  in- 
crease in  her  wheat  trade  has  been  added  also  the 
development  of  the  petroleum  trade  from  the  Cau- 
casus wells.  Since  the  agreement  for  the  partition  of 
Persia  with  Great  Britain  in  1907,  and  the  mutual 
"hands  off"  accord  with  Germany  at  Potsdam  in 
1910,  the  expectations  of  a  brilliant  Russian  future 
for  northern  Persia  and  the  Armenian  and  Kurdish 
comer  of  Asiatic  Turkey  have  been  great. 

140 


THE  DANUBE  AND  THE  DARDANELLES 

Since  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  Germany  has  come 
into  the  place  of  Great  Britain  as  the  enemy  who 
would  keep  Russia  from  finding  the  -^gean  Sea. 
The  growth  of  German  interests  at  Constantinople 
and  Asia  Minor  has  become  the  India — in  anticipa- 
tion— of  Germany.  When  Russia,  after  her  ill-fated 
venture  in  the  Far  East,  turned  her  efforts  once  more 
towards  the  Balkan  peninsula,  it  began  to  dawn  upon 
her  that  the  Drang  nach  Oesten  might  prove  a  menace 
to  her  control  of  the  Dardanelles,  fully  as  great  as 
was  formerly  the  British  fetish  of  the  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  to  keep  open  the  route  to  India. 
Diplomacy  endeavoured  to  ward  off  the  inevitable 
struggle.  But  the  Balkan  wars  created  a  new  situa- 
tion that  broke  rudely  the  accords  of  Skierniewice  and 
Potsdam.  Austria-Hungary  in  the  Balkans  and 
Germany  in  Asia  Minor  became  the  nightmare  of 
Russia. 


141 


CHAPTER  IX 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND   HER  SOUTH 
SLAVS 

IT  has  often  been  predicted  in  recent  years  that 
the  union  between  Austria  and  Hungary  would 
be  broken  by  internal  troubles.  Hungary  has 
been  credited  with  desiring  to  cut  loose  from  Austria. 
The  frequent  and  serious  quarrels  between  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Dual  Monarchy  have  caused  many  a 
wiseacre  to  shake  his  head  and  say,  "The  union 
will  not  outlive  Franz  Josef!"  But  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  has  been  founded  upon  sound 
political  and  economic  principles,  which  far  trans- 
cend a  single  life  or  a  dynasty.  Austrians  and 
Hungarians  may  be  unwilling  yoke-fellows.  But 
they  know  that  if  they  do  not  pull  together,  they 
cannot  pull  at  all.  They  have  too  many  Slavs 
around  them. 

The  principle  upon  which  Austrians  and  Hungari- 
ans have  founded  a  Dual  Monarchy  is  the  old  Latin 
proverb,  divide  et  impera.  In  the  Empire,  Austrians 
and  Hungarians  are  in  the  minority.  In  each  king- 
dom, by  dividing  the  Slavs  cleverly  between  them, 
they  hold  the  upper  hand.     The  German  race  is, 

142 


AUvSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SOUTH  SLAVS 

therefore,  the  dominant  race  in  Austria,  and 
the  Hungarian  race  is  the  dominant  race  in 
Hungary. 

If  one  looks  at  the  map,  and  studies  the  division 
of  the  Empire,  he  will  readily  see  that  it  is  much 
more  durably  constructed  than  he  would  have  reason 
to  believe  from  statistics  of  the  population.  The 
Slavic  question  in  the  Dual  Monarchy  is  not  how 
many  Slavs  of  kindred  races  are  to  he  found  in 
Austria-Hungary,  but  how  they  are  placed  in  re- 
lationship to  each  other  and  to  neighbouring  states. 
It  is  a  question  of  geography  rather  than  of  cen- 
sus. The  student  needs  a  map  instead  of  columns 
of  figures. 

In  only  one  place  is  the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy very  weak,  and  that  is  in  the  south.  The  sole 
port  for  the  thirty  millions  of  Austria  is  Trieste. 
To  reach  Trieste  one  passes  through  a  belt  of  Slavic 
territory,  and  Trieste  itself  is  more  Italian  than 
German.  The  sole  port  of  Hungary'-  is  Fiume.  To 
reach  Fiume  one  passes  through  a  belt  of  Slavic 
territory,  and  there  are  hardly  any  Hungarians  in 
Fiume  itself.  The  Slavs  which  cut  off  Fiume  from 
Hungary  and  the  Slavs  of  the  Dalmatian  coast  and 
of  all  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  belong  to  the  same 
family.  They  speak  practically  the  same  language 
as  the  Servians  and  Montenegrins. 

The  Hungarians,  then,  have  exactly  the  same 
interest  as  the  Austrians  in  every  move  that  has 
been  made  since  the  proclamation  of  the  constitution 
of  Turkey  to  prevent  the  foundation  of  a  strong 
independent  Servian  State  on  the  confines  of  the 

143 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Austro-Hungarian    Empire,    and    to    prevent    the 
Slavs  from  reaching  the  Adriatic  Sea. 

Austria  has  not  been  necessarily  influenced  in  her 
attitude  towards  the  Balkan  problem  by  Germany. 
Although  her  Drang  nach  Oesten  is  frequently  inter- 
preted as  a  part  of  the  Pan-Germanic  movement,  the 
Germans  of  Austria  have  needed  no  German  senti- 
ment and  no  German  prompting  to  arrive  at  their 
point  of  view  in  regard  to  the  Balkan  nationalities. 
It  must  be  clearly  kept  in  mind  that  the  Convention 
of  Reichstadt  in  1876,  which  was  the  beginning  of 
Austria's  consistent  policy  towards  the  Balkan 
peninsula,  was  signed  before  the  alliance  with  Ger- 
many; that  it  was  the  conception  of  a  Hungarian 
statesman,  and  that  the  occupation  oj  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  Pan- 
Germanism.  It  was  a  measure  of  self -protection  to 
prevent  these  remote  provinces  of  Turkey  from  form- 
ing a  political  union  with  Servia,  should  the  Russian 
arms,  intervening  on  behalf  of  the  south  Slavs 
against  Turkey,  prove  successful.  The  extension  of 
sovereignty  over  Bosnia-Herzegovina  in  1908  was 
to  prevent  the  constitutional  regime  from  trying  to 
weaken  the  hold  of  Austria-Hungary  upon  these 
provinces.  Austria-Hungary  certainly  would  have 
preferred  the  more  comfortable  status  of  an  occu- 
pation to  the  legal  adoption  of  a  Reichsland.  But 
she  could  take  no  chances  with  the  Young  Turks.  Her 
military  occupation  of  the  Sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar  was 
inspired  as  much  by  the  necessity  of  preventing  the 
union  of  Montenegro  and  Servia  as  by  the  desire  to 
provide  for  a  future  railway  extension  to  Salonika. 

144 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SOUTH  SLAVS 

Hungary  has  had  to  grapple  with  two  Balkan 
problems,  the  rise  of  Rumania  and  the  rise  of  Servia. 
She  has  had  within  her  kingdom  several  million 
Rumanian  subjects  and  several  million  South  Slavic 
subjects.  Most  of  her  Rumanians,  however,  have 
been  separated  from  Rumania  from  the  natural 
barrier  of  the  Carpathian  mountains,  and  have  not 
found  their  union  with  Hungary  to  their  disadvant- 
age. For  the  Rumanians  of  Hungary  enjoy  through 
Buda-Pesth  and  Fiume  a  better  outlet  to  the  markets 
of  the  world,  and  a  cheaper  haul,  than  they  would 
find  through  Rumania.  They  have  benefited  greatly 
by  their  economic  union  with  Hungary.  It  is  not 
the  same  with  the  Croatians.  They  are  situated 
between  Buda-Pesth  and  the  Adriatic.  They  have 
a  natural  river  outlet  to  the  Danube.  They  are 
not  separated  by  physical  barriers  from  their  broth- 
ers of  race  and  language  in  Servia,  Bosnia,  and  Dal- 
matia.  Were  they  to  separate  from  Hungary,  they 
would  not  find  their  economic  position  in  any  way 
jeopardized. 

Many  South  Slavs  have  advocated  a  trialism 
to  replace  the  present  dualism.  They  have 
claimed  that  the  most  critical  problems  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire  could  be  solved  in  this 
way.  Added  to  Hungary  and  Austria,  there  could 
be  a  Servian  kingdom,  perhaps  enlarged  by  the 
inclusion  of  independent  Servia  and  Montenegro, 
whose  crown  could  be  worn  by  the  Hapsburg 
ruler. 

But  this  solution  has  never  found  favour,  simple 
and  attractive  though  it  sounds  on  first  sight,  with 

145 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

either  Hungarians  or  Austrians.  For  it  would  mean 
the  cutting  off  of  both  kingdoms  from  the  sea.  The 
Hungarians  would  be  altogether  land-locked,  and 
surrounded  on  all  sides  by  alien  races.  Austria 
would  be  forced  into  hopeless  economic  dependence 
upon  Germany.  The  Germans  of  Austria  and  the 
Hungarians  of  Hungary  have  felt  that  their  national 
existence  depended  upon  keeping  in  political  sub- 
jection the  South  Slavs,  and  upon  repressing  merci- 
lessly any  evidences  of  Italian  irredentism  upon  the 
littoral  of  the  Adriatic.  Italian  irredentism  is  treated 
in  another  place.  The  repression  of  national  aspir- 
ations among  the  South  Slavs,  which  interests  us 
here,  has  been  the  comer-stone  of  Austro-Hungarian 
policy  in  the  Balkans.  For  Hungary  it  has  also 
been  an  internal  question  in  her  relationship  with 
Croatia. 

The  Serbo-Croatian  movement  in  southern  Hun- 
gary has  been  repressed  by  Hungary  with  the  same 
bitterness  and  lack  of  success  that  have  attended  the 
attempts  to  stifle  national  aspirations  elsewhere  in 
Europe.  No  weapon  has  been  left  unused  in  fight- 
ing nationalism  in  Croatia.  Official  corruption, 
bribery,  manipulation  of  judges,  imprisonment  with- 
out trial,  military  despotism,  gerrymandering,  electo- 
ral intimidation, — this  has  been  for  years  and  is 
still,  the  daily  record  in  Croatia.  If  there  were  a 
Slavic  Silvio  Pellico,  the  world  would  know  that  the 
ministers  of  the  aged  Franz  Josef  are  not  very  differ- 
ent from  the  ministers  of  the  young  Franz  Josef,  who 
crushed  the  Milanese  and  tracked  Garibaldi  like  a 
beast.     Radetzkys  and  Gorzkowskis  are  still  wearing 

146 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SOUTH  SLAVS 

Austrian  livery.  To  Austria  and  Hungary,  Salonika 
and  Macedonia  may  have  been  the  dream.  But 
Trieste,  Fiume,  and  Dalmatia  have  always  been 
the  realities.  If  Hungary  took  her  heel  off  the 
neck  of  the  Croatians,  Buda-Pesth  might  become 
another  Belgrade  and  Hungary  another  Servia, 
land-locked  with  no  other  outlet  than  the  Danube. 
This  does  not  excuse,  but  it  explains.  In  this 
world  the  battle  is  to  the  strong.  The  survival  of 
the  fittest  is  a  historical  as  well  as  a  biological 
fact. 

In  spite  of  their  juxtaposition,  the  Serbo-Croats 
have  never  been  able  to  unite.  There  have  been 
more  reasons  for  this  than  their  political  separa- 
tion. They  are  divided  in  religion.  The  Servians 
are  Orthodox,  and  the  Croatians  and  Dalmatians 
Catholic.  In  Bosnia  and  Macedonia,  the  race 
adhered  to  both  confessions,  though  in  majority 
Orthodox,  and  has  also  a  strong  Mohammedan 
element.  The  Orthodox  Servians  of  Servia  use  the 
Cyrillic  alphabet,  and  the  Catholic  Croatians  and 
Dalmatians  of  Austria-Hungary  the  Latin  alphabet. 

Until  the  recent  Balkan  Wars,  the  Croatians  and 
Dalmatians  considered  themselves  a  much  superior 
branch  of  the  race  to  the  Servians.  They  have  cer- 
tainly enjoyed  a  superior  education  and  demonstrated 
a  superior  civilization.  The  probable  reason  for  this 
is  that  they  did  not  have  the  misfortune  to  be  for 
centuries  under  the  Ottoman  yoke.  The  Croatians 
have  never  been  willing  to  play  the  understudy  to 
the  Servians.  Agram  has  considered  itself  the  centre 
of  the  Serbo-Croat  movement  rather  than  Belgrade. 

147 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

It  is  a  far  more  beautiful  and  modem  city  than 
Belgrade.  Few  cities  of  all  Europe  of  its  size  can 
equal  Agram  for  architecture,  for  municipal  works, 
and  for  keen,  stimulating  intellectual  life.  Its  uni- 
versity is  the  joyer  of  Serbo-Croat  nationalism  and 
of  risorgimento  literature.  It  was  here  that  the 
one  Roman  bishop  of  the  world,  who  dared  to  speak 
openly  in  the  Vatican  Council  of  1870  against  the 
doctrine  of  papal  infallibility  and  remain  within  the 
Church,  gave  to  his  people  the  prophetic  message 
that  nationality  transcended  creeds.  Here  also  an- 
other Catholic  priest  taught  the  oneness  of  Ser- 
vians and  Croatians  in  language  and  history,  and 
proved  by  scholarly  research  which  is  universally 
admired,  that  Croatia,  Slavonia,  and  Dalmatia 
formed  a  triune  kingdom,  whose  juridic  union 
with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  was  wholly 
personal  connection  with  the  Hapsburg  Crown, 
and  had  never  been  subjection  to  the  Magyar. 
The  Hungarians,  during  the  past  few  years  of  bit- 
terest persecution  at  Agram,  have  not  been  able  to 
drive  away  the  ghosts  of  Strossmayer  and  Racki. 
In  Croatia,  the  pen  has  proved  mightier  than  the 
sword. 

Until  recently,  Austria-Hungary  has  not  felt 
uneasy  about  the  relationship  between  the  Cro- 
atians and  the  Servians  of  the  independent  king- 
dom. But  there  has  never  been  a  minute  since 
the  annexation  of  1908  that  the  statesmen  of  the 
Ballplatz  have  not  been  nervous  about  the  Servian 
propaganda  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  To  keep 
Catholic  Croatians  and  Orthodox  Servians  in  an- 

148 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SOUTH  SLAVS 

tagonism  with  each  other  and  with  the  Moslems, 
to  prevent  the  education  and  economic  emancipa- 
tion of  the  Orthodox  peasants,  and  to  introduce 
German  colonists  and  German  industrial  enter- 
prises everywhere,  has  been  the  Austro-Hungarian 
program. 

Vienna  has  used  the  Catholic  Church  and  the 
propaganda  of  Catholic  missions  for  dividing  the 
Orthodox  Servians  in  Bosnia  from  their  Croatian 
brothers  of  the  Catholic  rite.  Missionaries  give 
every  encouragement  to  Servians  to  desert  the 
Orthodox  Church.  In  the  greater  part  of  Bosnia, 
the  Government  has  made  it  absolutely  impossible 
for  a  child  to  receive  an  education  elsewhere  than  in 
the  Catholic  schools.  There  are  only  two  hundred 
and  sixty-eight  schools  supported  by  the  Govern- 
ment, of  which  one-tenth  are  placed  in  such  a  way 
that  they  serve  exclusively  other  populations.  The 
Bosnian  budget  provides  four  times  as  much  money 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  gendarmerie  as  for  public 
schools. 

Moslem  law  provides  that  all  conquered  land  be- 
longs to  the  Khalif .  He  farms  it  out  in  annual,  life, 
or  hereditary  grants.  In  the  Ottoman  conquest  of 
the  Balkan  Peninsula,  the  territories  acquired  were 
granted  to  successful  soldiers  on  a  basis  which  pro- 
vided for  a  feudal  army.  The  feudal  proprietors,  or 
beys,  left  the  land  to  the  peasants  who  occupied  it, 
in  consideration  of  an  annual  rental  of  a  third  of  the 
yield  of  the  land.  The  peasants  had  in  addition  to 
pay  their  tenth  to  the  tax  collectors  of  the  Sultan. 
In  territories  that  were  on  the  borders  of  the  Ottoman 

149 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Empire,  like  Bosnia  and  Albania,  the  lands  were 
largely  retained  by  their  former  proprietors,  who 
became  Moslems.  So  the  landed  aristocracy  re- 
mained indigenous. 

The  lot  of  the  peasants  in  Bosnia,  who  were 
largely  Orthodox  Servians  was  not  intolerable  under 
Turkish  rule,  except  when  Moslem  fanaticism  was 
aroused  by  Christian  separatist  propaganda.  Austria- 
Himgary  claimed,  however,  that  her  occupation  of 
the  province  was  a  measure  dictated  by  humanity 
to  ameliorate  the  lot  of  the  enslaved  Christians. 
But  the  Austrian  administration  has  accomplished 
just  the  opposite.  The  new  government  from  the 
beginning  supported  its  authority  upon  the  Moslem 
landowners,  upon  whose  good-will  they  were  de- 
pendent to  prevent  the  awakening  of  national 
feeling  among  the  peasants.  Vienna  was  more 
complacent  in  overlooking  abuses  of  the  beys 
than  had  been  Constantinople.  For  the  Turks 
held  their  heys  in  check  when  exactions  grew  too 
bad.  The  Sublime  Porte  was  afraid  of  giving  an 
excuse  for  Christian  intervention.  But  the  Aus- 
trians  encouraged  the  exactions  of  the  beys  in  order 
to  keep  in  abject  subjection  the  Servian  peasant 
population. 

From  the  first  moment  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
occupation,  the  peasants  found  that  they  would  no 
longer  enjoy  undisturbed  possession  of  their  lands. 
The  exodus  of  Mohammedan  Bosnians,  who,  as  we 
have  seen  elsewhere,  were  urged  to  follow  the  Otto- 
man flag,  gave  the  Germans  the  opportunity  of 
settling  colonists  on  the  vacated  lands.     This  process 

150 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SOUTH  SLAVS 

of  colonization  was  afterwards  pursued  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  indigenous  Christian  population.  Ernest 
Haeckel,  the  great  philosopher,  once  said  in  a  lecture 
at  Jena  that  "the  work  of  the  German  people  to 
assure  and  develop  civilization  gives  it  the  right  to 
occupy  the  Balkans,  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and  Mesopo- 
tamia, and  to  exclude  from  these  countries  the  races 
actually  occupying  them  which  are  powerless  and 
incapable."  This  statement,  publicly  made  before 
a  body  of  distinguished  German  thinkers,  reveals  the 
real  ulterior  ideal  of  the  Drang  nach  Oeste?i.  Pro- 
fessor Wirth,  dealing  specifically  with  present  possi- 
bilities, stated  that  the  policy  of  Austria-Hungary 
in  Bosnia  must  be  to  keep  the  peasantry  in  slavery 
and,  as  much  as  possible,  to  encourage  them  by 
oppression  to  emigrate.  The  reason  given  for 
this  was:  "T'o  render  powerful  the  Bosnian  peas- 
ant is  to  render  powerful  the  Servian  people,  which 
would  be  the  suicide  of  Germany. ^^  Can  we  not  see 
from  this  how  public  sentiment  in  Germany  has 
stood  behind  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum  to 
Servia? 

From  1890  to  19 14,  the  theory  of  Haeckel  and  the 
advice  of  Wirth  have  been  followed  by  the  Austrian 
functionaries  in  Bosnia.  No  stone  has  been  left 
unturned  to  drive  the  peasants  from  their  lands. 
Right  of  inheritance  has  been  suppressed,  a  tax  col- 
lector has  been  introduced  between  the  bey  and 
his  peasants,  the  taxes  have  been  raised  in  many 
cases  arbitrarily  to  the  point  where  the  peas- 
ants have  been  compelled  to  abandon  their  land. 
To    German  immigrants    have    been    given    com- 

151 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

munal  lands  which  were  necessary  to  the  peasants 
for  pasturage  and  the  forests  where  their  swine  fed 
on  acorns. 

The  population  of  Bosnia  hardly  surpasses  thirty- 
five  inhabitants  to  the  kilometre.  The  total  popu- 
lation is  about  two  millions,  of  whom  eight  hundred 
thousand  are  Orthodox,  six  hundred  thousand  Mos- 
lem, and  five  hundred  thousand  Catholic.  But 
practically  all  of  this  population — except  one  hundred 
thousand  who  are  Jews,  Protestants,  and  other 
German  immigrants — is  Servian  or  Servian-speaking. 
There  are  thirty-five  Germans,  as  opposed  to  one 
million  eight  hundred  thousand  Slavs.  And  yet 
German  is  the  language  of  the  administration,  and 
the  only  language  of  the  railways  and  posts  and  tele- 
graphs, which  in  Bosnia  have  not  ceased  to  be  under 
the  control  of  the  military  government.  Many 
functionaries  after  thirty  years  of  service  in  Bosnia 
do  not  know  the  language  of  the  country.  Two 
German  newspapers  are  supported  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  public  budget  to  attack  indigenous 
elements.  In  German  schools,  pupils  are  taught 
the  history  of  Germany,  but  in  Slavic  schools  the 
history  of  the  south  Slavs  is  excluded  from  the 
curriculum.  There  are  fourteen  schools  for  ten 
thousand  Germans,  and  one  school  for  every  six 
thousand  Slavs. 

In  the  administration  of  Bosnia,  only  thirty-one 
out  of  three  hundred  and  twenty-two  functionaries 
are  Servians,  only  twelve  out  of  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  professors  of  lyceums,  only  thirty-one 
out  of  two  hundred  and  thirty-seven  judges  and 

152 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SOUTH  SLAVS 

magistrates.  And  yet  the  Orthodox  Servians  form 
forty-four  per  cent,  of  the  population.  The  young 
Bosnians  who  have  graduated  from  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  universities  find  themselves  excluded  from 
public  life.  Turning  to  commercial  life,  they  find 
eighty  per  cent,  of  the  large  industries  controlled  by 
German  capital  and  managed  exclusively  by  Ger- 
mans. Turning  to  agriculture,  they  find  economic 
misery  and  hopeless  ignorance  among  the  peasants 
of  their  race,  and  every  effort  made  by  the  Govern- 
ment to  prevent  the  bettering  of  their  lot.  Turning 
to  journalism  and  public  speaking  to  work  for  their 
race,  they  find  an  imreasoning  censorship  and  a  law 
against  assemblies.  As  one  of  them  expressed  it 
to  me,  "We  must  either  cease  to  be  Slavs  or  become 
revolutionaries. ' ' 

Did  Austria-Hungary  need  to  look  to  Servian 
propaganda,  to  influences  from  the  outside,  to  find 
the  cause  of  the  assassination  of  Franz  Ferdinand? 
Political  assassinations  were  not  new  in  the  south 
Slavic  provinces  of  the  monarchy.  A  young  Bosnian 
student  attempted  to  assassinate  the  Governor  of 
Bosnia  at  Sarajevo  on  June  6,  1 910,  at  the  time  of 
the  inauguration  of  the  Bosnian  Sahor  (Diet).  Two 
years  later  the  royal  commissioner  in  Croatia  was 
the  object  of  an  attempt  at  assassination  by  a 
Bosnian  at  Agram.  In  September  of  the  same 
year,  a  Croatian  student  shot  at  the  Ban  of  Cro- 
atia. The  same  Ban,  Skerletz,  was  attacked 
again  at  Agram  by  another  yoimg  Croatian  on 
August  18,  1 91 3.  These  assassinations  preceded 
those    of    the    Archduke    and    his    wife.      They 

153 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

were  all  committed  by  students  of  Austro-Hun- 
garian  nationality.  Only  the  last  one  had  ever 
been  in  Servia. 

In  theory,  Bosnia  has  had  since  February  20,  191  o, 
a  constitution  with  a  deliberative  assembly.  But 
the  Sahor  can  discuss  no  projects  of  law  that  have 
not  been  proposed  by  the  two  masters.  Once  voted, 
a  law  has  to  pass  the  double  veto  of  Vienna  and  Buda- 
Pesth.  As  if  this  were  not  enough,  the  Viennese 
bureaucracy  has  so  arranged  the  qualification  of  the 
electorate  and  the  electoral  laws  that  the  suffrage 
does  not  represent  the  country.  Then,  too,  the 
constitution  decides  arbitrarily  that  the  membership 
of  the  Sahor  must  be  divided  according  to  religions, 
one  Jew,  sixteen  Catholics,  twenty-four  Moslems, 
and  thirty-one  Orthodox.  The  Government  has 
reserved  for  itself  the  right  of  naming  twenty  mem- 
bers! The  constitution  provides  for  individual 
liberty,  the  inviolability  of  one's  home,  liberty  of  the 
press  and  speech,  and  secrecy  of  letters  and  tele- 
grams. This  enlightened  measure  of  the  Emperor 
was  heralded  to  the  world.  But  of  course  there 
was  the  joker.  Article  20.  Vienna  held  the  highest 
card!  In  case  of  menace  to  the  public  safety,  all 
public  and  private  rights  may  be  suspended  by  a 
word  from  Vienna.  Public  safety  always  being 
menaced  in  Bosnia,  the  constitution  is  perpetually 
suspended.  The  Government  even  goes  as  far  as 
to  prosecute  deputies  for  their  speeches  in  Parlia- 
ment. Newspapers  are  continually  censored.  Their 
telegraphic  news  from  Vienna  and  Buda-Pesth  is 
suppressed    without    reason.      Particularly    severe 

154 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SOUTH  SLAVS 

fines — sometimes  jail  sentences — are  passed  upon 
offending   journalists. 

Is  it  necessarily  because  of  instigation  and  pro- 
paganda from  Belgrade  that  of  the  three  Ser- 
vian political  parties  in  Bosnia  two  (the  Narod 
and  the  Otachbina)  are  closely  allied  to  the 
Pan-Servian  Society  Narodna  Obrana,  and  that 
these  two  parties  openly  support  the  separatist 
movement? 

In  Bosnia,  Dalmatia,  and  Croatia  in  1914  the 
bureaucracy  of  Vienna  has  been  engaged  in  the 
same  process  of  repression  and  police  persecution 
as  in  Italy  during  the  half  centurj'-  from  181 5 
to  the  liberation  of  Italy.  The  local  constitu- 
tions have  been  suspended  everywhere.  Why 
have  the  Austrians,  in  spite  of  the  lessons  of  the 
beginning  of  the  present  reign,  dared  to  tempt 
providence  in  exactly  the  same  way  after  the  Golden 
Jubilee? 

The  victories  of  the  Allies  in  the  Balkans  were  a 
terrible  blow  to  Austria-Hungary.  Not  only  was 
her  dream  of  reaching  the  ^gean  Sea  through  the 
sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar  and  Macedonia  shattered 
by  the  Greek  occupation  of  Salonika,  but  the  aggran- 
dizement of  Servia,  caused  by  a  successful  war, 
threatened  to  have  a  serious  effect  upon  the 
fortunes  of  the  Empire.  The  appearance  of  the 
Servians  on  the  Adriatic  would  mean  really  the 
extension  of  Russian  influence  through  Bulgaria 
and  Servia  to  the  Austrian  and  Italian  private 
lake,  and  would  cut  off  Austria  for  ever  from 
her    economic    outlet    to    the  ^gean.     But   there 

155 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

was  more  than  this  to  cause  alarm  both  in 
Austria  and  in  Hungary.  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia,  and  Dalmatia — would  they  remain  loyal 
to  the  Empire,  if  once  they  came  under  the  spell 
of  the  idea  of  Greater  Servia?  Leaving  Russia 
entirely  out  of  the  calculation,  an  independent, 
self-reliant,  and  enlarged  Servia,  extending  towards 
the  Adriatic  and  ^gean  Seas,  if  not  actually  reach- 
ing it, — would  it  not  be,  as  Professor  Wirth  declared, 
"the  suicide  of  Germany"?  The  statesmen  of  the 
Hohenzollem  and  Hapsburg  Empires  determined 
that  it  should  not  occur. 

From  the  very  moment  that  the  Servian  armies 
drove  the  Turks  before  them,  Austria-Hungary 
began  to  act  the  bully  against  Servia.  The  Aus- 
trian consuls  at  Prisrend  and  Mitrovitza  were 
made  the  first  cause  of  Austrian  interference. 
It  was  pretended  that  Herr  Prochaska  had  been 
massacred  and  mutilated  at  Prisrend,  and  that 
the  life  of  Herr  Tahy  had  been  threatened  so 
that  he  was  forced  to  flee  for  safety  from  Mi- 
trovitza. A  formal  inquest  showed  that  the  first 
of  these  consuls  was  safe,  and  that  the  trouble 
had  been  merely  a  discussion  between  Servian 
officers  and  Herr  Prochaska  over  some  fleeing 
Albanians  who  had  taken  refuge  in  the  consulate. 
In  the  other  case,  there  seemed  to  be  no  ground 
at  all  for  complaint.  But  on  January  15,  1913, 
the  Servians  acceded  to  the  demand  of  Austria 
that  the  reparation  be  granted  for  the  Prisrend 
incident.  A  company  of  Servian  soldiers  saluted 
the  Austro-Hungarian   flag   as    Consul    Prochaska 

156 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SOUTH  SLAVS 

solemnly  raised  it.  This  incident  seems  too  petty 
to  mention,  but  in  that  part  of  the  world  and  at 
that  moment  we  thought  it  very  serious.  For  it 
showed  how  anxious  Austria-Hungary  was  to  pick 
a  quarrel  with  Servia  in  the  midst  of  the  Balkan 
War. 

Two  other  incidents  of  an  even  more  serious 
character  immediately  followed.  Servia  refused 
the  Austrian  demand  that  Durazzo  be  evacuated, 
supporting  herself  upon  the  hope  that  Russia  would 
intervene.  During  December  and  January,  deluded 
by  unofficial  representatives  of  Russian  public  sen- 
timent and  by  demonstrations  against  Austria- 
Hungary  in  Moscow  and  Petrograd,  Servia  held  out. 
It  was  only  when  she  saw  that  Russian  support  was 
not  forthcoming  that  she  withdrew  from  Durazzo. 
The  international  situation  during  January,  1913, 
was  similar  to  that  during  July,  19 14,  and  the  cause 
of  the  crisis  was  practically  the  same.  In  both 
cases  Servia  backed  down,  but  the  second  time 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  determined  to 
provoke  the  war  which  they  believed  would  be 
the  end  of  Servia  and  the  destruction  of  Rus- 
sia's power  to  influence  the  political  evolution  of 
Balkan  Peninsula. 

After  Durazzo,  it  was  Scutari.  Servia  for  the 
third  time  bowed  before  the  will  of  Austria. 

The  next  move  against  Servia  was  the  annexa- 
tion on  May  12,  191 3,  of  the  little  island  of  Ada- 
Kaleh  on  the  Danube,  which  had  curiously  enough 
remained  Turkish  property  after  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin.     It  had  actually  been  forgotten  at  that  time. 

157 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

This  island,  situated  in  front  of  Orsova,  would  have 
given  Servia  a  splendid  strategic  position  at  the 
mouth  of  the  river.  Austria-Hungary  anticipated 
the  Treaty  of  London. 

It  was  to  reduce  Servia  that  secret  encouragement 
was  given  to  Bulgaria  to  provoke  the  second  Balkan 
war.  There  is  no  doubt  now  as  to  the  role  of  the 
Austro-Himgarian  Minister  at  Sofia  in  allowing 
this  crisis  to  be  precipitated. 

Had  Germany  been  willing  to  stand  behind  her 
at  Bukarest,  Austria-Hungary  would  have  prevented 
the  signing  of  the  treaty  between  the  Balkan  States 
by  presenting  an  ultimatum  to  Servia.  But  Ger- 
many did  not  seem  to  be  ready.  The  reason  com- 
monly given  that  Emperor  William  did  not  want  to 
embarrass  King  Carol  of  Rumania,  a  prince  of  his 
own  house,  and  his  brother-in-law,  the  King  of 
Greece,  does  not  seem  credible.  In  view  of  the 
events  that  have  happened  since,  the  signing  of  the 
Treaty  of  Bukarest  is  a  mystery  not  yet  cleared  up. 

The  second  Balkan  war  acted  as  a  boomerang  to 
Austria-Hungary.  It  increased  tremendously  the 
prestige  of  Servia  abroad,  and  the  confidence  of  the 
Servians  in  themselves.  The  weakness  of  the 
Turkish  armies  in  the  first  Balkan  war  had  been 
so  great  that  Servia  herself  has  hardly  considered 
it  a  fair  test  of  her  military  strength.  To  have 
measured  arms  successfully  with  Bulgaria  was 
worth  as  much  to  Servia  as  the  territory  that  she 
gained. 

We  have  seen  how  strained  were  the  relationships 
of  Austria-Hungary  as  separate  kingdoms  and  to- 

158 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  AND  SOUTH  SLAVS 

gether  as  an  empire  in  their  relationship  with  their 
south  Slavic  subjects.  The  Croatians,  the  Dalma- 
tians, and  a  major  portion  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  were  Servian  in  language  and 
sympathies.  They  had  never  thought  of  political 
union  with  Servia,  the  petty  kingdom  which  had 
allowed  its  rulers  to  be  assassinated,  and  which 
seemed  to  be  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the 
powerful  and  brilliant  country  of  which  they  would 
not  have  been  unwilling,  if  allowed  real  self-govern- 
ment, to  remain  a  part.  But  a  large  and  glorified 
Servia,  with  an  increased  territory  and  a  well-earned 
and  brilliant  military  reputation — would  this  prove 
an  attraction  to  win  away  the  dissatisfied  subjects 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy? 

Austria-Himgary  by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  had  taken  to  herself  more  Servians  in  a 
compact  mass  than  she  could  well  assimilate.  They 
were  not  scattered  and  separated  geographically 
like  her  other  Slavic  subjects.  It  was  a  danger  from 
the  beginning.  After  the  Balkan  wars,  it  became 
an  imminent  peril. 

The  death  sentence  of  Servia  was  decided  by  the 
statesmen  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  the 
moment  their  newspapers  brought  to  them  the 
story  of  the  battle  of  Kumonova. 

I  shall  never  forget  my  presentiment  when  I  heard 
on  Jime  29,  1914,  down  in  a  little  Breton  village, 
that  a  Bosnian  student  had  celebrated  the  anniver- 
sary of  the  battle  of  Kossova  by  assassinating  the 
Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand.  The  incident  for 
which  Austria  was  waiting  had  happened.     There 

159 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

came  back  to  me  the  words  of  Hakki  Pasha, 
"If  Italy  declares  war  on  Turkey,  the  cannon 
will  not  cease  to  speak  until  all  Europe  is  in  con- 
flagration." 


1 60 


CHAPTER  X 
RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  MACEDONIA 

IN  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the 
peace  of  Europe  was  twice  disturbed,  and  ter- 
rible wars  occurred,  over  the  question  of  the 
integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Since  it  is  still 
the  same  question  which  has  had  most  to  do — directly 
at  least — with  bringing  on  the  general  European 
war  of  1 9 14,  it  is  important  to  consider  what  has 
been,  since  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  the  very  heart  of 
the  Eastern  question  in  relation  to  Europe,  the 
rivalry  of  races  in  Macedonia. 

When  the  European  Powers,  following  the  lead 
of  Great  Britain  intervened  after  the  Russo-Turkish 
War  of  1877-78  to  annul  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano, 
they  frustrated  the  emancipation  from  Moslem  rule 
of  the  Christian  populations  in  Macedonia.  A  Bal- 
kan territorial  and  political  status  quo  was  decided 
upon  by  a  Congress  of  the  Powers  at  Berlin  in  1878. 
In  receiving  back  Macedonia,  Turkey  solemnly 
promised  to  give  equal  rights  to  her  Christian  sub- 
jects. In  taking  upon  themselves  the  terrible  re- 
sponsibility of  restoring  Christians  to  Turkish  rule, 
the  Powers  assumed  at  the  same  time  the  obligation 
to  watch  Turkey  and  compel  her  to  keep  her  promises. 
II  161 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

The  delegates  of  the  Powers  brought  to  the  Con- 
gress of  Berlin  a  determination  to  solve  the  problems 
of  South-eastern  Europe,  according  to  what  they 
believed  to  be  the  personal  selfish  interests  of  the 
nations  they  represented.  From  the  beginning  of 
the  Congress  to  the  end,  there  was  never  a  single 
thought  of  serving  the  interests  of  the  people  whose 
destinies  they  were  presuming  to  decide.  They 
compromised  with  each  other  "to  preserve  the  peace 
of  Europe."  This  formula  has  always  been  inter- 
preted in  diplomacy  as  the  getting  of  all  you  can 
for  your  country  without  having  to  fight  for  it ! 

Practically  every  provision  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
has  been  disregarded  by  the  contracting  parties 
and  by  the  Balkan  States.  The  policy  of  Turkey  in 
this  respect  has  not  been  different  from  that  of  the 
Christian  Powers.  Great  Britain  and  France,  as 
their  colonial  empires  increased,  ignored  the  obli- 
gations of  the  treaty  which  they  had  signed,  because 
they  feared  the  effect  upon  their  commercial  and 
colonial  interests  overseas,  were  they  to  press  the 
Khalif .  The  only  effective  pressure  would  have  been 
force  of  arms.  When  popular  sympathy  was  stirred 
to  the  depths  by  the  cruelty  of  Abdul  Hamid's  op- 
pression and  massacres,  successive  Britain  and  French 
Cabinets  washed  their  hands  of  any  responsibility  to- 
wards the  Christians  in  Turkey.  Pan-Islamism  was 
their  nightmare.  They  had  an  overwhelming  fear 
of  arousing  Mohammedan  sentiment  against  them 
in  their  colonies.  Germany  refused  to  hold  Abdul 
Hamid  to  his  promises,  because  she  wanted  to  curry 
favour  with  him  to  get  a  foothold  in  Asiatic  Turkey. 

162 


RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  MACEDONIA 

Russia  and  Austria,  the  Powers  most  vitally  inter- 
ested in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  because  they  were  its 
neighbours,  were  agreed  upon  preserving  the  Sultan's 
domination  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  no  matter  how 
great  the  oppression  of  Christians  became.  Neither 
Power  wanted  to  see  the  other  increase  in  influence 
among  the  Balkan  nationalities. 

The  centres  of  intrigue  were  Bulgaria,  Albania, 
Thrace,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  Macedonia, 
the  portions  of  the  Peninsula  which  had  been  refused 
emancipation  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  Bulgaria 
worked  out  her  own  emancipation.  She  refused 
the  tutelage  of  Russia,  annexed  Eastern  Rumelia  in 
defiance  of  the  Powers  in  1885,  and  proclaimed  her 
independence  in  1908.  The  fortunes  of  Albania 
have  been  followed  in  another  chapter.  Thrace  was 
too  near  Constantinople,  the  forbidden  city,  too 
unimportant  economically,  and  too  largely  Moslem 
in  population  to  be  coveted  by  the  Balkan  States. 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  administered  by  Austria- 
Hungary  since  1878,  were  annexed  in  defiance  of 
treaty  obligations  in  1908.  The  principal  victim 
of  the  mischief  done  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin  was 
Macedonia. 

The  future  of  Macedonia  has  been  the  great 
source  of  conflict  between  Austria-Himgary  and 
Russia,  and  between  the  Balkan  States.  At  Athens, 
Sofia,  Belgrade,  Bukarest,  and  Cettinje,  the  diplo- 
mats of  Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Turkey,  from 
the  morrow  of  the  Berlin  Congress  to  the  eve  of  the 
recent  Balkan  Wars,  played  a  game  against  each 
other,  endeavouring  always  to  use  the  Balkan  States 

163 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

as  pawns  in  their  sordid  strife.  Turkey  was  backed 
by  France  and  England,  whenever  it  suited  opportune 
diplomacy  to  do  so.  Austria-Hungary  was  backed 
by  Germany,  who  at  the  same  time  did  not  hesitate 
to  play  a  hand  with  the  Turks.  Russia  has  always 
stood  more  or  less  alone  in  the  Balkan  question, 
even  after  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance  with  France. 
Except  at  Cettinje,  Italian  activity  in  this  diplomatic 
game  has  never  been  particularly  marked. 

What  has  been  the  object  of  the  game?  This  is 
difficult  to  state  categorically.  Aims  have  changed 
with  changing  conditions.  For  example,  during  the 
five  years  immediately  following  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  British  diplomacy  was  directed  strenuously 
towards  keeping  down  emancipated  Bulgaria,  and 
towards  preventing  the  encroachment  of  Servia  in 
the  direction  of  the  Adriatic  and  the  -^gean.  But 
when  she  saw  that  Bulgaria  had  refused  to  be  the 
tool  of  Russia,  and  w^hen  her  problem  of  the  trade 
route  of  India  had  been  solved  by  the  buying  up  of 
the  majority  of  shares  in  the  Suez  Canal  and  the 
occupation  of  Egypt,  Great  Britain  championed 
Bulgaria  and  sustained  her  in  the  annexation  of 
Eastern  Rumelia.  British  policy  remained  anti- 
Servian  for  thirty  years.  There  was  more  in  the 
withdrawal  of  the  British  Legation  from  Belgrade 
than  disapproval  of  a  dastardly  regicide.  But  the 
moment  British  commerce  began  to  fear  German 
competition,  and  an  accord  had  been  made  with 
Russia  to  remove  causes  of  conflict,  the  British  press 
began  to  change  its  tone  towards  Servia.  What  a 
miracle  has  been  wrought  in  the  decade  since  "an 

164 


RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  MACEDONIA 

immoral  race  of  blackguards,  with  no  sense  of  national 
honour"  has  become  "that  brave  and  noble  little 
race,  spirited  defenders  of  the  liberties  of  Europe!" 
I  quote  these  two  sentiments  from  the  same  news- 
papers. If  Premier  Asquith  is  sincere  in  his  belief 
that  this  present  war  is  to  defend  the  principle  of 
the  sanctity  of  treaties,  will  he  insist,  when  peace  is 
concluded,  that  Servia  make  good  her  oath  to  Bul- 
garia, and  Russia  her  international  treaty  obliga- 
tions in  regard  to  the  kingdom  of  Poland?  Great 
Britain  is  the  least  of  the  offenders  when  it  comes 
to  diplomatic  cant  and  hypocrisy.  For  the  British 
electorate  has  a  keen  sense  of  justice,  and  an  intel- 
ligent determination  that  British  influence  shall  be 
exerted  for  the  betterment  of  humanity.  Cabinets 
must  reckon  with  this  electorate  when  they  decide 
questions  of  foreign  policy. 

But  we  do  not  want  to  lose  ourselves  in  a  maze  of 
diplomatic  intrigue,  which  it  is  fruitless  to  follow, 
even  if  we  could.  We  must  limit  ourselves  to  an 
exposition  of  the  ambitions  of  Austria-Hungary  and 
of  the  Balkan  States  to  the  possession  of  this  coveted 
province. 

Since  the  creation  of  modem  Italy,  the  great  Ger- 
man trade  route  to  the  Mediterranean  has  been 
changed.  The  influence  in  Teutonic  commercial 
evolution  of  the  passing  of  Lombardy  and  Venetia 
from  the  political  tutelage  of  a  thousand  years  has 
been  of  tremendous  importance,  for  the  connection 
between  Germany  and  Italy  had  always  been  vital. 
It  was  the  first  Napoleon  who  broke  this  connection. 
It  was  the  third  Napoleon  who  nullified  the  effort 

165 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  to  re-establish  it.  United 
Italy  gave  a  new  direction  to  Teutonic  expansion. 
United  Germany  gave  to  it  a  new  impulsion.  The 
Drang  nach  Oesten  was  bom. 

By  the  Convention  of  Reichstadt  in  1876,  Austria- 
Hungary  secured  from  Russia  the  promise  of  the 
Turkish  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in 
return  for  her  neutrality  in  the  "approaching  war 
of  liberation"  of  Russia  against  Turkey.  In  order 
to  liberate  some  Slavs,  Russia  changed  the  subjection 
of  others.  The  Convention  of  Reichstadt  is  really 
the  starting-point  of  the  quarrel  which  has  grown 
so  bitterly  during  the  last  generation  between  Austria 
and  Russia  over  the  Slavs  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 
Russia  paid  dearly  for  a  "free  hand"  with  Turkey 
in  1877.     She  is  paying  still. 

In  her  attitude  towards  the  Balkans,  Austria  has 
had  three  distinct  aims:  the  prevention  of  a  Slavic 
outlet  to  the  Adriatic,  the  realization  of  a  German 
outlet  to  the  ^gean,  and  the  effectual  hindrance  of 
the  growth  in  the  Balkans  of  a  strong  independent 
south  Slavic  state,  which  might  prove  a  fatal  attrac- 
tion to  her  own  provinces  of  Croatia  and  Dalmatia. 
It  was  this  triple  consideration  that  led  her  to  the 
occupation  and  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzego- 
vina, and  to  the  policy  of  hostility  to  Servia,  which 
is  developed  in  another  chapter.  Desiring  to  possess 
for  herself  the  wonderful  port  of  Salonika  on  the 
.^gean  Sea,  to  reach  which  her  railroads  would  have 
to  cross  Macedonia,  the  policy  of  Austria-Hungary 
towards  Macedonia  has  been  consistently  to  en- 
deavour to  uphold  the  semblance  of  Turkish  author- 

166 


RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  MACEDONIA 

ity,  and  at  the  same  time  to  make  that  authority 
difficult  to  uphold  though  the  exciting  of  racial 
rivalry  among  Greece,  Servia,  Bulgaria,  Rumania, 
and  Albania  in  this  turbulent  country.  Turkey  and 
Austria  met  on  the  common  ground  of  "keeping  the 
pot  boiling,"  although  with  a  different  aim.  By 
keeping  the  pot  boiling,  Turkey  thought  that  her 
sovereignty  was  safe,  while  Austria  hoped  that 
when  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  States  had  worn  them- 
selves out,  each  opposing  the  other,  she  could  step  in 
and  capture  the  prize. 

Turkey  and  Austria-Hungary,  then,  conspired  to- 
gether to  create  as  many  points  of  conflict  as  possible 
among  the  Macedonians  of  different  races.  The 
most  devilish  ingenuity  was  constantly  exercised  in 
stirring  up  and  keeping  alive  the  hatred  of  each 
race  over  the  other.  While  frequently  aroused  to 
the  point  of  making  perfunctory  protests,  the  other 
nations  of  Europe,  with  the  exception  of  Russia, 
let  Austria  and  Turkey  do  as  they  pleased,  just  as 
Turkey  was  allowed  a  free  hand  in  massacring  the 
Armenians.  The  laissez  faire  policy  of  the  Powers 
was  a  denial  of  their  treaty  obligations. 

It  was  only  when  the  Balkan  States  awoke  to  the 
realization  of  the  fact  that  they  were  regarded  as 
mere  pawns  upon  the  chequer  board  of  world  politics, 
to  be  sacrificed  without  compunction  by  the  Euro- 
pean Powers  whenever  it  was  to  their  interest,  that 
they  buried  differences  for  a  moment,  and  worked 
out  their  own  salvation.  If  the  Balkan  Wars  have 
brought  the  present  terrible  disaster  upon  Europe, 
it    is    no    more    than    the    contemptible    diplom- 

167 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

acy  of  self  interest  and  mutual  jealousy  could 
expect. 

Why  was  the  Austro-Turkish  policy  possible,  and 
why  did  it  succeed  for  a  whole  generation? 

The  Ottoman  Empire  was  founded  in  the  Balkan 
peninsula  by  rulers  whose  military  genius  was  coupled 
with  their  ability  to  use  one  Christian  population 
against  the  other.  The  Osmanlis  never  fought  a 
battle  in  which  the  Balkan  Christians  did  not  give 
valuable  assistance  in  forging  the  chains  of  their 
slavery.  The  Osmanlis  conquered  the  Balkan  peo- 
ples by  means  of  the  Balkan  peoples.  They  kept 
possession  of  the  country  just  as  long  as  they  could 
pit  one  chief  against  another,  and  then,  when  national 
feeling  arose,  one  race  against  another. 

Gradually,  in  the  portion  of  the  Balkans  where 
one  race  was  predominant,  nationalities  began  to 
form  states,  which  secured  independence  as  soon 
as  they  demonstrated  the  possibility  of  harmony. 
Greece  was  the  first,  and  was  followed  by  Servia. 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia  united  into  the  principality 
of  Rumania.  Last  of  all  came  Bulgaria.  After 
having  gained  autonomy,  independence  was  only 
a  matter  of  form.  But  in  the  central  portion  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  ^gean, 
through  Thrace,  Macedonia,  and  Albania,  the  sover- 
eignty of  Turkey,  restored  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
was  able  to  endure.  For  the  people  were  mixed  up, 
race  living  with  race,  and  in  no  place  could  the 
Christians  of  any  one  race  claim  that  the  country 
was  wholly  theirs. 

As  emancipated  Greeks,  Servians  and  Bulgarians 

i68 


RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  MACEDONIA 

formed  independent  states,  they  looked  towards 
Macedonia  as  the  legitimate  territory  for  expansion. 
But  here  their  claims,  both  historically  and  racially, 
overlapped.  Greece  regarded  Macedonia  as  entirely 
Hellenic.  Had  it  not  always  been  Greek  before  the 
Osmanlis  came,  from  the  days  of  Philip  of  Macedon 
to  the  Paleologi  of  the  Byzantine  Empire?  The 
Servians,  on  the  other  hand,  invoked  the  memory 
of  the  Servian  Empire  of  Stephen  Dushan,  who  in 
the  fourteenth  century,  on  the  eve  of  the  Ottoman 
conquest,  was  crowned  "King  of  Romania"  at 
Serres.  It  was  from  the  Servians  and  not  from  the 
Greeks,  that  the  Osmanlis  conquered  Macedonia  in 
the  three  battles  of  the  Maritza,  Tchernomen,  and 
Kossova.  The  Bulgarians  invoked  the  memory  of 
their  medieval  domination  of  Macedonia  and  Thrace. 
It  was  by  the  Bulgarians  that  northern  Thrace  was 
defended  against  the  Ottoman  invasion;  a  Bulgarian 
prince  was  the  last  independent  ruler  of  central 
Macedonia;  and  long  before  the  ephemeral  Servian 
Empire  of  Stephen  Dushan,  the  Bulgarian  Czars 
were  recognized  from  Timova  to  Okrida.  This 
latter  city,  in  fact,  was  the  seat  of  the  autonomous 
Bulgarian  patriarchate  in  the  Middle  Ages. 

These  historical  claims,  to  us  of  western  Europe, 
would  have  only  a  sentimental  value.  They  had 
been  forgotten  by  the  subject  populations  of  Euro- 
pean Turkey  for  many  centuries.  The  first  revival 
of  political  ambitions  was  that  of  Hellenism.  Modem 
Greece,  divorcing  itself  from  the  impossible  and 
pagan  dream  of  a  restoration  of  classic  Greece,  with 
Athens  as  its  capital,  which  had  been  woven  for  it 

169 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

by  western  European  admirers  during  the  first  half 
century  of  its  liberation,  began  to  take  stock  of  its 
Byzantine  and  Christian  heritage  during  the  latter 
part  of  the  reign  of  Abdul  Aziz.  The  new  Hellenism, 
as  the  prestige  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  decreased, 
took  the  definite  form  of  a  determination  to  succeed 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  as  it  had  preceded  it,  with 
Constantinople  as  capital. 

The  Greeks  believed  themselves  to  be  the  unifying 
Christian  race  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  They  had 
a  tremendous  advantage  over  the  Slavs,  because  the 
ecclesiastical  organization,  to  which  all  the  Christians 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  owed  allegiance,  was  in  their 
hands.  When  Mohammed  the  Conqueror  entered 
Constantinople,  he  gave  to  the  Patriarch  of  the  East- 
em  Church  the  headship  of  the  Balkan  Christians. 
The  spirit  of  Moslem  institutions  provides  for  no 
other  form  of  government  than  a  theocracy.  Reli- 
gion has  always  been  to  the  Osmanli  the  test  of 
nationality.  The  Christians  formed  one  millet,  or 
nation.  This  millet  was  Greek.  During  all  the 
centuries  of  Ottoman  subjection,  the  Balkan  Christ- 
ians owed  allegiance  to  the  Greek  Patriarchate. 
Whatever  their  native  tongue,  the  language  of  the 
Church  and  oj  the  schools  was  Greek. 

Unfortunately  for  Hellenism,  the  new  Greek 
aspirations  came  into  immediate  confiict  with  the 
renaissance  of  the  Bulgarian  nation.  Russia  had 
long  been  encouraging,  for  the  purposes  of  Pan- 
Slavism,  the  awakening  of  a  sense  of  nationality  in 
the  south  Slavs.  Her  agents  had  been  long  and 
patiently  working  among  the  Bulgarians.     But  they 

170 


RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  MACEDONIi 

overshot  their  mark.  When  Bulgarian  priests  and 
the  few  educated  men  of  the  peasant  nation  turned 
their  attention  to  their  past  and  their  language,  it 
was  not  the  idea  of  their  kinship  ^yith  the  great  Slavic 
Power  of  eastern  Europe  that  was  aroused,  hut  the 
conscious7tess  of  their  own  particular  race.  Bulgaria 
had  been  great  when  Russia  was  practically  un- 
known. Bulgaria  could  be  great  once  more,  when, 
by  the  disappearance  of  Ottoman  rule,  the  Bulgarian 
Empire  of  the  Middle  Ages  would  be  bom  again  in 
the  Balkans. 

One  can  readily  appreciate  that  the  first  necessity 
of  Bulgarian  renaissance  was  liberation  from  the  Greek 
Church.  Russia  strenuously  opposed  this  separatist 
agitation.  What  she  wanted  was  a  Slavic  movement 
within  the  bosom  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church, 
which,  if  bitterly  persecuted  by  the  Patriarchate, 
would  throw  the  south  Slavs  upon  the  Russian  Synod 
for  protection,  or,  if  tolerated,  would  give  Russia  a 
powerful  voice  in  the  councils  of  the  Orthodox  Church 
in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  But  the  Bulgarians  had 
progressed  too  far  on  the  road  of  religious  separation 
from  the  Greeks  to  be  arrested  by  their  Russian 
godfather.  It  was  a  prophecy  of  the  future  inde- 
pendent spirit  of  the  Bulgarian  people,  which  Beacons- 
field  and  Salisbury  imfortunately  failed  to  note, 
that  the  Bulgarians  determined  to  go  the  length 
of  uniting  with  Rome  in  order  to  get  free  from 
Phanar.  Another  Uniate  sect  would  have  been  bom 
had  Russia  not  yielded.  With  bad  grace,  her  Ambas- 
sador obtained  from  Sultan  Abdul  Aziz  the  firman 
of  March  ii,  1870,  creating  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate. 

171 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

The  cleverness  of  the  Bulgarians  outwitted  the 
manoeuvre  made  to  have  the  seat  of  the  Exarchate 
at  Sofia.  The  Greeks  realized  that  a  formidable 
competitor  had  entered  into  the  struggle  for  Mace- 
donia. From  that  moment  there  has  been  hatred 
between  Greek  and  Bulgarian.  In  spite  of  the  treaty 
of  Bukarest,  the  end  of  the  struggle  is  not  yet.  The 
policy  and  ambition  of  the  modem  state  are  dictated 
by  strong  economic  reasons,  of  which  sentimental 
aspirations  are  only  the  outward  expression.  If 
wars  and  the  treaties  that  follow  them  were  guided 
by  honest  confession  of  the  real  issues  at  stake,  how 
much  easier  the  solution  of  problems,  and  how  much 
greater  the  chances  of  finding  durable  bases  for 
treaties!  The  whole  effort  of  Bulgaria  in  Macedonia 
may  be  explained  by  the  simple  statement  that  the 
Bulgarian  race  has  been  seeking  its  natural,  logical, 
and  inevitable  outlet  to  the  ^gean  Sea. 

During  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
Servian  national  aspirations  were  directed  toward 
Croatia,  Dalmatia,  and  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The 
Servians  thought  only  in  terms  of  the  west.  It  was 
the  foundation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  dual  mon- 
archy in  1867,  followed  by  the  Austrian  occupation 
of  Bosnia- Herzegovina  and  of  the  sandjak  of  Novi 
Bazar,  that  led  Servia  to  enter  into  the  struggle  for 
Macedonia. 

As  soon  as  Russia  saw  that  she  could  not  control 
Bulgaria,  she  began  to  favour  a  Servian  propaganda 
in  the  valley  of  the  Vardar.  Russian  intrigues  at 
Constantinople  led  to  the  suppression  of  the  Bul- 
garian bishoprics  of  Okrida,  Uskub,  Kuprulii  (Veles) 

172 


RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  IVIACEDONIA 

and  Nevrokop.  Bulgaria  secured  the  restoration  of 
these  bishoprics  through  the  efforts  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Great  Britain.  The  story  of  Macedonia 
is  full  of  instances  like  this  of  intrigue  and  counter 
intrigue  by  European  Powers  at  the  Sublime  Porte. 
Combinations  of  interests  changed  sometimes  over 
night.  Is  it  any  wonder  that  the  Turks  grew  to 
despise  the  European  alliances,  and  to  laugh  at 
every  "joint  note"  of  the  Powers  in  relation  to 
Macedonia? 

Austria-Hungary  opposed  the  Russian  aid  given 
to  Servia  by  introducing  a  new  racial  propaganda. 
Ever  since  the  Roman  occupation  there  had  been  a 
small,  but  widely  diffused,  element  in  the  population 
of  Macedonia,  which  retained  the  Roman  language, 
just  as  the  Wallachians  and  Moldavians  north  of  the 
Danube  had  done.  Diplomatic  suggestion  at  Buka- 
rest  succeeded  in  interesting  Rumania  in  these 
Kutzo- Wallachians,  as  they  came  to  be  called. 
Rumania  did  not  have  a  common  boiindary  with 
European  Turkey.  But  her  statesmen  were  quick 
to  see  the  advantage  of  having  "a  finger  in  the  pie" 
when  the  Ottoman  Empire  disappeared  from  Europe. 
So  Rumania  became  protector  of  the  Kutzo-Walla- 
chian.  The  Sublime  Porte  gladly  agreed  to  recog- 
nize this  protectorate.  The  development  of  a 
strong  Rumanian  element  in  Macedonia  would  help 
greatly  to  preserve  Turkish  sovereignty.  For  Ruma- 
nia could  have  no  territorial  aspirations  there,  and 
would  look  with  disfavour  upon  Rumania  being 
swallowed  up  by  Greece,  Servia,  or  Bulgaria.  An- 
other propaganda,  well  financed,  and   encouraged 

173 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

by  the  Austro-Hungarian  and  Turkish  Governments 
was  added  to  the  rivalry  of  races  in  Macedonia. 

We  cannot  do  more  than  suggest  these  intrigues. 
After  1885,  the  Macedonian  question  became  gradu- 
ally the  peculiar  care  of  the  two  "most  interested" 
Powers.  There  was  little  to  attract  again  interna- 
tional attention  until  the  question  of  Turkey's 
existence  as  a  state  was  brought  forward  in  a  most 
startling  way  by  the  repercussion  throughout  the 
Empire  of  the  Armenian  massacres  of  1893-96. 
By  refusing  to  intervene  at  that  time,  the  Powers,  who 
fondly  thought  that  they  were  acting  in  the  interest  of 
the  integrity  of  the  Empire,  were  really  contributing 
to  its  further  decline. 

Elsewhere  we  have  spoken  of  the  Cretan  insur- 
rection of  1896  and  the  train  of  events  that  followed 
it,  ending  in  the  formation  of  the  Balkan  alliance  to 
drive  Turkey  out  of  Europe.  Here  we  take  up  the 
other  thread  which  leads  us  to  the  Balkan  Wars. 
Bulgaria,  remembering  the  happy  result  of  her  own 
sufferings  from  the  massacres  of  twenty  years  before, 
was  keen  enough  to  see  in  the  Asiatic  holocausts  of 
the  "Red  Sultan"  a  sign  of  weakness  instead  of  a 
show  of  strength.  The  statesmen  of  the  European 
Powers  had  not  acted  to  stop  the  massacres  of  the 
Armenians.  But  their  indecision  and  impolitic  ir- 
resolution was  not  an  expression  of  the  sentiments 
of  the  civilized  races  whom  they  represented.  The 
time  was  ripe  for  an  insurrection  in  Macedonia. 
Public  opinion  in  Europe  would  sustain  it.  The 
movement  was  launched  from  Sofia. 

From    that    moment,    Turkish    sovereignty    was 

174 


RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  MACEDONIA 

doomed.  Turkey  did  not  realize  this,  however. 
Instead  of  adopting  the  poHcy  of  treating  with 
Bulgaria,  and  giving  her  an  economic  outlet  to  the 
yEgean  Sea,  the  Sublime  Porte  was  delighted  with 
the  anticipation  of  a  new  era  of  racial  rivalry  in 
Macedonia.  For  it  knew  that  Bulgaria's  efforts 
to  secure  Macedonian  autonomy  would  be  opposed 
by  Servia  and  Greece.  In  fact,  the  Greeks  were  so 
alarmed  by  the  Bulgarian  activity  that  immediately 
after  their  unhappy  war  with  Turkey  they  gave 
active  support  to  the  Turks  in  putting  down  the 
Bulgarian  rebels.  The  services  of  the  Greek  Patri- 
archate were  particularly  valuable  to  Turkey  at  this 
time. 

Nor  did  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  appreciate 
the  significance  of  the  Bulgarian  movement.  In 
1897,  they  signed  an  accord,  solemnly  agreeing  that 
the  status  quo  be  preserved  in  the  Balkan  peninsula. 
Russia  was  anxious  for  this  convention  with  Austria. 
For  the  moment  all  her  energies  were  devoted  to 
developing  the  policy  in  the  Far  East  that  was  to 
end  so  abruptly  eight  years  later  on  the  battlefield 
of  Mukden.  Austria-Himgary  was  delighted  to 
have  the  solution  of  the  Macedonian  problem  de- 
layed. She  felt  that  every  year  of  anarchy  in  European 
Turkey  would  bring  her  nearer  to  Salonika.  The 
Drang  nach  Oesten  was  to  be  made  possible  through 
the  strife  of  Servian,  Bulgarian,  and  Greek. 

The  moment  was  favourable  for  the  Bulgarian 
propaganda.  Russia  was  too  much  involved  in 
Manchuria  to  help  the  Servians.  The  Greeks  had 
lost  prestige  with  the  Macedonians  by  their  easy 

175 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

and  humiliating  defeat  at  the  hands  of  Turkey. 
Gathering  force  with  successive  years,  and  supported 
by  the  admirably  laid  foundation  of  the  Bulgarian 
ecclesiastic  and  scholastic  organizations  throughout 
Macedonia,  the  Bulgarian  bands  gradually  brought 
the  vilayets  of  Monastir,  Uskub,  and  Salonika  into 
a  state  of  civil  war.  In  1901  and  1902,  conditions 
in  Macedonia  were  beyond  description.  But  the 
Powers  waited  for  some  new  initiative  on  the  part 
of  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia. 

Emperor  Franz  Josef  and  Czar  Nicholas  met  at 
Murszteg  in  the  autumn  of  1903.  Russia,  more  and 
more  involved  in  Manchuria,  and  on  the  eve  of  her 
conflict  with  Japan,  found  no  difficulty  in  falling  in 
with  the  suggestion  of  the  Austrian  Foreign  Secre- 
tary that  the  two  Powers  present  to  the  signers  of 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin  a  program  of  "reforms"  for 
Macedonia.  Europe  received  with  delight  this  new 
manifestation  of  harmony  between  Austria-Hungary 
and  Russia. 

In  1904  the  "Program  of  Murszteg"  was  imposed 
upon  Turkey  by  a  comic-opera  show  of  force  on  the 
part  of  the  Powers.  An  international  gendarmerie 
was  their  solution  of  the  Macedonian  problem. 
Different  spheres  were  mapped  out,  and  allotted  to 
officers  of  the  different  Powers.  Germany  refused 
to  participate  in  this  farce,  just  as  she  had  refused 
to  participate  in  "protecting"  Crete. 

The  international  "pacification"  failed  in  Mace- 
donia tor  the  same  reasons  that  it  had  failed  in 
Crete,  and  was  to  fail  a  third  time  ten  years  later  in 
Albania.     //  was  a  compromise  between  the  Powers^ 

176 


RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  MACEDONIA 

dictated  by  considerations  which  had  nothing  whatever 
to  do  with  the  problem  of  which  it  was  supposed  to  be 
the  solution.  This  is  the  story  of  European  diplomacy 
in  the  Near  East. 

From  the  very  moment  that  Turkey  foimd  herself 
compelled  to  accept  the  policing  of  Macedonia  by 
European  officers,  she  set  to  work  to  make  their  task 
impossible.  Hussein  Hilmi  pasha  was  sent  to 
Salonika  as  Governor.  An  accord  was  quickly 
established  between  him  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
agents  in  Macedonia.  Where  the  Bulgarians  were 
weak,  the  Turks  and  the  Austrian  emissaries  en- 
couraged the  Bulgarian  propaganda.  Where  the 
Greeks  were  weak,  Hellenic  bands  were  allowed 
immunity.  Where  the  Servians  were  weak,  the 
Servian  propaganda  made  great  strides  with  the  con- 
nivance of  the  Government.  The  European  gen- 
darmerie was  powerless  to  struggle  against  Turkish, 
Austro-Hungarian,  and  Balkan  intrigues.  The  cor- 
respondence of  the  European  officers  and  consuls, 
and  of  journalists  who  visited  Macedonia  during 
this  period,  makes  interesting  reading.  Their  point 
of  view  is  almost  invariably  that  of  their  surround- 
ings. It  depended  upon  just  what  part  of  Mace- 
donia one  happened  to  be  in,  or  the  company  in  which 
one  travelled,  whether  a  certain  nationality  were 
"noble  heroes  suffering  for  an  ideal"  or  "blood- 
thirsty ruffians."  Why  are  so  many  writers  who 
pretend  to  be  impartial  observers  like  chameleons? 

Greece,  Servia,  and  Bulgaria  were  alike  guilty  of 
subsidizing  bands  of  armed  men,  who  imagined  that 
they   were   fulfilling   a   patriotic   duty   in   brutally 

177 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

forcing  their  particular  nationality  upon  ignorant 
peasants,  most  of  whom  did  not  know — or  care — to 
what  nation  they  belonged.  There  was  little  to 
choose  between  the  methods  and  the  actions  of  the 
different  bands.  Everywhere  pillage,  incendiarism, 
and  assassination  were  the  order  of  the  day.  When 
Christian  propagandists  let  them  alone,  the  poor 
villagers  had  to  endure  the  same  treatment  from 
Moslem  Albanians  and  from  the  Turkish  soldiery. 
In  order  to  give  the  "reforms"  of  the  Program  of 
Miirszteg  a  chance,  Athens,  Sofia,  and  Belgrade 
ostensibly  withdrew  their  active  support  of  the 
bands.  But  the  efforts  of  the  Powers  had  still  not 
only  the  secret  bad  faith  of  Austria-Hungary  and 
Turkey  to  contend  with,  but  also  the  determination 
of  the  Macedonians  themselves  not  to  be  "reformed " 
a  Veuropeenne,  that  is  to  say,  d  la  turque.  The 
powerful  Bulgarian  "interior  organization"  in 
Macedonia  kept  up  the  struggle  in  the  hope  that  the 
continuation  of  anarchy  would  bring  the  Powers  to 
see  that  there  was  no  other  solution  possible  of  the 
Macedonian  question  than  the  autonomy  of  Mace- 
donia under  a  Christian  governor.  Greeks  and 
Servians  opposed  the  project  of  autonomy,  however, 
because  they  knew  that  it  would  result  eventually 
in  the  reversion  of  Macedonia  to  Bulgaria.  The 
history  of  Eastern  Rumelia  would  be  repeated.  In 
considering  the  Macedonian  problem,  it  must  never 
be  forgotten  that  the  great  bulk  of  the  population  of 
Macedonia  is  Bulgarian,  in  spite  of  all  the  learned 
dissertations  and  imposing  statistics  of  Greek  and 
Servian    writers.     But   the   difficulty   is   that   this 

178 


RACIAL  RIVALRIES  IN  MACEDONIA 

Bulgarian  population  is  agricultural.  In  the  cities 
near  the  sea  and  all  along  the  seacoast  from  Salonika 
to  Dedeagatch  the  Greek  element  is  predominant. 
No  geographical  division  of  Macedonia  can  be  made, 
viable  from  the  economic  point  of  view,  which 
satisfies  racial  claims  by  following  the  principle  of 
preponderant  nationality. 

After  her  disasters  in  the  Far  East,  Russia  began 
to  turn  her  attention  once  more  to  the  Near  East. 
A  reopening  of  the  Macedonian  question  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  was  imminent  when 
the  Young  Turk  revolution  of  July,  1908,  upset  all 
calculations,  and  brought  a  new  factor  into  the  prob- 
lem of  the  future  of  European  Turkey.  Austria- 
Hungary  boldly  challenged — more  than  that,  defied 
— Russia  by  annexing  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In  this 
action  she  was  backed  by  Germany.  Russia  and 
France  were  not  ready  for  war.  Great  Britain  and 
Italy,  each  involved  in  an  internal  social  revolution 
of  tremendous  importance,  could  not  afford  to  risk 
the  programs  of  their  respective  cabinets  by  em- 
barking upon  uncertain  foreign  adventures. 

The  Balkan  States  were  left  to  solve  the  Mace- 
donian problem  by  themselves.  Their  solution  was 
the  Treaty  of  Bukarest.  The  success  of  Servia  in 
planting  herself  in  the  valley  of  the  Vardar,  and  in 
occupying  Monastir,  is  the  result  of  the  struggle  of 
races  in  Macedonia.  It  is  the  direct,  immediate 
cause  of  the  European  War  of  1914. 


179 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME  IN  THE 
OTTOMAN  EMPIRE 

NO  event  during  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth 
century  was  heralded  throughout  Europe  with 
so  great  and  so  sincere  interest  and  sympathy 
as  the  bloodless  revolution  of  July  24,  1908,  by  which 
the  regime  of  Abdul  Hamid  was  overthrown  and  the 
constitution  of  1876  resuscitated. 

Although  the  world  was  unprepared  for  this  event, 
it  was  not  due  to  any  sudden  cause.  For  twenty 
years  the  leaven  of  liberalism  had  been  working  in 
the  minds  of  the  educated  classes  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  Moslems,  as  well  as  Christians,  had  been 
in  attendance  in  large  numbers  at  the  American, 
French,  Italian,  and  German  schools  in  Tiirkey,  and 
had  gone  abroad  to  complete  their  education.  Just 
as  in  Italy  and  in  Germany,  Young  Turkey  had  come 
into  existence  through  contact  with  those  free  institu- 
tions in  the  outside  world  which  other  races  enjoyed, 
had  been  emancipated  from  superstition  and  from  the 
stultifying  influences  of  religious  formalism,  and  had 
grown,  in  the  army,  to  numbers  sufficient  to  dictate 
the  policy  of  the  Government. 

From  the  beginning  of  his  reign,  Abdul  Hamid  had 

180 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

done  all  in  his  power  to  prevent  the  growth  of  the 
liberal  spirit.  The  result  of  thirty  years,  in  so  far 
as  civil  officials  of  the  Government  were  concerned, 
had  been  the  stamping  out  of  every  man  who  com- 
bined ability  with  patriotism  and  devotion  to  an 
ideal.  The  best  elements  had  taken  the  road  to 
death,  to  imprisonment,  or  to  exile,  so  that  from  the 
palace  down  to  the  humblest  village,  the  Turkish 
civil  service  was  composed  of  a  set  of  men  absolutely 
lacking  in  independence  and  in  honour,  and  devoted 
to  the  master  who  ruled  from  Yildiz.  But  in  the 
army,  this  same  policy,  though  attempted,  had  not 
wholly  succeeded.  A  portion  at  least  of  the  officers 
received  an  education;  many  of  them,  indeed,  had 
been  sent  abroad  to  Germany  and  to  France  in  order 
to  keep  abreast  with  the  development  of  military 
science,  so  essential  to  the  very  existence  of  Turkey. 
In  the  army,  then,  hundreds  of  officers  of  high 
character  and  high  ideals  were  able  to  avoid  the  fate 
which  had  come  to  other  educated  Moslems  in 
Turkey.  They  learned  to  love  their  country,  and 
with  that  love  came  a  sense  of  shame  for  the  results 
of  the  despotism  under  which  they  existed.  To  have 
lived  in  Paris  or  in  Berlin  was  enough  to  make  them 
dissatisfied;  to  have  visited  Cairo  or  Alexandria, 
Sofia  or  Bukarest  or  Athens,  and  to  have  contrasted 
the  conditions  of  life  in  these  cities,  recently  their 
own,  with  Constantinople,  Salonika,  and  Smyrna,  was 
sufficient. 

It  is  impossible  in  the  limits  of  this  book  to  tell 
how  this  bloodless  revolution  was  planned  by  exiles 
abroad  and  officers  at  home.     It  was  successful,  as 

i8i 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

well  as  bloodless,  because  the  army  refused  to  obey 
the  orders  of  the  Sultan.  To  save  his  life  and  his 
throne,  Abdul  Hamid  was  compelled  to  resuscitate 
the  constitution  which  he  had  granted,  and  then 
suppressed,  at  the  beginning  of  his  reign. 

We  who  lived  through  those  dream  days  of  the 
beginning  of  the  new  regime  will  never  forget  the 
sense  of  joy  of  an  emancipated  people.  The  spy 
system  was  abolished,  newspapers  were  allowed  to 
tell  the  truth  and  express  their  own  opinions,  pass- 
ports and  teskeres  (permissions  to  travel  from  one 
point  to  another  within  the  Empire)  were  declared 
unnecessary,  bakshish  was  refused  at  the  custom 
house  and  police  station.  Moslem  ulema  and  Chris- 
tian clergy  embraced  each  other  in  public,  rode 
through  the  streets  in  triumph  in  the  same  carriages, 
and  harangued  the  multitudes  from  the  same  plat- 
form in  mosque  and  church.  A  new  era  of  Liberty, 
Fraternity,  and  Equality,  they  said,  had  dawned  for 
all  the  races  in  Turkey.  The  Sultan  was  the  father, 
Turkey  the  fatherland,  barriers  and  disabilities  of 
creed  and  race  had  ceased  to  exist.  It  seemed  in- 
credible, but  these  scenes  were  really  happening 
from  the  Adriatic  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 

Optimism,  hope  for  the  future,  was  so  strong  that 
one  had  not  the  heart  to  express  very  loudly  his 
belief  that  no  real  revolution  was  ever  bloodless,  that 
no  real  change  in  political  and  social  life  of  the  people 
could  come  in  a  single  day  or  as  a  result  of  an  ofificial 
document.  No  one  could  think  of  anything  else  but 
the  constitution,  which  had  broken  the  chains  for 
Moslem  and  Christian  alike,  the  constitution  which 

182 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

was  going  to  restore  Turkey  to  its  lawful  place 
among  the  nations  of  Europe,  the  constitution  which 
was  to  heal  the  sick  man  and  solve  the  question  of  the 
Orient.  In  Smyrna,  in  Constantinople,  in  Beirut, 
and  in  Asia  Minor,  I  heard  the  same  story  over  and 
over  again.  But  there  was  always  the  misgiving,  the 
apprehension  for  the  future,  from  which  the  foreigner 
in  Turkey  is  never  free.  It  seemed  too  good  to  be 
true ;  it  was  too  good  to  be  true.  It  was  against  the 
logic  of  history.  The  most  wonderful  constitution 
that  the  world  has  ever  known  is  that  of  England. 
It  does  not  exist  on  paper;  there  is  no  need  for  a 
document.  It  is  good,  and  it  has  endured,  because 
it  has  been  written  in  blood,  in  suffering,  and  in  the 
agony  of  generations,  on  the  pages  of  eight  centuries 
of  history.  Could  Turkey  hope  to  be  free  in  a  day? 
The  first  test  of  the  constitution  came,  of  course, 
with  the  election  and  composition  of  the  Parliament. 
The  election  was  held  quietly,  in  some  parts  of  the 
Empire  secretly  even,  and  when  the  Parliament  as- 
sembled at  Constantinople,  one  began  to  see  already 
the  handwriting  on  the  wall.  For  its  composition 
was  in  no  way  in  accordance  with  the  distribu- 
tion of  population  in  the  Empire.  The  Turk — and 
by  the  Turk  I  mean  the  composite  Moslem  race 
which  has  grown  up  through  centuries  of  inter- 
marriage and  forcible  conversion — had  always  been 
the  ruling  race.  With  the  establishment  of  a  con- 
stitutional regime,  the  Young  Turks  did  not  mean  to 
abdicate  in  favour  of  Moslem  Arabs  or  Christian 
Greeks  and  Armenians.  They  had  "arranged"  the 
elections  in  such  a  way  that  they  would  have  in  the 

183 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Parliament  a  substantial  majority  over  any  possible 
combination  of  other  racial  elements. 

One  cannot  but  have  sympathy  with  the  natural 
feeling  of  racial  pride  which  is  inborn  in  the  Turks. 
A  race  of  masters, — who  could  expect  that  they 
would  be  willing  to  surrender  the  privileges  of  cen- 
turies? But  they  forgot  that  a  constitutional  regime 
and  the  principles  of  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Frater- 
nity must  necessarily  imply  the  yielding  of  their 
unique  position  in  the  Empire.  The  Turk,  as  a  race, 
is  composed  of  two  elements,  a  ruling  class  of  land- 
owners and  military  and  civil  officials,  arrogant 
though  courteous,  corrupt  though  honest  in  private 
life,  parasitical  though  self-respecting,  and  a  peasant 
class,  hopelessly  ignorant,  lacking  in  energy,  initia- 
tive, ambition,  aspirations,  and  ideals.  The  great 
bulk  of  the  Turkish  element  in  the  Empire  looked 
with  the  indifference  of  ignorance  and  the  hostility 
of  jealous  regard  for  their  unique  position  in  the 
community  upon  the  granting  of  a  constitution.  I 
doubt  if  five  per  cent,  of  the  Turkish  population  of 
the  Empire  has  ever  known  what  a  constitutional 
regime  means,  or  cared  whether  it  exists  or  not. 

There  remains  the  five  per  cent.  Of  these  the 
great  bulk  belong  either  to  the  corrupt  official  class, 
whose  subjection  to  the  tyranny  of  Yildiz  Kiosk  had 
totally  unfitted  them  for  service  under  the  new 
regime  on  which  they  were  entering,  and  the  land- 
owners, whose  wealth  was  dependent  upon  the 
unequal  privileges  that  the  law  allowed  to  them  as 
Moslems,  and  whose  interests  were  totally  at  vari- 
ance with  the  spirit  of  the  constitution.    There  are 

184 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

left  small  groups  of  younger  army  officers  and  of 
professional  men,  who  had  been  educated  in  foreign 
schools  or  by  foreign  teachers  in  Turkey  and  abroad. 
They  were,  for  the  most  part,  either  without  the 
knowledge  of  any  other  metier  than  the  army,  or, 
if  civilian,  unfitted  by  training  and  experience  for 
governmental  executive  and  administrative  work. 
Consequently  from  the  very  beginning,  the  genuine 
Young  Turks  who  were  honest  in  their  idealism  had 
to  make  a  compact  with  the  higher  army  officers  and 
with  corrupt  civil  officials  of  Abdul  Hamid.  When 
the  real  Young  Turks  controlled  the  Cabinet,  their 
disasters  were  those  of  theorists  and  visionaries. 
When  they  yielded  the  control  of  affairs  to  men  more 
experienced  than  they,  it  was  simply  the  renewal  of 
the  tyranny  of  Abdul  Hamid.  It  was  because  these 
two  elements  were  united  in  the  firm  resolution  to 
keep  the  control  in  the  hands  of  Moslem  Turks,  that 
the  constitutional  regime  in  Turkey  has  gone  from 
Scylla  to  Charybdis  without  ever  entering  port. 

From  the  very  beginning,  thoughtful  men  pointed 
out  that  there  was  only  one  way  of  salvation  and  of 
liberal  evolution  for  the  Ottoman  Empire.  That  was 
an  honest  and  sincere  co-operation  with  the  Christian 
elements  of  the  Empire,  and  with  the  Arabic  and 
Albanian  Moslem  elements.  Fanaticism  and  racial 
pride  prevented  the  Young  Turks  from  adopting  the 
sole  possible  way  of  establishing  the  constitutional 
regime.  From  the  very  beginning,  then,  they  failed, 
and  it  is  their  failure  which  has  plunged  Europe  into 
the  series  of  wars  that  has  ended  in  the  devastation  of 
unhappy  Belgium,  so  far  remote  from  the  cause  and 

185 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

so  innocent  of  any  part  in  the  events  which  brought 
upon  her  such  terrible  misfortunes.  One  could  write 
a  whole  book  upon  the  events  of  the  first  five  years  of 
constitutional  government  in  Turkey  and  could  show, 
beyond  a  shadow  of  a  doubt,  how  from  the  very 
beginning  there  was  no  honest  and  loyal  effort  made 
to  apply  even  the  most  rudimentary  principles  of 
constitutional  government.  Despotism  means  the 
subjection  of  a  country  to  the  will  of  its  rulers. 
Constitutionalism  means  the  subjection  of  the  rulers 
to  the  will  of  the  country.  The  Young  Turks,  em- 
bodied in  the  "Committee  of  Union  and  Progress," 
merely  continued  the  despotism  of  Abdul  Hamid. 
They  were  far  worse  than  Abdul  Hamid,  however, 
for  they  were  irresponsible  and  unskilled.  One 
handling  the  helm,  knowing  how  to  steer,  might  have 
kept  the  ship  of  state  afloat,  all  the  more  easily, 
perhaps,  because  the  waters  were  so  troubled.  Many 
hands,  none  knowing  where  or  how  to  go,  steered  the 
Ottoman  Empire  to  inevitable  shipwreck. 

Although  the  vicissitudes  of  various  Cabinets  and 
Parliaments  can  have  place  in  our  work  only  so  far 
as  they  have  a  direct  bearing  on  foreign  relations, 
there  are  six  matters  of  internal  policy  which  must  be 
mentioned  in  order  to  explain  how  rapidly  and  surely 
the  Ottoman  Empire  went  to  its  destruction;  the 
treatment  of  Armenians  before  and  after  the  Adana 
massacres;  the  attempt  to  suppress  the  liberties  of 
the  Orthodox  Church;  the  Cretan  question,  ending 
in  the  Greek  boycott;  the  Macedonian  policy;  the 
Albanian  uprisings ;  and  the  lack  of  co-operation  and 
sympathy  with  the  Arabs. 

1 86 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

THE  ARMENIANS  AND  THE  ADANA  MASSACRES 

Among  the  various  races  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
none  was  more  overcome  with  joy  at  the  proclama- 
tion of  the  constitutional  regime  than  the  Armenian. 
Scattered  everywhere  throughout  the  Empire,  and 
in  no  region  an  element  of  preponderance,  the  Ar- 
menians had  always  made  themselves  felt  in  the 
commercial  and  intellectual  life  of  Turkey  far  out  of 
proportion  to  their  numerical  strength.  They  ap- 
preciated and  understood,  best  of  all  the  Christian 
populations,  the  significance  of  constitutional  govern- 
ment. Honestly  applied,  it  meant  more  to  them 
than  to  any  other  element  of  the  Empire. 

In  the  first  place,  the  burden  of  Turkish  and  Mos- 
lem oppression  had  fallen  most  heavily  on  them. 
It  was  not  only  the  massacres  of  1894  to  1896, 
horrible  as  they  were,  which  had  put  the  Armenians 
in  continual  fear  for  their  lives ;  it  was  the  centuries- 
old  petty  persecution,  from  which  they  believed  they 
were  now  to  be  freed.  Turkish  officialdom  had 
grown  rich  in  extorting  the  last  farthing  from  the 
Armenians.  Only  those  who  had  seen  this  persecu- 
tion and  extortion  can  realize  how  large  a  part  it 
played  in  the  daily  life  of  the  Armenians,  and  how 
continuous  and  rich  a  source  of  revenue  it  was  to  the 
official  Turk.  For  every  little  service  the  official  ex- 
pected his  fat  fee,  always  charging  up  to  the  limit 
his  victim  was  able  to  pay.  You  could  not  carry  on 
your  business,  you  could  not  build  a  house,  you  could 
not  enlarge  or  alter  or  repair  your  shop,  you  could 
not  get  a  tax  on  your  harvest  estimated,  you  could 

187 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

not  travel  even  from  one  village  to  another  for  the 
purpose  of  business  or  pleasure  or  study,  without 
paying  the  officials.  Very  frequently  between  the 
local  Turkish  official  and  the  Armenian  stood  a 
middle  man  who  must  also  be  paid  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  the  fee  or  bribe  to  the  official  in  charge. 
How  people  could  have  lived  under  such  a  regime 
and  have  prospered,  is  beyond  the  comprehension  of 
the  Occidental.  Nothing  speaks  so  eloquently  for  the 
business  acumen  of  the  Armenian  race,  as  well  as  for 
devotion  to  the  religion  of  its  fathers. 

Naturally,  the  Armenians  expected  that  the 
constitution  would  bring  to  them  a  complete  relief 
from  economic  repression,  as  well  as  from  the  terrors 
of  massacre.  They  were  led  to  believe  this  by  the 
Young  Turks  who  had  so  long  plotted  the  overthrow 
of  Abdul  Hamid's  despotism.  During  the  campaign 
from  1 890- 1 908,  the  Young  Turks  needed  the  money 
and  the  brains  of  Armenians  in  the  larger  centres  of 
population  where  they  had  their  foyers,  and  in  the 
cities  abroad  where  they  lived  in  exile.  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  there  were  among  the  Young  Turks 
during  the  period  when  they  had  to  keep  alive  their 
ideals  in  the  fire  of  hope,  an  honest  intention  to  give 
the  Armenians  a  share  in  the  regeneration  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  But,  as  soon  as  they  realized  their 
ambitions,  racial  and  religious  fanaticism  came  to 
them  with  such  force  that  they  forgot  the  brilliant 
promises  as  well  as  the  affectionate  intercourse  of  the 
days  of  suffering  and  struggle. 

In  the  second  place,  Armenians,  unlike  the  Greeks, 
the  Macedonians,  and  the  Arabs,  had,  as  a  race,  no 

188 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

separatist  tendencies.  They  were  not  looking  to- 
wards another  state  to  come  and  redeem  them. 
They  feared  Russia.  They  were  too  scattered  to 
hope  to  form,  by  the  break-up  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
a  state  of  their  own.  They  loved  the  land  in  which 
they  lived  with  all  the  passion  of  their  nature.  In 
many  regions,  Turkish  was  their  native  tongue. 
They  were  industrious  tillers  of  the  soil,  as  well  as 
merchants.  The  Sultan  could  have  had  no  more 
loyal  subjects  than  these,  had  he  so  desired. 

Although  the  composition  of  the  new  Parliament 
chosen  in  October,  1908,  and  of  the  first  constitu- 
tional Cabinet,  was  a  prophecy  of  how  they  were  to 
be  left  out  in  the  cold,  the  Armenians  were  through- 
out that  winter,  when  the  constitution  was  new,  firm 
and  loyal,  as  well  as  intelligent,  supporters  of  re- 
generated Turkey.  The  wish  was  father  to  the 
thought.  For  them  there  was  no  longer  the  barrier 
of  race  and  creed.  All  were  Osmanlis,  and  willing  to 
lose  their  identity  in  the  politically  amalgamated 
race.  The  reign  of  Abdul  Hamid  was  a  nightmare, 
quickly  forgotten.  The  future  was  full  of  hope.  If 
only  the  Young  Turks  had  realized  what  a  tremen- 
dous influence  the  Armenians  could  have  played  in 
the  creation  of  New  Turkey,  if  only  they  had  been  will- 
ing to  use  these  allies,  we  might  have  been  able  to  write 
a  different  history  of  the  past  few  years  in  Europe. 

But  the  awakening  was  to  be  cruel.  It  came  in  a 
region  of  the  Empire  that  never  before  experienced 
the  horrors  of  a  general  massacre,  where  Christians 
felt  not  only  at  ease,  but  on  friendly  terms  with  their 
Moslem  neighbours. 

189 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

On  April  14,  1909,  on  a  morning  when  the  sun  had 
risen  upon  the  peaceful  and  happy  city  of  Adana,  out 
of  a  clear  sky  came  the  tragedy  which  was  the  be- 
ginning of  the  end  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Without 
provocation,  the  Moslem  population  began  to  attack 
and  kill  the  Christians.  The  Governor  of  the  pro- 
vince and  his  military  officials  not  only  did  nothing 
whatever  to  stop  the  bloodshed,  but  they  actu- 
ally handed  out  arms  and  munitions  to  the  blood- 
frenzied  mob  of  peasants,  who  were  pouring  into  the 
city.  For  three  days,  killing,  looting,  and  burning  of 
houses  were  aided  by  the  authorities.  The  massacres 
spread  west  through  the  great  Cilician  plain  to 
Tarsus,  and  east  over  the  Amanus  Range  into  north- 
em  Syria,  as  far  as  Antioch,  where  the  followers 
of  Jesus  were  first  called  Christians.  The  world, 
horrified  by  the  stories  which  soon  made  their  way 
to  the  newspapers,  realized  that  the  "bloodless  re- 
volution" had  not  regenerated  Turkey.  The  blood 
had  come  at  last,  and  without  the  regeneration! 
The  Great  Powers  sent  their  warships  to  Mersina, 
the  port  of  Tarsus  and  Adana.  Even  from  the 
distant  United  States  came  two  cruisers,  under 
pressure,  over  six  thousand  miles. 

In  the  meantime,  events  of  great  importance,  but 
not  of  equal  significance  in  the  future  of  Turkey, 
were  taking  place  at  Constantinople.  On  the  eve  of 
the  first  Adana  massacre,  Abdul  Hamid,  having 
corrupted  the  soldiers  of  the  Constantinople  garrison, 
set  in  motion  a  demonstration  against  the  constitu- 
tion. The  soldiers  shot  down  their  officers  in  cold 
blood,  marched  to  Yildiz  Kiosk,  and  demanded  of  the 

190 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

Sultan  the  abolition  of  the  constitution,  which  they 
declared  was  at  variance  with  the  Sheriat,  the  sacred 
law  of  Islam.  Abdul  Hamid  gladly  consented.  Popu- 
lar sympathy  in  Constantinople  and  throughout  the 
Empire  was  with  the  Sultan,  as  far  as  the  object  of 
the  revolution  went.  But  the  way  in  which  it  was 
brought  about  made  it  impossible  for  the  Sultan  to 
remain  within  the  pale  of  civilization.  Of  all  nations, 
none  relied  on  its  army  more  than  Turkey.  Were 
the  assassination  of  the  officers  to  go  unpunished,  the 
disintegration  of  the  Empire  necessarily  followed.  So 
the  military  hierarchy,  "Old"  Turks  as  well  as 
"Young,"  rose  against  the  Sultan.  The  army 
corps  in  Salonika  under  the  command  of  Mah- 
mud  Shevket  pasha,  marched  against  the  capital 
and  with  very  little  resistance  mastered  the  mu- 
tiny of  the  Constantinople  garrison.  Abdul  Hamid 
was  deposed,  and  sent  into  exile  at  the  Villa  Ala- 
tini  at  Salonika.  His  brother,  Reshid  Mohammed, 
came  to  the  throne,  under  the  title  of  Moham- 
med V. 

As  soon  as  the  Young  Turks  found  themselves 
again  in  control  of  the  situation,  even  before  the 
proclamation  of  the  new  Sultan,  they  sent  from 
Beirut  to  Adana  a  division  of  infantry  to  "re-estab- 
lish order."  These  regiments  disembarked  at  Mer- 
sina  on  the  day  Mohammed  V  ascended  the  throne, 
April  25th.  Immediately  upon  their  arrival  in  Adana 
they  began  a  second  massacre  which  was  more 
horrible  than  the  first.  Thousands  were  shot  and 
burned,  and  more  than  half  the  city  was  in  ruins. 
This  second  massacre  occurred  in  spite  of  the  fact 

191 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

that  a  dozen  foreign  warships  were  by  this  time 
anchored  in  the  harbour  of  Mersina. 

It  is  impossible  to  estimate  the  losses  of  life  and 
property  in  the  vilayets  of  Cilicia  and  northern  Syria 
during  the  last  two  weeks  of  April,  1908.  Not  less 
than  thirty  thousand  Armenians  were  massacred. 
The  losses  of  property  in  Adana  alone  were  serious 
enough  to  cause  the  foremost  fire  insurance  company 
in  France  to  fight  in  the  courts  for  two  years  the 
payments  of  its  claims.  But  it  is  not  in  the  realm  of 
our  work  to  follow  out  the  local  aftermath  of  this 
terrible  story.  We  are  interested  here  only  in  its 
bearing  on  the  fortunes  of  the  Empire  and  of  Europe. 

From  the  very  beginning,  the  Young  Turks,  now 
re-established  in  Constantinople  with  a  Sultan  of 
their  own  creation,  and  having  nothing  more  to  fear 
from  the  genius  and  bad  will  of  Abdul  Hamid,  pro- 
tested before  Europe  that  the  massacres  were  due 
to  the  old  regime  and  that  they  had  been  arranged 
by  Abdul  Hamid,  whose  deposition  cleared  them  of 
responsibility.  But  the  revelations  of  the  New  York 
Herald,  the  Tribuna  of  Rome,  and  the  Berliner  Tage- 
hlatt,  translated  and  reprinted  in  the  British,  French, 
and  Russian  press,  were  so  moving  that  it  was 
necessary  for  the  Young  Turks  to  send  special  com- 
missions to  the  capitals  of  Europe  to  counteract 
the  impression  of  these  articles. 

Europe  was  willing  to  accept  the  explanation  of 
the  Constantinople  Cabinet,  and  to  continue  its 
faith,  though  shaken,  in  the  intentions  of  the  Young 
Turks  to  grant  to  the  Christians  of  Turkey  the 
regime  of  equality  and  security  of  life  and  property 

192 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

which  the  constitution  guaranteed.  Even  the  Ar- 
menians, terrible  as  this  blow  had  been,  were  also 
willing  to  forgive  and  forget.  But  the  condition  of 
forgiveness,  and  the  proof  of  sincerity  of  the  declara- 
tions of  the  Young  Turks,  both  to  the  outside  world 
and  to  the  Armenians,  would  be  the  punishment  of 
those  who  had  been  guilty  of  this  most  horrible  blot 
upon  the  civilization  of  the  twentieth  century.  This 
was  to  be  the  test. 

The  Court-Martial,  sent  to  Adana  from  Constan- 
tinople after  the  new  Sultan  was  established  upon 
the  throne  and  the  Young  Turks  were  certain  of  their 
position,  had  every  guarantee  to  enable  it  to  do  its 
work  thoroughly  and  justly.  It  was  not  influenced 
or  threatened.  There  was,  however,  no  honest  in- 
tention to  give  decisions  impartially  and  in  accord- 
ance with  the  facts  that  the  investigation  would 
bring  forth.  The  methods  and  findings  of  the  Court- 
Martial  were  a  travesty  of  justice.  Its  members 
refused  absolutely  to  go  to  the  bottom  of  the  massa- 
cre, and  to  punish  those  who  had  been  guilty.  I 
happen  to  be  the  only  foreign  witness  whose  deposi- 
tion they  took.  They  refused  to  allow  me  to  testify 
against  the  Vali  and  his  fellow-conspirators.  The 
line  of  conduct  had  been  decided  before  their  arrival. 
The  idea  was  to  condemn  to  death  a  few  Moslems 
of  the  dregs  of  the  population,  who  would  probably 
have  found  their  way  to  the  gallows  sooner  or  later 
any  way.  With  them  were  to  be  hanged  a  number 
of  Armenians,  whose  only  crime  was  that  they  had 
defended  the  lives  and  honour  of  their  women  and 
children.  The  Vali  of  Adana,  who  had  planned  the 
13  193 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

massacre  and  had  carried  it  out,  and  two  or  three 
Moslem  leaders  of  the  city  who  had  co-operated  with 
him  and  with  the  military  authorities  in  the  effort 
to  exterminate  the  Armenians,  were  not  even  sent  to 
prison.  No  testimony  against  them  was  allowed  to 
be  brought  before  the  Court-Martial.  They  went 
into  exile  "until  the  affair  blew  over." 

When  a  future  generation  has  the  prospective  to 
make  researches  into  the  downfall  of  the  Young  Turk 
constitutional  regime  in  Turkey,  they  will  probably 
find  the  beginning  of  the  end  in  the  failure  to  punish 
the  perpetrators  of  the  Adana  massacres.  For  this 
was  a  formal  notification  to  the  Christians  of  Turkey 
that  the  constitutional  regime  brought  to  them  no 
guarantees  of  security,  or  justice,  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  made  their  position  in  the  Empire  even  more 
precarious  than  it  had  been  under  the  despotism  of 
Abdul  Hamid.  After  Adana,  the  Ai-menian  popula- 
tion became  definitely  alienated  from  the  constitu- 
tional movement,  and  was  convinced  that  its  only 
hope  lay  in  the  absolute  disappearance  of  Turkish 
rule. 

THE   ATTEMPT   TO   SUPPRESS   THE   LIBERTIES    OF 
THE   ORTHODOX  CHURCH 

When  Mohammed  the  Conqueror  entered  Con- 
stantinople in  1453,  he  showed  a  wise  determination 
to  continue  the  policy  of  his  predecessors  by  pre- 
serving the  independence  of  the  Orthodox  Church. 
For  he  knew  well  that  the  success  of  the  Osmanlis  had 
been  due  to  religious  toleration,  and  that  no  durable 
empire  could  be  built  in  Asia  Minor  and  the  Balkan 

194 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

Peninsula  by  a  Moslem  government,  unless  the 
liberties  of  the  Christian  inhabitants  were  assured 
through  the  recognition  of  the  Greek  patriarchate. 
The  first  thing  that  Mohammed  did  was  to  seek  out 
the  Greek  patriarch,  and  confirm  him  in  his  position 
as  the  political,  as  well  as  the  religious,  head  of 
Christian  Ottoman  subjects. 

Islam  is  a  theocracy.  The  spirit  of  its  government 
is  inspired  by  the  sacred  law,  the  Sheriat,  based  upon 
the  Koran  and  the  writings  of  the  earliest  fathers  of 
Islam.  Down  to  the  smallest  details,  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  state,  of  the  courts  of  justice,  and  of  the 
social  life  of  Mohammedan  peoples,  is  influenced  by 
ecclesiastical  law,  and  by  the  power  of  the  Church. 
As  this  law  does  not  provide  for  the  inclusion  of  non- 
Moslem  elements  either  in  the  political  or  social  life 
of  the  nation,  it  has  always  been  evident  that  people 
of  another  religion,  within  the  limits  of  a  Moslem 
state,  can  exist  only  if  they  have  an  ecclesiastical 
organization  of  their  own,  with  well-defined  liberties, 
privileges,  and  safeguards. 

This  principle  was  recognized  by  the  Osmanlis  for 
over  five  hundred  years;  even  the  most  despotic  of 
sultans  never  dreamed  of  abandoning  it.  There 
might  be  persecutions,  there  might  be  massacres, 
there  might  be  even  assassination  of  patriarchs,  but, 
until  the  Young  Turk  regime,  no  Ottoman  ministry 
ever  dreamed  of  destroying  the  organism  which  had 
made  possible  the  life  of  Moslem  and  Christian  under 
the  same  rule. 

The  thesis  of  the  Young  Turks  was,  from  a  theo- 
retical standpoint,  perfectly  sound  and  just.     They 

195 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

said  that  ecclesiastical  autonomy  was  necessary  under 
a  despotism,  but  that  it  had  ceased  to  have  a  raison 
d'etre  under  a  constitutional  government.  The  con- 
stitution guaranteed  equal  rights,  irrespective  of 
religion,  to  all  the  races  of  the  Empire.  Therefore 
the  Greek  Church  must  resign  its  prerogatives  of  a 
political  nature,  for  they  were  wholly  incompatible 
with  the  idea  of  constitutional  government. 

Many  foreigners,  carried  away  by  the  reasonable- 
ness of  this  argument,  severely  condemned  the 
Orthodox  Church  for  continuing  to  resist  the  en- 
croachments of  the  new  Government  upon  its  secular 
privileges — secular  in  both  senses  of  the  word.  They 
attributed  the  attitude  of  the  Greek  ecclesiastics 
to  hostility  to  the  constitution,  to  the  reactionary 
tendency  of  every  ecclesiastic  organization,  and  to 
selfish  desire  to  hold  firmly  the  privileges  which 
enabled  them  to  keep  in  their  clutches  the  Greek 
population  of  Turkey,  and  continue  to  enjoy  the 
prestige  and  wealth  accruing  to  them  from  these 
privileges.  Such  criticism  only  revealed  ignorance 
of  history  and  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  real 
issue  at  stake. 

No  ecclesiastical  organization  can,  under  a  con- 
stitutional government,  continue  indefinitely  to  be  a 
state  within  a  state,  and  to  enjoy  peculiar  privileges 
and  immunities.  But  the  application  of  the  consti- 
tution must  come  first.  It  must  enter  into  the  life 
of  the  people.  It  must  become  the  vital  expression 
of  their  national  existence,  evolved  through  genera- 
tions of  testing  and  experimenting.  The  constitu- 
tion is  finally  accepted  and  supported  by  a  nation 

196 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

when,  and  because,  it  has  been  found  good  and  has 
come  to  reflect  the  needs  and  wishes  of  the  people. 
Then,  without  any  great  trouble,  the  ecclesiastical 
organization  will  find  itself  gradually  deprived  of 
every  special  privilege.  For  the  privileges  will  have 
become  an  anachronism. 

But,  just  as  in  the  establishment  of  the  constitu- 
tion, in  their  attitude  toward  the  Greek  Church  the 
Young  Turks  acted  as  if  the  work  of  generations  in 
other  countries  could  be  for  them,  in  spite  of  their 
peculiarly  delicate  problems  and  the  differences  in 
creed  involved,  the  act  of  a  single  moment.  This 
mentality  of  the  half -educated,  immature  visionary 
has  been  shown  in  every  one  of  the  numerous  sense- 
less and  disastrous  decisions  which  have  brought  the 
Ottoman  Empire  so  speedily  to  its  ruin. 

The  Greek  Church  resisted  bitterly  every  move  of 
the  Young  Turks  to  bring  about  the  immediate 
millennium.  The  patriarch  was  a  man  of  wide  ex- 
perience, of  sound  common  sense,  and  of  undaunted 
courage.  Backed  by  the  Lay  Assembly,  which  has 
always  been  an  admirable  democratic  institution  of 
the  Orthodox  Church,  he  refused  to  give  up  realities 
for  chimeras.  With  all  its  privileges  and  all  its 
power,  it  had  been  hard  enough  for  the  Orthodox 
Church  to  protect  the  Greek  subjects  of  Turkey. 
The  patriarch  did  not  intend  to  surrender  the  safe- 
guards by  which  he  was  enabled  to  make  tolerable 
the  life  of  his  flock  for  illusory  and  untested  guar- 
antees. Let  the  constitution  become  really  the 
expression  of  the  will  of  the  people  of  Turkey,  let  it 
demonstrate  the  uselessness  of  any  safeguards  for 

197 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

protecting  the  Christians  from  Moslem  oppression, 
let  the  era  of  liberty  and  equality  and  fraternity 
actually  be  realized  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and 
then  the  Church  would  resign  its  privileges.  For 
they  would  be  antiquated,  and  fall  naturally  into 
desuetude.  But  in  constitutions,  as  in  other  things, 
the  proof  of  the  pudding  is  in  the  eating. 

What  the  Yoimg  Turks  attempted  to  do  was  to 
destroy  the  privileges  of  the  Orthodox  Church,  on  the 
ground  that  these  privileges  were  a  barrier  to  the 
assimilation  of  the  races  in  the  Empire.  Americans, 
above  all  nations,  have  deep  sympathies  for,  and  well 
justified  reasons  for  having  faith  in,  the  policy  of 
assimilation.  Have  not  the  various  races  of  Europe, 
different  in  religion  and  in  political  and  social  cus- 
toms, passed  wonderfully  through  the  crucible  of 
assimilation  on  American  soil?  But  by  assimilation 
the  Young  Turks  meant,  not  the  amalgamation  of 
races,  each  co-operating  and  sharing  in  the  building 
up  of  the  fatherland,  as  in  America,  but  the  complete 
subjection  and  ultimate  disappearance  of  all  other 
elements  in  the  Empire  than  their  own.  They  in- 
tended, from  the  very  first  days  of  the  constitutional 
regime,  to  make  Turkey  a  nation  of  Turks.  Theirs 
was  the  strong,  virile  race,  into  which  the  other  races 
would  be  fused.  Turkey  was  weak,  they  declared, 
because  it  was  the  home  of  a  conglomeration  of 
peoples.  If  Turkey  was  to  become  like  the  nations 
of  Europe,  these  different  nationalities  must  be  de- 
stroyed. To  destroy  them,  the  Government  had  first 
to  aim  at  the  foyer  of  national  life,  the  ecclesiastical 
hierarchies. 

198 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

I  have  talked  with  many  a  zealous  Young  Turk. 
What  I  have  written  here  is  not  only  the  logical 
interpretation  of  the  facts;  it  is  also  the  faithful 
expression  of  the  ideas  of  the  most  earnest  and  in- 
telligent Turkish  partisans  of  the  new  regime.  They 
pointed  out,  with  perfect  logic,  that  this  process  had 
gone  on  in  every  European  country,  and  that  it  was 
the  only  way  in  which  a  strong  nation  could  be  built. 
So  far  they  were  right.  But,  aside  from  the  fact 
that  in  Europe  this  political  and  social  evolution  had 
taken  centuries,  there  was  also  the  working  of  the 
law  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest.  In  European  na- 
tions it  had  been  the  element,  always  composite, 
which  deserved  to  live,  that  formed  the  nucleus  of  a 
nationality.  The  whole  root  of  the  question  in 
Turkey  was,  were  the  Young  Turks  justified  in 
believing  that  the  Turk  was  this  element? 

There  is  not  space  to  discuss  the  reasons  for  the 
supremacy  of  the  Osmanli  in  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
Up  to  the  eighteenth  century,  the  Osmanli  was  un- 
doubtedly the  "fittest"  element.  For  the  past  two 
hundred  years,  the  continued  domination  of  Turk 
and  the  continued  subjection  of  Christian  popula- 
tions, in  Turkey,  has  been  due  to  causes  outside  of 
the  Empire.  The  Turk  has  remained  the  ruling  race. 
But  is  he  still  the  fittest?  One  may  examine  the 
different  elements  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and 
measure  them  by  the  tests  of  civilization.  From  the 
intellectual  standpoint,  from  the  business  standpoint, 
from  the  administrative  standpoint,  the  Turk  is 
hardly  able  to  sustain  his  claim  to  continue  to  be,  in 
a  twentieth-century  empire,  the  element  which  can 

199 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

hope  to  assimilate  Greek,  Armenian,  Albanian,  Slav, 
and  Arab.  He  is  less  fit  than  any  of  the  others, 
especially  than  the  Greek  and  Armenian  in  intellec- 
tual and  business  faculties,  and  than  the  Albanian  in 
administrative  faculties.  There  remains,  then,  as  his 
sole  claim  to  dominate  the  other  races,  his  physical 
superiority.  By  history  and  by  legend,  he  is  the 
fighting  man  and  rules  by  right  of  conquest  and 
force. 

It  was  always  the  sane — and  only  safe — policy  of 
the  Turks  to  keep  Christians  out  of  the  army.  They 
saw  to  it  that  the  metier  of  arms  remained  \vholly  to 
the  Moslems.  In  spite  of  the  increasing  wealth  and 
education  of  the  Christian  elements  of  the  Empire, 
the  ascendancy  was  preserved  to  the  Turk  through 
the  army.  But  at  what  a  sacrifice!  By  reason  of 
military  service,  the  Turkish  peasant  has  been  kept 
in  economic  and  intellectual  serfdom,  while  his 
Christian  neighbour  progressed.  The  Turkish  popu- 
lation has  actually  decreased,  and  the  ravages  of 
garrison  life,  due  to  dyspepsia  and  syphilis,  have 
diminished  fearfully  the  physical  vigour  of  the  race. 
By  the  same  token,  the  upper  classes,  knowing  only 
the  life  of  army  officers,  have  been  removed  from  the 
necessity  of  competing  in  the  world  for  position  and 
success.  Can  manhood  be  formed  in  any  other  mould 
than  that  of  competition,  where  the  goal  is  achieve- 
ment, and  is  reached  only  by  continued  effort  of  will 
and  brain?  The  upper  class  Turk  is  a  parasite,  and, 
like  all  parasites,  helpless  when  that  upon  which  he 
feeds  is  taken  from  him. 

The  attack  of  the  Young  Turk  party  upon  the 

200 


Long-itude        D 


Longitude       F 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

Greek  Church  failed.  The  patriarch  refused  to  sur- 
render his  privileges.  The  Greek  clergy  and  the 
Lay  Council  held  out  under  persecution  and  threats. 
In  October,  1910,  when  the  Lay  Council  met  in 
Constantinople,  its  members  were  arrested,  and 
thrown  into  jail.  In  Macedonia  and  Thrace,  in  the 
^gean  Islands,  along  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  the 
bishops  and  clergy  suffered  untold  persecutions. 
Some  were  even  assassinated.  I  shall  never  forget  a 
memorable  interview  I  had  with  Joachim  III,  during 
that  crisis.  His  Holiness  untied  with  trembling 
fingers  the  dossier  of  persecutions,  which  contained 
letters  and  sworn  statements  from  a  dozen  dioceses. 
"They  treat  us  like  dogs!"  he  cried.  "Never  under 
Abdul  Hamid  or  any  Sultan  have  my  people  suffered 
as  they  are  suffering  now.  But  we  are  too  strong  for 
them.  We  refuse  to  be  exterminated.  I  see  all 
Europe  stained  with  blood  because  of  these  crimes." 
How  prophetic  these  words  as  I  record  them  now! 

The  Turk  could  not  hope  to  assimilate  the  Greek 
by  peaceful  methods,  because  he  was  his  intellectual 
inferior.  When  he  planned  to  use  force,  the  Balkan 
Alliance  was  formed.  The  battle  of  Lule  Burgas 
took  away  from  the  Turk  his  last  claim  to  fitness  as 
dominant  race.  He  could  no  longer  fight  better  than 
Christians.  The  first  Balkan  War  gave  the  coup  de 
grace  to  the  final — and  has  it  not  been  all  along  the 
only? — argument  for  Turkish  racial  supremacy. 

THE  CRETAN  QUESTION  AND  THE  GREEK  BOYCOTT 

The  island  of  Crete  had  long  been  to  Turkey,  in 
relation  to  Greece,  what  Cuba  had  been  to  Spain,  in 

201 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

relation  to  the  United  States.  In  both  cases,  and 
about  the  same  time,  wars  of  Hberation  broke  out. 
But  Greece  was  not  as  fortunate  in  her  efforts  for  the 
emancipation  of  an  enslaved  and  continually  rebel- 
lious population  as  was  the  United  States.  Powerless 
and  humiliated,  after  the  war  of  1897,  Greece  could 
no  longer  hope  to  have  a  voice,  by  reason  of  her  own 
force,  in  the  direction  of  Cretan  affairs.  Crete  be- 
came the  foundling  of  European  diplomacy. 

Together  with  the  declaration  of  Bulgarian  in- 
dependence, and  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina by  Austria-Hungary,  the  Young  Turks  had  to 
face  a  decree  of  the  Cretan  assembly  to  the  effect 
that  Crete  was  indissolubly  united  to  the  kingdom  of 
Greece.  The  Young  Turks  could  do  nothing  against 
Bulgaria.  For  the  ceremony  of  Timovo  had  been 
no  more  than  the  de  jure  sanction  of  a  de  facto  con- 
dition. The  only  cause  for  conflict,  the  question 
of  the  railroads  in  eastern  Rumelia,  was  solved 
by  Russian  diplomacy.  Against  Austria-Hungary  a 
boycott  was  declared.  It  resulted  in  a  few  success- 
ful attempts  to  prevent  the  landing  of  mails  and 
freights  from  Austrian  steamers,  and  in  the  tear- 
ing up  of  several  million  fezes  which  were  of  Aus- 
trian manufacture.  These,  by  the  way,  were  soon 
replaced  by  new  fezes  from  the  same  factories.  The 
Sublime  Porte  settled  the  Bosnia-Herzegovina  ques- 
tion by  accepting  a  money  payment  from  Austria- 
Hungary. 

All  the  rancour  resulting  from  these  losses  and 
humiliation,  all  the  vials  of  wrath,  were  poured  upon 
the  head  of  Greece.     The  Cretan  question  became 

202 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

the  foremost  problem  in  European  diplomacy.  The 
Cretans  stubbornly  refused  to  listen  to  the  Powers, 
and  decided  to  maintain  their  decision  to  belong  to 
Greece.  But  Greece  was  threatened  with  war  by 
Turkey,  if  she  did  not  refuse  to  accept  the  annexation 
decree  voted  by  the  Cretans  themselves.  In  order  to 
prevent  Turkey  from  attacking  Greece,  the  Powers 
decided  to  use  force  against  the  Cretans.  Turkey, 
not  satisfied  with  the  efforts  of  the  Powers  to  preserve 
the  Ottoman  sovereignty  and  Ottoman  pride  in 
Crete,  demanded  still  more  of  Greece.  She  asked  that 
the  Greek  Parliament  should  not  only  declare  its 
disinterestedness  in  Crete,  but  should  take  upon  it- 
self the  obligation  to  maintain  that  disinterestedness 
in  the  future. 

To  go  into  all  the  tortuous  phases  of  the  Cretan 
question  up  to  the  time  of  the  Balkan  War  would 
make  this  chapter  out  of  proportion;  and  yet  Crete, 
like  Alsace-Lorraine,  has  had  a  most  vital  in- 
fluence upon  the  present  European  war.  The 
one  point  to  be  emphasized  here  is,  that  to 
bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  Greece  in  defining  her 
attitude  toward  Crete,  the  Young  Turks  decided 
to  revive  the  commercial  boycott  which  they  had 
used  against  Austria.  I  have  seen  from  close  range 
the  notorious  Greek  boycott  of  1910  to  1912.  It  was 
far  more  disastrous  to  the  Turks  than  to  the  Greeks 
of  Turkey.  It  threatened  so  completely,  however,  the 
economic  prosperity  of  Greece,  which  is  a  commercial 
rather  than  an  agricultural  country,  that  it  forced 
Greece  into  the  Balkan  Alliance  much  against  her 
will,  for  the  sake  of  self-preservation. 

203 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

If  this  boycott  had  been  carried  on  against  the 
Greeks  of  Greece  alone,  it  wovild  not  have  affected 
vitally  the  prosperity  of  the  Greeks  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  Their  imports  come  from  every  country, 
and  for  their  exports  the  freight  steamers  of  all  the 
European  nations  competed.  But  it  was  directed 
also  against  the  Greeks  who  were  Ottoman  subjects. 
In  Salonika,  Constantinople,  Trebizond,  Smyrna, 
and  other  ports,  commerce  was  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  Greeks.  They  owned  almost  every  steamer 
bearing  the  Ottoman  flag.  They  owned  the  cargoes. 
They  bought  and  sold  the  merchandise.  The  Young 
Turks,  working  through  the  hamals  or  longshoremen 
and  the  boatmen  who  manned  the  lighters, — all 
Turks  and  Kurds, — succeeded  in  tying  up  absolutely 
the  commerce  of  Ottoman  Greeks.  The  Greek 
merchants  and  shippers  were  ruined.  It  was  urged 
cleverly  that  this  was  the  chance  for  Moslems  to  get 
the  trade  of  the  great  ports  of  Turkey  into  their  own 
hands.  The  Government  encouraged  them  by  buy- 
ing and  maintaining  steamship  lines.  But  the  Turks 
had  no  knowledge  of  commerce,  no  money  to  buy 
goods,  and  no  inclination  to  do  the  work  and  accept 
the  responsibilities  necessary  for  successful  commer- 
cial undertakings.  The  result  was  that  imports  were 
stopped,  prices  went  up,  and  the  Moslems  were  hurt 
as  much  as,  if  not  more  than,  the  Christians.  After 
several  voyages,  the  new  government  passenger 
vessels  were  practically  hors  de  combat.  There  was 
no  longer  first,  second,  and  third  class.  Peasants 
squatted  on  the  decks  and  in  the  saloons.  Filth 
reigned    supreme,    and    hopeless    confusion.      No 

204 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

European  could  endure  a  voyage  on  one  of  these 
steamers,  and  no  merchant  cared  to  entrust  his 
shipments  to  them. 

The  boycott  died  because  it  was  a  hopeless  under- 
taking. For  many  months,  the  Government  lost 
heavily  through  the  falling  off  in  the  custom  house 
receipts.  The  labouring  class  (almost  wholly  Mos- 
lems) of  the  seaports  suffered  terribly,  as  our  labour- 
ing class  suffers  during  a  prolonged  strike.  The 
boycott  was  removed,  Greeks  were  allowed  to  re- 
sume their  business,  so  essential  for  the  prosperity 
of  the  community,  and,  as  is  always  the  case  in 
Turkey,  everything  worked  again  in  the  same  old 
way. 

But,  just  as  the  failure  to  punish  the  perpetrators 
of  the  Adana  massacre  alienated  definitely  and 
irrevocably  the  sympathy  and  loyal  support  of  the 
Armenian  element  from  the  constitutional  regime, 
so  the  boycott,  iniquitous  and  futile,  lost  to  the 
Young  Turks  the  allegiance  of  the  Greeks  of  the 
Empire.  Already  alarmed  by  the  attack  upon 
the  liberties  of  the  patriarchate,  the  Greeks  began 
to  look  to  Greece  for  help;  and,  in  the  islands  of  the 
^gean  and  in  Macedonia,  the  hope  was  strong  that 
a  successful  war  might  put  an  end  to  what  they  were 
suffering. 

The  Greeks  of  Turkey  are  not  free  from  the  univer- 
sal characteristic  of  human  nature.  You  can  perse- 
cute and  browbeat  a  man,  you  can  bully  him  and  do 
him  physical  injury,  you  can  refuse  him  a  share  in 
the  government  and  put  him  in  an  inferior  social 
position,  and  he  will  continue  to  endure  it.     But, 

205 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

rob  him  of  the  chance  of  making  a  Hvelihood,  and  he 
will  commence  to  conspire  against  the  government. 
A  man's  vital  point  is  his  pocket-book.  That  vital 
point  the  Young  Turks  threatened  by  their  boycott. 

THE  YOUNG  TURKS  AND  THE  MACEDONIAN  PROBLEM 

It  was  at  Salonika  that  the  Young  Turk  move- 
ment first  gained  its  footing  in  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
and  until  the  loss  of  European  Turkey,  after  the 
disastrous  war  with  the  Balkan  States,  Salonika 
continued  to  be  the  centre  of  the  "Committee  of 
Union  and  Progress."  Its  congresses  were  always 
held  there.  From  Salonika  the  third  army  corps 
went  forth  to  suppress,  in  April,  1909,  the  counter- 
revolution in  Constantinople.  To  the  Young  Turks, 
Salonika  seemed  the  safest  place  in  all  the  Ottoman 
dominions  for  the  imprisonment  of  Abdul  Hamid. 
Many  of  the  leading  members  of  the  party  were 
natives  of  Macedonia.  In  fact,  it  was  because  the 
Young  Turks  saw  clearly  that  European  Turkey 
would  soon  be  lost  to  the  Empire,  unless  there  was 
a  regeneration,  that  they  precipitated  in  1908  the 
revolution  which  had  so  long  been  brewing. 

It  is  natural,  then,  that  the  Macedonian  problem 
should  be  the  first  and  uppermost  of  all  the  many 
problems  that  had  to  be  solved  in  the  regenera- 
tion of  Turkey.  The  "  Committee  of  Union  and  Pro- 
gress" saw  that  immediate  action  must  be  taken  to 
strengthen  Ottoman  authority,  so  severely  shaken 
since  the  war  with  Russia,  in  the  European  vilayets. 

We  have  already  shown  in  a  previous  chapter  how 

206 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

the  struggle  of  races  in  European  Turkey  had  made 
Macedonia  the  bloody  centre  of  Balkan  rivalry,  and 
had  reduced  the  vilayets  of  Uskub  and  Salonika  to 
anarchy. 

Up  to  the  coming  of  the  constitutional  regime, 
there  had  been  a  very  strong  element  in  Macedonia, 
principally  Bulgarian,  which  saw — oh,  how  prophetic- 
ally ! — that  the  liberation  of  Macedonia  from  Turkish 
rule  would  endanger,  rather  than  aid,  the  propa- 
ganda for  eventual  Bulgarian  hegemony  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula.  These  Bulgarians,  wise  in  their 
day  and  generation  beyond  their  emancipated 
brethren,  advocated  the  intervention  of  Bulgarian 
arms,  not  to  secure  independence,  but  autonomy. 
They  felt  that  by  the  creation,  for  a  period  of  years, 
of  an  autonomous  province  of  Macedonia  under  the 
suzerainty  of  the  Sultan,  the  felicitous  history  of 
Eastern  Rumelia  would  repeat  itself. 

The  Young  Turks  decided  to  solve  the  Macedon- 
ian problem  by  strengthening  the  Moslem  element 
in  every  comer  of  the  vilayets  of  Salonika  and  Uskub. 
The  means  of  doing  this  were  at  hand.  After  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Turkish 
agents  began  to  work  among  the  Moslem  popula- 
tion in  these  countries  to  induce  them  to  emigrate 
and  come  under  the  dominion  of  the  "Padishah,"  as 
the  Sultan  is  called  by  his  faithful  subjects.  They 
were  brought  in  and  settled,  with  the  help  of  the 
Government,  in  those  districts  of  Macedonia  where 
the  Moslem  element  was  weak.  This  was  a  repeti- 
tion of  the  policy  of  Abdul  Hamid  after  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  when,  in   Eastern  Rumelia  and  Thrace, 

207 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

to  oppose  the  Bulgarians  Circassians  from  the  lost 
Caucasus  were  settled,  and  to  oppose  the  Servians 
Albanian  emigration  into  old  Servia  and  the  Sand- 
jak  of  Novi  Bazar  was  encouraged. 

In  addition  to  this,  the  Young  Turks  decided  to 
secure  the  loyalty  of  their  Christian  subjects  in 
European  Turkey  by  abolishing  the  karadj  (head  tax) 
which  exempted  Christians  from  military  service. 
Bulgarians,  Greeks,  and  Servians  were  summoned  to 
serve  in  the  Ottoman  army. 

The  first  of  these  measures  should  never  have  been 
adopted.  The  bitter  experience  of  former  years 
should  have  taught  the  Young  Turks  the  lesson 
that  emigration  of  this  nature  not  only  tended  to 
arouse  religious  fanaticism,  but  also  introduced  an 
element,  ignorant  and  unruly,  and  wholly  worthless 
from  the  economic  point  of  view.  It  has  often  been 
recorded  that  Moslems,  prompted  to  the  sacrifice  of 
abandoning  everything  for  their  love  of  remaining 
Turkish  subjects,  have  made  these  "treks"  after  the 
unsuccessful  wars  of  Turkey  of  their  own  initiative. 
Nothing  is  farther  from  the  truth.  There  has  never 
been  an  exodus  of  this  sort  which  has  not  been  due 
to  the  instigation  of  political  agents.  From  the  very 
fact  that  large  industrious  and  influential  Moslem 
elements  have  remained  and  prospered  under  Rus- 
sian, Bulgarian,  and  Austrian  rule,  it  can  be  inferred 
that  those  who  yielded  to  the  solicitation  of  Turkish 
agents  were  the  undesirable  Moslem  element,  who, 
never  having  acquired  anything  where  they  were, 
had  nothing  to  lose  by  making  a  change.  If  one 
excepts  a  certain   portion   of  the  Circassians,   the 

208 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

statement  may  well  be  made  that  these  emigrants — 
muhadjirs  they  are  called  in  Turkish — are  an  element 
forming  the  lowest  dregs  of  the  population,  as  worth- 
less and  shiftless  as  the  great  majority  of  the  Jews 
whom  the  Zionist  movement  has  attracted  to  Pales- 
tine. More  than  this,  the  muhadjirs  have  been 
fanatical  and  lawless,  and  it  is  they  whose  massacres 
of  Christians  have  invariably  ended  in  irretrievable 
disaster  for  Turkey. 

In  Macedonia,  the  muhadjirs,  in  conjunction  with 
the  Albanian  Moslem  immigrants,  were  responsible 
for  the  succession  of  massacres  in  1912,  such  as  those 
of  Ishtip  and  Kotchana,  which  helped  to  bring  about 
the  Balkan  alliance.  The  same  thing  is  happening 
to-day  in  the  coast  towns  of  Asia  Minor  and  Thrace, 
where  the  brutality  and  blood  lust  of  the  muhadjirs 
since  1913  will  eventually  cause  another  attack  of 
Greece  upon  Turkey. 

The  second  policy — that  of  enrolling  Christians  in 
the  army — was  recorded,  back  in  the  days  of  the  first 
attempt  at  the  emancipation  of  Christians,  the  Tan- 
zimat  of  1839,  as  a  measure  which  would  ameliorate 
their  lot  and  bring  about  equality.  The  idea  was 
splendid,  but  its  application  was  impracticable.  Otto- 
man Christians  are  so  wholly  incompatible,  from  their 
social  and  educational  background,  with  Ottoman 
Moslems,  that  they  cannot  be  placed  in  the  army, 
in  mixed  regiments,  without  incurring  humiliation, 
degradation,  and  persecution  of  the  most  cruel  sort. 

The  only  way  in  which  Christians  could  be  called 
to  serve  in  the  Ottoman  army  would  have  been  the 
formation,  at  first,  of  separate  regiments,  where  the 
J4  209 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

soldiers  would  enjoy  immunity  from  persecution. 
When  this  reform  was  made,  there  should  have  been 
also  a  provision  from  the  very  first,  that  the  ranks  of 
officers  be  recruited  from  the  Christian  elements  in 
the  Empire,  in  proportion  to  their  numerical  strength. 
But  with  both  Christians  and  Jews,  obligatory  army 
service  was  used  from  the  beginning — it  is  still  used 
today — as  a  means  of  extorting  money  from  those 
who  could  pay,  and  terrorizing  and  reducing  to 
slavery  those  who  could  not  raise  the  forty  pounds 
required  for  exemption.  Even  if  there  were  no  reli- 
gious fanaticism,  even  if  it  were  not  necessary  for 
Christians  of  intelligence  to  serve  in  an  army  wholly 
officered  by  Moslems,  the  terrible  and  criminal  condi- 
tions of  service  which  they  were  called  upon  to  suffer 
would  have  justified  the  Christians  in  adopting  every 
possible  measure  to  avoid  military  service. 

Throughout  the  Empire,  intelligent  Christians 
who  could  not  purchase  their  freedom  from  this 
obligation  preferred  exile  to  military  service.  From 
1909  to  1914,  Turkey  has  lost  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  its  best  young  blood. 

The  result  in  Macedonia  of  the  coming  of  the 
muhadjirs  and  the  taking  of  Christians  for  the 
army,  was  that  the  Macedonians  abandoned  their 
advocacy  of  autonomy,  under  the  suzerainty  of  the 
Sultan,  and  looked  to  the  Balkan  States  for  freedom 
from  Turkish  rule. 

THE  ALBANIAN  UPRISINGS 

Albania  was  never  fully  conquered  by  the  Osmanlis. 
Like  the  Montenegrins,  the  Albanians  were  always 

210 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

able  to  resist  the  extension  of  Turkish  authority  in 
their  mountains.  Not  only  did  the  nature  of  the 
country  favour  them,  but  their  proximity  to  the 
Adriatic,  and  their  ability  to  call  at  will  for  Italian 
and  Austrian  help,  made  it  advisable  for  the  Supreme 
Porte  to  compromise  with  them.  Many  Albanians, 
including  principally,  as  in  Bosnia,  the  landowning 
families,  were  converted  to  Mohammedanism,  and 
attached  themselves  to  the  fortunes  of  Turkey. 
Without  ever  giving  up  their  local  independence, 
these  renegade  Albanians  became  the  most  loyal  and 
efficient  supporters  of  Ottoman  authority  outside  of 
Albania. 

Turkey  has  gained  much  from  the  Albanians.  Her 
higher  classes,  endowed  with  extreme  intelligence  and 
physical  activity,  have  been  the  most  valuable  civil 
and  military  officials  that  the  Government  has  ever 
enjoyed.  Because  they  were  Moslems,  they  were 
able  to  take  high  positions  in  the  army  and  govern- 
ment service.  It  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  facts 
of  Ottoman  history  that  the  great  majority  of  the 
really  great  statesmen  and  soldiers  of  the  Empire, 
if  not  of  Christian  ancestry,  have  been,  and  still  are, 
Albanians.  In  strengthening  the  Turkish  domination 
in  the  European  provinces,  after  the  period  of  decline 
set  in,  the  Albanians  have  been  indispensable.  Their 
emigration  from  their  mountains  into  Epirus,  Old 
Servia,  the  valley  of  the  Vardar,  and  the  coast  towns 
of  Macedonia  checked  for  a  long  time  the  conspira- 
cies and  rebellions  of  the  Christian  elements. 

The  Sultans  of  Turkey  and  their  counsellors  have 
always  recognized  the  value  of  the  Albanians.     In 

211 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

return  for  their  great  services  to  the  Empire,  they 
were  allowed  to  retain  their  local  privileges.  This 
meant  independence,  in  reality,  rather  than  auton- 
omy. They  gave  what  taxes  they  pleased,  or  none. 
Military  service  was  rendered  upon  their  own  terms. 
Christian  Albanians,  as  well  as  Moslem,  have  pre- 
ferred Ottoman  sovereignty  to  any  other.  They  have 
never  thought  of  independence,  because  this  would 
have  brought  them  responsibilities  and  dangers 
from  which,  under  the  fetish  of  "the  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,"  they  were  free.  So  they  resisted 
every  effort  of  Italian,  Austrian,  Slav,  and  Greek  to 
weaken  their  allegiance  to  the  Sultan.  Turkey  also 
allowed  them  to  remain  under  the  mediaeval  condi- 
tions in  which  they  lived  back  in  the  fourteenth 
century.  They  wanted  neither  railways,  roads,  nor 
ports.  Among  all  the  subjects  of  the  Sultan,  the 
Albanians  were  best  satisfied  with  the  absolute  lack 
of  progress  under  Moslem  rule.  These  are  the 
reasons  why  the  majority  of  Albanians  want  to 
return  once  more  to  the  fold  of  Turkey. 

The  Young  Turks  were  no  more  felicitous  in  their 
treatment  of  the  Albanians  than  of  the  Greeks  and 
Armenians.  Without  any  consideration  of  the  pe- 
culiar problems  involved,  they  decided  immediately, 
tackling  every  problem  at  once,  that  Albania  must 
be  civilized  and  that  Ottoman  sovereignty  must  work 
there  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  in  any  other  part  of 
the  Empire.  Albanians  must  render  military  service, 
and  submit  to  being  sent  wherever  the  authorities  at 
Constantinople  decided.  Local  independence  must 
cease.     Taxes  must  be  paid  regularly.     When  the 

212 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

Albanians  resisted,  as  they  did  immediately,  an 
army  was  sent  to  pacify  the  country. 

One  cannot  but  sympathize  with  the  principle  laid 
down  by  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  at  Constan- 
tinople, that  the  central  authority  must  be  recognized 
and  that  the  only  way  to  stamp  out  the  Albanian 
anarchy  was  to  disarm  the  population.  But  the 
Young  Turks  knew  no  other  way  of  doing  this  than 
by  force.  They  did  not  realize  that  anarchy  and 
lawlessness  disappear  only  with  education  and 
economic  progress.  Instead  of  starting  to  "civilize" 
the  Albanians  by  establishing  schools  and  opening 
up  the  country  with  railways,  they  sent  rapid-firing 
guns.  In  the  summer  of  1909,  the  rebellion  was 
stamped  out  with  ruthless  cruelty  by  the  burning  of 
villages,  the  destruction  of  crops,  and  the  seizing  of 
cattle.  Such  measures  were  a  very  poor  argument 
for  the  Albanian  to  induce  him  to  comply  with  the 
disarmament  decree.  Under  ordinary  circumstances 
an  Albanian  would  rather  lose  his  leg  than  his  gun. 
Under  these  circumstances,  he  preferred  risking  his 
life  to  giving  up  what  he  considered  his  only  means 
of  defence. 

Every  year  the  Albanian  rebellion  broke  out  afresh. 
Every  year  the  Young  Turks  exhausted  the  strength 
and  spent  the  resources  of  their  armies  in  European 
Turkey  against  the  invulnerable  mountains  of 
Albania.  After  every  "pacification,"  Albania"^ in 
arms  was  just  as  certain  each  May  as  the  coming 
again  of  summer. 

In  1912,  when  affairs  were  in  a  critical  state  as 
regards  the  Christian  neighbours,   the  Cabinet  in 

213 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Constantinople  was  once  more  engaged  in  the  hope- 
less task  of  subduing  Albanian  opposition.  The 
Albanians,  however,  seemed  to  gain  strength  rather 
than  lose  it.  In  September,  1912,  I  was  in  Uskub 
just  four  weeks  before  the  Balkan  War  broke  out. 
The  Albanian  chieftains  were  there,  having  made  a 
truce  for  Ramazan  (the  sacred  month  of  the  Moslem 
fasting).  They  said  to  me  that  the  next  year,  if  the 
Turks  did  not  stop  persecuting  them,  they  would 
take  their  army  to  Constantinople.  Others  were 
to  get  ahead  of  them,  and  they  were  to  win  their 
independence  without  having  to  fight  the  Turks 
again.  The  poor  showing  of  the  Turkish  arms  against 
the  Greeks  and  Servians  is  very  largely  due  to  the 
exhaustion  which  had  come  to  them  through  con- 
tinuous and  unsuccessful  attempts  to  get  the  better 
of  the  Albanian  uprisings.  The  Balkan  States  knew 
how  severely  the  western  Macedonian  army  had 
suffered  in  July  and  August,  19 12.  It  was  one  of  the 
considerations  which  decided  them  to  strike  at  that 
moment. 

THE  TREATMENT  OF  THE  ARABIC  ELEMENT 

In  Asiatic  Turkey  there  are  supposed  to  be  about 
eight  million  Arabic-speaking  inhabitants.  These 
figures  may  be  an  exaggeration,  for  no  census  has 
ever  been  taken.  But  the  vilayets  are  occupied 
almost  exclusively  by  Arabs  and  races  speaking 
Arabic.  They  form  a  half  of  the  Empire's  dominions 
in  Asia,  starting  with  the  Taurus  and  Amanus  ranges, 
south  through  Syria  to  Arabia  and  east  and  south- 
east through  Mesopotamia  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 

214 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

These  large  stretches  of  territory  were  never 
thoroughly  conquered  by  the  Turks.  They  did  not 
settle  there  in  the  way  they  had  done  in  the  Balkan 
Peninsula,  outside  of  Albania  and  Montenegro,  and 
in  Asia  Minor.  The  race  from  whom  they  had  taken 
their  religion  and  from  whom  they  soon  absorbed 
whatever  culture  and  art  they  can  be  said  to  possess, 
was  never  assimilated  by  the  Turks.  Their  simple 
warrior  and  herdsman  language  was  enriched  by 
Arabic  substantives,  as  Anglo-Saxon  was  enriched 
by  the  Latin  gotten  through  the  Normans  and 
through  the  Church.    But  there  was  no  racial  fusion. 

Only  in  appearance  did  Turkish  officialdom  and 
the  authority  of  the  Sultan  ever  get  a  real  hold  over 
the  Arabs.  By  habit  they  came  to  respect  the  Sultan 
as  Khalif.  The  allegiance  which  they  gave  him  as 
ruler  was  altogether  without  value — a  pure  matter  of 
form.  An  aggressive  pasha  found  it  easy  to  detach 
Egypt  from  Turkish  rule.  It  was  conglomerate 
populations  and  a  lack  of  natural  boundaries  for 
forming  states  that  prevented  the  other  Arabic 
portions  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  from  following 
Egypt.  In  Arabia  proper,  and  in  the  larger  portion 
of  Mesopotamia,  up  to  the  present  day,  the  Arabs 
have  been  as  independent  of  the  Sublime  Porte  as 
have  been  the  Albanians. 

In  the  reign  of  Abdul  Hamid,  when  the  idea  of  the 
Pan-Islamic  movement  was  conceived,  the  import- 
ance of  joining  the  sacred  cities  of  Medina  and  Mecca 
more  closely  with  the  Turkish  Empire  was  recognized. 
French  interests  were  building  a  railway  across  the 
Lebanon  Mountains  to  Aleppo  and  Damascus.    The 

215 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Germans  had  launched  their  project  for  the  Bag- 
dadbahn.  Abdul  Hamid  decided  to  create  a  railway 
directly  under  government  control,  from  Damascus 
to  Medina  and  Mecca.  For  the  first  time  since  they 
were  joined  to  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  Arabic 
provinces  saw  themselves  in  prospective  connec- 
tion with  the  capital.  It  had  been  for  a  long  time 
easier  and  quicker  to  go  from  Constantinople  to  the 
United  States  or  to  China  than  to  Bagdad  or  to 
Mecca.  The  railways  would  have  one  of  two  results : 
either  the  Arabs  would  be  brought  more  closely 
into  connection  with  the  Empire,  or  they  would  be 
definitely  alienated  from  it. 

The  Arabic  question  stood  thus  when  the  constitu- 
tion was  re-established  in  1908.  There  are  many 
Arabs  among  the  Young  Turks,  but  these,  like  the 
Slavs  in  the  military  and  official  service  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  have  been  definitely  alienated  from  their 
own  nationality.  Here  was  the  opportunity  to  bring 
into  sympathy  with  the  constitutional  movement  the 
millions  of  Arabic-speaking  subjects  of  the  Sultan, 
who  formed  the  most  numerous  Moslem  element  in 
the  Empire.  But  the  Young  Turks  were  no  more 
tactful  in  the  treatment  of  the  Arabs,  who  were 
mostly  of  their  own  religion,  than  of  the  Greeks  and 
Armenians.  In  the  first  Parliament,  they  were 
almost  as  unfair  to  Moslem  Arabs  as  to  Christians. 
In  the  apportionment  of  places  in  the  Cabinet,  the 
Arabs  were  ignored.  It  is  true  that  some  Cabinet 
members,  some  high  officials  both  in  the  military  and 
civil  administration,  and  some  members  of  the  inner 
council  of  the  Committee  of   Union  and   Progress 

216 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

were  of  Arabic  origin.  But  they  must  be  counted 
practically  as  Turks,  for  they  had  lived  so  long  away 
from  their  own  country  and  their  people  that  they 
had  lost  all  Arabic  sympathies.  Some  who  were 
called  Arabs  were  in  reality  members  of  the  old 
Turkish  families,  who  in  Mesopotamia,  as  in  Syria 
and  Egypt,  had  received  large  tracts  of  land  at  the 
time  of  the  conquest,  and  had  always  been  Turks  by 
interests  and  by  atmosphere.  The  younger  national- 
istic Arabic  element,  educated,  and  living  by  pro- 
fessional or  business  interests  in  cities  of  the  Arabic 
portion  of  the  Empire,  were  from  the  very  beginning 
ignored. 

Two  things  soon  became  evident.  In  the  first 
place,  the  Young  Turks  tried  to  impose  their  language 
in  local  administration  as  the  sole  official  language 
of  the  Empire.  In  many  places  in  Syria  and  Mesopo- 
tamia, civil  officials,  even  in  the  courts  of  justice, 
were  appointed  without  a  knowledge  of  the  language 
of  the  people  among  whom  they  had  to  serve.  In 
the  Balkans  and  in  Asia  Minor,  where  there  were  so 
many  races  and  so  many  tongues,  the  Turks  were 
acting  reasonably  and  sensibly  in  imposing  their  own 
language  as  a  medium  for  the  transaction  of  gov- 
ernment business,  but  in  vilayets  which  were  wholly 
Arabic  speaking,  the  foisting  of  the  Turkish  language 
upon  the  people  could  be  likened  to  a  bastard  child 
endeavouring  to  rule  the  branch  of  his  family  from 
which  he  had  received  his  best  and  purest  blood. 
Before  a  year  had  passed,  the  educated,  intellectual 
Arabs  were  wholly  out  of  sympathy  with  the  new  re- 
gime.   Many  of  them  began  to  dream  of  the  revival  of 

217 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

the  Arabian  khalifate,  and  looked  to  the  nationalistic 
movement  in  Egypt  as  the  seed  from  which  their 
Pan- Arabic  tree  would  some  day  grow.  Others, 
older  and  less  sentimental,  did  not  hesitate  to  express 
a  desire  to  see  British  or  French  sovereignty  extended 
over  Syria  and  Mesopotamia. 

In  the  second  place,  among  the  quasi-independent 
tribes  of  the  Syrian  hinterland,  and  of  the  Arabian 
peninsula,  the  attempt  of  the  Turks  to  destroy  their 
privileges  ended  in  the  same  way  as  it  had  done  in 
Albania.  From  1908  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Bal- 
kan War,  millions  of  treasure  and  thousands  of  the 
best  soldiers  of  the  Empire  were  lost  in  fruitless 
efforts  to  realize  the  aspirations  of  the  Young  Turks. 
We  cannot  even  enumerate  these  rebellions.  They 
were  as  perennial  as  the  Albanian  uprisings,  and  as 
disastrous  to  the  Turkish  army.  In  Arabia,  rebellious 
Arabs  treated  with  the  Italians.  In  Syria,  beyond 
the  Jordan,  they  made  a  practice  of  tearing  up  the 
tracks  and  burning  the  stations  of  the  Hedjaz  rail- 
way. In  Mesopotamia,  they  refused  to  respond  to 
the  obligation  of  military  service. 

This  incomplete  summary  of  the  Young  Turk 
regime  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  has  been  given  to 
throw  light  upon  the  collapse  of  the  constitutional 
regime  and  of  the  military  reputation  of  Turkey.  I 
have  refrained  from  going  into  a  discussion  of  party 
politics,  of  intrigues,  and  of  the  bickerings  of  Parlia- 
ment. Enough  has  been  told  to  show  that  the 
constitutional  regime  was  marked  for  failure  from 
the  beginning  for  three  reasons :   There  was  no  honest 

218 


THE  YOUNG  TURK  REGIME 

attempt  to  bring  together  the  various  races  of  the 
Empire  in  a  common  effort  for  regeneration.  The 
Young  Turks,  having  no  statesmen  among  their 
leaders,  depended  upon  untrained  men  and  upon 
those  Abdul  Hamid  had  trained  in  sycophancy  and 
despotism.  In  spite  of  the  heroic  and  able  efforts 
of  the  German  miHtary  mission  and  the  British  naval 
mission,  no  progress  was  made  in  reforming  the  only 
force  by  which  the  Young  Turks  could  have  held  in 
respect  and  obedience  the  Sultan's  own  subjects,  as 
well  as  those  foreign  nations  who  were  looking  for  the 
opportunity  to  dismember  the  Empire. 

If  the  hopes  of  the  true  friends  of  Turkey  had  been 
realized,  if  only  the  constitution  had  been  applied, 
if  only  there  had  been  the  will  to  regenerate  Turkey, 
all  the  wars  of  the  past  few  years,  including  the  one 
which  is  now  shaking  Europe  to  its  foundations, 
would  have  been  avoided. 


219 


CHAPTER  XII 
CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

ON  November  19,  1910,  the  Cretan  General 
Assembly  made  a  stirring  appeal  "to the  four 
Great  Powers  who  are  protectors  of  the  island, 
to  the  two  great  Powers  of  Central  Europe,  to  the 
great  Republic  of  the  New  World,  to  the  liberal  and 
enlightened  press  of  two  Continents,  and  in  general 
to  all  Christians,  in  favour  of  the  rights  of  the  Cretan 
people  which  it  represents, — rights  acquired  and 
made  legal  by  so  many  sacrifices  and  sufferings." 
The  Cretans  definitely  included  the  United  States 
and  the  American  press  in  this  manifesto.  They 
wanted  the  American  people  to  become  acquainted 
with  what  was  known  to  the  chancelleries  of  Europe 
as  "the  Cretan  question."  For  one  fifth  of  the 
Cretans  have  members  of  their  families  in  America. 
There  are  few  hamlets  in  the  island  into  which  the 
spirit  and  influence  of  "the  great  Republic  of  the 
New  World"  has  not  penetrated. 

A  review  of  the  relationship  between  Crete  and 
the  European  Powers  is  as  necessary  in  trying  to 
throw  light  upon  the  events  which  led  up  to  the  war 
of  1 91 4  as  is  the  exposition  of  the  later  phases  of  the 
Albanian  question.    It  helps  us  to  grasp  the  attitude 

220 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

of  the  Powers  towards  Turkey  in  the  years  immedi- 
ately after  the  proclamation  of  the  constitution,  the 
tremendous  power  of  Hellenism  under  the  wise  and 
skilful  guidance  of  a  statesman  such  as  M.  Venizelos 
has  proved  himself  to  be,  the  importance  of  the 
Cretan  question  in  precipitating  the  Balkan  Wars, 
and  the  impotence  of  European  diplomacy  to  pre- 
serve the  status  quo,  and  decide  ex  cathedra  the  de- 
stinies of  countries  like  Crete  and  Macedonia,  whose 
emancipated  kinsfolk  had  acquired  the  spirit  of  the 
soldiers  who  sang: 

"As  Christ  died  to  make  men  holy,  let  us  die  to 
make  men  free." 

A  century  ago,  Crete  was  cut  off  from  the  outside 
world.  It  had  been  for  two  hundred  and  fifty  years 
under  the  Turks,  who  took  a  peculiar  pride  in  the 
island  from  the  fact  that  it  was  their  last  great 
conquest.  Its  Christian  inhabitants,  although  form- 
ing the  majority  of  the  population,  lived,  or  rather 
existed,  under  the  same  hopeless  conditions  as  pre- 
vailed throughout  Turkey.  In  the  sea-coast  towns 
the  Christians  prospered  better  than  the  Moslems, 
owing  to  their  aptitude  for  commerce;  but  the  bulk 
of  the  Christian  population  was  in  abject  slavery  to 
the  Turkish  beys,  who  were  the  great  landowners. 

The  Greek  war  of  liberation  was  shared  in  by  the 
Cretans,  who  lent  valuable  aid  to  their  brethren  of 
the  mainland.  They  endured  all  the  sufferings  of 
the  war,  but  reaped  none  of  its  rewards.  It  is  quite 
possible  that  they  might  have  thrown  off  the  Turkish 
yoke  at  that  favourable  moment  had  it  not  been  for 

221 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

the  astute  policy  of  the  Turks,  who,  seeing  the 
danger  of  losing  Crete,  handed  it  over  to  Mehemet 
AH  in  1830  as  a  reward  for  Egyptian  aid  in  the  Greek 
war  and  compensation  for  the  ships  destroyed  at 
Navarino.  With  the  downfall  of  Mehemet  All's 
schemes  of  conquest  in  1840,  the  island  reverted  to 
Turkey.  At  this  time  the  Powers  could  easily  have 
united  Crete  with  Greece,  but  deliberately  sacrificed 
the  Cretans  to  their  commercial  rivalries. 

Turkey  never  succeeded  in  gaining  her  former 
ascendancy  in  Crete.  Insurrection  after  insurrec- 
tion was  drowned  in  blood.  During  two  generations 
the  Turks  sent  into  the  unhappy  island  successive 
armies,  whose  orgies  of  cruelty  and  lust  are  better 
left  undescribed.  But  the  tortures  of  hell  could  not 
extinguish  the  flames  of  liberty.  Every  few  years  the 
Cretans  would  rise  again  and  repay  blood  with  blood 
until  they  were  overwhelmed  by  Anatolian  soldiers, 
of  whom  Turkey  possesses  an  unlimited  supply. 

At  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878  the  Greeks  pled, 
with  much  force,  for  the  privilege  of  annexing  Crete. 
As  we  read  them  to-day,  the  arguments  of  M.  Dely- 
annis  are  a  prophecy.  The  Powers  put  Crete  back 
under  Ottoman  control,  subject  to  a  reformed  con- 
stitution called  the  Pact  of  Helepa,  which  provided  a 
fairly  good  administration,  if  a  capable  and  sincere 
governor  were  chosen.  Everything  went  well  until 
Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  in  1889  practically  annulled 
the  solemn  agreement  he  had  made  by  appointing 
a  Moslem  Governor-General,  and  reducing  the  repre- 
sentation in  the  General  Assembly  in  such  a  way 
that  the  Moslem  minority  in  the  island  came  into 

222 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

power  again.  It  would  be  fruitless  to  go  into  the 
complex  history  of  the  next  seven  years  during  which 
the  lawlessness  of  former  times  was  revived. 

Christian  refugees  fled  to  Greece  and  carried  the 
tale  of  their  sufferings.  A  massacre  in  Canea  in 
February,  1897,  engineered  by  Turkish  officers  fresh 
from  similar  work  in  Armenia,-  had  such  a  reper- 
cussion in  Greece  that  King  George  would  have  lost 
his  throne  had  he  remained  deaf  to  the  popular 
demand  that  aid  be  sent  to  the  Cretans.  Greek 
soldiers  crossed  to  the  stricken  island.  This  meant 
war  with  Turkey.  In  a  few  weeks  Greece  was  over- 
whelmed in  Thessaly,  and  the  Powers  were  compelled 
to  intervene.  Much  ridicule  has  been  cast  upon 
Greece  for  her  impotence  in  the  war  of  1897.  Her 
defeat  was  a  foregone  conclusion,  and  she  was 
severely  blamed  for  having  jeopardized  the  peace 
of  Europe  just  as  the  Balkan  States  are  being 
blamed  to-day. 

But  there  are  times  when  a  nation  simply  has  to 
fight.  So  it  was  with  Greece  in  1897.  ^^  exactly 
similar  circumstances,  but  with  conditions  less  serious 
and  an  issue  not  so  long  outstanding  or  so  vital  to 
national  well-being,  the  United  States  a  year  later 
declared  war  on  Spain.  There  was  great  similarity 
between  the  Cretan  situation  in  1897  and  that  of 
191 2  in  Crete  and  Macedonia.  Refugees,  crossing 
the  borders  and  telling  unspeakable  tales  to  their 
brothers  of  blood  and  religion,  were  continually 
before  the  eyes  of  the  Bulgarians  and  Servians  and 
Montenegrins  and  Greeks  since  the  proclamation  of 
the  constitution  in  1908.     Each  nationality  suffered 

223 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

by  massacres  in  Macedonia  which  were  followed  by 
no  serious  punishment. 

Even  though  defeated  in  1897,  Greece  forced  the 
hand  of  the  Powers  and  of  Turkey.  Crete  was  given 
autonomy,  and  placed  under  the  protection  of  Italy, 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  who  occupied  the 
principal  ports  of  the  island.  For  a  year  and  a  half 
they  searched  for  a  ''neutral"  governor  for  the  Cre- 
tans. The  Turkish  troops,  however,  remained  at 
Candia,  leaving  the  rest  of  the  island  to  the  revolu- 
tionaries. It  was  not  until  the  British  were  attacked 
in  the  harbour  of  Candia,  and  their  Vice-Consul 
murdered,  that  the  Powers  moved.  But,  as  at 
Alexandria  in  1882,  it  was  a  bluff  admiral  and  not  the 
diplomats  who  settled  the  status  of  the  island.  The 
Turkish  troops  were  compelled  to  withdraw,  and 
the  Powers  were  told  that  they  would  either  have  to 
appease  the  Cretans  by  some  encouragement  of  their 
aspirations  or  conquer  the  island  by  force.  A  way 
out  of  the  dilemma  was  found  in  the  appointment  of 
Prince  George  of  Greece  as  High  Commissioner  of 
the  protecting  Powers  in  Crete. 

Here  is  where  the  Powers,  if  they  had  at  that  time 
any  intention  of  "preserving  the  rights  of  Turkey" 
in  Crete,  made  the  first  of  their  blunders.  To  call  the 
son  of  the  King  of  Greece  to  the  chief  magistracy  of 
an  island  which  had  so  long  aspired  to  political  union 
with  Greece  was,  in  the  eyes  of  the  people,  a  direct 
encouragement  to  their  aspirations.  How  could  they 
think  otherwise?  The  Turkish  Cretans,  too,  re- 
garded this  step  as  the  end  of  Ottoman  sovereignty, 
for  they  emigrated  in  so  great  a  number  that  soon  the 

224 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

Moslem  population  was  reduced  to  ten  per  cent. 
Prince  George's  appointment,  made  in  December, 
1898,  was  for  three  years,  but  really  lasted  eight. 
In  1906  he  withdrew  because  he  had  become  hope- 
lessly involved  in  party  politics,  and  had  "backed 
the  wrong  horses." 

Now  comes  the  second  blunder,  unless  the  Powers 
were  preparing  Crete  for  union  with  Greece.  They 
sent  a  letter  to  the  King  of  Greece,  asking  him  to 
appoint  a  successor  to  his  son!  Let  me  quote  from 
the  exact  wording  of  this  letter : 

"The  protecting  Powers,  in  order  to  manifest 
their  desire  to  take  into  account  as  far  as  possible 
the  aspirations  of  the  Cretan  people,  and  to  recog- 
nize in  a  practical  manner  the  interest  which  His 
Hellenic  Majesty  must  always  take  in  the  pros- 
perity of  Crete,  are  in  accord  to  propose  to  His 
Majesty  that  hereafter,  whenever  the  post  of  High 
Commissioner  of  Crete  shall  become  vacant,  His 
Majesty,  after  confidential  consultations  with  the 
representatives  of  the  Powers  at  Athens,  will  desig- 
nate a  candidate  capable  of  exercising  the  mandate 
of  the  Powers  in  this  island.  ..." 

Turkey  naturally  protested  against  the  change  in 
the  status  quo  which  such  a  step  implied,  and  pointed 
out  that  it  was  a  virtual  destruction  even  of  the 
suzerainty  of  the  Sultan.  The  Powers,  however,  did 
not  object  to  the  publication  of  their  note  to  the  King 
of  Greece  in  the  newspapers  of  Crete.  M.  Zaimis,  a 
former  prime  minister  of  Greece,  was  appointed  High 
Commissioner.  The  island  had  its  own  flag  and 
postage  stamps,  and  laws  identical  with  those  of 
IS  225 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Greece.  Cretan  officers  in  Greek  uniform  com- 
manded the  militia  and  constabulary  of  the  island. 
Turkey  treated  Crete  as  a  foreign  country.  For  this 
statement  there  is  no  more  conclusive  proof  than  the 
records  of  the  custom-houses  at  Smyrna  and  Salonika 
which  show  that  Cretan  products  were  subjected  to 
the  same  duties  as  were  applied  to  all  foreign  imports. 

It  would  seem,  then,  that  Crete  was  in  practically 
the  same  position  as  Eastern  Roumelia  in  1885,  or,  in 
fact,  as  Bulgaria  herself.  Nothing  was  more  natural 
than  that  the  establishment  of  a  constitutional  regime 
in  Turkey  should  lead  to  a  proclamation  of  union 
with  Greece.  The  motives  which  led  to  this  action 
were  identical  with  those  which  Austria-Hungary  put 
forth  as  an  explanation  of  her  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina.  The  Cretans  quite  justly  feared 
that  the  Young  Turks  would  repudiate  the  obliga- 
tions assumed  by  Abdul  Hamid,  and  endeavour  to 
bring  Crete  back  into  the  Turkish  fold.  At  the 
moment  Turkey  was  so  engrossed  in  the  question  of 
the  Austrian  annexation  and  the  Bulgarian  declara- 
tion of  independence  and  seizure  of  the  railways  in 
Eastern  Roumelia  that  she  contented  herself  with  a 
formal  protest  against  the  action  of  the  Cretan 
Assembly. 

What  did  the  Powers  do ?  Turkey,  at  the  moment, 
could  have  done  nothing  had  they  recognized  the 
union  with  Greece.  But  they  did  not  want  to  go  that 
far.  On  the  other  hand,  they  did  not  want  to  offend 
Greece  and  the  Cretans.  They  made  no  threats,  and 
took  no  action,  although  their  troops  were  in  the 
island.    Inaction  and  indecision  were  made  worse  by 

226 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  following  note,  which  was  sent  by  the  four 
Consuls  at  Candia  to  the  self-appointed  provisional 
government : 

"The  undersigned,  agents  of  France,  Great 
Britain,  Italy,  and  Russia,  by  order  of  their  re- 
spective governments,  have  the  honour  of  bringing 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  Cretan  government  {sic) 
that  the  protecting  Powers  consider  the  union  of 
Crete  to  Greece  as  depending  upon  the  assent  of 
the  Powers  who  have  contracted  obligations  with 
Turkey.  Nevertheless  they  would  not  refuse  to 
envisage  with  kindly  and  sympathetic  interest  the 
discussion  of  this  question  with  Turkey,  if  order  is 
maintained  in  the  island  and  if  the  safety  of  the 
Moslem  population  is  secured." 

That  diplomatic  sanction  would  sooner  or  later  be 
given  to  the  action  of  the  Cretans,  if  they  showed 
their  ability  to  preserve  order  in  the  island  and  treat 
the  Moslems  well,  is  an  altogether  justifiable  inter- 
pretation of  this  note  of  the  Powers.  Otherwise 
would  they  not  have  protested  against  the  illegality 
of  the  provisional  government,  and  have  forbidden 
the  Cretan  authorities  to  promulgate  their  decrees 
in  the  name  of  King  George?  Although  the  High 
Commissioner  had  disappeared,  and  the  Cretans  were 
running  the  island  just  as  if  the  annexation  were  an 
assured  fact,  the  Powers,  far  from  protesting,  an- 
nounced their  intention  of  withdrawing  their  troops 
of  occupation ! 

What  were  their  intentions  concerning  Crete,  and 
what  was  their  understanding  of  the  status  quo  at  the 
moment  of  withdrawal?     This  question  they  did  not 

227 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

answer  then,  nor  did  they  answer  it  afterwards. 
They  simply  withdrew  from  the  island  without 
stating  what  legal  power  was  to  succeed  them.  This 
was  in  the  summer  of  1909.  M.  Venizelos,  then 
Prime  Minister  of  Crete,  asked  the  Powers  to  state 
definitely  their  intentions.  He  said  that  he  did  not 
wish  to  run  counter  to  the  orders  of  the  Powers,  but 
that  he  would  have  to  raise  the  flag  of  Greece  over 
the  island  when  their  troops  left,  unless  they  for- 
mally forbade  him  to  do  so.  With  admirable  clear- 
ness and  irrefutable  logic  he  pointed  out  to  the 
Powers  that  the  only  other  alternative  would  be 
anarchy.  But  the  Powers,  pressed  by  their  am- 
bassadors at  Constantinople,  were  afraid  to  assent  to 
annexation.  They  were  equally  averse  to  taking  the 
opposite  course.  So  they  contented  themselves  with 
giving  M.  Venizelos  "friendly  counsels"  not  to  hoist 
the  Greek  flag.  The  result  was  the  ludicrous  spec- 
tacle of  the  cutting  down  of  the  Greek  flag  by  marines 
landed  from  eight  warships.  It  was  like  a  scene 
from  a  comic  opera,  and  M.  Venizelos  must  have 
formed  then  the  opinion  which  every  succeeding 
action  of  the  Powers  strengthened  and  to  which  he 
gave  expression  after  the  Balkan  War  was  declared, — 
that  the  Powers  were  "venerable  old  women. " 

Crete  now  began  to  be  menaced  by  the  insensate 
chauvinism  of  the  Young  Turks,  who  thought  they 
could  avenge  the  loss  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  the 
Bulgarian  declaration  of  independence  by  destroy- 
ing the  autonomy  of  Crete  and  re-establishing  the 
authority  of  the  Sultan  in  this  island  which  had  been 
repudiating    the    Ottoman    government    for    eighty 

228 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

years.  In  the  spring  of  1910,  the  Tanine,  at  that 
time  official  organ  of  the  Committee  of  Union  and 
Progress,  laid  down  five  points  as  the  minimum  which 
the  Porte  would  accept  in  the  definite  and  permanent 
solution  of  the  status  of  Crete : 

"i.  Formal  recognition  of  the  rights  of  the  Sul- 
tan. 

"2.  The  right  of  the  Sultan  to  name  the  Gover- 
nor-General of  the  island  among  three  Cretan  can- 
didates elected  by  the  General  Assembly. 

"3.  The  right  of  the  sheik-id-islam  to  name  the 
religious  chiefs  of  the  Cretan  Moslems. 

''4.  Establishment  in  the  Bay  of  Suda  of  a  coal- 
ing-station for  the  Ottoman  fleet,  and  the  main- 
tenance there  of  a  permanent  stationnaire  like  the 
stationnaires  of  the  embassies  at  Constantinople. 

"5.  Restriction  of  the  rights  of  the  Cretan 
government  in  the  matter  of  conclusion  of  treaties 
of  commerce  and  agreements  with  foreign  powers." 

What  the  "rights  of  the  Sultan  "  might  be  were  not 
specified  then,  nor  have  they  been  since:  but  articles 
four  and  five  were  enough  to  throw  the  whole  of  Crete 
into  a  state  of  wildest  excitement.  The  Turks,  after 
having  lost  the  island,  were  trying  to  win  it  back. 

Left  to  themselves  (as  they  had  every  reason  to 
believe)  the  Cretans  convoked  the  National  Assem- 
bly for  April  26,  1910.  The  Assembly  was  opened 
in  the  name  of  George  L,  King  of  the  Hellenes. 
The  Moslem  deputies  immediately  presented  a 
protest  in  which  they  rejected  the  sovereignty  of 
Greece  over  Crete.  The  deputies  were  then  asked 
to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  in  the  name  of  King 
George.     A  second  petition  was  presented  by  the 

229 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Moslem  deputies,  declaring  that,  as  the  Sultan  of 
Turkey  held  "sovereign  rights"  in  the  island,  they, 
in  the  name  of  their  Moslem  constituents,  protested 
against  such  an  action.  They  refused  to  take  the 
oath.  Should  they  be  excluded  from  the  Assembly, 
or  be  allowed  to  sit  without  taking  the  oath? 

Instead  of  insisting  on  the  admission  of  the  Moslem 
deputies,  the  Powers  again  gave  "friendly  counsels." 
Once  more  M.  Venizelos  pleaded  that  they  speak  out 
their  mind  in  the  matter  of  the  legal  status  of  the 
island.  The  diplomats  "temporized"  again,  and  the 
warships  reappeared  to  assure  to  the  Moslem  depu- 
ties "their  lawful  rights. "  When  M.  Venizelos  could 
get  no  statement  from  the  Powers  as  to  the  grounds 
upon  which  these  "lawful  rights"  rested,  he  saw  that 
all  hope  of  help  from  the  Powers  was  over,  and  that 
he  was  only  wasting  his  time.  Like  Cavour,  when  he 
turned  with  disgust  from  his  efforts  to  interest  the 
Powers  and  had  the  inspiration,  Italia  faro  da  se, 
the  Cretan  leader  abandoned  the  antechamber  of  the 
chancelleries.  While  the  Powers  still  sought  a  modus 
Vivendi  for  Crete,  M.  Venizelos  made  one.  From  that 
moment  the  Balkan  War  was  a  certainty. 

The  Young  Turk  Cabinet,  arrogant  and  drunk 
with  the  success  of  their  boycott  against  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  at  the  same  time  knowing  that  they 
must  turn  public  attention  away  from  the  loss  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  began  to  press  the  Powers 
for  the  restoration  in  Crete  of  the  status  quo  as  it  had 
existed  before  the  diplomatic  blunders  I  have  out- 
lined above,  and,  in  addition,  for  the  coaling  station 
and  for  control  over  Crete's  foreign  relations.     At 

230 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

the  same  time,  they  demanded  of  the  Athens  Cabinet 
that  Greece  renoimce  formally,  not  only  for  the 
present  but  also  for  the  future,  any  intention  of  annex- 
ing Crete.  The  Young  Turks  represented  that  public 
opinion  in  Turkey  was  so  wrought  up  over  the  Cretan 
question  that  war  with  Greece  would  certainly  follow. 
To  illustrate  to  the  Powers  and  to  Greece  the  force 
of  this  public  opinion,  a  widespread  boycott  against 
everything  Greek  in  Turkey  was  started.  This 
economic  warfare  is  described  in  another  chapter. 
In  some  parts  of  Turkey  the  boycott  has  never  ceased. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  this  boycott  was  one  of 
the  very  most  important  factors  in  bringing  on  the 
Balkan  War.  For  it  taught  the  Greeks,  who  were 
continually  being  bullied  and  threatened  with  an 
invasion  in  Thessaly,  the  imperative  necessity  of 
reconciliation  with  Bulgaria  by  a  compromise  of  rival 
claims  in  Macedonia. 

Thinking  that  he  could  serve  his  country  better  in 
Greece  than  in  Crete,  M.  Venizelos  posed  his  candi- 
dacy to  the  Greek  Chamber  in  the  summer  of  1910. 
Seemingly  he  was  abandoning  Crete  to  its  fate, 
and  he  had  to  bear  many  unjust  reproaches  from 
his  fellow-countrymen.  His  wonderful  personality 
and  extraordinary  political  genius  soon  brought  him 
to  the  front  in  Greece.  The  Cretan  revolutionary 
became  Prime  Minister  of  Greece.  Steadfast  in  his 
purpose  he  began  to  negotiate  with  the  other  Balkan 
States  and  with  Russia.  He  was  able  to  accomplish 
the  impossible.  The  war  with  Turkey  is  largely  his 
personal  success.  No  statesman  since  Bismarck  has 
had  so  brilliant  a  triumph. 

231 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

In  1910,  M.  Venizelos  took  the  step  which  was  the 
turning  point  in  his  career  and  in  the  history  of  Greece. 
Firmly  persuaded  that  Crete  could  be  annexed  to 
Greece  only  by  Greece  proving  herself  stronger  than 
Turkey,  and  not  by  diplomatic  manoeuvres,  he  de- 
cided to  desert  Cretan  politics,  and  enter  the  larger 
sphere  open  to  him  at  Athens.  It  was  easy  to  secure 
a  seat  in  the  Greek  Parliament,  but  that  was  the 
only  easy  part  about  it.  When  one  considered  the 
fickle  character  of  the  Greek  people  in  their  politics, 
the  selfish  narrowness  and  bitter  prejudices  of  their 
leaders,  the  inefficiency  of  the  army  and  navy,  whose 
officers  had  been  ruined  by  political  activity,  the 
emptiness  of  the  treasury,  the  unpopularity  of  the 
royal  family,  and  the  general  disorder  throughout 
the  country,  it  seems  incredible  that  M.  Venizelos 
should  have  been  willing  to  assume  the  responsibility 
of  government,  let  alone  succeed  in  his  self-imposed 
task.  Had  you  asked  the  leading  statesmen  of 
Europe  five  years  ago  what  country  presented  the 
most  formidable  and  at  the  same  time  most  hopeless 
task  for  a  Premier,  there  would  have  been  unanimity 
in  selecting  Greece. 

But  for  Eleutherios  Venizelos  there  was  no  diffi- 
culty which  could  not  be  overcome.  It  is  the  nature 
of  the  man  to  refuse  to  see  failure  ahead.  "If  one 
loves  to  work,  and  works  for  love,"  he  has  declared, 
"failure  does  not  exist." 

Called  to  be  Prime  Minister  in  August,  1 9 10,  M. 
Venizelos  began  to  reform  everything  in  sight.  His 
first  step  was  to  endow  Greece  with  a  new  constitu- 
tion, whose  most  important  changes  were  a  Council  of 

232 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

State,  chosen  for  life  and  irremovable,  to  act  as  a 
Senate  (Greece  has  single-chamber  government), 
legalizing  the  state  of  siege,  sanctioning  the  employ- 
ment of  foreigners  in  the  service  of  the  Government, 
fixing  twenty-four  hours  as  the  maximum  delay  for 
bringing  one  who  had  been  arrested  before  a  magis- 
trate, forbidding  the  publication  of  uncensored  news 
relative  to  military  and  naval  operations  in  time  of 
war,  establishing  free,  obligatory  primary  instruction, 
excluding  from  Parliament  directors  in  corporations, 
and  facilitating  the  expropriation  of  property  for 
public  purposes.  I  have  given  enough  to  show  the 
practical  character  of  the  new  constitution. 

Although  strongly  urged  to  do  so,  both  by  the 
King  and  by  the  political  leaders,  M.  Venizelos  re- 
fused to  turn  his  Constituent  Assembly  into  an  ordi- 
nary Parliament,  and  proceed  to  the  legislation  made 
possible  by  the  new  constitution.  Seeing  clearly 
that  durable  and  effective  ministerial  power  could  be 
derived  only  from  the  people  and  supported  only  by 
their  intelligent  good-will,  he  balked  the  intrigues  of 
the  politicians,  and  overcame  the  dynastic  fears  of 
the  King.  The  Constituent  Assembly  was  dissolved. 
M.  Venizelos  went  before  the  people,  travelling 
everywhere  and  explaining  his  program  for  the  re- 
formation of  the  country.  The  result  was  a  tri- 
umph such  as  no  man  has  ever  received  in  modern 
Greece.  In  November,  1910,  followers  of  M.  Venize- 
los were  returned  in  so  overwhelming  a  majority 
that  he  could  afford  to  ignore  the  Athenian  politicians 
who  saw  in  him  a  menace  to  their  personal  rule,  their 
sloth,  and  their  "graft." 

233 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Since  that  day  M.  Venizelos  has  been  the  idol  of 
Greece.  Never  has  trust  in  pubHc  man  been  more 
amply  justified.  Every  administration  of  the  State 
was  completely  transformed  within  eighteen  months. 
Even  to  outline  what  M.  Venizelos  has  accomplished 
reads  like  a  fairy  tale.  Only  those  who  knew  the 
Greece  before  his  arrival  and  are  able  to  contrast  it 
with  the  Greece  of  today  can  appreciate  the  im- 
mensity of  his  labours  and  the  radical  character  of  the 
changes  he  has  made.  I  cannot  dwell  on  the  talent 
shown  by  this  Cretan  in  matters  of  financial  reform. 
But  his  military  and  naval  reforms,  and  his  foreign 
policy,  have  been  so  important  in  making  possible 
the  Balkan  alliance  and  its  successes  that  they 
cannot  be  passed  over. 

M.  Venizelos,  when  he  first  came  to  Athens,  saw 
what  was  the  matter  with  the  Greek  military  and 
naval  establishments.  Like  Peter  the  Great  and 
the  Japanese,  he  realized  that  the  Greeks  must 
learn  from  Europe  by  submitting  to  European 
teachers.  To  persuade  his  fellow-countrymen,  who 
have  a  very  exalted  opinion  of  their  own  ability 
(the  Greeks  are  always  sure  they  were  bom  to  com- 
mand, without  first  having  learned  to  obey!),  that 
they  must  not  only  call  in  foreign  advisers,  but  must 
submit  to  their  authority,  has  been  the  most  Hercu- 
lean of  the  tasks  this  great  man  set  before  him. 
Article  three  of  the  new  constitution  had  authorized 
the  appointment  of  foreigners  as  officers  of  the 
Government  and  given  them  temporarily  Hellenic 
citizenship.  From  England  was  asked  a  naval 
mission,  from  France  a  military  mission,  and  from 

234 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

Italy  officers  to  reorganize  the  gendarmerie.  In 
Greece  the  foreign  officers  were  able  to  accomplish 
more  in  eighteen  months  than  the  foreign  "advisers" 
of  Turkey  had  accomplished  in  many  long  years. 
This  is  no  assertion  of  personal  opinion.  The  facts 
of  the  Balkan  War  speak  for  themselves.  Why  is 
this?  In  Turkey,  the  foreign  teachers  have  never 
been  given  any  real  authority,  and  have  seen  every 
effort  they  put  forth  nullified  by  the  insouciance, 
self-sufficiency,  and  cursed  apathy  of  the  Turk.  The 
Greeks,  on  the  contrary,  "became  as  little  children," 
and  lo!  a  miracle  was  wrought! 

When  foreigners  who  visited  Greece  within  recent 
years  read  about  the  successes  of  the  Crown  Prince 
at  Salonika  and  Janina,  the  assassination  of  King 
George,  the  mourning  of  the  Greek  people,  and  the 
hearty  acclamation  of  King  Constantine,  the  national 
hero,  they  could  think  back  to  less  than  four  years 
ago  when  the  Crown  Prince  was  practically  banished 
from  Greece,  after  having  been  dismissed  from  his 
command  in  the  army  by  a  popular  uprising,  and 
when  the  portrait  of  the  King  was  removed  from 
every  coffee-house  in  Athens.  What  is  the  cause  of 
the  complete  revulsion  in  public  feeling  towards  the 
dynasty?  It  is  due  to  the  common  sense  of  M. 
Venizelos.  He  saw  that  the  present  dynasty  was 
necessary  for  Greece,  and  that  the  Crown  Prince 
must  come  back  and  take  command  of  the  army. 
In  defiance  of  public  opinion,  he  insisted  on  this 
point.  This  attitude  was  a  bitter  disappointment  to 
many  who  imagined  that  M.  Venizelos  would  be 
anti-dynastic    in    his    policy.     As    a    result    of    his 

235 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

success  in  reconciling  the  Greeks  with  their  sovereign 
and  his  family,  the  sympathies  of  Russia  and  Ger- 
many and  Great  Britain  were  not  alienated  from  the 
Greek  people,  as  was  rapidly  becoming  the  case. 
Emperor  William  especially,  whose  sister  is  wife  of 
the  new  Greek  King,  was  so  delighted  with  the  success 
of  M.  Venizelos  in  rehabilitating  his  brother-in-law 
that  he  asked  the  Greek  Premier  to  visit  him  at 
Corfu. 

This  visit  of  the  former  Cretan  revolutionary  to 
the  German  Emperor  in  April,  1912,  was  hardly 
commented  upon  by  the  European  press.  But  epoch- 
making  words  must  have  been  spoken  in  the  villa 
Achilleion,  for  immediately  after  that  visit  the  semi- 
official German  press  began  to  prepare  the  public  for 
the  events  which  were  to  take  place  in  the  Balkans. 
The  eloquence  and  remorseless  logic  which  had 
carried  the  day  among  Cretan  insurgents  and  Greek 
electors  was  not  lost  on  the  "war-lord  of  Europe." 
Emperor  William  carried  back  to  Berlin  the  convic- 
tion that  no  diplomacy  could  outwit  the  Greek 
Premier's  determination  that  Turkey  should  dis- 
appear from  Crete  and  Macedonia. 

I  do  not  think  I  am  exaggerating  in  saying  that 
when  the  Young  Turks,  by  their  insensate  chauvin- 
ism, caused  M.  Venizelos  to  despair  of  saving  Crete 
through  Crete  itself,  they  signed  their  own  death- 
warrant.  If  they  had  refrained  from  their  boycott 
and  let  Crete  alone,  would  M.  Venizelos  have  gone  to 
Greece?  I  think  not.  It  is  one  of  those  strange 
coincidences  of  history  that  on  the  very  day  when 
Mahmud  Shevket  pasha,  in  the  Ottoman  Parliament, 

236 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

declared  that  if  Greece  did  not  make  a  public  state- 
ment to  the  effect  that  she  had  no  intention  at  any 
time  to  extend  her  sovereignty  over  Crete,  a  million 
Turkish  bayonets  would  gleam  upon  the  plains  of 
Thessaly,  Eleutherios  Venizelos  was  quietly  leaving 
Crete  for  Athens. 

To  bring  together  Greece,  Bulgaria,  Servia,  and 
Montenegro  into  an  alliance  which  would  drive  the 
Turk  out  of  Europe  was  in  the  mind  of  M.  Venizelos 
as  far  back  as  the  summer  of  1909,  when  he  saw  the 
international  fleet  at  Canea  land  marines  to  cut  down 
the  Greek  flag  which  he  had  raised.  It  became  an 
obsession  with  him.  It  was  possible,  because  he 
believed  it  was  possible.  But  no  one  else  regarded 
it  as  more  than  an  idle  dream.  The  rare  friends  to 
whom  M.  Venizelos  vaguely  hinted  that  such  an 
alliance  was  the  only  way  of  solving  the  Balkan 
question  called  it  the  "acme  of  absurdity. "  I  quote 
the  words  of  an  eminent  diplomat  to  whom  this 
solution  was  mentioned.  At  the  opening  of  the 
Italian  War,  when  I  suggested  to  the  Turkish  Grand 
Vizier  that  such  an  alliance  was  possible,  he  looked 
at  me  pityingly,  and  said,  "The  questions  you  ask 
display  your  ignorance  of  conditions  in  this  part  of 
the  world.  My  time  is  too  valuable  to  discuss  such 
an  impossible  hypothesis.  Go  to  Hussein  Hilmi 
pasha,  and  ask  him  if  he  thinks  the  Greeks  and  Bul- 
garians could  ever  unite."  Hussein  Hilmi  pasha 
referred  me  to  every  single  book  that  has  ever  been 
written  about  the  Macedonian  question.  "I  do  not 
care  which  you  read,"  said  the  ex- Governor- General 
of  Macedonia,  "they  all  tell  the  same  story." 

237 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

But  M.  Venizelos  was  not  asking  himself,  "Can  I 
do  it?"  but,  '.'How  shall  I  do  it?"  Once  more  he  saw- 
clearly.  The  pan-Hellenic  national  ideal  must  be 
given  up.  Greece  must  content  herself  with  Epiros, 
the  ^gean  Islands,  Crete,  and  a  slice  of  Macedonia 
west  of  the  Vardar — possibly  including  Salonika,  if 
the  army  proved  as  victory-winning  as  those  of 
Bulgaria  and  Servia.  Everything  else  must  be  left 
to  Bulgaria  and  Servia.  When  first  proposed  to  the 
leaders  of  Greece,  this  proposition  seemed  so  pre- 
posterous that  M.  Venizelos  was  accused  of  being  a 
traitor  to  Hellenism.  He  is  still  denounced  by  the 
fanatics,  after  all  that  he  has  accomplished.  But 
patiently  he  built  up  his  argument,  using  all  his 
magnetism  and  his  eloquence  to  convince  his  col- 
leagues. He  showed  how  Greece  was  being  constantly 
humiliated  and  menaced  by  the  chauvinism  of  the 
Young  Turks,  how  the  boycott  was  ruining  Greek 
shipping,  how  Crete  itself  would  gradually  get  to 
like  independence  better  than  union  with  Greece, 
and  how  inevitable  it  was  that  the  Slavs  should  in 
the  course  of  time  come  to  possess  Thrace  and  Mace- 
donia. "Instead  of  sacrificing  everything  to  Bul- 
garia, "  he  maintained,  "  this  is  our  only  chance  to  get 
any  part  of  European  Turkey.  We  must  give  up  our 
ideal,  because  it  is  impracticable.  With  Bulgaria,  we 
can  crush  Turkey.  Without  Bulgaria,  Turkey  will 
crush  us.  And  if  Bulgaria  helps,  we  must  pay  the 
price."  It  may  be  years — not  until  archives  are 
open  to  historians  and  memoirs  of  present  actors  are 
published — before  everything  is  clear  concerning  the 
formation  of  an  alliance  which  was  as  great  a  surprise 

238 


CRETE  AND  EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY 

to  Europe  as  it  was  to  Turkey.  But  the  famous 
telegram  which  M.  Gueshoff,  Prime  Minister  of 
Bulgaria,  addressed  to  his  colleagues  at  Athens  after 
the  first  successes  of  the  war  were  won,  is  sufficient 
testimony  to  the  essential  part  played  by  M.  Veni- 
zelos  in  forming  the  coalition. 

After  M.  Venizelos  left  Crete,  a  last  blunder  made 
the  protecting  Powers  the  laughing-stock  of  Europe. 
The  Cretans  elected  deputies  to  the  Greek  Chamber, 
and  the  warships  of  the  Powers  played  hide-and-seek 
with  small  Cretan  craft  in  a  fruitless  endeavour  to 
prevent  the  chosen  deputies  from  proceeding  to 
Athens.  This  move  was  altogether  unnecessary,  for 
they  had  not  yet  learned  the  matchless  worth  of  their 
opponent.  M.  Venizelos,  knowing  that  Greece  and 
her  new  allies  were  not  yet  ready  for  war  with  Turkey, 
"tipped  off"  both  the  Cretans  and  the  leaders  in  the 
Greek  Parliament  that  they  would  have  to  wait  one 
or  two  years  longer.  But,  to  satisfy  the  hoi  polloi 
on  the  one  hand  and  the  diplomats  on  the  other,  a 
little  comedy  was  enacted  before  the  Parliament 
House  in  Athens  which  threw  wool  over  everybody's 
eyes. 

As  soon  as  he  saw  that  war  was  inevitable  and  that 
his  allies  were  ready,  M.  Venizelos  admitted  the 
Cretan  deputies.  Europe  was  face  to  face  with  a 
fait  accompli.  The  Cretan  and  Macedonian  ques- 
tions were  settled  by  war.  The  hand  of  Turkey  and 
the  diplomats  was  forced. 

Now  we  see  the  importance  of  the  Cretan  question. 
The  Balkan  War  could  have  been  avoided  by  a 
courageous  and   straightforward   policy  of  efficient 

239 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

protection  of  Christians  who  lived  under  the  Ottoman 
flag.  It  is  because  the  Powers  did  not  fulfil  the  obli- 
gations of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  and  sacrificed  Cretans 
and  Bulgarians  and  Servians  and  Greeks  to  the 
furthering  of  their  commercial  interests  at  Con- 
stantinople, that  all  Europe  is  now  stained  with 
blood.  By  flattering  the  Turk  and  condoning  his 
crimes,  the  Powers  succeeded  in  destroying  the  "in- 
tegrity of  the  Ottoman  Empire,"  which  they  pro- 
fessed to  uphold.  In  trying  to  be  the  friends  of  the 
Turk  they  proved  his  worst  enemies. 

The  Cretan  question  is  a  commentary  upon  the 
utter  futility  of  insincere  and  procrastinating 
diplomacy. 


240 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

SINCE  the  days  when  Mazzini,  looking  beyond 
the  almost  irrealizable  dream  of  Italian  unity, 
said  in  his  Paris  exile,  "North  Africa  will  be- 
long to  Italy,"  a  new  Punic  conquest  has  been  the 
steadfast  hope  of  the  Italians.  France  had  already 
started  her  conquest  of  Algeria  when  Mazzini  spoke, 
and  was  mistress  of  the  richest  portion  of  the 
southern  Mediterranean  littoral  before  the  Italian 
unification  was  completed.  Late  though  they  were 
in  the  race,  the  Italians  began  to  try  to  realize  their 
dream  by  sending  thousands  of  colonists  to  Egypt  and 
to  Tunis.  But  the  events  of  the  years  1 881-1883  in 
these  two  countries,  consummated  by  the  Conven- 
tion of  London  in  1885,  gave  Egypt  to  England 
and  Tunis  to  France.  Italy  was  too  weak  at  the 
time  to  protest,  and  Germany  had  not  yet  begun  to 
develop  her  weltpolitik. 

For  some  years  Italian  colonial  aspirations  were 
directed  towards  Somaliland  and  Abyssinia.  The 
battle  of  Adowa  in  1896  was  a  death-blow  to  the 
hopes  of  founding  an  Italian  empire  of  Erythrea. 
Ten  years  ago  Giolitti  received  a  portfolio  in  the 
Zanardelli  ministry,  and  ever  since  then  there  has 
16  241 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

been  a  new  Cato  at  Rome,  crying  "Tripoli  must  be 
taken."  By  the  Franco-Italian  protocol  of  1901, 
it  was  agreed  that  if  France  should  ever  extend  her 
protectorate  over  Morocco,  Italy  should  have  the 
Tripolitaine  and  Barca,  with  the  Fezzan  as  a  hinter- 
land. This  "right"  of  Italy  was  recognized  at  the 
international  conference  of  Algeciras  in  1906,  and 
has  since  been  accepted  in  principle  by  the  European 
cabinets. 

During  the  past  decade  Italy  quietly  prepared  to 
seize  Tripoli, — peacefully,  if  possible,  and  if  not,  by 
force.  Had  Italy  been  ready,  Turkey  would  have 
lost  Tripoli  in  the  autumn  of  1908,  when  Bulgaria 
declared  her  independence  and  Austria  annexed 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Internal  politics  made  a 
bold  stroke  impossible  at  that  favourable  moment. 

To  accomplish  her  purpose,  Italy  worked  along 
two  lines.  She  tried  to  make  her  economic  position 
so  strong  in  Tripoli  that  the  country  would  virtually 
belong  to  her  and  be  exploited  by  her  without  any 
necessity  for  a  change  in  its  political  status,  until 
Arabs  and  Berbers,  choosing  between  prosperity 
under  Italy  and  poverty  under  Turkey,  would  of 
their  own  accord  expel  the  Turks.  Foreseeing  a  pos- 
sibility of  failure  in  this  plan,  she  at  the  same  time 
prepared  for  a  forcible  occupation  of  the  country. 

Immediately  after  the  Anglo-Boer  War,  the  Italian 
Ministries  of  War  and  Marine  began  to  make  a  study 
of  the  question  of  transporting  troops  and  landing 
them  under  the  cover  of  a  fleet.  Tourists  who  were 
in  Italy  during  the  summer  of  1904  will  remember  the 
famous  dress  rehearsal  of  the  Tenth  Army  Corps. 

242 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

Some  six  thousand  men,  completely  provided  with 
horses,  ammunition,  artillery,  and  provisions,  were 
embarked  in  eleven  hours.  The  convoy  put  to  sea, 
escorted  by  a  squadron  of  battleships  and  torpedo- 
boats,  in  two  columns  of  five  transports  each.  De- 
spite a  heavy  swell,  these  troops  and  all  their  stores 
were  landed  in  the  Bay  of  Naples  in  sixteen  hours. 
I  wonder  if  many  who  were  watching  and  applauding 
on  that  memorable  day  understood  why  Italy  was 
practising  so  assiduously  landing  from  transports, — 
and  under  the  protection  of  the  fleet.  For  what  war 
was  she  preparing  in  time  of  peace?  In  1907,  the 
Minister  of  Marine  announced  in  the  Italia  Militare 
that  Italy  could  send  seventy  thousand  troops  upon 
a  distant  expedition  oversea  and  one  hundred  and 
fourteen  thousand  jor  a  short  journey  not  exceeding 
two  nights  at  sea! 

The  peaceable  conquest  of  Tripoli  was  cleverly 
conceived,  and  has  been  faithfully  tried.  Branches 
of  the  Banco  di  Roma  were  established  at  Tripoli 
and  Benghazi,  and,  for  the  first  time  since  the  days 
of  Imperial  Rome,  a  serious  attempt  was  made  to 
develop  the  agricultural  and  commercial  resources 
of  the  country.  The  natives  were  encouraged  in 
every  enterprise,  and  managed  in  such  a  way  that 
they  became — in  the  vicinity  of  the  seaports  and 
trading-posts,  at  least — dependent  for  their  liveli- 
hood upon  the  Banco  di  Roma.  Italian  steamship 
lines,  heavily  subsidized,  maintained  regular  and 
frequent  services  between  Tunis  and  Tripoli  and 
Benghazi  and  Derna  and  Alexandria.  The  more 
enterprising  natives  travelled  for  a  few  piastres  to 

243 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Alexandria,  and  the  object-lesson  of  contrast  was 
left  without  words  to  work  its  effect  upon  them. 
The  admirable  Italian  parcel  post  system — one  of 
the  most  successful  in  Europe — extended  its  opera- 
tions into  the  hinterland  and  captured  the  ostrich 
feather  trade.  The  Italians  began  to  talk  of  making 
secure  the  routes  to  Ghadames  and  Ghat  and  Mur- 
ziik,  and  of  establishing  for  the  interior  postal  and 
banking  facilities  that  these  regions  could  never 
hope  to  have  under  Turkish  administration.  Rail- 
ways were  contemplated  as  soon  as  they  could  be 
financed  entirely  by  Italian  capital. 

The  Italian  schemes  were  working  beautifully 
when  the  birth  of  New  Turkey  in  the  revolution  of 
July,  1908,  changed  the  whole  situation.  The  indo- 
lent and  corrupt  officials  of  the  vilayet  of  Tripoli  and 
sandjak  of  Benghazi,  whose  attention  had  been 
turned  from  Italian  activities  by  Italian  gold  pieces, 
were  replaced  by  members  of  the  Union  and  Progress 
party.  These  new  officials,  owing  to  their  utter  in- 
experience and  their  sense  of  self-esteem,  may  have 
been  no  better  than  the  old  ones;  probably  they 
proved  as  inefficient,  for  executive  power  is  not  in- 
herent in  the  Turkish  character.  But  they  were  men 
who  had  passed  through  the  fire  of  persecution  and 
suffering  for  love  of  their  fatherland,  and  the  renais- 
sance of  Turkey  was  the  supreme  thing  in  their  lives. 
Their  patriotism  and  enthusiasm  knew  no  bounds. 
Their  ambitions  for  Turkey  may  have  been  far  in 
advance  of  their  ability  to  serve  her.  But  criticism 
is  silent  before  patriotism  which  has  proved  its 
willingness  to  sacrifice  life  for  country. 

244 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

One  can  imagine  the  feelings  of  the  Young  Turks 
when  they  saw  what  Italy  was  doing.  It  is  easy 
enough  to  say  that  they  should  have  immediately 
reformed  the  administration  of  the  country  and  given 
to  the  Tripolitans  an  efficient  government.  Reform 
does  not  come  in  a  twelvemonth,  and  the  Young 
Turks  had  to  act  quickly  to  prevent  the  loss  of 
Tripoli.  They  took  the  only  means  they  had.  They 
began  to  thwart  and  obstruct  every  Italian  enterprise, 
to  extend  the  military  frontiers  of  Tripoli  into  the 
Soudan,  to  bring  all  the  Moslem  tribes  of  Africa  into 
touch  with  the  Constantinople  khalifate. 

Italy  saw  her  hopes  being  destroyed  as  other 
colonial  hopes  had  been  destroyed  one  after  the  other. 
Representations  at  Constantinople  were  without 
effect.  The  more  her  ambassador  tried,  the  more  he 
realized  the  hopelessness  of  his  case.  Surely  it  was 
a  fruitless  diplomatic  task  to  persuade  Young  Turkey 
that  her  officials  in  Tripoli  and  Benghazi  should  be 
forbidden  to  hinder  the  onward  march  of  Italian 
"peaceable  conquest."  The  Italian  economic  fabric 
in  Tripoli,  so  carefully  and  so  patiently  built,  seemed 
to  be  for  nothing.  Austria-Hungary  had  begun  the 
disintegration  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  by  the  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in  1908.  No  Power 
had  successfully  protested,  much  less  the  helpless 
Turks.    So  Italy  began  to  prepare  her  coup. 

The  crisis  could  not  be  precipitated.  Italian  public 
opinion,  wary  of  colonial  enterprises  since  the  terrible 
Abyssinian  disaster,  and  opposed  to  the  imposition 
of  fresh  taxes,  had  to  be  carefully  prepared  to  sustain 
the  Ministry  in  a  hostile  action  against  Turkey. 

245 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

In  January,  191 1,  the  Italian  press  began  to  pub- 
lish articles  on  Tripoli,  dilating  upon  its  economic 
value  and  its  vital  importance  to  Italy,  if  she  were 
to  hold  her  place  among  the  great  Powers  of  Europe. 
Every  little  Turkish  persecution — and  there  were 
many  of  them — was  made  the  subject  of  a  first-page 
bit  of  telegraphic  news.  The  Italian  people  were 
worked  up  to  believe  that  not  only  in  Tripoli,  but 
elsewhere,  the  Young  Turks  were  showing  their  con- 
tempt for  Italian  officials  and  for  the  Italian  flag. 
An  Italian  sailing  vessel  was  seized  at  Hodeidah  in 
the  Red  Sea;  the  incident  was  magnified.  An  Ameri- 
can archaeological  expedition  was  granted  a  concession 
in  Tripoli;  a  similar  concession  had  been  refused  to 
Italian  applicants.  The  newspapers  pretended  that 
the  Americans  were  really  prospecting  for  sulphur 
mines,  whose  development  would  mean  disaster  to 
the  great  mines  in  Sicily!  French  troops  reached 
the  Oasis  of  Ghadames ;  the  hinterland  of  Tripoli  was 
threatened  by  the  extension  of  French  sovereignty 
into  the  Sahara.  At  this  moment  the  reopening  of 
the  Morocco  question  by  the  Agadir  incident  gave 
Italy  the  incentive  and  the  encouragement  to  show 
her  hand. 

In  September,  the  press  campaign  against  the 
Turkish  treatment  of  Italians  in  Tripoli  became  daily 
and  violent.  Signor  Giolitti  succeeded  in  getting  all 
parties,  except  the  extreme  Socialists,  to  promise  their 
support. 

It  was  not  until  the  last  moment  that  the  Sublime 
Porte  realized  the  danger.  On  September  26th,  the 
Derna,  a  transport,  arrived  at  Tripoli,  with  much- 

246 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

needed  munitions  of  war.  There  had  been  a  shame- 
ful neglect  to  keep  up  the  garrisons  in  the  Afri- 
can provinces,  and  when  it  was  too  late — as  is  so 
often  the  case  at  Constantinople — there  dawned 
the  realization  that  the  provinces  were  practically 
without  defence. 

On  September  27th,  the  first  of  the  series  of  ulti- 
matums which  have  brought  all  Europe  into  war  was 
delivered  to  the  Sublime  Porte.  Italy  gave  Turkey 
forty-eight  hours  to  consent  to  the  occupation  of 
Tripoli,  with  the  proviso  of  the  Sultan's  sovereignty 
under  the  Italian  protectorate,  and  the  payment  of  an 
annual  subsidy  into  the  Ottoman  Treasury.  In  Italy, 
two  classes  were  mobilized.  General  Caneva  em- 
barked his  troops  upon  transports  that  had  already 
been  prepared,  and  the  Italian  fleet  proceeded  to 
Tripoli. 

The  Turks  did  not  believe  that  there  would  be  war. 
On  the  afternoon  of  September  29th,  the  Grand 
Vizier,  as  far-seeing  in  his  understanding  of  interna- 
tional affairs  as  he  was  blind  in  grasping  what  was 
best  for  Turkey's  interests,  told  me  that  he  was  sure 
Italy  would  hesitate  before  entering  upon  a  war  that 
would  be  the  prelude  to  the  greatest  catastrophe  that 
the  world  has  ever  known.  "Italy  will  not  draw  the 
sword,"  he  declared,  "because  she  knows  that  if  she 
does  attack  us,  all  Europe  will  be  eventually  drawn 
into  the  bloodiest  struggle  of  history, — a  struggle 
that  has  always  been  certain  to  follow  the  destruction 
of  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire."  Hakki 
pasha  was  right,  except  in  one  important  particular. 
Perhaps  Italy  did  know  what  an  attack  upon  Turkey 

247 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

would  eventually  lead  to.  But  two  hours  after  my 
conversation  with  the  Grand  Vizier,  he  received  a 
declaration  of  war. 

Simultaneously  with  the  news  of  the  declaration 
of  war,  Constantinople  learned  that  the  first  shots 
had  already  been  fired.  Without  waiting  for  any 
formalities,  the  Italian  fleet  had  attacked  and  sunk 
Turkish  torpedo-boats  off  Preveza  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Adriatic.  The  Turkish  fleet  had  just  left  Beirut 
to  return  to  Constantinople,  and  for  three  days  it  was 
feared  that  the  Italians  would  follow  up  their  offen- 
sive by  destroying  the  naval  power  of  Turkey.  They 
did  not  do  so,  although  it  would  have  been  an  easy 
victory.  For  it  was  the  hope  of  the  Giolitti  Cabinet 
that  there  would  be  no  real  war. 

The  attack  at  Preveza  had  a  double  purpose  of 
preventing  the  torpedo-boats  from  interfering  with 
the  Italian  commerce,  and  of  striking  terror  into  the 
hearts  of  the  Turks.  The  Italians  did  not  want  to 
widen  the  breach  and  draw  upon  themselves  the 
hatred  and  enmity  of  Turkey  by  sinking  her  navy. 
Such  an  action  would  make  difificult  the  negotiations 
which  they  still  hoped  to  pursue.  It  was  not  war 
against  the  people  of  Turkey  that  they  had  declared ; 
that  was  a  mere  form.  What  they  wanted  was  a 
pretext  for  seizing  Tripoli.  So  naval  and  military 
operations  were  directed  not  against  Turkey,  but 
against  the  coveted  African  provinces.  Considera- 
tions of  international  diplomacy,  also,  dictated  this 
policy. 

The  Italian  warships  opened  fire  upon  Tripoli  on 
September  30th.    On  October  26.  and  3d,  the  forts 

248 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

were  dismantled  and  the  garrison  driven  out  of  the 
city  by  the  bombardment.  On  October  5th,  Tripoli 
surrendered.  The  expeditionary  corps  disembarked 
on  the  nth.  The  next  transports  from  Italy  went 
farther  east.  Derna  capitulated  on  the  8th,  but  a 
heavy  sea  prevented  the  troops  from  landing  until 
the  i8th.  General  Ameglio  took  Benghazi  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet  on  October  19th.  Homs  was 
occupied  on  the  21st. 

The  Turks  and  Arabs  attempted  to  retake  Tripoli 
on  October  23d.  While  the  Italian  soldiers  were  in 
the  trenches  they  were  fired  upon  from  behind  by 
Arabs  who  were  supposed  to  be  non-combatants. 
Discovery  of  the  assailants  was  practically  im- 
possible, because  many  clothed  themselves  like 
women  and  hid  their  faces  by  veils.  The  Italians 
had  to  repress  this  move  from  the  rear  with  ruthless 
severity.  They  did  what  any  other  army  would 
have  done  under  the  circumstances,  for  their  safety 
depended  upon  putting  down  the  enemy  that  had 
arisen  in  their  rear.  Failure  to  act  quickly  and 
severely  would  have  encouraged  a  revolution  in  the 
city  and  its  suburbs.  Horror  was  excited  throughout 
the  world  by  the  highly  coloured  stories  of  this  re- 
pression. Details  of  Italian  cruelty  were  emphasized. 
No  effort  was  made  to  explain  impartially  the  provo- 
cation which  had  led  to  this  killing.  There  was  an 
unconscious  motive  in  these  stories  to  embarrass 
Italy  in  her  attempt  to  build  a  colonial  empire,  just 
exactly  as  there  had  been  in  the  time  of  the  Abys- 
sinian War  in  1896.  The  American  Consul  at  Tripoli 
has  assured  me  that  the  correspondents  who  were 

249 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

guests  at  the  time  of  the  Italian  army  did  not  give 
the  facts  as  they  were. 

The  French  and  EngHsh  newspaper  campaign 
against  Italy  was  as  violent  as  it  had  been  against 
Austria  in  1908,  at  the  time  of  the  first  violation  of 
Ottoman  territorial  integrity.  Attempts  were  made 
to  denounce  the  high-handed  act  of  piracy  of  which 
Italy  had  been  guilty,  and  to  poison  the  public  mind 
against  the  Italian  army.  It  is  significant  to  note 
this  attitude  of  the  press  of  the  two  countries,  which 
are  now  so  persuasively  extending  the  olive  branch 
to  Italy.  Great  Britain  and  France  were  alarmed 
over  the  menace  to  the  "equilibrium"  of  the  Medi- 
terranean. This  is  why  they  did  not  hesitate  to 
denounce  unsparingly  the  successful  effort  of  Italy  to 
follow  in  their  own  footsteps !  The  tension  between 
France  and  Italy  was  illustrated  by  the  vehement 
newspaper  protests  against  the  Italian  use  of  the 
right  of  search  for  contraband  on  French  ships.  Italy 
was  taken  to  task  for  acting  in  exactly  the  same  way 
that  France  has  since  acted  in  arresting  Dutch  ships 
in  August  and  September,  19 14. 

The  attempt  of  October  23d  failed,  in  spite  of  the 
conspiracy  behind  the  lines.  A  second  attempt  on 
the  26th  was  equally  unsuccessful.  On  November 
6th,  the  garrison  of  Tripoli  started  to  take  the  offen- 
sive. But  progress  beyond  the  suburbs  of  the  city 
was  found  to  be  impossible. 

A  decree  annexing  the  African  provinces  of  Turkey 
was  approved  by  the  Italian  Parliament  on  Novem- 
ber 5th.  The  Italian  "adventure,"  as  those  who 
looked  upon  Italy's  aggression  with  unfriendly  eyes 

250 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

persisted  in  calling  it,  was  now  shown  to  be  irrevoca- 
ble.  Turkey's  opportunity  to  compromise  had  passed. 

In  Tripoli,  as  well  as  in  the  other  cities,  it  took  the 
whole  winter  to  make  the  foothold  on  the  coast  secure. 
From  November  27th  to  March  3d,  Enver  bey  made 
three  attempts  to  retake  Derna.  From  November 
28th  to  March  12th,  six  assaults  of  Turks  and  Arabs 
were  made  upon  Benghazi.  The  Italian  positions 
at  Homs  were  not  secure  until  February  27th.  Italy 
was  practically  on  the  defensive  everywhere. 

Hakki  pasha  found  himself  compelled  to  resign 
when  the  war  was  declared.  In  fact,  he  considered 
himself  fortunate  not  to  be  assassinated  by  army 
officers,  who  declared  that  he  had  been  negligent  to 
the  point  of  treason  in  laying  Turkey  open  to  the 
possibility  of  being  attacked  where  and  when  she  was 
weakest.  Said  pasha  became  Grand  Vizier — he  had 
held  the  post  six  times  under  Abdul  Hamid.  Five 
members  of  the  former  Cabinet,  including  Mahmud 
Shevket  pasha,  remained  in  office. 

The  first  appearance  of  Said  pasha's  Cabinet  be- 
fore Parliament  is  a  scene  that  I  shall  never  forget. 
No  pains  had  been  spared  to  make  it  a  brilliant  spec- 
tacle. The  Sultan  was  present  during  the  reading 
of  his  speech  from  the  throne.  Everyone  expected 
an  important  pronouncement.  The  speech  of  Said 
pasha  was  typically  Turkish.  Instead  of  announcing 
how  Turkey  was  to  resist  Italy,  he  gave  it  to  be 
understood  in  vague  language  that  diplomacy  was 
going  to  save  the  day  once  more,  and  that  Turkey 
was  secure  because  the  preservation  of  her  territorial 
integrity  was  necessary  for  Europe. 

251 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

The  action  of  Italy,  however,  had  upset  the  calcu- 
lations of  the  Young  Turks  in  the  game  they  were 
trying  to  play  in  European  diplomacy.  It  was  their 
dream — more  than  that,  their  belief — that  Turkey 
held  the  balance  of  power  between  the  two  great 
groups  of  European  Powers.  They  thought  that  the 
destinies  of  Europe  were  in  their  hands.  I  heard 
Mahmud  Shevket  pasha  say  once  that  "the  million 
bayonets  of  Turkey  would  decide  the  fortunes  of 
Europe. "  Turkey  was  essentially  mixed  up  in  the 
European  imbroglio.  But  it  was  the  absence  of 
those  million  bayonets,  of  which  Mahmud  Shevket 
pasha  boasted,  that  changed  the  fortunes  of  Europe. 
The  military  weakness  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  has 
brought  us  to  the  present  catastrophe. 

The  embarrassment  of  the  Young  Turks  was  that 
Italy  belonged  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  that  Ger- 
many, while  professing  deep  and  loyal  friendship, 
stood  by  and  saw  Turkey  attacked  by  her  ally,  Italy, 
just  as  she  had  stood  by  in  1908,  when  the  other 
partner  of  the  Triple  Alliance  had  annexed  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina.  Those  who  had  based  their  hopes 
of  Turkey's  future  upon  the  pan-Germanic  move- 
ment had  a  bitter  awakening.  In  what  sense  could 
Wilhelm  II  be  called  "the  defender  of  Islam"? 

I  attended  sessions  of  Parliament  frequently  during 
the  five  weeks  between  the  outbreak  of  the  war  and 
the  passing  of  the  decree  by  which  the  African  pos- 
sessions of  Turkey  were  annexed  to  the  kingdom  of 
Italy.  Before  this  step  had  been  taken  by  Italy, 
there  was  a  possibility  of  saving  the  situation.  But 
the  Turks,  instead  of  presenting  a  united  front  to  the 

252 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

world,  and  finding  ways  and  means  of  making  a 
successful  resistance  against  Italy,  wasted  not  only 
the  precious  month  of  October,  when  there  was  still 
a  way  out,  but  also  the  whole  winter  that  followed. 
In  November,  the  opposition  in  the  House  and 
Senate  formed  a  new  party  which  they  called  the 
"Entente  Liberale. "  The  principal  discussions  in 
Parliament  were  about  whether  the  Hakki  pasha 
Cabinet  should  be  tried  for  high  treason,  and  whether 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  could  be  prorogued  by  the 
Sultan  without  the  consent  of  the  Senate.  The 
opposition  grew  so  rapidly  that  the  Committee  of 
Union  and  Progress  induced  the  Sultan  to  dissolve 
Parliament  on  January  i8,  19 13. 

The  new  elections  were  held  at  the  end  of  March. 
Throughout  the  Empire  they  were  a  pure  farce.  The 
functionaries  of  the  Government  saw  to  it  that  only 
members  of  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress 
were  returned.  While  the  Young  Turks  were  play- 
ing their  game  of  parties,  anarchy  was  rife  in  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  Empire.  The  "  Interior  Organization" 
had  been  revived  in  Macedonia.  The  Albanians, 
who  had  been  left  entirely  out  of  the  fold  in  the  new 
elections,  were  determined  to  get  redress.  In  Arabia, 
the  neutrality  of  Iman  Yahia  in  the  war  with  Italy 
was  purchased  only  by  the  granting  of  complete 
autonomy.  It  was  the  surrender  of  the  last  vestige 
of  Turkish  authority  in  an  important  part  of  Arabia. 
Said  Idris,  the  other  powerful  chief  in  the  Yemen, 
refused  to  accept  autonomy,  and  continued  to  harass 
the  Turkish  army. 

The  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  was  not 

253 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

allowed  to  enjoy  long  its  fraudulent  victory.  In  the 
army  an  organization  which  called  itself  "The  Mili- 
tary League  for  the  Defence  of  the  Country"  was 
formed,  and  received  so  many  adhesions  that  Mah- 
mud  Shevket  pasha  was  compelled  to  leave  the  Minis- 
try of  War  on  July  loth,  and  Said  pasha  the  Grand 
Vizirate  eight  days  later.  Ghazi  Mukhtar  pasha 
accepted  the  task  of  forming  a  new  Cabinet.  The 
Unionist  Parliament  refused  to  listen  to  his  program. 
So  he  secured  from  the  Sultan  a  second  prorogation 
of  Parliament  on  August  5th.  The  weapon  the 
Unionists  had  used  was  turned  against  them. 

While  Turkey  showed  herself  absolutely  incapable 
of  making  any  military  move  to  recover  the  invaded 
provinces  or  to  punish  the  invader,  Italy  had  none 
the  less  a  difficult  problem  to  face.  A  few  Turkish 
officers  had  succeeded  in  organizing  among  the  Arabs 
of  Tripoli  and  Benghazi  a  troublesome  resistance. 
General  Caneva  went  to  Rome  at  the  beginning  of 
February,  and  told  the  Cabinet  very  plainly  that  it 
would  take  months  to  get  a  start  in  Africa,  and  years 
to  complete  the  pacification  of  the  new  colonies, 
unless  the  Turks  consented  to  withdraw  the  sup- 
port of  their  military  leadership  and  to  cease  their 
religious  agitation. 

The  question  was,  how  could  Turkey  be  forced  to 
recognize  the  annexation  decree  of  November  5th? 
The  Italian  fleet  could  not  be  kept  indefinitely,  at 
tremendous  expense  and  monthly  depreciation  of  the 
value  of  the  ships,  under  steam.  The  Turkish  fleet 
did  not  come  out  to  give  battle,  so  the  Italians  were 
immobilized  at  the  mouth  of  the  Dardanelles.    Ital- 

254 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

ian  commerce  in  the  Black  Sea  and  eastern  Medi- 
terranean was  at  a  standstill.  Upon  Italian  imports 
into  Turkey  had  been  placed  a  duty  of  one  hundred 
per  cent.  Where,  outside  of  Tripoli,  was  the  pressure 
to  be  exercised? 

Premier  San  Giuliano  had  promised  before  the  war 
started  that  he  would  not  disturb  political  conditions 
in  the  Balkan  peninsula.  The  alliance  with  Austria- 
Hungary  made  impossible  operations  in  the  Adriatic. 
But  it  was  clear  that  something  must  be  done.  Pub- 
lic opinion  in  Italy  had  been  getting  very  restless. 
It  did  not  seem  to  the  Italians  that  the  considerations 
of  international  diplomacy  should  stand  in  the  way 
of  finishing  the  war.  Were  they  to  burden  them- 
selves with  heavy  taxes  in  order  to  spare  the  feelings 
of  the  Great  Powers?  Had  Russia  hesitated  in  the 
Caucasus?  Had  Great  Britain  hesitated  in  Egypt? 
Had  Austria  hesitated  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina? 

As  a  sop  to  public  opinion,  and  also  as  a  feeler  to 
see  how  the  move  would  be  taken  by  the  other 
Powers,  the  Cabinet  decided  upon  direct  action 
against  Turkey.  The  fleet  appeared  before  Beirut 
on  February  24th,  and  sank  two  Turkish  warships 
in  the  harboiir.  It  was  not  exactly  a  bombardment 
of  the  city,  but  many  shells  did  fall  on  the 
buildings  and  on  the  streets  near  the  quay.  Neither 
Turkey  nor  Europe  paid  much  attention  to  this 
demonstration.  In  April,  Italy  had  come  to  the 
point  where  she  felt  that  she  must  cast  all  scruples 
to  the  winds.  A  direct  attack  upon  Turkey  was 
decided.  Italy,  at  this  writing  the  only  neutral 
among  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  took  the  action 

255 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

which  brought  Balkan  ambitions  to  a  ferment,  and 
caused  the  kindhng  of  the  European  conflagration. 
Her  declaration  of  war  on  Turkey  and  the  annexa- 
tion of  Tripoli  inevitably  led  to  this.  On  April  i8th 
Admiral  Viala  bombarded  the  forts  of  Kum  Kale  at 
the  Dardanelles,  and  on  the  same  day  the  port  of 
Vathy  in  Samos.  Four  days  later  Italian  marines 
disembarked  on  the  island  of  Stampali.  On  May 
4th,  Rhodes  was  invaded,  a  battle  occurred  in  the 
streets  of  the  town,  and  the  Turks  withdrew  to 
the  interior  of  the  island.  They  were  pursued,  and 
surrendered  on  the  17th.  Ten  other  islands  at  the 
mouth  of  the  ^gean  Sea  were  occupied. 

A  demonstration  at  Patmos  for  union  with  Greece 
was  vigorously  repressed.  Italy  protested  her  good 
faith  in  regard  to  the  islands.  But  the  dismember- 
ment of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  arrested  at  San  Stef- 
ano  in  1878,  had  begun  again. 

Turkey  responded  to  the  bombardment  of  Kum 
Kale  by  closing  the  Dardanelles,  and  to  the  occupa- 
tion of  Rhodes  by  attempting  to  expel  from  Turkey 
all  Italian  residents.  The  expulsion  decree,  however, 
was  carried  out  with  great  humanity  and  considera- 
tion by  the  Turks.  During  the  Italian  War  and 
also  the  Balkan  War,  Turkish  treatment  of  sub- 
jects of  hostile  states  living  in  Ottoman  territory 
was  highly  praiseworthy.  The  Christian  nations  of 
Europe  would  today  do  well  to  follow  their  example ! 

The  closing  of  the  straits  lasted  for  a  month.  It 
disturbed  all  Europe.  Never  before  has  the  question 
of  the  straits  been  shown  to  be  so  vital  to  the  world. 
From  April  i8th  to  May  i8th.  over  two  hundred 

356 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

merchant  vessels  of  all  nations  were  immobilized  in 
Constantinople.  It  was  a  sight  to  be  witness  of  once 
in  a  lifetime.  For  these  ships  were  not  lost  in  a  maze 
of  basins,  docks,  and  piers.  They  lay  in  the  stream  of 
the  Bosphorus  and  at  the  entrance  to  the  Sea  of 
Marmora.  You  could  count  them  all  from  the 
Galata  Tower.  The  loss  to  shipping  was  tremendous. 
Southern  Russia  is  the  bread  basket  of  Europe.  No 
European  resident  could  remain  unaffected  by  a 
closing  of  the  only  means  of  egress  for  these  billions 
of  bushels  of  wheat.  Angry  protests  were  in  vain. 
Turkey  reopened  the  straits  only  when  assurance  had 
been  given  to  her  that  the  attack  of  the  Italian  fleet 
would  not  be  repeated. 

Little  had  been  gained  by  Italy  as  far  as  hastening 
peace  was  concerned.  She  had  done  all  that  she 
could.  Turkey  still  remained  passive  and  unresisting, 
because  she  knew  well  that  any  vital  action,  such 
as  the  bombardment  of  Salonika  or  Smyrna,  or  the 
invasion  of  European  Turkey  by  way  of  Albania  or 
Macedonia,  would  bring  on  a  general  European  war. 
Italy  could  not  take  this  responsibility  before  history. 
So  for  months  longer  it  remained  a  war  without 
battles.  Many  Italian  warships  had  not  fired  a 
single  shot. 

During  May,  June,  and  July,  the  Italians  pushed 
on  painfully  to  the  interior  of  Tripoli.  There  was 
no  other  way.  In  August,  the  Turkish  resistance  on 
the  side  of  Tunis  was  finished.  In  September,  a 
desperate  attack  of  Enver  bey  against  Derna  was 
repulsed.  The  Italian  forces  were  in  a  much  better 
position  than  before.  But  the  attacks  of  the  Arabs 
17  257 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

were  of  such  a  character  that  they  could  not  be 
suppressed  by  overwhelming  numbers  of  trained 
men  that  the  Italians  could  muster.  It  was  a  guerilla 
warfare  with  the  oases  of  the  desert  as  the  back- 
ground. The  Italians  felt  that  the  Arabs,  if  left  to 
themselves,  would  soon  tire  of  the  conflict.  For  they 
were,  after  all,  traders,  and  were  dependent  upon  the 
outlets  for  their  caravan  trade  which  was  now  com- 
pletely in  the  hands  of  Italians.  It  was  the  mere 
handful  of  Turkish  troops  and  Turkish  officers  who 
kept  the  Arabs  stirred  up  to  fight. 

As  early  as  June,  Italian  and  Turkish  representa- 
tives met  informally  at  Ouchy  on  Lac  Leman  to 
discuss  bases  for  a  solution  of  the  conflict  which  had 
degenerated  into  an  odd  impasse.  Italy  was  anxious 
to  conclude  peace  for  several  reasons.  Her  com- 
merce was  suffering.  Her  warships  needed  the  dry- 
dock  badly.  While  Turkey  could  no  longer  prevent 
the  conquest  of  Tripoli  and  Benghazi,  the  absence 
of  Turkish  direction  in  keeping  the  tribesmen  of  the 
interior  stirred  up,  and  the  cessation  of  the  propa- 
ganda against  the  Italian  occupation  on  the  ground 
of  religion,  would  help  greatly  in  the  pacification  of 
the  provinces.  Since  the  Albanian  revolution  had 
assumed  alarming  proportions,  Turkey  also  became 
anxious  for  peace.  She  was  uncertain  of  Italy's 
attitude  in  case  of  an  outbreak  in  the  Balkans.  Un- 
officially, Italy  had  let  it  be  known  that  there  was  a 
limit  to  patience,  and  that  the  development  of  a 
hostile  attitude  by  the  Balkan  States  against  Turkey 
would  find  her,  in  spite  of  Europe,  in  alliance  with 
them  against  her.     In  reality,  however,  the  Italian 

258 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

ministers  at  the  Balkan  courts  had  all  along  done 
their  best  to  keep  Greece  and  Bulgaria  from  being 
carried  away  by  the  temptation  to  take  advantage  of 
the  situation.  This  had  been  especially  true  in  April 
and  May,  during  the  period  of  Italian  activity  in  the 
iEgean. 

Turkey  knew  perfectly  well,  before  the  pourparlers 
at  Ouchy,  what  were  the  Italian  terms.  In  March, 
when  the  five  other  Powers  had  offered  to  mediate, 
Italy  had  laid  down  the  following  points :  tacit  recog- 
nition of  the  Italian  conquest  and  withdrawal  of  the 
Turkish  army  from  Africa;  recognition  by  the  Powers, 
if  not  by  Turkey,  of  the  decree  of  annexation.  Italy 
promised,  if  this  were  done,  to  recognize  the  Sultan 
as  Khalif  in  the  African  provinces  (this  meant  purely 
religious  sovereignty) ;  to  respect  the  religious  liberty 
and  customs  of  the  Moslem  populations;  to  accord 
an  amnesty  to  the  Arabs ;  to  guarantee  to  the  Otto- 
man Public  Debt  the  obligations  for  which  the  cus- 
toms-duties of  Tripoli  had  been  mortgaged;  to  buy 
the  properties  owned  by  the  Ottoman  Government ; 
to  guarantee,  in  accord  with  the  other  Powers,  the 
(future!)  "integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire."  Tur- 
key had  refused  these  terms,  in  spite  of  the  pressure 
of  the  Powers  at  the  Sublime  Porte.  Then  followed 
the  loss  of  Rhodes  and  the  other  islands. 

The  first  pourparlers  at  Ouchy  had  been  inter- 
rupted by  the  fall  of  Said  pasha.  They  were  resumed 
on  August  1 2th  by  duly  accredited  delegates.  After 
six  weeks  an  accord  was  prepared,  and  sent  to  Con- 
stantinople. The  ministry,  although  facing  a  war 
with  the  Balkan  States,  tried  to  prolong  the  negotia- 

259 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

tions.  Italy  then  addressed  an  ultimatum  on  Octo- 
ber 1 2th.  The  Sublime  Porte  was  doing  its  best  to 
prevent  war  with  the  Balkan  States.  Italy  was 
determined  now  to  go  to  any  length  to  wring  peace 
from  her  stubborn  opponent.  For  the  Balkan  storm 
was  breaking,  and  she  wanted  to  get  her  ambassador 
back  to  Constantinople  to  take  part  in  the  councils  of 
the  Great  Powers.  The  continuance  of  a  state  of  war 
with  Turkey  was  never  more  clearly  against  her 
interests.  When  the  ultimatum  arrived,  Turkey 
yielded.  The  preliminaries  of  Ouchy  were  signed  on 
October  15th. 

There  were  two  distinct  parts  to  the  Treaty  of 
Lausanne,  as  it  is  generally  called.  In  order  to  save 
the  pride  of  Turkey,  nothing  was  said  in  the  text  of 
the  treaty  about  a  cession  of  territory.  Turkey  was 
not  asked  to  recognize  the  Italian  conquest.  The 
unofficial  portion  of  the  treaty  consisted  of  a  firman, 
granting  complete  autonomy  to  the  African  vilayet, 
and  appointing  a  personal  religious  representative 
of  the  Khalif ,  with  functions  purely  nominal ;  and  the 
promise  of  amnesty  and  good  administration  to  the 
-^gean  Islands. 

The  text  of  the  treaty  provided  for  the  cessation  of 
hostilities;  the  withdrawal  of  the  Turkish  army  from 
Tripoli  and  Benghazi  and  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Italian  army  from  the  islands  of  the  .^gean;  the 
resumption  of  commercial  and  diplomatic  relations; 
and  the  assumption  by  Italy  of  Tripoli's  share  of  the 
Ottoman  Public  Debt. 

Italy  had  no  intention  of  fulfilling  the  spirit  of 
the  second  clause  of  this  treaty,  which  was  that  the 

260 


WAR  BETWEEN  ITALY  AND  TURKEY 

islands  occupied  by  her  be  restored  to  Turkey. 
The  text  of  the  treaty  provided  that  the  recall  of  the 
Italian  troops  be  subordinated  to  the  recall  of  the 
Turkish  troops  from  Tripoli.  It  was  easy  enough  to 
quibble  at  a  later  time  about  the  meaning  of  "Turk- 
ish. "  As  long  as  there  was  opposition  to  the  Italian 
pacification,  the  opponents  could  be  called  Turkish. 
Italy  said  that  the  holding  of  the  Dodecanese  was  a 
guarantee  of  Turkish  good  faith  in  preventing  the 
continuance  secretly  of  armed  opposition  to  her 
subjugation  of  the  new  African  colonies.  As  long  as 
an  Arab  held  the  field  against  the  Italian  army,  it 
could  still  be  claimed  that  Turkey  had  not  fulfilled 
her  side  of  the  promise  in  Article  2.  At  the  moment, 
Turkey  was  quite  willing  to  see  the  Italians  stay  in 
the  southern  islands  of  the  .^gean.  For  otherwise 
they  would  have  inevitably  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
the  Greeks  when  the  Balkan  War  broke  out. 

Since  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  was  signed,  the 
Italians  have  remained  in  the  Dodecanese.  Not  only 
that,  but  they  have  used  their  position  in  Rhodes  to 
begin  a  propaganda  of  Italian  economic  influence  in 
south-western  Asia  Minor.  Before  the  present  Euro- 
pean war,  Italy  might  have  found  herself  compelled 
to  relinquish  her  hold  on  these  islands.  But  now  her 
advantageous  neutrality  has  put  into  her  hands  the 
cards  by  which  she  can  secure  the  acquiescence  of 
Europe  to  the  annexation  of  Rhodes. 

The  outbreak  of  indignation  in  Turkey  against 
Italy  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  was  even  more 
vehement  than  that  against  Austria-Hungary  when 
she    had    annexed     Bosnia-Herzegovina    in     1908. 

261 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Hussein  Djahid  bey,  in  the  Tanine,  wrote  an  edi- 
torial, in  which  he  said:  "Never  shall  we  have  any 
dealings  with  the  Italians  in  the  future.  Never  shall 
a  ship  bearing  their  flag  find  trade  at  an  Ottoman 
port.  And  we  shall  teach  our  children,  and  tell  them 
to  teach  their  children,  the  reasons  for  the  undying 
hatred  between  Osmanli  and  Italian  as  long  as  history 
lasts."  Having  read  the  same  sort  of  a  thing  in 
1908,  I  was  interested  in  seeing  just  how  long  the 
hatred  would  last.  Just  a  year  from  the  day  war 
was  declared,  and  this  editorial  appeared,  the  Italian 
ambassador  returned  on  a  warship  to  Constantinople, 
the  Italian  post  offices  opened,  and  all  my  Italian 
friends  began  to  reappear.  This  is  told  here  to  illus- 
trate the  fact  that  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized : 
there  is  no  public  opinion  in  Turkey. 

The  chief  importance  of  the  year  of  "the  war  that 
was  no  war"  is  not  in  the  loss  of  Tripoli.  It  is  in  the 
fact  that  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
secure  since  1878,  had  been  attacked  by  violence. 
The  example  given  by  Italy  was  to  be  followed  by  the 
Balkan  States.  What  Europe  had  feared  had  come. 
This  war  was  the  prelude  to  Europe  in  arms. 


262 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  BALKAN  STATES 
AND  TURKEY 

DURING  the  year  191 1  there  had  been  a  per- 
ceptible drawing  together  of  the  Balkan 
States  in  the  effort  to  find  a  common  ground 
for  an  offensive  alliance  against  Turkey.  The  path 
of  union  was  very  difficult  for  the  diplomats  of  the 
Balkan  States  to  follow.  It  was  clear  to  them  in 
principle  that  they  would  never  be  able  to  oppose 
the  policy  of  the  Young  Turks  separately.  They 
were  not  even  sure  whether  their  united  armies 
could  triumph  over  the  large  forces  which  the  Ot- 
toman Empire  was  able  to  put  in  the  field,  and  which 
were  reputed  to  be  well  trained  and  disciplined. 
This  reputation  was  sustained  by  the  unanimous 
opinion  of  the  military  attaches  of  the  Great  Powers 
at  Constantinople  And  then,  there  were  the  mutual 
antipathies  to  be  healed,  and  the  problem  of  the 
terrible  rivalry  in  Macedonia,  of  which  we  have 
spoken  before,  to  be  solved.  Most  formidable  of 
all,  was  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  benefit  to  the 
different  Balkan  nations  of  a  successful  war  against 
Turkey. 

It  is  impossible  to  explain  here  all  the  diplomatic 

263 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

steps  leading  up  to  the  Balkan  alliance  against 
Turkey.  They  have  been  set  forth,  with  much 
divergency  of  opinion,  by  a  number  of  writers 
who  were  in  intimate  touch  with  the  diplomatic 
circles  of  the  Balkan  capitals  during  the  years  imme- 
diately preceding  the  formation  of  the  alliance.  We 
muet  confine  ourselves  to  a  statement  of  the  general 
causes  which  induced  the  Balkan  States,  against 
the  better  judgment  of  many  of  their  wisest  leaders, 
to  form  the  alliance,  and  to  declare  war  upon  Turkey. 

Both  Bulgaria  and  Gteece  had  sentimental  reasons ; 
the  terrible  persecution  of  the  Christians  of  their 
own  race  in  Macedonia  seemed  cause  enough  for 
war.  But  while  Bulgaria  had  long  held  the  thesis 
of  Macedonian  autonomy,  which  was  sustained  by 
the  Bulgarian  Macedonians  themselves,  Greece  was 
afraid  that  the  creation  of  such  a  regime  would  in 
the  end  prove  an  irrevocable  blow  to  Hellenistic 
aspirations.  It  was  well  known  to  the  Greeks  that 
the  population  of  Macedonia  was  not  only  largely 
Bulgarian,  but  aggressively  so,  and  that  its  sense 
of  nationality  had  been  intelligently  and  skilfully 
awakened  and  fostered  by  the  educational  propa- 
ganda. Above  all  things  Hellenism  feared  the 
Bulgarian  schools.  Under  an  autonomous  regime 
their  influence  could  not  be  combated. 

The  possibility  of  the  Balkan  alliance  was  really 
in  the  hands  of  Greece.  For  it  was  recognized  that 
no  matter  how  large  and  powerful  an  army  Bulgaria 
and  Servia  could  raise,  the  co-operation  of  the  Greek 
navy,  which  would  prevent  the  use  of  the  ^gean 
ports  of  the  Macedonian  littoral  for  disembarking 

264 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

troops  from  Asia,  was  absolutely  essential  to  success. 
In  spite  of  their  fears  for  the  future  of  Macedonia, 
the  Greeks  were  converted  to  the  idea  of  an  alliance 
with  the  Slavic  Balkan  States  to  destroy  the  power 
of  Turkey  by  the  continual  bullying  of  the  Young 
Turks  over  Crete,  and  by  the  economic  disasters 
from  the  boycott.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
the  attitude  of  the  Young  Turks  towards  the  Cretan 
questions,  and  their  institution  of  the  boycott,  were 
two  factors  directly  responsible  for  the  downfall  of 
the  Empire. 

The  visit  of  three  hundred  Bulgarian  students  to 
Athens  in  Easter  week,  191 1,  should  have  been  a 
warning  to  Turkey  of  the  danger  which  attended 
her  policy  of  goading  the  Greeks  to  desperation.  I 
was  present  on  the  Acropolis  at  the  memorable  re- 
ception given  by  the  students  of  Athens  to  their 
guests  from  the  University  of  Sofia,  and  remember 
well  the  peculiar  political  significance  of  the  speeches 
of  welcome  addressed  to  them  there.  Later  in  the 
same  year,  Greece  followed  the  example  of  the  other 
Balkan  States  in  sending  her  Crown  Prince  to  Sofia 
to  join  in  the  festivities  attendant  upon  the  coming 
of  age  of  Crown  Prince  Boris. 

Bulgaria  was  drawn  into  the  Balkan  alliance,  and 
reluctantly  compelled  to  abandon  the  policy  of 
Macedonian  autonomy,  by  the  attitude  of  the  Young 
Turks  toward  Macedonians.  The  settlement  of 
immigrants  from  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  the 
conscription  for  the  Turkish  army,  led  to  reprisals 
on  the  part  of  Bulgarian  bands.  These  were  fol- 
lowed by  massacres  at  Ishtib  and  elsewhere.     In  the 

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THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

first  week  of  August,  191 2,  the  massacre  of  Kotchana 
was  for  Bulgaria  the  last  straw  on  the  camel's  back. 
I  was  in  Sofia  at  the  end  of  August  when  the  national 
congress,  called  together  wholly  without  the  Govern- 
ment's co-operation,  declared  that  war  was  a  neces- 
sity. Seated  one  evening  in  the  public  garden  at  a 
cafe — if  I  remember  rightly  it  was  the  ist  of  Septem- 
ber— I  heard  from  the  lips  of  one  of  the  influential 
delegates  at  this  congress  that  public  opinion  in 
Bulgaria  was  so  wholly  determined  to  force  war,  that 
the  King  and  the  Cabinet  would  have  to  yield. 

In  Servia  and  Montenegro,  it  had  long  been  re- 
cognized that  any  opportunity  to  unite  with  Bul- 
garia and  Greece  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon 
Turkey  could  not  but  be  beneficial  to  these  two 
kingdoms.  There  was  the  sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar 
to  be  divided  between  Montenegro  and  Servia. 
There  was  the  possibility  of  an  outlet  to  the  Adriatic. 
So  far  as  Macedonia  was  concerned,  if  we  believe 
that  she  was  honest  and  sincere  in  the  treaty  of 
partition  with  Bulgaria,  Servia  was  quite  content 
with  the  idea  of  a  possible  annexation  of  Old  Servia, 
and  the  opportunity  to  drive  back  the  Moslem 
Albanians,  who  had  been  established  on  her  frontiers 
under  the  Young  Turk  regime,  and  were  ruthlessly 
destroying  Slavs  wherever  they  got  the  opportunity. 

One  does  not  have  any  hesitation  in  declaring  that 
the  political  leaders  in  power  in  the  Balkan  States 
at  first  hoped  to  avoid  a  war  with  Turkey.  That 
they  did  not  succeed  in  doing  so  was  due  to  the  pres- 
sure of  public  sentiment  upon  them.  This  public 
sentiment  forced  them  to  action.    Every  Balkan 

266 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

Cabinet  would  have  fallen  had  the  ministries  re- 
mained advocates  of  peace.  Over  against  the  fear  of 
the  Turkish  army,  which  (let  me  say  it  emphatically) 
was  very  strong  among  the  military  authorities  in 
each  of  the  Balkan  States,  was  the  feeling  that  the 
time  was  very  favourable  to  act,  and  that  chances 
of  success  in  a  common  war  against  Turkey  were 
greater  in  the  autumn  of  191 2  than  they  would  be 
later;  for  the  Young  Turks  were  spending  tre- 
mendous sums  of  money  on  army  reorganization. 
At  that  moment,  they  were  coming  to  the  end  of  a 
demoralizing  war  with  Italy,  and  the  Macedonian 
army  had  suffered  greatly  during  the  summer  by 
the  Albanian  uprising. 

Early  in  September,  Bulgaria,  Servia,  Greece,  and 
Montenegro  decided  that  peace  could  be  preserved 
only  by  the  actual  application,  under  sufficient 
guarantees,  of  sweeping  reforms  in  Macedonia. 
They  appealed  to  the  Powers  to  sustain  them  in 
demanding  for  Macedonia  a  provincial  assembly,  a 
militia  recruited  within  the  limits  of  the  province, 
and  a  Christian  Governor.  The  Great  Powers,  as 
usual,  tried  to  carry  water  on  both  shoulders.  Blind 
to  the  fact  that  inaction  and  vague  promises  would 
no  longer  keep  in  check  the  neighbours  of  Turkey, 
they  urged  the  Balkan  States  to  refrain  from  "being 
insistent,"  and  pointed  out  to  Turkey  the  "ad- 
visability" of  making  concessions.  The  Turks  did 
not  believe  in  the  reality  of  the  union  of  the  Balkan 
States.  They  could  not  conceive  upon  what  grounds 
their  neighbours  had  succeeded  in  forming  an  alli- 
ance.    Neither  the  Balkan  States  nor  Turkey  had 

267 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

any  respect  for  the  threats  or  promises  or  offers  of 
assistance  of  the  Powers. 

In  order  to  convince  the  Balkan  States  that  they 
had  better  think  twice  before  making  a  direct  ulti- 
matum, the  Turks  organized  autumn  manoeuvres 
north  of  Adrianople,  in  which  fifty  thousand  of  the 
elite  army  corps  were  to  take  part.  The  answer  of 
the  Balkan  States  was  an  order  for  general  mobili- 
zation issued  simultaneously  in  the  four  capitals. 
This  was  on  September  30th.  The  next  day  Turkey 
began  to  mobilize.  All  the  Greek  ships  in  the  Bos- 
phorus  and  the  Dardanelles  were  seized.  Munitions 
of  war,  disembarked  at  Salonika  for  Servia,  were 
confiscated.  It  was  not  until  then  that  it  began  to 
dawn  upon  Turkey  and  her  sponsors,  the  Great 
Powers,  that  the  Balkan  States  meant  business. 
The  questions  of  reforms  in  Macedonia  had  been  so 
long  the  prerogative  of  the  Powers  that  they  did  not 
realize  that  the  moment  had  come  when  the  little 
Balkan  States,  whom  they  called  "troublesome," 
were  no  longer  going  to  be  put  off  with  promises. 
The  absolute  failure  of  concerted  European  diplo- 
macy to  accomplish  anything  in  the  Ottoman  Empire 
was  demonstrated  from  the  results  in  Macedonia,  and 
also  in  Crete. 

So  the  Balkan  States  were  not  in  the  proper  frame 
of  mind  to  receive  the  joint  note  on  the  status  quo, 
which  will  remain  famous  in  the  annals  of  European 
diplomacy  as  a  demonstration  of  the  futility  of  con- 
certed diplomatic  action,  when  there  is  no  genuine 
unity  behind  it.  On  the  morning  of  October  8th, 
the  ministers  of  Russia  and  Austria,  acting  in  the 

268 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

name  of  the  six  "Great  Powers,"  handed  in  at  Sofia, 
Athens,  Belgrade,  and  Cettinje,  the  following  note : 

"The  Russian  and  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ments declare  to  the  Balkan  States: 

"i.  That  the  Powers  condemn  energetically 
every  measure  capable  of  leading  to  a  rupture  of 
peace ; 

"2.  That,  supporting  themselves  on  Article  23 
of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  they  will  take  in  hand, 
in  the  interest  of  the  populations,  the  realization 
of  the  reforms  in  the  administration  of  European 
Turkey,  on  the  understanding  that  these  reforms 
will  not  diminish  the  sovereignty  of  His  Imperial 
Majesty  the  Sultan  and  the  territorial  integrity 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire;  this  declaration  reserves, 
also,  the  liberty  of  the  Powers  for  the  collective 
and  ulterior  study  of  the  reforms; 

"3.  That  if,  in  spite  of  this  note,  war  does 
break  out  between  the  Balkan  States  and  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  they  will  not  admit,  at  the  end 
of  the  conflict,  any  modification  in  the  territorial 
status  quo  in  European  Turkey. 

"The  Powers  will  make  collectively  to  the  Sub- 
lime Porte  the  steps  which  the  preceding  declaration 
makes  necessary." 

The  shades  of  San  Stefano,  Berlin,  Cyprus, 
and  Egypt,  Armenian  massacres,  Mitylene  and 
Miinsterberg,  Bagdad  railway,  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Tripoli,  and  Rhodes,  haunted  this  declaration,  and 
made  it  impotent,  honest  effort  though  it  was  to 
preserve  the  peace  of  Europe.  It  was  thirty-six 
years  too  late. 

For,  one  hour  after  it  was  delivered,  the  charge 

269 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

d'affaires  of  the  Montenegrin  legation  at  Constanti- 
nople, evidently  as  a  result  of  an  anticipation  of  a 
joint  note  from  the  Powers,  left  at  the  Sublime  Porte 
the  following  memorable  declaration  of  war: 

"In  conformity  with  the  authorization  of  King 
Nicholas,  I  have  the  honour  of  informing  you  that 
I  shall  leave  Constantinople  to-day.  The  Govern- 
ment of  Montenegro  breaks  off  all  relations  with 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  leaving  to  the  fortunes  of 
arms  of  the  Montenegrins  the  recognition  of  their 
rights  and  of  the  rights  scorned  through  centuries 
of  their  brothers  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

"I  leave  Constantinople. 

"The  royal  government  will  give  to  the  Ottoman 
representative  at  Cettinje  his  passports. 

"October  8,  1912.  Plamenatz." 

There  could  no  longer  be  any  doubt  of  the  trend 
of  things.  Inevitable  result,  this  declaration  of  war, 
of  the  action  of  Italy  one  year  before,  just  as  the 
action  of  Italy  harked  back  to  Russian  action  in 
the  Caucasus,  British  action  in  Egypt,  Austrian 
action  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and  French  action 
in  Morocco.  Inevitable  precursor,  this  declaration 
of  war,  of  the  European  catastrophe  of  1914.  Who, 
then,  is  presumptuous  enough  to  maintain  that  the 
cause  is  simple,  and  the  blame  all  at  one  door? 
Europe  is  reaping  in  blood-lust  what  all  the  "Great 
Powers"  have  sown  in  land-lust. 

The  chancelleries  made  strenuous  efforts  to  nullify 
what  their  inspired  organs  called  the  "blunder," 
or  the  "hasty  and  inconsiderate  action,"  of  King 
Nicholas.     There  was  feverish  activity  in  Constan- 

270 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

tinople,  and  a  continual  exchange  of  conferences  be- 
tween the  embassies  and  the  SubHme  Porte.  The 
ambassadors  gravely  handed  in  a  common  note,  in 
which  they  offered  to  avert  war  by  taking  in  hand 
themselves  the  long-delayed  reforms.  Had  they 
forgotten  the  institution  of  the  gendarmerie  in  1903, 
and  Hussein  Hilmi  pasha  at  Salonika? 

On  this  same  day,  the  Montenegrin  ex-minister 
at  Constantinople,  whose  declaration  of  war  had 
been  so  theatrical,  was  reported  as  having  said  at 
Bukarest  on  his  way  home,  "Montenegro  wants 
territorial  aggrandizements,  and  will  not  give  back 
whatever  conquests  she  makes.  We  do  not  fear  to 
cross  the  will  of  the  Great  Powers,  for  they  do  not 
worry  us."  These  words  express  exactly  the  senti- 
ments of  the  other  allies,  both  as  regards  their 
possible  conquests  and  their  attitude  towards  the 
dictum  of  the  Powers. 

Events  moved  rapidly  during  the  next  ten  days. 
On  October  13th,  the  Balkan  States  responded  to 
the  Russo- Austrian  note,  thanking  the  Powers  for 
their  generous  offices,  but  declaring  that  they  had 
come  to  the  end  of  their  patience  in  the  matter  of 
Turkish  promises  for  Macedonian  reform,  and  were 
going  to  request  of  the  Ottoman  Government  that 
it  accord  "without  delay  the  reforms  that  have  been 
demanded,  and  that  it  promise  to  apply  them  in 
six  months,  with  the  help  of  the  Great  Powers,  and 
of  the  Balkan  States  whose  interests  are  involved.'^ 
This  response  was  not  only  a  refusal  of  mediation. 
It  was  an  assertion,  as  the  last  words  show,  that  the 
time  had  come  when  the  Balkan  States  felt  strong 

271 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

enough  to  claim  a  part  in  the  management  of  their 
own  affairs. 

Acting  in  accordance  with  this  notification  to  the 
Powers,  on  October  14th,  Servia,  Greece,  and  Bul- 
garia demanded  of  Turkey  the  autonomy  of  the 
European  provinces,  under  Christian  governors;  the 
occupation  of  the  provinces  by  the  allied  armies  while 
the  reforms  were  being  applied;  the  payment  of  an 
indemnity  for  the  expenses  of  mobilization;  the 
immediate  demobilization  of  Turkey/";  and  the  pro- 
mise that  the  reforms  would  be  effected  within  six 
months.  The  demand  was  in  the  character  of  an 
ultimatum,  and  forty-eight  hours  were  given  for  a 
response. 

It  was  now  evident  that  unless  the  Powers  could 
compel  the  Balkan  States  to  withdraw  this  sweeping 
claim,  war  would  be  inevitable.  For  no  independent 
state  could  accept  such  a  demand,  and  retain  its  self.- 
respect.  The  representatives  of  Turkey  at  Belgrade 
and  Athens  were  quite  right  in  refusing  to  receive 
the  note  and  transmit  it  to  Constantinople. 

The  Sublime  porte  did  not  answer  directly  the 
ultimatum  of  the  allies.  Ar  effort  was  made  to  anti- 
cipate the  Balkan  claims,  and  get  the  Powers  to 
intervene,  by  reviving  the  law  of  reform  for  the 
vilayets,  which  provided  for  the  organization  of 
communes  and  schools,  the  building  of  roads,  and 
the  limitation  of  military  service  to  the  vilayet  or 
recruitment.  But  the  fact  that  this  law  had  been 
on  the  statute  books  since  1880,  and  had  remained 
throughout  the  Empire  a  dead  letter,  gave  little 
hope  that  it  would  be  seriously  applied  now. 

272 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

On  October  15th,  fighting  began  on  the  Serbo- 
Turkish  frontier.  The  war  had  already  brought 
about  Turkish  reverses  at  the  hands  of  the  Monte- 
negrins. Greece  threw  an  additional  defiance  in  the 
face  of  Turkey  by  admitting  the  Cretan  deputies  to 
the  Greek  legislative  chamber. 

To  gain  time,  for  she  was  unprepared,  and  her 
mobilization  progressing  very  slowly,  Turkey  made 
desperate  efforts  to  delay  the  declaration  of  war  by 
offering  to  treat  at  Sofia,  on  the  basis  of  a  cessation 
of  Moslem  immigration  into  Macedonia,  and  the 
suspension  of  enrolment  of  Christians  in  Moslem 
regiments.  These  points,  as  we  have  already  shown, 
were  the  two  principal  reasons  why  the  Bulgarians 
of  Macedonia  had  changed  their  policy  from  auto- 
nomy to  independence.  But  Bulgaria,  feeling  that 
cause  for  hesitation  over  a  war  of  liberation  had 
been  removed  by  her  secret  partition  treaty  with 
Servia,  remained  obdurate. 

Then  the  Turkish  diplomats  turned  their  atten- 
tion to  Athens,  and  tried  to  detach  the  Greeks  from 
the  alliance  by  agreeing  to  recognize  the  annexation 
of  Crete  to  Greece,  and  promising  an  autonomous 
government  for  some  of  the  ^gean  Islands.  This 
failed.  But,  to  the  very  last,  the  Turks  believed 
that  Greece  might  stay  out  of  the  war.  For  this 
reason  her  representative  at  Athens  was  instructed 
to  do  all  in  his  power  to  remain  at  his  post,  even  if 
war  were  declared  by  the  Subhme  Porte  on  Bulgaria 
and  Servia. 

Peace  was  hurriedly  concluded  with  Italy  at 
Ouchy  on  October  15th.  On  the  i6th,  when  the 
18  273 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

forty-eight  hours  of  the  ultimatum  had  expired,  and 
there  was  no  answer  from  Turkey,  every  one  expected 
a  declaration  of  war  from  the  allies.  None  came. 
On  the  1 8th,  to  preserve  her  dignity,  Turkey  saw 
that  she  must  be  the  one  to  act.  It  was  no  longer 
possible  to  wait  until  the  allies  were  "good  and 
ready"!  She  declared  war  on  Bulgaria  and  Servia. 
Greece  waited  till  afternoon  to  receive  a  similar 
declaration.  None  came.  So  Greece  declared  war 
on  Turkey. 

THE  FIRST  PERIOD  OF  THE  WAR 

While  the  diplomats  were  still  agitating  and  bluster- 
ing, while  Turkey  was  procrastinating  and  trying 
to  put  off  the  evil  day,  and  while  the  larger  Balkan 
States  were  quietly  completing  their  mobilization, 
Montenegro  entered  into  action.  On  October  9th, 
the  day  following  her  declaration  of  war,  the  Mon- 
tenegrins entered  the  sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar,  and 
surrounded  the  frontier  fortress  of  Berana.  This 
was  captured  after  six  days  of  fighting.  On  the 
same  day,  Biepolje  fell.  Nearly  one  thousand 
prisoners,  fourteen  cannon,  and  a  large  number  of 
rifles  and  stores  were  captured  by  the  Montenegrins. 
In  the  meantime,  two  other  Montenegrin  columns 
had  marched  southward,  reached  San  Giovanni  di 
Medua,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Boyana,  and  cut  Scutari 
off  from  the  sea.  Scutari  was  invested,  but  the 
Montenegrins,  who  had  been  able  to  put  into  the 
field  scarcely  more  than  thirty  thousand  men,  found 
themselves  mobilized  for  the  entire  winter.     The 

274 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

great  fortress  of  Tarabosh,  a  high  mountain,  towering 
over  the  town  of  Scutari  and  the  lower  end  of  the 
lake,  was  too  strong  for  their  forces  and  for  their 
artillery.  Inside  the  city  of  Scutari,  it  was  the  Al- 
banians fighting  for  their  national  life,  and  not  the 
Turks,  who  organized  and  maintained  the  splendid 
and  protracted  resistance. 

The  mobilization  in  the  other  Balkan  States  was 
not  completed  until  the  i8th,  when  the  declaration 
of  war  was  made  on  both  sides. 

Most  important  of  the  foes  of  Turkey  were  the 
Bulgarians,  whose  military  organization  had  for 
some  years  been  attracting  the  admiration  of  all 
who  had  been  privileged  to  see  their  manoeuvres  and 
to  visit  their  casernes.  Bulgaria  had  been  carefully 
and  secretly  preparing  her  mobilization  long  before 
the  crisis  became  acute.  I  had  the  privilege  of 
travelling  in  Bulgaria  during  the  last  two  weeks  of 
July,  and  of  spending  the  month  of  August  along 
the  frontier  between  Thrace  and  Bulgaria.  Every- 
where one  could  see  the  accumulation  of  the  soldiers 
of  the  standing  army  already  on  war  footing,  and 
of  military  stores,  at  a  number  of  different  places. 
During  August  and  September,  every  detail  of  the 
mobilization  had  been  carefully  arranged.  When 
war  was  declared,  Bulgaria  had  four  armies  with 
a  total  effective  of  over  three  hundred  thousand. 
Three  of  them  were  quickly  massed  on  the  frontier, 
fully  equipped.  No  army  has  ever  entered  the  field 
under  better  auspices. 

On  the  day  of  the  declaration  of  war,  the  Czar 
Ferdinand  issued  a  proclamation  to  his  troops  which 

275 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

clearly  defined  the  issue.  It  was  to  be  a  war  of 
liberation,  a  crusade,  undertaken  to  free  the  brothers 
of  blood  and  faith  from  the  yoke  of  Moslem  oppres- 
sion. In  summing  up,  the  Czar  said:  "In  this 
struggle  of  the  Cross  against  the  Crescent,  of  liberty 
against  tyranny,  we  shall  have  the  sympathy  of  all 
those  who  love  justice  and  progress."  At  the  time, 
bitter  criticism  was  directed  against  the  Czar  for 
having  used  words  which  brought  out  so  sharply 
the  religious  issue.  The  proclamation  of  a  crusade 
could  bring  forth  on  the  other  side  the  response  of  a 
djehad  (holy  war).  This,  above  all  things,  was  what 
the  European  Powers  wished  to  avoid ;  for  they  feared 
not  only  that  it  would  make  the  war  more  bitter 
and  more  cruel  between  the  opponents  in  the  field, 
but  that  it  would  awaken  a  wave  of  fanaticism 
among  the  Moslems  living  under  European  control 
in  Asia  and  in  Africa.  How  many  lessons  will  it 
need  to  teach  Europe  that  the  political  menace  of 
Pan-Islamism  is  a  phantom,  a  myth ! 

According  to  the  plan  adopted  by  the  allied  States, 
the  offensive  movement  in  Thrace,  in  which  the  bulk 
of  the  Turkish  army  would  be  met,  was  to  be  under- 
taken solely  by  Bulgaria.  Only  a  Bulgarian  army 
of  secondary  importance  was  to  enter  eastern  Mace- 
donia, to  protect  the  flank  of  the  main  Bulgarian 
army  from  a  sudden  eastward  march  of  the  Turkish 
Macedonian  army.  Its  objective  point,  though  not 
actually  agreed  upon,  was  to  be  Serres. 

The  role  of  Servia  and  Greece,  who  in  the  general 
mobilization  were  expected  to  put  about  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  troops  each  into  the  field,  was 

276 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

to  keep  in  check  the  Turkish  army  in  Macedonia, 
and  to  prevent  Albanian  reinforcements  from  reach- 
ing the  Turkish  army  in  Thrace.  In  addition  to 
this,  Servia  and  Montenegro  were  expected  to  prevent 
the  possible  surprise  of  Austrian  interference,  while 
the  fleet  of  Greece  would  perform  the  absolutely 
necessary  service  of  preventing  the  passage  of 
Turkish  forces  from  Asia  Minor  to  a  Macedonian 
port. 

The  allies  expected  a  bitter  struggle  and,  in 
Macedonia  and  Thrace  at  least,  the  successful  op- 
position of  a  Turkish  offensive,  rather  than  the 
destruction  of  the  Turkish  armies. 

The  mobilization  in  Turkey  was  described  by 
many  newspaper  men  who  had  come  to  Constanti- 
nople for  the  war  in  the  most  glowing  terms.  The 
efforts  of  Mahmud  Shevket  pasha  to  prepare  the 
Turkish  army  for  war  were  declared  to  be  bearing 
splendid  fruits  in  the  first  days  of  the  mobilization. 
Wholly  inaccurate  accounts  were  written  of  the 
wonderful  enthusiasm  of  the  Turkish  people  for  the 
war.  Naturally,  what  even  the  residents  of  Con- 
stantinople saw  at  the  beginning  was  the  best  foot 
front.  We  knew  that  tremendous  sums  had  been 
expended  for  four  years  in  bringing  the  army  up  to 
a  footing  of  efficiency.  We  had  seen  with  our  own 
eyes  the  brilliant  manoeuvres  on  the  anniversary  of 
the  Sultan's  accession  in  May,  and  on  the  anniver- 
sary of  the  Constitution  in  July.  The  work  accom- 
plished by  the  German  mission  had  cast  its  spell  over 
us.  We  saw  what  we  were  expecting  to  see  during 
the  first    days  of    the    mobilization.     The    "snap 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

judgments"  of  special  correspondents  have  little 
value,  other  than  freshness  and  naivete,  except  to 
readers  even  less  informed  than  they  are.  But  the 
East  is  a  sphinx  even  to  those  who  live  there.  After 
you  have  figured  out,  from  what  you  call  your 
"experience,"  what  ought  to  happen,  the  chances 
are  even  that  just  the  opposite  comes  true.  In 
spite  of  the  misgivings  which  had  been  awakened  by 
a  trip  into  the  interior  of  Asia  Minor,  as  far  as  Konia, 
during  the  third  week  of  September,  I  believed  that 
the  Turkish  army  was  going  to  give  a  good  account 
of  itself  against  the  Bulgarians,  whose  spirit  and 
whose  organization  I  had  had  opportimity  to  see 
and  admire  during  that  very  summer. 

Every  one  was  mistaken.  There  were  large  bodies 
of  splendidly  trained  and  well-equipped  troops  in 
Thrace.  Spick  and  span  regiments  did  come  over 
from  garrison  towns  in  Asia.  We  saw  them  fill 
the  trains  at  Stambul  and  at  San  Stefano.  But  we 
over-estimated  their  number.  The  truth  of  the 
matter  is  that  the  trained  and  well-equipped  iovces 
of  the  Thracian  army,  officered  by  capable  men,  did 
not  amount  to  more  than  eighty  thousand.  In 
retrospect,  after  going  over  carefully  the  position 
of  the  forces  which  met  the  Bulgarians,  I  feel  that 
these  figures  can  be  pretty  accurately  established. 
But  even  these  eighty  thousand  soldiers  of  the  nizam 
(active  army)  could  have  done  wonders  in  the  Thra- 
cian campaign,  if  they  had  been  allowed  to  go  ahead 
to  meet  the  Bulgarians,  and  to  form  the  first  line 
of  battle.     But  this  was  not  done. 

There   are   three   time-honoured   principles   that 

278 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

cannot  afford  to  be  neglected  at  the  beginning  of  a 
campaign.  The  army  used  for  initial  offensive  action 
against  the  enemy  should  be  composed  wholly  of 
soldiers  in  active  service.  The  army  should  be 
concentrated  to  meet  the  attack,  or  to  attack  one 
opposing  army  first,  leaving  the  others  until  later. 
Armies  must  be  kept  mobile,  and  not  allow  themselves 
to  be  trapped  in  fortresses.  The  fortresses  in  the 
portions  of  territory  which  may  have  to  be  abandoned 
temporarily  to  the  invasion  of  the  enemy  may  easily 
be  overstocked  with  defenders,  but  never  with 
provisions  and  munitions  of  war.  In  spite  of  the 
instructions  of  von  der  Goltz  pasha,  the  Turks 
showed  no  regard  for  the  first  two,  at  least,  of  these 
elementary  principles.  The  mobile  army  in  Mace- 
donia, outside  of  the  fortresses,  was  not  recalled  to 
Thrace,  and  redifs  (reservists)  were  mixed  with 
nizams  (actives)  in  the  first  line  of  battle.  The 
neglect  of  these  principles  was  the  direct  cause  of 
the  Turkish  disasters. 

After  the  nizams,  most  of  whom  were  already  in 
Thrace,  came  the  redifs  from  Asia  Minor.  They 
arrived  at  Constantinople  and  at  San  Stefano  in 
huge  numbers,  and  without  equipment.  I  saw  many 
of  them  with  their  feet  bound  in  rags.  There  were 
no  tents  over  them  or  other  shelter;  there  was  no 
proper  field  equipment  for  them,  and,  even  while 
they  were  patiently  waiting  for  days  to  be  forwarded 
to  the  front,  they  lacked  (within  sight  of  the  mina- 
rets of  Stambul!)  bread  to  eat,  shoes  for  their  feet, 
and  blankets  to  cover  them  at  night.  More  than 
that,  among  them  were  many  thousands  who  did 

279 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

not  know  how  to  use  the  rifles  that  were  given  to 
them,  and  who  had  not  even  a  rudimentary  miHtary 
education.  In  defensive  warfare,  as  they  proved 
at  Adrianople  and  at  Tchatalja,  they  could  fight 
like  lions.  But  for  an  offensive  movement  in  the 
field  the  great  majority  of  the  redifs  were  worse 
than  useless. 

The  Turks  were  absolutely  sure  of  victory.  The 
press  of  the  capital,  on  the  day  that  war  was  de- 
clared, stated  that  the  army  of  Thrace  was  composed 
of  four  hundred  thousand  soldiers,  and  that  it  was 
the  intention  to  march  direct  to  Sofia.  Turkish 
officers  of  my  acquaintance  told  me  that  they  were 
all  taking  their  dress  uniforms  in  their  baggage  for 
this  triumphal  entry  into  Sofia,  and  that  the  invasion 
of  Bulgaria  would  commence  immediately. 

On  the  19th  of  October,  the  Bulgarian  army  ap- 
peared in  force  at  Mustafa  Pasha,  the  first  railway 
station  after  passing  the  Turkish  frontier  on  the 
line  from  Sofia  to  Constantinople,  and  about  eighteen 
miles  north-west  of  Adrianople.  It  was  the  an- 
nounced intention  of  the  Bulgarians  to  attack  imme- 
diately the  fortress  of  Adrianople,  whose  cannon 
commanded  the  sole  railway  line  from  Bulgaria  into 
Thrace.  Two  of  the  Bulgarian  armies  were  directed 
upon  Adrianople,  and  the  third  army  under  General 
Dimitrieff  received  similar  orders.  In  Bulgaria, 
as  well  as  in  Turkey,  every  one  expected  to  see  an 
attack  upon  Adrianople.  Had  not  General  Savoff 
declared  openly  that  he  would  sacrifice  fifty  thou- 
sand men,  if  necessary,  as  the  Japanese  had  done  at 
Port  Arthur,  in  order  to  capture  Adrianople? 

280 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

A  strict  censorship  was  established  in  Bulgaria. 
No  one,  native  or  foreigner,  who  by  chance  saw  just 
what  the  armies  were  doing,  could  have  any  hope 
of  sending  out  the  information.  Postal  and  tele- 
graphic commimications  were  in  the  hands  of  the 
military  authorities.  No  one,  who  happened  to  be  in 
the  region  in  which  the  troops  were  moving  forward, 
was  allowed  to  leave  by  train,  automobile,  bicycle, 
or  even  on  foot.  Never  in  history  has  the  world 
been  so  completely  in  the  dark  as  to  the  operations 
of  the  army.  But  the  attacks  of  the  outposts  of 
Adrianople,  and  the  commencement  of  the  bombard- 
ment of  the  forts,  seemed  to  indicate  the  common 
objective  of  the  three  Bulgarian  armies.  Adrianople 
had  the  reputation  of  being  one  of  the  strongest 
fortresses  in  the  world.  This  reputation  was  well 
justified. 

Some  miles  to  the  west  of  Adrianople,  guarding 
the  mountains  of  the  south-eastern  frontier  of  Bul- 
garia, was  Kirk  Kilisse,  which  was  also  supposed 
to  be  an  impregnable  position.  Here  the  Ottoman 
military  authorities  had  placed  stores  to  form  the 
base  of  supplies  for  the  offensive  military  operation 
against  Bulgaria.  Shortly  before  the  war,  a  branch 
railway  from  the  sole  line  between  Constantinople 
and  Adrianople,  going  north  from  Lule  Burgas,  was 
completed.  It  furnished  direct  means  of  communi- 
cation between  the  capital  and  Kirk  Kilisse. 

The  General  Staff  at  Constantinople  wisely  decided 
to  leave  in  Adrianople  only  a  sufficient  garrison  to 
defend  the  forts  and  the  city.  It  was  their  inten- 
tion to  send  the  bulk  of  their  Thracian  army  north- 

281 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

west  from  Kirk  Kilisse,  using  that  fortress  as  a  base, 
in  order  to  cut  off  the  Bulgarians  from  their  supplies, 
and  throw  them  back  against  the  forts  of  Adrianople. 
In  this  way  they  intended  to  put  the  Bulgarians 
between  two  fires  and  crush  them.  Then  they 
would  commence  the  invasion  of  Bulgaria.  The 
plan  was  excellent.  If  Turkey  had  actually  had 
in  the  field  a  half  million  men  well  trained  and  well 
equipped,  well  officered  and  with  a  spirit  of  enthusi- 
asm, and — most  important  of  all — properly  fed, 
it  is  probable  that  the  Bulgarians  could  have  been 
held  in  check.  But  this  army  did  not  exist.  The 
millions  spent  for  equipment  had  disappeared — who 
knows  where?  There  were  not  enough  horses,  even 
with  the  requisitions  in  Constantinople,  for  the 
artillery,  and  for  the  cavalry  reserves.  That  meant 
that  there  were  no  horses  at  all  for  the  commissary 
department.  The  only  means  of  communication  with 
the  front  was  a  single  railway  track.  Roads  had 
never  been  made  in  Thrace  since  the  conquest.  The 
artillery  and  the  waggons  had  to  be  drawn  through 
deep  mud. 

Beyond  the  needs  of  the  nizam  (active)  regiments, 
there  were  hardly  any  officers.  The  wretched  masses 
of  redifs  (reservists)  were  without  proper  leadership. 
Not  only  was  this  all  important  factor  for  keeping 
up  the  morale  of  the  soldiers  lacking,  but,  from  the 
moment  they  left  Constantinople — even  before  that 
— there  was  insufficient  food.  Nor  did  the  soldiers 
know  why  they  were  fighting.  There  was  no  enthu- 
siasm for  a  cause.  The  great  mass  of  the  civil  popu- 
lation, if  not,  like  the  Christians,  hostile  to  the  army, 

282 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

was  wholly  indifferent.  I  do  not  believe  there  were 
ten  thousand  people  in  the  city  of  Constantinople, 
who  really  cared  what  happened  in  Thrace.  Since 
I  have  been  in  the  midst  of  a  mobilization  in  France, 
and  have  seen  how  the  French  soldiers  are  equipped 
for  war  and  fed,  and  how  they  have  been  made  to 
feel  that  every  man,  woman,  and  child  in  the  nation 
was  ready  to  make  any  sacrifice — no  matter  how 
great — for  "the  little  soldiers  of  France,"  I  feel  more 
deeply  the  tragedy  of  the  Turkish  redifs.  My  wonder 
is  that  they  were  able  to  fight  as  bravely  as  they  did. 
The  world  has  no  use  for  the  government — for  the 
"system" — which  caused  them  to  suffer  as  they  did, 
and  to  give  their  lives  in  a  wholly  useless  sacrifice. 

The  story  of  the  Thracian  campaign  I  heard  from 
the  lips  of  many  of  those  who  had  taken  part  in  it, 
when  the  events  were  still  fresh  in  their  memory. 
It  is  fruitless  to  go  into  all  the  details,  to  discuss  the 
strategy  of  the  generals  in  command,  and  to  give  a 
technical  description  of  the  battles,  and  of  the  retreat. 
Turkish  and  Bulgarian  officers,  as  well  as  a  host  of 
foreign  correspondents,  have  published  books  on 
this  campaign.  Most  of  them  hide  the  real  causes 
of  the  defeat  under  a  mass  of  unimportant  detail, 
and  seem  to  be  written  either  to  emphasize  the 
writer's  claim  as  a  "first-hand"  witness,  to  take  to 
task  certain  generals,  or  to  prove  the  superiority  of 
French  artillery,  and  the  faultiness  of  German  mili- 
tary instruction.  When  all  these  issues  are  cast  to 
one  side,  the  campaign  can  be  briefly  described. 

We  have  already  anticipated  the  debacle  of  the 
military  power  of    Turkey  by   giving  the  causes. 

283 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

This  is  not  illogical.  For  these  causes  existed,  and 
led  to  the  inevitable  result,  before  the  first  gun  was 
fired. 

On  October  19th,  the  Bulgarians  began  the  invest- 
ment of  Adrianople  from  the  north  and  west.  There 
was  no  serious  opposition.  The  Turkish  garrison 
naturally  fell  back  to  the  protection  of  the  forts, 
for  the  Turks  had  not  planned  to  oppose,  beyond 
Adrianople,  the  Bulgarian  approach.  The  Ottoman 
advance-guard,  composed  of  the  corps  of  Constanti- 
nople and  Rodosto,  under  the  command  of  Abdullah 
and  Mahmud  Mukhtar  pashas,  was  ordered  to  take 
the  offensive  north  of  Kirk  Kilisse.  They  were  to 
be  followed  by  another  army.  This  movement  was 
intended  to  cut  off  the  Bulgarians  from  their  base 
of  supplies,  and  throw  them  back  on  Adrianople. 
The  remainder  of  the  Turkish  forces  in  Thrace  were 
to  wait  the  result  of  this  movement.  If  the  Bul- 
garians moved  down  the  valley  of  the  Maritza, 
leaving  Adrianople,  they  would  meet  these  imposing 
forces  which  covered  Constantinople,  and  would 
have  behind  them  the  garrison  of  Adrianople,  and 
the  army  of  Abdullah  and  Mahmud  Mukhtar 
threatening  their  communications.  If  they  besieged 
Adrianople,  the  second  army  would  take  the  offensive 
and  the  Bulgarians  would  be  encircled. 

The  outposts  of  the  Turkish  army  came  into 
contact  with  the  Bulgarians  on  October  20th.  Be- 
lieving that  they  had  to  do  with  the  left  of  the  army 
investing  Adrianople,  Mahmud  and  Abdullah  decided 
to  begin  immediately  their  encircling  movement. 
On  the  2ist  and  22d,  the  two  columns  of  the  Turkish 

^84 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

army  were  in  fact  engaged  with  the  advance-guards 
of  the  first  and  second  Bulgarian  armies.  But,  in 
the  meantime,  General  Dimitrieff  and  the  third 
army  (which  they  believed  was  on  the  extreme 
Bulgarian  right,  pressing  down  the  Maritza  to  invest 
the  southern  forts  of  Adrianople)  had  quietly  crossed 
the  frontier  almost  directly  north  of  Kirk  Kilisse, 
and  fell  like  a  cyclone  upon  the  Turks.  The  Turkish 
positions  were  excellent,  and  had  to  be  taken  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet.  From  morning  till  night  on 
October  23d,  the  Bulgarian  third  army  captured 
position  after  position,  without  the  help  of  their 
artillery,  which  was  stuck  in  the  mud  some  miles  in 
the  rear.  In  the  evening,  during  a  terrible  storm, 
two  fresh  Bulgarian  columns  made  an  assault  upon 
the  Turkish  positions.  It  was  not  until  then  that 
the  Turks  realized  that  they  were  fighting  another 
army  than  that  charged  with  the  investment  of 
Adrianople.  A  wild  panic  broke  out  among  the 
redifs,  who  were  mostly  without  officers.  They 
started  to  retreat,  and  were  soon  followed  by  the 
remainder  of  the  army.  At  Uskubdere,  they  met 
during  the  night  reinforcements  coming  to  their  aid. 
Two  regiments  fired  on  each  other,  mutually  mistak- 
ing the  other  for  Bulgarians.  The  reinforcements 
joined  in  the  disorderly  retreat,  which  did  not  end 
until  morning,  when,  exhausted  and  still  crazed  by 
fear,  what  remained  of  the  Turkish  army  had  reached 
Eski  Baba  and  Bunar  Hissar. 

The  army  was  saved  from  annihilation  by  the 
darkness  and  the  storm.  For  not  only  were  the 
Bulgarians  ignorant  of  the  abandonment  of  Kirk 

285 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Kilisse,  but,  along  the  line  where  they  knew  the  enemy- 
were  retreating,  their  cavalry  could  not  advance  in 
the  darkness  and  mud,  nor  could  their  artillery  shell 
the  retreating  columns.  On  the  morning  of  the 
24th,  when  General  Dimitrieff  was  preparing  to 
make  the  assault  upon  Kirk  Kilisse,  he  learned  that 
the  Turkish  army  had  fled,  and  that  the  fortress 
was  undefended. 

By  the  capture  of  Kirk  Kilisse  the  Bulgarians 
gained  enormous  stores.  They  had  a  railway  line 
open  to  them  towards  Constantinople.  The  only 
menace  to  a  successful  investment  of  Adrianople 
was  removed.  The  victory,  so  easily  purchased, 
was  far  beyond  their  dreams.  But  it  would  not 
have  been  possible  had  it  not  been  for  the  willingness 
of  the  Bulgarian  soldiers  to  charge  without  tiring 
or  faltering  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The  victory 
was  earned,  in  spite  of  the  Turkish  panic.  For  the 
Bulgarian  steel  had  much  to  do  with  that  panic. 

As  soon  as  he  realized  the  extent  of  the  victory 
of  Kirk  Kilisse,  General  Savoff  ordered  a  general 
advance  of  the  three  Bulgarian  armies.  Only  enough 
troops  were  left  around  Adrianople  to  prevent  a  sortie 
of  the  garrison.  Notwithstanding  the  unfavourable 
condition  of  the  roads,  the  Bulgarian  armies  moved 
with  great  rapidity.  The  cavalry  in  two  days  made 
reconnaissances  on  the  east  as  far  as  Midia,  and  on 
the  south  as  far  as  Rodosto.  The  main — and  sole — • 
armies  of  the  Turks  were  thus  ascertained  to  be  along 
the  Ergene,  and  beyond  in  the  direction  of  the  capital. 
On  the  left,  the  third  army  of  General  Dimitrieff, 
not  delaying  at  Kirk  Kilisse,  was  in  contact  with  the 

286 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

Turks  at  Eski  Baba  on  the  28th.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  same  day  the  Bulgarians  drove  the  Turks 
out  of  the  village  of  Lule  Burgas,  on  the  railway 
to  Constantinople,  east  of  the  point  where  the 
Dedeagatch-Salonika  line  branches  off. 

For  three  days,  October  29-31,  the  Turkish  armies 
made  a  stand  along  the  Ergene  from  Bunar  Hissar 
to  Lule  Burgas.  Since  Gettysburg,  Sadowa,  and 
Sedan,  no  battle  except  that  of  Mukden  has  ap- 
proached the  battle  of  Lule  Burgas  in  importance, 
not  only  because  of  the  numbers  engaged,  but  also 
of  the  issue  at  stake.  Three  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  soldiers  were  in  action,  the  forces  being 
about  evenly  divided.  For  two  days,  in  spite  of  the 
demonstration  of  Kirk  Kilisse,  the  Turks  fought 
with  splendid  courage  and  tenacity.  Time  and 
again  the  desperate  charges  of  the  Bulgarian  in- 
fantry were  hurled  back  with  heavy  loss.  Not  until 
the  third  day  did  the  fighting  seem  to  lean  decisively 
to  the  advantage  of  the  Bulgarians.  Their  artillery 
began  to  show  marked  superiority.  From  many 
points  shells  began  to  fall  with  deadly  effect  into  the 
Turkish  entrenchments.  The  Turks  were  unable 
to  silence  the  murderous  fire  of  the  Bulgarian  bat- 
teries. The  soldiers,  because  they  were  starving,  did 
not  have  it  in  them  to  attempt  to  take  the  most 
troublesome  Bulgarian  positions  by  assault. 

The  retreat  began  on  the  afternoon  of  the  31st. 
On  November  ist,  owing  to  lack  of  officers  and  of 
central  direction,  it  became  a  disorderly  flight,  a 
sauve  qui  peut.  Camp  equipment  was  abandoned. 
The  soldiers  threw  away  their  knapsacks  and  rifles, 

287 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

so  that  they  could  run  more  quickly.  The  artillery- 
men cut  the  traces  of  their  gim-wagons  and  am- 
munition-wagons, and  made  off  on  horseback. 
Everything  was  abandoned  to  the  enemy.  Nazim 
pasha,  generalissimo,  and  the  general  staff,  who  had 
been  in  headquarters  at  Tchorlu,  without  proper  tele- 
graphic or  telephonic  communication  with  the  battle 
front,  were  drawn  into  the  flight.  The  Turkish 
army  did  not  stop  until  it  had  placed  itself  behind 
the  Tchatalja  line  of  forts,  which  protected  the  city 
of  Constantinople. 

The  battle  of  Lule  Burgas  marked  more  than  the 
destruction  of  the  Turkish  military  power  and  the 
loss  of  European  Turkey  to  the  Empire.  It  revealed 
the  inefficiency  of  Turkish  organization  and  adminis- 
tration to  cope  with  modem  conditions,  even  when 
in  possession  of  modem  instruction  and  modern 
tools.  With  the  Turks,  it  is  not  a  question  of  an 
ignorance  or  a  backwardness  which  can  be  remedied. 
Total  lack  of  organizing  and  administrative  ability 
is  a  fault  of  their  nature.  Courage  alone  does  not 
win  battles  in  the  twentieth  century. 

The  Bulgarians  were  without  sufficient  cavalry 
and  mounted  machine-guns  to  follow  up  their  victory. 
The  defeat  of  the  Turks,  too,  had  not  been  gained 
without  the  expenditure  of  every  ounce  of  energy 
in  the  army  that  had  in  those  three  days  won  undying 
fame.  The  problem  of  pursuit  was  difficult.  There 
was  only  a  single  railway  track.  Food  and  muni- 
tions for  the  large  army  had  to  be  brought  up.  The 
artillery  advanced  painfully  through  roads  hub- 
deep  in  mud.     It  took  two  weeks  for  the  Bulgarian 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

army  to  move  from  the  Ergene  to  Tchatalja,  and 
prepare  for  the  assault  of  the  last  line  of  Turkish 
defence. 

An  immediate  offensive  after  Lule  Burgas  would 
have  found  Constantinople  at  the  mercy  of  the 
victorious  army.  The  two  weeks  of  respite  changed 
the  aspect  of  things.  For  in  this  time  the  forts 
across  the  peninsula  from  the  Sea  of  Marmora  to 
the  Black  Sea  were  hastily  repaired.  They  were 
mounted  with  guns  from  the  Bosphorus  defences, 
the  Servian  Creusots  detained  at  Salonika  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  and  whatever  artillery  could 
be  brought  from  Asia  Minor.  The  army  had  been 
reformed,  the  worthless,  untrained  elements  ruth- 
lessly weeded  out,  and  a  hundred  thousand  of  the  best 
soldiers,  among  whom  the  only  redijs  were  those 
who  had  come  fresh  from  Asia  Minor,  and  had  not 
been  contaminated  by  the  demoralization  of  Kirk 
Kilisse  and  Lule  Burgas,  were  placed  behind  the 
forts.  The  Turkish  cruisers  whose  guns  were  able 
to  be  fired  were  recalled  from  the  Dardanelles,  and 
anchored  off  the  end  of  the  line  on  either  side. 

On  November  15th,  the  Bulgarians  began  to  put 
their  artillery  in  position  all  along  the  Tchatalja 
line  from  Buyuk-Tchekmedje  on  the  Sea  ot  Marmora 
to  Derkos  Lake,  near  the  Black  Sea.  At  the  same 
time,  they  entrenched  the  artillery  positions  by 
earthworks  and  ditches,  working  with  incredible 
rapidity.  For  they  had  to  take  every  precaution 
against  a  sudden  sortie  of  the  enemy.  In  forty- 
eight  hours  they  were  ready. 

The  attack  on  the  Tchatalja  lines  commenced 
19  289 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

at  six  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning,  November  17th, 
by  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire  as  well  as  by  artillery. 
The  forts  and  the  Turkish  cruisers  responded.  In 
the  city  and  in  the  villages  along  the  Bosphorus  we 
could  hear  the  firing  distinctly.  On  the  17th  and 
1 8th,  the  Bulgarians  delivered  assaults  in  several 
places.  Near  Derkos  they  even  got  through  the 
lines  for  a  short  while.  These  were  merely  for  the 
purpose  of  testing  the  Turkish  positions,  however. 
Several  of  the  assaults  were  repulsed.  The  Bulga- 
rians suffered  heavily  on  the  i8th,  when  the  first 
and  only  prisoners  of  the  war  were  made.  On  the 
19th,  the  artillery  fire  grew  less  and  less,  and  there 
were  no  further  attacks.  Towards  evening  it  was 
evident  that  the  Bulgarians  had  abandoned  their 
advanced  lines,  and  did  not  intend  to  continue  the 
attack.     No  general  assault  had  been  delivered. 

It  seems  certain  that  General  Savoff  had  in  mind 
the  capture  of  Constantinople  on  November  17th- 
Turkish  overtures  for  peace,  opened  on  the  15th, 
had  been  repulsed.  Every  preparation  was  made 
for  the  attempt  to  pierce  Tchatalja.  '  Why  was 
the  plan  abandoned  before  it  was  actually  proven 
impossible?  Did  General  Savoff  fear  the  risk  of  a 
reverse?  Was  he  short  of  ammunition?  Had  the 
Turkish  defence  of  the  17th  and  iSth  been  more 
determined  than  he  had  expected?  Was  it  fear  of  a 
cholera  epidemic  among  his  soldiers?  Or  was  the 
abandonment  of  the  attempt  to  capture  Constan- 
tinople, for  that  is  what  a  triumph  at  Tchatalja 
would  have  meant,  dictated  by  political  reasons? 

Perhaps   there   was   a   shortage   of   ammunition. 

290 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

But  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  General  SavofE 
ceased  the  attack  because  he  feared  a  failure,  or 
because  he  paused  before  the  heavy  sacrifice  of  life 
it  would  involve.  The  Bulgarians  were  too  fresh 
from  their  sudden  and  overwhelming  victories  to 
be  halted  by  the  unimportant  fighting  of  the  17th 
and  1 8th.  They  were  not  yet  aware  of  the  terrible 
danger  from  cholera. 

At  the  time  it  was  the  common  belief  in  Constan- 
tinople— I  heard  it  expressed  in  a  number  of  intel- 
ligent circles — that  the  Great  Powers — in  particular 
Russia — had  informed  Bulgaria  that  she  should  halt 
where  she  was.  A  second  San  Stef ano !  This  seems 
improbable.  Even  in  the  moment  of  delirium  over 
Lule  Burgas,  the  Bulgarians  had  no  thought  of 
occupying  permanently  Constantinople.  They  knew 
that  this  would  be  a  task  beyond  their  ability  as  a 
nation  to  undertake.  If  there  was  a  thought  of 
entering  Constantinople,  it  was  to  satisfy  military 
pride,  and  to  be  able  to  dictate  more  expeditiously 
and  satisfactorily  terms  of  peace. 

The  real  reason  for  the  halt  of  Tchatalja,  and 
the  willingness  to  conclude  an  armistice,  must  be 
found  in  the  alarm  awakened  in  Bulgaria  by  the 
Servian  and  Greek  successes.  Greece  had  settled 
herself  in  Salonika,  and  the  King  and  royal  family 
had  come  there  to  live.  Is  it  merely  a  coincidence 
that  on  November  i8th  the  Servians  captured 
Monastir,  foyer  of  Bulgarianism  in  western  Mace- 
donia, and  on  the  foUowi?ig  day,  a  telegram  from  Sofia 
caused  the  cessation  of  the  Bulgarian  attack  upon 
Tchatalja? 

291 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

At  Adrianople,  a  combined  Bulgarian  and  Servian 
army,  under  the  command  of  General  Ivanoff,  which 
had  been  hampered  during  the  first  month  of  opera- 
tions by  the  floods  of  the  Maritza,  and  by  daring 
sorties  of  the  garrison,  after  receiving  experienced 
reinforcements  on  November  22d,  began  a  deter- 
mined bombardment  and  narrow  investment  of  the 
forts.  Ten  days  later,  a  general  attack  was  ordered, 
probably  to  hurry  the  Turks  in  the  armistice  nego- 
tiations. The  investing  army  had  made  very  little 
progress  on  December  2d  and  3d,  when  the  signing 
of  the  armistice  caused  a  cessation  of  hostilities. 

But  while  the  Bulgarians  were  vigorously  pressing 
the  attack  upon  Adrianople,  they  were  inactive  at 
Tchatalja. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Thracian  campaign,  a 
portion  of  the  Turkish  fleet  started  to  attack  the 
Bulgarian  coast.  The  Bulgarians  had  only  one 
small  cruiser  and  six  torpedo-boats  of  doubtful  value. 
But  their  two  ports,  termini  of  railway  lines,  were 
well  protected  by  forts.  On  October  19th,  two 
Turkish  battleships  and  four  torpedo-boats  appeared 
before  Varna,  and  fired  without  effect  upon  the  forts. 
Then  they  bombarded  the  small  open  port  of  Ka- 
vama,  near  the  Rumanian  frontier.  On  the  21st, 
they  succeeded  in  throwing  a  few  shells  into  Varna, 
but  did  not  risk  approaching  near  enough  to  do 
serious  damage.  This  was  the  extent  of  the  offensive 
naval  action  against  Bulgaria.  A  short  time  later, 
the  Hamidieh,  which  was  stationed  on  the  Thracian 
coast  of  the  Black  Sea  to  protect  the  landing  of 
redifs  from  Samsun,  was  surprised  in  the  night  by 

292 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

Bulgarian  torpedo-boats.  Two  torpedoes  tore  holes 
in  her  bow.  She  was  able  to  return  to  Constanti- 
nople under  her  own  steam,  but  had  to  spend  ten 
weeks  in  dry-dock.  The  only  service  rendered  by 
the  Turkish  fleet  against  the  Bulgarians  was  the 
safeguarding  of  the  transport  of  troops  from  Black 
Sea  ports  of  Asiatic  Turkey,  and  the  co-operation 
at  the  ends  of  the  Tchatalja  lines  during  the  Bul- 
garian assaults  of  November  17th  and  i8th. 

The  Servian  campaign  was  a  good  second  to  the 
astounding  successes  of  the  Bulgarians  in  Thrace. 
The  third  army  entered  the  sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar, 
so  long  coveted  by  Servia,  and  expelled  the  Turks 
in  five  days.  A  portion  of  this  army  next  occupied 
Prisrend  and  Diakova,  descended  the  valley  of  the 
Drin  through  the  heart  of  northern  Albania  to 
Alessio,  where  it  joined  on  November  19th  the  Mon- 
tenegrins, who  were  already  at  San  Giovanni  di 
Medua.  On  the  28th,  they  occupied  Durazzo.  The 
Servians  had  reached  the  Adriatic! 

While  the  third  army  was  in  the  sandjak  of  Novi 
Bazar,  the  second  Servian  army  crossed  into  Old 
Servia,  passed  through  the  plain  of  Kossova,  where 
the  Turks  had  destroyed  the  independence  of  Servia 
in  1389,  and  occupied  Pristina  on  October  23d.  This 
gave  them  control  of  the  branch  railway  from  Uskub 
to  the  confines  of  the  sandjak. 

The  flower  of  the  Servian  fighting  strength  was 
reserved  for  the  first  army  under  the  command  of 
Crown  Prince  Alexander.  This  force,  considerably 
larger  than  the  two  other  armies  combined,  mustered 
over  seventy   thousand.     Its  objective  point   was 

293 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Uskub,  covering  which  was  the  strong  Turkish  army 
of  Zekki  pasha.  Battle  was  joined  outside  of  Kuma- 
nova  on  October  22d,  After  three  days  of  fighting 
during  which  the  Turkish  cavalry  was  annihilated 
by  the  Servian  artillery  and  the  Servian  infantry 
took  the  Turkish  artillery  positions  at  the  point  of 
the  bayonet,  the  army  of  Zekki  Pasha  evacuated 
Kumanova.  No  attempt  was  made  to  defend 
Uskub,  which  the  Servians  entered  on  October  26th. 
The  Turkish  army  retreated  to  Kuprulu  on  the 
Vardar,  towards  Salonika.  When  the  Servians 
continued  their  march,  Zekki  pasha  retreated  to 
Prilip,  where  he  occupied  positions  that  could  not 
well  be  shelled  by  artillery.  After  two  days  of 
continuous  fighting,  the  Servians'  bayonets  dislodged 
the  Turks.  They  withdrew  to  Monastir  with  the 
Servians  hot  upon  their  heels. 

Together  with  Kumanova,  in  which  the  bulk  of 
Prince  Alexander's  forces  did  not  find  it  necessary  to 
engage,  the  capture  of  Monastir  is  the  most  brilliant 
feat  of  an  army  whose  intrepidity,  agility,  and  intel- 
ligence deserves  highest  praise.  Into  Monastir  had 
been  thrown  the  army  of  Tahsin  pasha,  pushed 
northward  by  the  Greeks,  as  well  as  that  of  Zekki 
pasha,  harried  southward  by  the  Servians.  The 
Servians  did  not  hesitate  to  approach  the  defences 
of  the  city  on  one  side  up  to  their  arm-pits  in  water, 
while  on  the  other  side  they  scaled  the  heights  domi- 
nating Monastir — heights  which  ought  to  have  been 
defended  for  weeks  without  great  difficulty.  The 
Turks  were  compelled  to  withdraw,  for  they  were  at 
the  mercy  of  the  Servian  artillery.     They  tried  to 

294 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

retreat  to  Okrida,  but  the  Servian  left  wing  anti- 
cipated this  movement.  Only  ten  thousand  escaped 
into  Epirus.  Nearly  forty  thousand  Turks  surren- 
dered to  the  Servians  on  November  i8th.  Monastir 
and  Okrida  were  captured.  The  Turkish  armies  of 
Macedonia  had  ceased  to  exist. 

The  Greeks  were  eager  to  wipe  out  the  shame  of 
the  war  of  1897.  Fifteen  years  had  wrought  a  great 
difference  in  the  morale  of  the  Greek  army.  A  new 
body  of  officers,  who  spent  their  time  in  learning 
their  profession  instead  of  in  discussing  politics  at 
caf^  terr asses,  had  been  created.  The  French  mili- 
tary mission,  under  General  Eydoux,  had  been 
working  for  several  years  in  the  complete  reorgani- 
zation of  the  Greek  army.  I  had  the  privilege  at 
Athens  of  enjoying  the  hospitality  of  Greek  officers 
in  their  casernes  at  several  successive  Easter  festi- 
vals. Each  year  one  could  notice  the  progress. 
They  were  always  ready  to  show  you  how  the  trans- 
formation of  their  artillery,  and  its  equipment  for 
mountain  service  as  well  as  for  field  work,  would 
make  all  the  difference  in  the  world  in  the  "  approach- 
ing" war  with  the  Turks.  The  results  were  beyond 
expectations.  What  the  Greeks  had  been  working 
for  was  mobility.  This  they  demonstrated  they 
had  learned.  They  had  also  an  esprit  de  corps 
which,  in  fighting,  made  up  for  that  they  lacked 
of  Slavic  dogged  perseverance.  Neither  in  actual 
combat,  nor  in  strategy,  with  the  exception  of  Janina, 
were  the  Greeks  put  to  the  test,  or  called  upon  to 
bear  the  burden,  of  the  Bulgarians  and  Servians. 
But,  especially  when  we  take  into  consideration  the 

295 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

invaluable  service  of  their  fleet,  there  is  no  reason  to 
belittle  their  part  in  the  downfall  of  Turkey.  If  the 
effort  had  been  necessary,  they  probably  would  have 
been  equal  to  it. 

The  Greeks  sent  a  small  army  into  Epirus.  The 
bulk  of  their  forces,  following  a  sound  military  prin- 
ciple, were  led  into  Thessaly  by  the  Crown  Prince 
Constantine.  They  crossed  the  frontier  without 
resistance,  fought  a  sharp  combat  at  Elassona  on  the 
19th,  in  which  they  stood  admirably  imder  fire,  and 
broke  down  the  last  Turkish  resistance  at  Servia. 
The  army  of  Tahsin  pasha  was  thrown  back  upon 
Monastir.  The  battles  of  the  next  ten  days  were 
hardly  more  than  skirmishes,  for  the  Turkish  stand 
was  never  formidable.  At  Yanitza,  the  only  real 
battle  of  the  Greek  campaign  was  fought.  The 
Turks  fled.     The  way  to  Salonika  was  open. 

The  battle  of  Yanitza  (Yenidje-Vardar)  was 
fought  on  November  3d.  On  October  30th,  a  Greek 
torpedo-boat  had  succeeded,  in  spite  of  the  strong 
harbour  fortifications,  equipped  with  electric  search- 
lights, and  the  mined  channel,  in  coming  right  up 
to  the  jetty  at  Salonika  during  the  night,  and  launch- 
ing three  torpedoes  at  an  old  Turkish  cruiser  which 
lay  at  anchor  there.  The  cruiser  sank.  On  his 
way  out  to  open  sea,  the  commander  of  the  torpedo- 
boat  did  not  hesitate  to  fire  upon  the  forts! 

This  daring  feat,  and  the  approach  of  the  Greek 
army,  threw  the  city  into  a  turmoil  of  excitement. 
The  people  had  been  fed  for  two  weeks  on  false 
news,  and  telegrams  had  been  printed  from  day  to 
day,  relating  wonderful  victories  over  the  Servians, 

296 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

Bulgarians,  and  Greeks.  But  the  coming  of  the 
refugees,  fresh  thousands  from  nearer  places  every 
day,  and  the  presence  in  the  streets  of  the  city  of 
deserters  in  uniform,  gave  the  lie  to  the  "official" 
news.  When  the  German  stationnaire  arrived  from 
Constantinople,  and  embarked  the  prisoner  of  the 
Villa  Allatini,  ex-Sultan  Abdul  Hamid,  the  most 
pessimistic  suspicions  were  confirmed. 

Although  he  had  thirty  thousand  soldiers,  and 
plenty  of  munitions,  Tahsin  pasha,  commandant  of 
Salonika,  did  not  even  attempt  to  defend  the  city. 
He  began  immediately  to  negotiate  with  the  advanc- 
ing Greek  army.  When  the  Crown  Prince  refused 
to  accept  any  other  than  unconditional  surren- 
der, and  moved  upon  the  city,  Tahsin  pasha  yielded. 
Not  a  shot  was  fired.  On  November  9th,  without 
any  opposition,  the  Greek  army  marched  into 
Salonika. 

In  other  places  the  Turks  at  least  fought,  even  if 
they  did  not  fight  well.  At  Salonika  their  surrender 
demonstrated  to  what  humiliation  and  degradation 
the  arrogance  of  the  Young  Turks  had  brought  a 
nation  whose  past  was  filled  with  glorious  deeds  of 
arms. 

The  Bulgarian  expeditionary  corps  for  Macedonia, 
under  General  Theodoroff,  had  crossed  the  frontier 
on  October  i8th.  Joined  to  it  were  the  notorious 
bands  of  comitadjis  under  the  command  of  Sandansky, 
who  afterwards  related  to  me  the  story  of  this  march. 
General  Theodoroff's  mission  was  to  engage  the 
portion  of  the  Turkish  Fifth  Army  Corps,  which  was 
stationed  in  the  valleys  of  the  Mesta  and  Struma, 

297 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

east  of  the  Vardar,  thus  preventing  it  from  assem- 
bling and  making  a  flank  movement  against  the  main 
Servian  or  Bulgarian  armies.  The  Bulgarians  were 
greeted  everywhere  as  liberators,  and,  although  they 
were  not  in  great  numbers,  the  Turks  did  not  try 
to  oppose  them.  Soldiers  and  Moslem  Macedonians 
together  fled  before  them  towards  Salonika. 

When  General  Theodoroff  realized  the  demoraliz- 
ation of  the  Turks,  and  heard  how  the  Greeks  were 
approaching  Salonika  without  any  more  serious 
opposition  than  that  which  confronted  him,  he  hur- 
ried his  column  towards  Salonika.  The  Bulgarian 
Princes  Boris  and  Cyril  joined  him.  They  were  not 
in  time  to  take  part  in  the  negotiations  for  the  sur- 
render of  the  city.  The  cowardice  of  Tahsin  pasha 
had  brought  matters  to  a  climax  on  November  9th. 
But  they  were  able  to  enter  Salonika  on  the  loth, 
at  the  same  time  that  Crown  Prince  Constantine 
was  making  his  triumphal  entry.  Sandansky  and 
his  comitadjis  hurried  to  the  principal  ancient  church 
of  the  city,  for  over  four  hundred  years  the  Saint 
Sophia  of  Salonika,  and  placed  the  Bulgarian  flag 
in  the  minarets  before  the  Greeks  knew  they  had 
been  outwitted.  On  the  12th,  King  George  of 
Greece  arrived  to  make  his  residence  in  the  city 
that  was  to  be  his  tomb. 

After  the  capture  of  Monastir,  the  Servians  pressed 
on  to  Okrida,  on  November  23d,  and  from  there  into 
Albania  to  Elbassan,  which  they  reached  five  days 
later.  It  was  their  intention  to  join  at  Durazzo 
the  other  column  of  the  third  Servian  army,  of  whose 
march  down  the  Drin  we  have  already  spoken.     But 

298 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

the  threatening  attitude  of  Austria-Hungary  neces- 
sitated the  recall  of  the  bulk  of  the  Servian  forces  to 
Nish.  This  is  the  reason  they  were  not  able,  at  that 
stage  of  the  war,  to  give  the  Montenegrins  effective 
assistance  against  Scutari. 

The  left  wing  of  the  Thessalian  Greek  army,  after 
the  capture  of  Monastir  by  the  Servians,  pursued 
towards  Albania,  the  Turks  who  had  escaped  from 
Monastir.  With  great  skill,  they  managed  to  pre- 
vent the  Turks  from  turning  north-west  into  the 
interior  of  Albania.  After  the  brilliant  and  daring 
storming  of  the  heights  of  Tchangan,  what  remained 
of  the  Turkish  army  was  compelled  to  retreat  into 
Epirus  towards  Janina. 

On  October  20th,  the  Greek  fleet  under  Admiral 
Koundouriotis  appeared  at  the  Dardanelles  to  offer 
battle  to  the  Turks.  Under  the  cover  of  the  pro- 
tection of  their  fleet,  the  Greeks  occupied  Lemnos, 
Thasos,  Imbros,  Samothrace,  Nikaria,  and  the 
smaller  islands.  The  inhabitants  of  Samos  had 
expelled  the  Turkish  garrisons  on  their  own  initia- 
tive at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  Mitylene  was 
captured  without  great  difficulty  on  November  2 1st. 
The  Greeks  landed  at  Chios  on  the  24th.  Here  the 
Turkish  garrison  of  two  thousand  retired  to  the 
mountainous  centre  of  the  island,  and  succeeded  in 
prolonging  their  resistance  until  January.  When  he 
saw  that  no  help  was  coming  from  Asia  Minor,  whose 
shores  had  been  in  sight  during  all  the  weeks  of 
combat  and  suffering,  the  heroic  Turkish  commander 
surrendered  with  one  thousand  eight  hundred  starv- 
ing men  on  January  3d.     It  was  only  because  Italy, 

299 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

by  a  clause  of  the  Treaty  of  Ouchy,  still  held  the 
Dodecanese,  that  all  of  the  ^gean  Islands  were 
not  "gathered  into  the  fold"  by  Greece. 

There  had  been  less  than  six  weeks  of  fighting. 
The  Balkan  allies  had  swept  from  the  field  all  the 
Turkish  forces  in  Europe.  The  Turkish  armies 
were  bottled  up  in  Constantinople,  Adrianople, 
Janina,  and  Scutari,  with  absolutel}''  no  hope  of 
making  successful  sorties.  Except  at  Constantinople, 
they  were  besieged,  and  could  expect  neither  rein- 
forcements nor  food  supplies.  The  Greek  fleet  was 
master  of  the  ^gean  Sea,  and  held  the  Turkish 
navy  blocked  in  the  Dardanelles.  No  new  armies 
could  come  from  Asiatic  Turkey.  This  was  the 
situation  when  the  armistice  was  signed.  The 
Ottoman  Empire  in  Europe  had  ceased  to  exist. 
The  military  prestige  of  Turkey  had  received  a 
mortal  blow. 

THE  ARMISTICE  AND  THE  FIRST  CONFERENCE  OF 
LONDON 

The  hopelessness  of  the  outcome  of  the  war  with 
Italy,  the  dissatisfaction  over  the  foolish  and  arbi- 
trary rule  of  its  secret  committees  had  weakened  the 
hold  of  the  "Committee  of  Union  and  Progress"  over 
the  army.  Despite  its  success  in  the  spring  elections 
of  1912,  its  position  was  precarious.  In  July,  Mah- 
mud  Shevket  pasha,  who  was  suspected  of  planning 
a  military  pronunciamento,  resigned  the  Ministry  of 
War.  The  Grand  Vizier,  Said  pasha,  soon  followed 
him  into  retirement.     The  Sultan  declared  that  a 

500 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

ministry  not  under  the  control  of  a  political  party- 
was  a  necessity. 

Ghazi  Mukhtar  pasha,  after  much  difficulty, 
succeeded  in  forming  a  ministry,  in  which  a  distin- 
guished Armenian,  Noradounghian  effendi,  was  given 
the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  Unionist 
majority  in  the  lower  house  of  Parliament  proved 
intractable.  Its  obstructionist  tactics  won  for  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  the  name  of  the  "comic  opera- 
house  of  Fundukli. "  (Fundukli  was  the  Bosphorus 
quarter  in  which  the  House  of  Parliament  was 
located.)  With  the  help  of  the  Senate,  and  the  moral 
support  of  the  army,  the  Sultan  dissolved  Parliament 
on  August  5th.  Only  the  menace  of  the  Albanian 
revolution  prevented  the  Committee  from  attempting 
to  set  up  a  rival  Parliament  at  Salonika.  This  was 
the  tmenviable  internal  situation  of  Turkey  at  the 
opening  of  the  Balkan  War. 

The  disasters  of  the  Thracian  campaign  led  to 
the  resignation  of  the  Ghazi  Mukhtar  pasha  Cabinet. 
The  aged  statesman  of  the  old  regime,  Kiamil  pasha, 
was  called  for  the  eighth  time  to  the  Grand  Vizirate. 
He  retained  Nazim  pasha,  generalissimo  of  the 
Turkish  army,  and  Noradounghian  effendi,  in  the 
Ministries  of  War  and  Foreign  Affairs.  The  most 
influential  of  the  Young  Turks,  who  had  opposed 
bitterly  the  peace  with  Italy  and  were  equally  deter- 
mined that  no  negotiations  should  be  undertaken 
with  the  Balkan  States,  were  exiled.  Kiamil  pasha 
saw  clearly  that  peace  was  absolutely  necessary.  His 
long  experience  allowed  him  to  have  no  illusions  as 
to  the  possibility  of  continuing  the  struggle.     Before 

301 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

the  Bulgarian  attack  upon  Tchatalja,  he  began 
pourparlers  with  General  Savoff.  After  the  repulse 
of  November  17th  and  i8th,  he  was  just  as  firm  in  his 
decision  that  the  negotiations  must  be  continued. 
He  won  over  to  his  point  of  view  the  members  of  the 
Cabinet,  and  notably  Nazim  pasha. 

The  conditions  of  the  armistice,  signed  on  Decem- 
ber 3d,  were  an  acknowledgment  of  the  complete 
debacle  of  the  Turkish  army.  Bulgaria  forced  the 
stipulation  that  her  army  in  front  of  Tchatalja 
should  be  revictualled  by  the  railway  which  passed 
under  the  guns  of  Adrianople,  while  that  fortress 
remained  without  food!  Greece,  by  an  agreement 
with  her  allies,  refused  to  sign  the  armistice,  but  was 
allowed  to  be  represented  in  the  peace  conference. 
The  allies  felt  that  the  state  of  war  on  sea  must 
continue,  in  order  that  Turkey  should  be  prevented 
during  the  armistice  from  bringing  to  the  front  her 
army  corps  from  Syria  and  Mesopotamia  and  Arabia ; 
while  Greece,  in  particular,  was  determined  to  run 
no  risk  in  connection  with  the  -^gean  Islands.  The 
peace  delegates  were  to  meet  in  London. 

Orientals,  Christian  as  well  as  Moslem,  are  famous 
for  bargaining.  Nothing  can  be  accomplished  with- 
out an  exchange  of  proposals  and  counter-proposals 
ad  infinitum.  In  the  Conference  of  London,  the 
demands  of  the  allies  were  the  cession  of  all  European 
Turkey,  except  Albania,  whose  boundaries  were  not 
defined,  of  Crete,  and  of  the  islands  in  the  ^gean 
Sea.  A  war  indemnity  was  also  demanded.  Turkey 
was  to  be  allowed  to  retain  Constantinople,  and  a 
strip  of  territory  from  Midia  on  the  Black  Sea  to 

302 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

Rodosto  on  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  and  the  peninsula 
of  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  which  formed  the 
European  shore  of  the  Dardanelles.  The  boundaries 
of  Albania,  and  its  future  status,  were  to  be  decided 
by  the  Powers. 

I  had  a  long  conversation  with  the  Grand  Vizier, 
Kiamil  pasha,  on  the  day  the  peace  delegates  left 
for  London.  He  was  frank  and  unhesitating  in  the 
statement  of  his  belief  that  Turkey  could  not  con- 
tinue the  war.  He  denounced  unsparingly  the 
visionaries  who  were  clamouring  for  a  continuance  of 
the  struggle.  "It  is  because  of  them  that  we  are  in 
our  present  humiliating  position,"  he  said.  "  They 
cry  out  now  that  we  must  not  accept  peace,  but  they 
know  well  that  we  cannot  hope  to  win  back  any  por- 
tion of  what  we  have  lost. " 

There  were  a  number  of  reasons  why  the  position 
of  Kiamil  pasha  was  sound.  First  of  all,  the  army 
organization  was  in  hopeless  confusion.  Although  the 
Bulgarians  were  checked  at  Tchatalja,  the  condi- 
tions on  the  Constantinople  side  of  the  forts  was 
terrible.  The  general  headquarters  at  Hademkeuy 
were  buried  in  filth  and  mud.  Although  the  army 
was  but  twenty-five  miles  from  the  city,  there  were 
days  on  end  when  not  even  bread  arrived.  Cholera 
was  making  great  ravages.  Soldiers,  crazed  from 
hunger,  were  shot  dead  for  disobeying  the  order 
which  forbade  their  eating  raw  vegetables.  There 
were  neither  fuel,  shelter,  nor  blankets.  Winter  was 
at  hand.  At  San  Stefano,  one  of  the  most  beautiful 
suburbs  of  Stambul,  in  a  concentration  camp  the 
soldiers  died  by  the  thousands  of  starvation  fever. 

303 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

It  was  one  of  the  most  heart-rending  tragedies  of 
history. 

All  the  while,  in  the  cafes  of  Pera,  Galata,  and 
Stambul,  Turkish  officers  sat  the  day  long,  sipping 
their  coffee,  and  deciding  that  Adrianople  must  not 
be  given  up.  Even  while  the  fighting  was  going  on, 
when  the  fate  of  the  city  hung  in  the  balance,  I  saw 
these  degenerate  officers  by  the  hundreds,  feasting  at 
Pera,  while  their  soldiers  were  dying  like  dogs  at 
Tchatalja  and  San  Stefano.  This  is  an  awful  state- 
ment to  make,  but  it  is  the  record  of  fact.  Notices 
in  the  newspapers,  declaring  that  officers  found  in 
Constantinople  without  permission  would  be  im- 
mediately taken  before  the  Court-Martial,  had 
absolutely  no  effect. 

The  navy  failed  to  give  any  account  of  itself  to 
the  Greeks,  who  were  waiting  outside  of  the  Darda- 
nelles. Finally,  on  December  i6th,  after  the  people 
of  the  vicinity  had  openly  cursed  and  taunted  them, 
the  fleet  sailed  out  to  fight.  An  action  at  long  range 
did  little  damage  to  either  side.  The  Turkish  vessels 
refused  to  go  beyond  the  protection  of  their  forts. 
They  returned  in  the  evening  to  anchor.  The  mas- 
tery of  the  sea  remained  to  the  Greeks.  ^ 

'  In  this  connection,  it  would  be  forgetting  to  pay  tribute  to  a 
remarkable  exploit  to  omit  mention  of  the  raid  of  the  Hatnidieh 
during  the  late  winter.  One  Ottoman  officer  at  least  chafed  under 
the  disgrace  of  the  inaction  of  the  Ottoman  navy.  With  daring  and 
skill,  Captain  Reouf  bey  slipped  out  into  the  ^gean  Sea  on  the 
American-built  cruiser,  the  Hamidieh.  He  evaded  the  Greek  block- 
aders,  bombarded  some  outposts  on  one  of  the  islands,  and  sank  the 
auxiliary  cruiser,  the  Makedonia,  in  a  Greek  port.  The  Hamidieh 
next  appeared  in  the  Adriatic,  where  she  sank  several  transports,  and 
bombarded  Greek  positions  on  the  coast  of  Albania.     The  cruiser 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

If  the  army  and  the  navy  were  powerless,  how  about 
the  people  of  the  capital?  From  the  very  beginning 
of  the  war,  the  inhabitants  of  Constantinople,  Mos- 
lem as  well  as  Christian,  displayed  the  most  complete 
indifference  concerning  the  fortunes  of  the  battles. 
Even  when  the  Bulgarians  were  attacking  Tchatalja, 
the  city  took  little  interest.  Buying  and  selling  went 
on  as  usual.  There  were  few  volunteers  for  national 
defence,  but  the  cafes  were  crowded  and  the  theatres 
and  dance-halls  of  Pera  were  going  at  full  swing.  The 
refugees  came  and  camped  in  our  streets  and  in  the 
cemeteries  outside  of  the  walls.  Those  who  did  not 
die  passed  on  to  Asia.  The  wounded  arrived,  and 
crowded  our  hospitals  and  barracks.  The  cholera 
came.  The  soldiers  starved  to  death  at  San  Stefano. 
The  spirit  of  Byzantium  was  over  the  city  still.  The 
year  1913  began  as  1453  had  begun. 

The  Government  tried  to  raise  money  by  a  national 
loan.  It  could  get  none  from  Europe,  unless  it  agreed 
to  surrender  Adrianople  and  make  peace  practically 
on  the  terms  of  the  allies.  An  appeal  must  be  made 
to  the  Osmanlis.  For  how  could  the  war  be  resumed 
without  money?  There  are  many  wealthy  pashas 
at  Constantinople.  Their  palaces  line  both  shores  of 
the  Bosphorus.    They  spend  money  at  Monte  Carlo 

was  next  heard  of  at  Port  Said.  She  passed  through  the  Suez  Canal 
into  the  Red  Sea  for  a  couple  of  weeks,  and  then  returned  boldly 
into  the  Mediterranean,  although  Greek  torpedo-boats  were  lying 
in  wait.  Captain  Reouf  bey  ran  again  the  gauntlet  of  the  Greek 
fleet,  and  got  back  to  the  Dardanelles  without  mishap.  This  venture, 
undertaken  without  permission  from  the  Turkish  admiral,  had  no 
eflfect  upon  the  war.  For  it  came  too  late.  But  it  showed  what  a 
little  enterprise  and  courage  might  have  done  to  prevent  the  Turkish 
debdcle,  if  undertaken  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

20  305 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

like  water.  They  live  at  Nice,  as  they  live  at  Con- 
stantinople, like  princes — or  like  American  million- 
aires! One  of  the  sanest  and  wisest  of  Turkish 
patriots,  a  man  whom  I  have  known  and  admired, 
was  appointed  to  head  a  committee  to  wait  upon 
these  pashas,  many  of  them  married  to  princesses  of 
the  imperial  family,  and  solicit  their  contributions. 
The  scheme  was  that  the  subscribers  should  advance 
five  years  of  taxes  on  their  properties  for  the  pur- 
poses of  national  defence.  The  committee  hired  a 
small  launch,  and  spent  a  day  visiting  the  homes  of 
the  pashas.  On  their  return,  after  paying  the  rental 
of  the  launch,  they  had  about  forty  pounds  sterling! 
Was  it  not  two  million  pounds  that  was  raised  for  the 
Prince  of  Wales  Fund  recently  in  London?  Was 
not  the  French  loan  "for  national  defence,"  issued 
just  before  the  present  war,  subscribed  in  a  few  hours 
forty-three  times  over  the  large  amount  of  thirty-two 
million  pounds  asked  for? 

In  the  face  of  these  facts,  the  Young  Turks  were 
vociferous  in  their  demand  that  the  war  be  continued. 
Adrianople  must  not  be  surrendered !  Kiamil  pasha 
decided  to  call  a  "Divan,"  or  National  Assembly,  of 
the  most  important  men  in  Turkey.  They  were 
summoned  by  the  Sultan  to  meet  at  the  palace  of 
Dolma-Baghtche  on  January  22,  1913.  I  went  to  see 
what  would  happen  there.  One  would  expect  that 
the  whole  of  Constantinople  would  be  hanging  on 
the  words  of  this  council,  whose  decision  the  Cabinet 
had  agreed  to  accept.  A  half-dozen  policemen  at  the 
palace  gate,  a  vendor  of  lemonade,  two  street- 
sweepers,  an  Italian   cinematograph  photographer, 

306 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

and  a  dozen  foreign  newspaper  men — that  was  the 
extent  of  the  crowd. 

The  Divan,  after  hearing  the  exposes  of  the  Minis- 
ters of  War,  Finance,  and  Foreign  Affairs,  decided 
that  there  was  nothing,  to  discuss.  The  decision  was 
inevitable.  Peace  must  be  signed.  That  night 
Kiamil  pasha  telegraphed  to  London  to  the  Turkish 
commissioners,  directing  them  to  consent  to  the 
readition.  of  Adrianople  and  the  other'  fortresses 
which  were  still  holding  out,  and  to  make  peace  at 
the  price  of  ceding  all  the  Ottoman  territories  in 
Europe  beyond  a  line  running  from  Enos  on  the 
-^gean  Sea,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Maritza  River,  to 
Midia  on  the  Black  Sea. 

On  the  following  day,  January  23d,  a  coup  d'etat 
was  successfully  carried  out. 

Enver  bey,  the  former  "hero  of  liberty, "  who  had 
taken  a  daring  and  praiseworthy  part  in  the  revolu- 
tion of  1908,  had  been  ruined  afterwards  by  being 
appointed  military  attache  of  the  Ottoman  Embassy 
at  Berlin.  There  was  much  that  was  admirable  and 
winning  in  Enver  bey,  much  that  was  what  the 
French  call  "elevation  of  soul."  He  was  a  sincere 
patriot.  But  the  years  at  Berlin,  and  the  deadening 
influence  of  militarism  and  party  politics  mixed 
together,  had  changed  him  from  a  patriot  to  a  politi- 
cian. He  went  to  Tripoli  during  the  Italian  War, 
and  organized  a  resistance  in  Benghazi,  which  he 
announced  would  be  "as  long  as  he  lived."  But  it 
was  a  decision  d  la  Turqiie.  The  Balkan  War  found 
him  again  at  Constantinople — not  at  the  front  lead- 
ing a  company  against  the  enemy — but  at  Con- 

307 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

stantinople,  plotting  with  the  other  Young  Turks 
how  they  could  once  more  get  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment in  their  hands.  The  decision  of  the  Divan 
was  the  opportunity.  Enver  bey  led  a  small  band 
of  followers  into  the  Sublime  Porte,  and  shot  Nazim 
pasha  and  his  aide-de-camp  dead.  The  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Cabinet  were  imprisoned,  and  the  tele- 
phone to  the  palace  cut.  Enver  bey  was  driven  at 
full  speed  in  an  automobile  to  the  palace.  He 
secured  from  the  Sultan  a  firman  calling  on  Mahmud 
Shevket  pasha  to  form  a  new  Cabinet.  The  Young 
Turks  were  again  in  power. 

The  bodies  of  Nazim  pasha  and  the  aide-de-camp 
were  buried  quickly  and  secretly.  For  one  of  Enver's 
companions,  a  man  of  absolutely  no  importance,  who 
had  been  killed  by  defenders  of  Nazim,  a  great  mili- 
tary funeral  was  held. 

Mahmud  Shevket  pasha,  who  had  been  living  in 
retirement  at  Scutari  since  the  war  began,  accepted 
the  position  of  Grand  Vizier.  I  heard  him,  on  the 
steps  of  the  Sublime  Porte,  justify  the  murder  of 
Nazim  pasha,  on  the  ground  that  there  had  been  the 
intention  to  give  up  Adrianople.  The  new  Cabinet 
was  going  to  redeem  the  country,  and  save  it  from  a 
shameful  peace. 

When  the  news  of  the  coup  d'etat  reached  London, 
it  was  recognized  that  further  negotiations  were 
useless.    The  peace  conference  had  failed. 

THE  SECOND  PERIOD  OF  THE  WAR 

It  is  very  doubtful  if  Mahmud  Shevket,  Enver, 
and  their  accomplices  had   any  hope  whatever  of 

308 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

retrieving  the  fortunes  of  Turkish  arms.  They  had 
prepared  the  coup  d'etat  to  get  back  again  into  office. 
This  could  not  be  done  without  the  tacit  consent 
of  the  army.  At  the  moment  of  the  Divan  the 
army  was  stirred  up  over  the  surrender  of  Adrianople. 
It  was  the  moment  to  act.  At  any  other  time  the 
army  would  not  have  acquiesced  in  the  murder  of  its 
generalissimo.  The  Sultan's  part  in  the  plot  was  not 
clear.  His  assent  was,  however,  immediately  given. 
Living  in  seclusion,  and  knowing  practically  nothing 
of  what  was  going  on,  he  signed  the  firmans,  accept- 
ing the  resignation  of  the  Kiamil  pasha  Cabinet  and 
charging  Mahmud  Shevket  with  the  formation  of  a 
new  Cabinet,  either  by  force  or  by  playing  upon  his 
fears  of  what  might  be  his  own  fate,  should  the  agree- 
ment to  surrender  Adrianople  lead  to  a  revolution. 

On  January  29th,  the  allies  denounced  the  armis- 
tice, and  hostilities  reopened.  The  Bulgarians  at 
Tchatalja  had  strongly  entrenched  themselves,  and 
were  content  to  rest  on  the  defensive.  They  did  not 
desire  to  capture  Constantinople.  But  the  Turks 
wanted  to  relieve  Adrianople.  The  offensive  move- 
ment must  come  from  them.  The  Young  Turks  had 
killed  Nazim  pasha,  they  said,  because  they  believed 
Adrianople  could  be  saved.  The  word  was  now  to 
Mahmud  Shevket  and  Enver.  Let  them  justify 
their  action. 

Enthusiastic  speeches  were  made  at  Constan- 
tinople. We  were  told  that  the  army  at  Tchatalja 
had  moved  forward,  and  was  going  to  drive  the  Bul- 
garians out  of  Thrace.  The  Turks  did  advance  some 
kilometres,  but,  like  their  fleet  at  the  Dardanelles, 

309 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

not  beyond  the  protection  of  the  forts!  They  did 
not  dare  to  make  a  general  assault  upon  the  Bulgarian 
positions.  The  renewal  of  the  war,  as  far  as  Tcha- 
talja  was  concerned,  was  a  perfect  farce.  Every  one 
in  Constantinople  knew  that  the  army  was  not  even 
trying  to  relieve  Adrianople  by  a  forward  march 
from  Constantinople. 

Enver  bey,  who  realized  that  he  must  make 
some  move  to  justify  the  coup  d'etat  of  January  23d, 
gathered  two  army  corps  on  the  small  boats  which 
serve  the  Bosphorus  villages  and  the  Isles  of  Princes. 
It  was  his  intention  to  land  on  the  European  shore  of 
the  Dardanelles,  and  take  the  Bulgarians  in  the  rear. 
A  few  of  his  troops — the  first  that  were  sent — dis- 
embarked at  Gallipoli,  and,  co-operating  with  the 
Dardanelles  garrison,  attempted  an  offensive  move- 
ment against  the  Bulgarian  positions  at  Bulair, 
which  were  bottling  the  peninsula.  The  attack 
failed  ignominiously.  For  the  Bulgarians,  after 
dispersing  the  first  bayonet  charge  by  their  machine- 
guns,  were  not  content  to  wait  for  another  attack* 
They  scrambled  over  their  trenches,  and  attacked 
the  Turks  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The  army 
broke,  and  fled.  Some  six  thousand  Turks  were  left 
on  the  field.  The  Bulgarian  losses  were  trifling.  On 
the  same  day,  February  8th,  and  the  following  day, 
the  rest  of  Enver  bey's  forces  tried  to  land  at  several 
places  on  the  European  shore  of  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 
For  some  reason  that  has  never  been  explained,  the 
Turkish  fleet  did  not  co-operate  with  Enver  bey's 
attempted  landings.  Naturally  the  Turks  were 
mowed  down.    At  Sharkeuy  it  was  simply  slaughter. 

310 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

Three  divisions  were  butchered.  Those  few  who 
succeeded  in  getting  foot  on  shore  were  driven  into 
the  sea  and  bayoneted.  The  two  corps  were  prac- 
tically annihilated. 

After  this  exploit,  Enver  bey  returned  to  Con- 
stantinople, and  received  the  congratulations  of  the 
Grand  Vizier  whom  he  had  created,  by  a  murder,  to 
redeem  Turkey  and  recover  Adrianople. 

The  inability  to  advance  at  Tchatalja  and  at 
Bulair,  and  the  failure  to  land  troops  on  the  coasts 
of  Thrace,  entirely  immobilized  the  Turkish  armies 
during  the  second  period  of  the  war.  They  were 
content  to  sit  and  watch  the  fall  of  the  three  fortresses 
of  Janina,  Adrianople,  and  Scutari.  At  the  moment 
of  the  coup  d'etat,  I  telegraphed  that  the  whole  miser- 
able affair  was  nothing  more  than  a  party  move  of 
the  "outs"  to  oust  the  "ins. "  The  events  confirmed 
this  judgment.  Mahmud  Shevket  pasha  had  no 
other  policy  than  that  of  Kiamil  pasha  and  Nazim 
pasha.  He,  and  the  Young  Turk  party,  did  abso- 
lutely nothing  to  relieve  the  situation.  As  soon  as 
they  thought  they  were  safe  from  those  who  swore  to 
avenge  Nazim 's  death,  the}?"  began  again  negotiations 
for  peace,  and  on  exactly  the  same  terms. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Greeks,  who  had  not  signed 
the  armistice,  decided  that  they  must  take  Janina  by 
assault.  The  worst  of  the  winter  was  not  yet  over, 
but  plans  were  made  to  increase  the  small  Greek 
forces  which  had  been  practically  inactive  since  the 
siege  began.  Janina  had  never  been  completely 
invested.  When  the  Crown  Prince  arrived,  he 
planned  to  capture  the  most  troublesome  forts,  and 

311 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

from  them  to  make  untenable  the  formidable  hills 
which  commanded  the  city.  The  Greeks  followed 
the  plan  with  great  skill  and  courage.  Position  after 
position  was  taken  until  the  city  was  at  the  mercy 
of  their  artillery.  During  the  night  of  March  5th, 
Essad  pasha  sent  to  Prince  Constantine  emissaries 
to  surrender  the  city,  garrison,  and  munitions  of  war 
without  conditions. 

The  Crown  Prince  returned  to  Salonika  in  triumph. 
A  few  days  later,  the  assassination  of  King  George 
made  him  King.  From  this  time  on,  the  diplomatic 
position  of  Premier  Venizelos,  in  his  endeavour  to 
keep  within  bounds  the  military  party  which  had  the 
ear  of  the  new  King,  became  most  difficult.  Even  his 
great  genius  could  not  prevent  the  rupture  with 
Bulgaria. 

After  the  fall  of  Janina,  the  Bulgarian  general  staff 
realized  that  it  was  essential  for  them  to  force  the 
capitulation  of  Adrianople,  or  to  take  the  city  by 
assault.  As  they  had  to  keep  a  large  portion  of  their 
army  before  Tchatalja  and  Bulair,  it  was  decided 
that  forty-five  thousand  Servians,  with  their  siege 
cannon,  should  co-operate  in  the  attack  upon  Adria- 
nople. It  was  afterwards  given  by  the  Servians  as  an 
excuse  for  breaking  their  treaty  with  Bulgaria,  that 
they  had  helped  in  the  fall  of  Adrianople.  But  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  Bulgarian  army,  by 
its  maintenance  of  the  positions  at  Tchatalja  and 
Bulair,  was  rendering  service  not  to  herself  alone  but 
to  the  common  cause  of  the  allies.  Greece  and  Servia 
will  never  be  able  to  get  away  from  the  fact  that 
Bulgaria  bore  the  brunt  of  the  burden  in  the  first 

312 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

Balkan  War,  and  that  her  services  in  the  common 
cause  were  far  greater  than  those  of  either  of  her 
allies.  One  cannot  too  strongly  emphasize  the  point, 
also,  that  the  capture  and  possession  of  Adrianople 
did  not  mean  to  Bulgaria  either  from  the  practical 
or  from  the  sentimental  standpoint  what  Salonika 
meant  to  the  Greeks  and  Uskub  to  the  Servians. 
The  Servian  contingent  before  Adrianople  was  not 
helping  Bulgaria  to  do  what  was  to  be  wholly  to  the 
benefit  of  Bulgaria.  The  Servians  were  co-operating 
in  an  enterprise  that  was  to  contribute  to  the  success 
of  their  common  cause. 

Adrianople  had  been  closely  invested  ever  since  the 
battle  of  Kirk  Kilisse.  No  army  came  to  the  relief 
of  the  garrison  after  the  fatal  retreat  of  October  24th. 
The  Bulgarians  had  not  made  a  serious  effort  to 
capture  the  city  during  the  first  period  of  the  war. 
The  armistice  served  their  ends  well,  because  each 
day  lessened  the  provisions  of  the  besieged.  Inside 
the  city  Shukri  pasha  had  done  all  he  could  to  keep 
up  the  courage  of  the  inhabitants.  He  himself  was 
ignorant  of  the  real  situation  at  Constantinople. 
Perhaps  it  was  in  good  faith  that  he  assured  the 
garrison  continually  that  the  hour  of  deliverance  was 
at  hand.  By  wireless,  the  authorities  at  Constan- 
tinople, after  the  coup  d'etat  especially,  kept  assuring 
him  that  the  army  was  advancing,  and  that  it  was  a 
question  only  of  days.  So,  in  spite  of  starvation  and 
of  the  continual  rain  of  shells  upon  the  city,  he 
managed  to  maintain  the  morale  of  his  garrison.  The 
allies  finally  decided  upon  a  systematic  assault  of 
the  forts  on  all  sides  of  the  city  at  once.    In  this  way, 

313 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

the  Turks  were  not  able  to  use  their  heavy  artillery 
to  best  advantage.  Advancing  with  scissors,  the 
Bulgarians  and  Servians  cut  their  way  through  the 
tangle  of  barbed  wire.  On  the  24th  and  25th,  the 
forts  fell  one  after  the  other.  Czar  Ferdinand  entered 
the  city  with  his  troops  on  March  26th. 

It  was  at  the  moment  of  this  heroic  capture,  in 
which  there  was  glory  enough  for  all,  that  the  clouds 
of  trouble  between  Bulgaria  and  Servia  began  to 
appear  on  the  horizon.  Shukri  pasha,  following  the 
old  policy  of  the  Turks,  which  had  been  so  successful 
for  centuries  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  tried  to  surren- 
der to  the  Servian  general,  who  was  too  loyal  to 
discipline  to  fall  into  this  trap.  But  the  Servian 
newspapers  began  to  say  that  it  was  really  the  Servian 
army  who  had  captured  the  city,  and  that  Shukri 
pasha  recognized  this  fact  when  he  sent  to  find  the 
Servian  commander.  There  was  an  unedifying  duel 
of  newspapers  between  Belgrade  and  Sofia,  which 
showed  that  the  material  for  conflagration  was 
ready. 

In  the  second  period  of  the  war,  the  Servians  gave 
substantial  aid,  especially  in  artillery,  to  the  Mon- 
tenegrins, who  had  been  besieging  Scutari  ever  since 
October  15th.  I  went  over  the  mountain  of  Tarabosh 
on  horse  with  an  Albanian  who  had  been  one  of  its 
defenders.  He  related  graphically  the  story  of  the 
repeated  assaults  of  the  Montenegrins  and  Servians. 
Each  time  they  were  driven  back  before  they  reached 
those  batteries  that  dominated  Scutari  and  made 
impossible  the  entry  to  the  city  without  their  capture. 
The  loss  of  life  was  tremendous.    The  bravery  of  the 

314 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

assailants  could  do  nothing  against  the  miles  and 
miles  of  barbed  wire.  No  means  of  stopping  assault 
has  ever  proved  more  efficacious.  The  besiegers  were 
unable  to  capture  Tarabosh.  So  they  could  not  enter 
the  city. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Scutari  was  under 
the  command  of  Hassan  Riza  pasha.  In  February, 
he  was  assassinated  by  his  subordinate,  Essad  pasha, 
an  Albanian  of  the  Toptani  family,  who  had  been  a 
favourite  of  Abdul  Hamid,  and  had  had  a  rather 
questionable  career  in  the  gendarmerie  during  the 
days  of  despotism.  After  the  assassination  of  the 
Turkish  commandant,  it  was  for  Albania  and  not  for 
Turkey  that  Essad  pasha  continued  the  resistance. 
In  March,  Austria  began  to  threaten  the  Montene- 
grins, and  assure  them  that  they  could  not  keep  the 
city.  The  story  of  how  she  secured  the  agreement  of 
the  Great  Powers  in  coercing  Montenegro  is  told  in 
another  chapter.  Montenegro  was  defiant,  and  paid 
no  attention  to  an  international  blockade.  But  on 
April  13th,  the  Servians,  fearing  international  com- 
plications, withdrew  from  the  siege.  It  was  astonish- 
ing news  to  the  world  that  after  this,  on  April  22d, 
Essad  pasha  surrendered  Scutari  to  the  King  of 
Montenegro,  with  the  stipulation  that  he  could 
withdraw  with  his  garrison,  his  light  artillery,  and 
whatever  mimitions  he  might  be  able  to  take  with 
him. 

The  Ottoman  flag  had  ceased  to  wave  in  any  part 
of  Europe  except  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles. 
The  war  was  over,  whether  the  Young  Turks  would 
have  it  so  or  not.    Facts  are  facts. 

315 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

THE  TREATY  OF  LONDON 

Nazim  pasha  was  assassinated  on  January  23d. 
The  armistice  was  denounced  on  the  29th.  On 
February  loth,  Mahmud  Shevket  pasha  began  to 
sound  the  Great  Powders  for  their  intervention  in 
securing  peace.  It  was  necessary,  however,  now  that 
the  war  had  been  resumed,  that  the  impossibiHty  of 
reheving  Adrianople  be  demonstrated,  so  that  it 
might  not  continue  to  be  a  stumbHng-block  in  re- 
opening the  negotiations.  The  Great  Powers  were 
willing  to  act  as  mediators,  but  could  not  make  any 
acceptable  overture  until  after  the  fall  of  Janina  and 
Adrianople. 

On  March  23d,  they  proposed  the  following  as 
basis  for  the  renewal  of  the  negotiations  at  London : 

"l.  A  frontier  line  from  Enos  to  Midia,  which 
would  follow  the  course  of  the  Maritza,  and  the 
cession  to  the  Allies  of  all  the  territories  west  of 
that  line,  with  the  exception  of  Albania,  whose 
status  and  frontiers  would  be  decided  upon  by  the 
Powers. 

"2.  Decision  by  the  Powers  of  the  question  of 
the  -^gean  Islands. 

"3.     Abandonment  of  Crete  by  Turkey. 

"4.  Arrangement  of  all  financial  questions  at 
Paris,  by  an  international  commission,  in  which 
the  representatives  of  Turkey  and  the  allies  would 
be  allowed  to  sit.  Participation  of  the  allies  in  the 
Ottoman  Debt,  and  in  the  financial  obligations  of 
the  territories  newly  acquired.  No  indemnity  of 
war,  in  principle. 

"5.  End  of  hostilities  immediately  after  the 
acceptance  of  this  basis  of  negotiations." 

316 


BALKAN  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TURKEY 

Turkey  agreed  to  these  stipulations.  The  Balkan 
States,  however,  did  not  want  to  commit  themselves 
to  the  Enos-Midia  line  "as  definitely  agreed  upon," 
but  only  as  a  base  of  pourparlers.  They  insisted 
that  the  -^gean  Islands  must  be  ceded  directly  to 
them.  They  wanted  to  know  what  the  Powers  had 
in  mind  in  regard  to  the  frontiers  of  Albania.  In  the 
last  place,  they  refused  to  relinquish  the  possibility 
of  an  indemnity  of  war. 

Notes  were  exchanged  back  and  forth  among  the 
chancelleries  until  April  20th,  when  the  Balkan  States 
finally  agreed  to  accept  the  mediation  of  the  Powers. 
They  had  practically  carried  all  their  points,  how- 
ever, except  that  of  the  communication  of  the 
Albanian  frontier.  Hostilities  ceased.  There  really 
was  not  much  more  to  fight  about,  at  least  as  far 
as  Turkey  was  concerned. 

It  was  a  whole  month  before  the  second  conference 
at  London  opened.  The  only  gleam  of  hope  that 
the  Turks  were  justified  in  entertaining,  when  they 
decided  to  renew  the  war,  had  been  the  possible 
outbreak  of  a  war  between  the  Allies.  If  only  the 
quarrel  over  Macedonia  had  come,  for  which  they 
looked  from  week  to  week,  they  might  have  been 
able  to  put  pressure  on  Bulgaria  for  the  return  of 
Adrianople,  and  on  Greece  for  the  return  of  the 
-^gean  Islands.  But  the  rupture  between  the  Allies 
did  not  take  place  until  after  they  had  settled  with 
Turkey.  Why  fight  over  the  bear's  skin  until  it  was 
actually  in  their  hands? 

The  negotiations  were  reopened  in  London  on 
May  20th.      On  May  30th,  the  peace  preliminaries 

317 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

were  signed.  The  Sultan  of  Turkey  ceded  to  the 
Kings  of  the  allied  states  his  dominions  in  Europe 
beyond  the  Enos-Midia  line.  Albania,  its  status  and 
frontiers,  were  intrusted  by  the  Sultan  to  the  sover- 
eigns of  the  Great  Powers.  He  ceded  Crete  to  the 
allied  sovereigns,  but  left  the  decision  as  to  the 
islands  in  the  ^gean  Sea,  and  the  status  of  Mount 
Athos,  to  the  Great  Powers. 

The  war  between  the  allies  enabled  Turkey  to 
violate  this  treaty.  They  won  back  from  Bulgaria, 
without  opposition,  most  of  Thrace,  including  Adri- 
anople  and  Kirk  Kilisse.  Later,  treaties  were  made 
separately  with  each  of  the  Balkan  States.  But,  as 
it  seems  to  be  a  principle  of  history  that  no  territories 
that  have  once  passed  from  the  shadow  of  the  Cres- 
cent return,  it  is  probable  that  the  Treaty  of  London 
will,  in  the  end,  represent  the  minimum  of  what 
Turkey's  former  subjects  have  wrested  from  her. 


318 


CHAPTER  XV 
THE    RUPTURE    BETWEEN    THE    ALLIES 

TO  those  who  knew  the  centuries-old  hatred  and 
race  rivalry  between  Greece  and  Servia  and 
Bulgaria  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  an  alliance 
for  the  purpose  of  liberating  Macedonia  seemed  im- 
possible. The  Ottoman  Government  had  a  sense  of 
security  which  seemed  to  be  justifiable.  They  had 
known  how  to  keep  alive  and  intensify  racial  hatred 
in  European  Turkey,  and  believed  that  they  were 
immune  from  concerted  attack  because  the  Balkan 
States  would  never  be  able  to  agree  as  to  the  division 
of  spoils  after  a  successful  war. 

The  history  of  the  ten  years  of  rivalry  between 
bands,  which  had  nullified  the  efforts  of  the  Powers 
to  "reform"  Macedonia  by  instalHng  a  gendarmerie 
under  European  control,  had  taught  the  diplomats 
that  they  had  working  against  the  pacification  of 
Macedonia  not  only  the  Ottoman  authorities,  but 
also  the  native  Christian  population  and  the  neigh- 
bouring emancipated  countries.  They  were  ready 
to  believe  the  astute  Hussein  Hilmy  pasha,  Vali  of 
Macedonia,  when  he  said:  "I  am  ruling  over  an 
insane  asylum.     Were  the  Turkish  flag  withdrawn, 

319 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

they  would  fly  at  each  other's  throats,  and  instead 
of  reform,  you  would  have  anarchy." 

If  the  Balkan  States  had  realized  how  completely 
and  how  easily  they  were  going  to  overthrow  the 
military  power  of  Turkey,  they  probably  would  not 
have  attempted  it.  This  seems  paradoxical,  but 
it  is  true  all  the  same. 

The  Allies  did  not  anticipate  more  than  the  hold- 
ing of  the  Ottoman  forces  in  check  and  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  frontiers  and  of  the  upper  valleys  of  the 
Vardar  and  Struma.  Greece  felt  that  she  would 
be  rewarded  by  a  slight  rectification  of  boundary  in 
Thessaly  and  Epirus,  if  only  the  war  would  settle 
the  status  of  Crete  and  result  in  an  autonomous 
regime  for  the  -^gean  Islands.  At  the  most,  the 
Balkan  States  hoped  to  force  upon  Turkey  the  au- 
tonomy of  Macedonia  under  a  Christian  governor. 
So  jealous  was  each  of  the  possibility  of  another's 
gaining  control  of  Macedonia  that  this  solution 
would  have  satisfied  them  more  than  the  complete 
disappearance  of  Turkish  rule.  Both  hopes  and 
fears  as  to  Macedonia  were  envisaged  rather  in 
connection  with  each  other  than  in  connection 
with  the  Turks. 

Between  Servia  and  Bulgaria  there  was  a  definite 
treaty,  signed  on  March  13,  19 12,  which  defined 
future  spheres  of  influence  in  upper  Macedonia. 
But  Greece  had  no  agreement  either  with  Bulgaria 
or  Servia. 

The  events  of  October,  191 2,  astonished  the  whole 
world.  No  such  sudden  and  complete  collapse  of 
the  Ottoman  power  in  Europe  was  dreamed  of.     I 

320 


RUPTURE  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES 

have  already  spoken  of  how  fearful  the  European 
Chancelleries  were  of  an  Ottoman  victory.  Had 
they  not  been  so  morally  certain  of  Turkey's  triumph 
they  would  never  have  sent  to  the  belligerents  their 
famous — and  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events  ridi- 
culous— joint  note  concerning  the  status  quo. 

But  if  the  Great  Powers  were  unprepared  for  the 
succession  of  Balkan  triumphs,  the  allies  were  much 
more  astonished  at  what  they  were  able  to  accom- 
plish. Kirk  Kilisse  and  Lule  Burgas  gave  Thrace  to 
Bulgaria.  Kumanovo  opened  up  the  valley  of  the 
Vardar  to  the  Servians,  while  the  Greeks  marched 
straight  to  Salonika  without  serious  opposition. 

The  victories  of  the  Servians  and  Greeks,  so  easily 
won,  were  to  the  Bulgarians  a  calamity  which  over- 
shadowed their  own  striking  military  successes. 
They  had  spilled  much  blood  and  wasted  their 
strength  in  the  conquest  of  Thrace  which  they  did 
not  want,  while  their  allies — but  rivals  for  all  that — 
were  in  possession  of  Macedonia,  the  Bulgaria  irre- 
denta. To  be  encircling  Adrianople  and  besieging 
Constantinople,  cities  in  which  they  had  only  second- 
ary interest,  while  the  Servians  attacked  Monastir 
and  the  Greeks  were  settling  themselves  comfort- 
ably in  Salonika,  was  the  irony  of  fate  for  those  who 
felt  that  others  were  reaping  the  fruits  for  which  they 
had  made  so  great  and  so  admirable  a  sacrifice. 

When  we  come  to  judge  dispassionately  the  folly 
of  Bulgaria  in  provoking  a  war  with  her  comrades  in 
arms,  and  the  seemingly  amazing  greed  for  land 
which  it  revealed,  we  must  remember  that  the  Bul- 
garians felt  that  they  had  accomplished  everything 
21  321 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

to  receive  nothing.  Salonika  and  not  Adrianople 
was  the  city  of  their  dreams.  Macedonia  and  not 
Thrace  was  the  country  which  they  had  taken  arms 
to  Hberate.  The  ^gean  Sea  and  not  the  extension 
of  their  Black  Sea  littoral  formed  the  substantial 
and  logical  economic  background  to  the  appeal  of 
race  which  led  them  to  insist  so  strongly  in  gathering 
under  their  sovereignty  all  the  elements  of  the  Bul- 
garian people.  European  writers  have  not  been  able 
to  understand  how  little  importance  the  Bulgarians 
attached  to  their  territorial  acquisitions  in  Thrace, 
and  of  how  little  interest  it  was  for  them  to  acquire 
new  possessions  in  which  there  were  so  few  Bulgarians. 
Then,  too,  the  powerful  elements  which  had  pushed 
Bulgaria  into  the  war  with  Turkey,  and  had  contri- 
buted so  greatly  to  her  successes,  were  of  Mace- 
donian origin.  In  Sofia,  the  Macedonians  are 
numerically,  as  well  as  financially  and  politically, 
very  strong.  I  had  a  revelation  of  this,  such  as  the 
compilation  of  statistics  cannot  give,  on  the  day 
after  the  massacre  of  Kotchana.  The  newspapers 
called  upon  all  the  Macedonians  in  Sofia  to  put  out 
flags  tied  with  crepe.  In  the  main  streets  of  the 
city,  it  seemed  as  if  every  second  house  was  that  of 
a  Macedonian.  To  these  people,  ardent  and  power- 
ful patriots,  Macedonia  was  home.  It  had  been  the 
dream  of  their  lives  to  unite  the  regions  from  which 
they  had  come — once  emancipated  from  the  Turks 
— to  the  mother  country.  From  childhood,  they 
had  been  taught  to  look  towards  the  Rhodope  Mount- 
ains as  the  hills  from  which  should  come  their  help. 
Is  it  any  wonder  then,  that,  after  the  striking  victo- 

322 


RUPTURE  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES 

ries  of  their  arms,  there  should  be  a  feehng  of  insan- 
ity— for  it  was  that — when  they  saw  the  dreams  of 
a  lifetime  about  to  vanish? 

But  the  mischief  of  the  matter,  as  a  Scotchman 
would  say,  was  that  Greeks  and  Servians  felt  the 
same  way  about  the  same  places.  Populations  had 
been  mixed  for  centuries.  At  some  time  or  other 
in  past  history  each  of  the  three  peoples  had  had 
successful  dynasties  to  spread  their  sovereignty  over 
exactly  the  same  territories.  Each  then  could 
evoke  the  same  historical  memories,  each  the  same 
past  of  suffering,  each  the  same  present  of  hopes, 
and  the  same  prayers  of  the  emancipated  towards 
Sofia  and  Athens  and  Belgrade. 

After  the  occupation  of  Salonika  by  the  Greeks, 
the  Bulgarian  ambitions  to  break  the  power  of 
Turkey  were  not  the  same  as  they  had  been  before. 
Had  Salonika  been  occupied  two  weeks  earlier,  there 
might  not  have  been  a  Lule  Burgas.  An  armistice 
was  hurriedly  concluded.  During  the  trying  period 
of  negotiations  in  London,  and  during  the  whole  of 
the  second  part  of  the  war,  the  jealousies  of  the  allies 
had  been  awakened  one  against  the  other.  Between 
Greeks  and  Bulgarians,  it  had  been  keen  since  the 
very  first  moment  that  the  Greek  army  entered  Mace- 
donia. The  crisis  between  Servia  and  Bulgaria  did 
not  become  acute  until  Servia  saw  her  way  blocked  to 
the  Adriatic  by  the  absurd  attempt  to  create  a  free 
Albania.  Then  she  naturally  began  to  insist  that 
the  treaty  of  partition  which  she  had  signed  with 
Bulgaria  could  not  be  carried  out  by  her.  In  vain 
she  appealed  to  the  sense  of  justice  of  the  Bulgarians. 

323 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

The  treaty  had  been  signed  on  the  understanding 
that  Albania  would  fall  under  the  sphere  of  Servian 
aggrandizement.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  had  it 
been  contested  that  Thrace  would  belong  to  Bul- 
garia. If  the  treaty  were  carried  out,  Bulgaria 
would  get  everything  and  Servia  nothing.  Servia 
also  reminded  the  Bulgarians  of  the  loyal  aid  that 
had  been  given  them  in  the  reduction  of  Adrianople. 
But  Bulgaria  held  to  her  pound  of  flesh. 

Under  the  circumstances  of  the  division  of  ter- 
ritory, Bulgaria's  claim  to  cross  the  Vardar  and 
go  as  far  as  Monastir  and  Okrida,  would  not 
only  have  given  her  possession  of  a  fortress  from 
which  she  could  dominate  both  Servia  and  Greece, 
but  would  have  put  another  state  between  Servia 
and  Salonika.  Bulgaria  was,  in  fact,  demanding 
everything  as  far  as  Servia  was  concerned.  Servia 
cannot  be  blamed  then  for  coming  to  an  understand- 
ing with  Greece,  even  if  it  were  for  support  in  the 
violation  of  a  treaty.  For  where  does  history  give 
us  the  example  of  a  nation  holding  to  a  treaty  when 
it  was  against  her  interest  to  do  so? 

After  their  return  from  London,  the  Premiers 
Venizelos  and  Pasitch  made  an  offensive  and  defen- 
sive alliance  for  ten  years  against  the  Bulgarian 
aspirations.  In  this  alliance,  concluded  at  Athens 
shortly  after  King  George's  death,  the  frontiers 
were  definitely  settled.  In  the  negotiations,  Greece 
showed  the  same  desire  to  have  everything  for 
herself  which  Bulgaria  was  displaying.  Finally  she 
agreed  to  allow  Servia  to  keep  Monastir.  Without 
this  concession,  Servia  would  have  fared  as  badly 

324 


RUPTURE  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES 

at  the  hands  of  Greece  as  at  the  hands  of  Bulgaria. 
It  is  only  because  Greece  feared  that  Servia  might 
be  driven  to  combine  with  Bulgaria  against  her, 
that  the  frontier  in  this  agreement  was  drawn  south 
of  Monastir.  The  Greek  army  officers  opposed 
strongly  this  concession,  but  Venizelos  was  wise 
enough  to  see  that  the  maintenance  of  Greek  claims 
to  Monastir  might  result  in  the  loss  of  Salonika. 
The  Serbo-Greek  alliance  was  not  made  public  until 
the  middle  of  June.  Bulgaria  had  also  been  making 
overtures  to  Greece,  and  at  the  end  of  May  had 
expressed  her  willingness  to  waive  her  claim  to 
Salonika  in  return  for  Greek  support  against  Servia. 
Venizelos,  already  bound  to  Servia,  was  honourable 
enough  to  refuse  this  proposition. 

But  the  military  reputation  of  Bulgaria  was  still 
so  strong  in  Bulgarian  diplomacy  that  Servia  and 
Greece  were  anxious  to  arrive,  if  possible,  at  an 
arrangement  without  war.  Venizelos  proposed  a 
meeting  at  Salonika.  Bulgaria  declined.  Then 
Venizelos  and  Pasitch  together  proposed  the  arbi- 
tration of  the  Czar.  Bulgaria  at  the  first  seemed  to 
receive  this  proposition  favourably,  but  stipulated 
that  it  would  be  only  for  the  disputed  matter  in  her 
treaty  with  Servia.  At  this  moment,  the  Russian 
Czar  sent  a  moving  appeal  to  the  Balkan  States  to 
avoid  the  horrors  of  a  fratricidal  war.  Bulgaria 
then  agreed  to  send,  together  with  her  Allies,  dele- 
gates to  a  conference  at  Petrograd. 

All  the  while,  Premier  Gueshoff  of  Bulgaria  had 
been  struggling  for  peace  against  the  pressure  and 
the  intrigues  of  the  Macedonian   party  at   Sofia. 

325 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

They  looked  upon  the  idea  of  a  Petrograd  conference 
as  the  betrayal  of  Macedonians  and  Bulgarians  by 
the  mother  country.  Unable  to  maintain  his  posi- 
tion, Gueshoff  resigned.  His  withdrawal  ruined 
Bulgaria,  for  he  was  replaced  by  M.  Daneff,  who 
was  heart  and  soul  with  the  Macedonian  party.  A 
period  of  waiting  followed.  But  from  this  moment 
war  seemed  inevitable  to  those  who  knew  the  feeling 
on  both  sides.  Daneff  and  his  friends  did  not  hesi- 
tate. They  would  not  listen  to  reason.  They 
believed  that  they  had  the  power  to  force  Greece 
and  Servia  to  a  peace  very  nearly  on  their  own 
terms.  Public  opinion  was  behind  them,  for 
news  was  continually  coming  to  Sofia  of  Greek  and 
Servian  oppression  of  Bulgarians  in  the  region  be- 
tween Monastir  and  Salonika.  These  stories  of 
unspeakable  cruelty,  which  were  afterwards  estab- 
lished to  be  true  by  the  Carnegie  Commission,  had 
much  to  do  with  making  possible  the  second  war. 

It  was  not  difficult  for  the  Macedonian  party  at 
Sofia  to  precipitate  hostilities.  The  Bulgarian 
general  staff,  in  spite  of  the  caution  that  should  have 
imposed  itself  upon  them  by  the  consideration  of  the 
exhausting  campaign  in  the  winter,  felt  certain  of 
their  ability  to  defeat  the  Servians  and  Greeks  com- 
bined. Then,  too,  the  army  on  the  frontiers,  in 
which  there  was  a  large  element — perhaps  twenty 
per  cent. — of  Macedonians,  had  already  engaged  in 
serious  conflicts  with  the  Greeks. 

In  fact,  frontier  skirmishes  had  begun  in  April. 
The  affair  of  Nigrita  was  really  a  battle.  After 
these  outbreaks,  Bulgarian  and  Greek  officers  had 

326 


RUPTURE  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES 

been  compelled  to  establish  a  neutral  zone  in  order 
to  prevent  the  new  war  from  beginning  of  itself. 
At  the  end  of  May,  there  had  been  fighting  in  the 
Panghaeon  district,  east  of  the  river  Strymon.  The 
Bulgarian  staff  had  wanted  to  prevent  the  Greeks 
from  being  in  a  position  to  cut  the  railway  from 
Serres  to  Drama.  In  the  beginning  of  June,  Bul- 
garian coast  patrols  had  fired  on  the  Aver  off.  By 
the  end  of  June,  the  Bulgarian  outposts  were  not 
far  from  Salonika. 

The  first  Bulgarian  plan  was  to  seize  suddenly 
Salonika,  which  would  thus  cut  off  the  Greek  army 
from  its  base  of  supplies  and  its  advantageous  com- 
munication by  sea  with  Greece.  There  were  nearly 
one  thousand  five  hundred  Bulgarian  soldiers  in 
Salonika  under  the  command  of  General  Hassapsieff . 
How  many  comitadjis  had  been  introduced  into  the 
city  no  one  knows.  I  was  there  during  the  last 
week  of  June,  and  saw  many  Bulgarian  peasants, 
big  strapping  fellows,  who  seemed  to  have  no  occu- 
pation. Wlien  I  visited  the  Bulgarian  company, 
which  was  quartered  in  the  historic  mosque  of  St. 
Sophia,  two  days  before  their  destruction,  they 
seemed  to  me  to  be  absolutely  sure  of  their  position. 
At  this  moment,  the  atmosphere  among  the  few 
Bulgarians  in  Salonika  was  that  of  complete 
confidence. 

Among  the  Greeks,  a  spirit  of  excitement  and  of 
apprehension  made  them  realize  the  gravity  and  the 
dangers  of  the  events  which  were  so  soon  to  follow. 
Perfect  confidence,  while  highly  recommended  by  the 
theorists,   does  not  seem   to  win   wars.     Nervous- 

327 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

ness,  on  the  other  hand,  makes  an  army  alert,  and 
ready  to  exert  all  the  greater  effort,  from  the  fact 
that  it  feels  it  needs  that  effort.  In  all  the  wars  with 
which  this  book  deals  this  has  been  true, — Italian 
confidence  in  191 1,  Turkish  confidence  in  1912, 
Bulgarian  confidence  in  191 3,  and  German  confidence 
in  1914. 

On  the  29th  of  June,  when  I  left  Salonika  to  go 
to  Albania,  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  Greek  officers 
in  Salonika  that  the  war — which  they  viewed  with 
apprehension — would  be  averted  by  the  conference 
at  Petrograd.  When  I  got  on  my  steamship,  the 
first  man  I  met  was  Sandansky,  who  had  become 
famous  a  decade  before  by  the  capture  of  Miss  Stone, 
an  American  missionary.  He  had  embarked  on 
this  Austrian  Lloyd  steamer  at  Ka valla,  with  the 
expectation  of  slipping  ashore  at  Salonika,  if  possible, 
to  prepare  the  way  for  the  triumphal  entry  of  the 
Bulgarian  army.  But  he  was  only  able  to  look 
sorrowfully  out  on  the  city,  for  the  police  were 
waiting  to  arrest  him.  What  bitter  thoughts  he 
must  have  had  when  he  saw  the  Bulgarian  flag, 
which  he  had  planted  there  with  his  own  hands, 
waving  from  the  minaret  of  St.  Sophia,  and  he  un- 
able to  organize  its  defence!  A  week  later  I  saw 
Sandansky  at  a  cafe  in  Valona.  The  war  had  then 
started,  and  he  was  probably  trying  to  persuade  the 
Albanians  to  enter  the  struggle  and  to  take  the 
Servians  in  the  rear. 

Up  to  June  29th,  Servians  and  Bulgarians  were 
fraternizing  at  their  outposts,  and  joking  about  how 
soon  they  would  be  getting  back  to  their  everyday 

328 


RUPTURE  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES 

occupations,  for  which  months  of  war  and  excite- 
ment had  begun  to  unfit  them.  In  several  places 
Servians  and  Bulgarians  ate  together.  I  know  of 
one  outpost  where  the  patrols  were  photographed 
together  on  a  bridge.  Little  did  they  realize  the 
horrible  plot  that  was  being  coolly  planned  at  Sofia, 
and  which  would  cause  a  new  period  of  bloodshed 
and  destruction  in  Macedonia,  frustrate  all  the 
efforts  of  the  European  Chancelleries,  and  bring  in 
its  wake  the  world-wide  war. 


329 


CHAPTER  XVI 
THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  BALKAN  ALLIES 

ON  Sunday  night,  June  29th,  without  any  de- 
claration of  war  or  even  warning,  General 
Savoff  ordered  a  general  attack  all  along 
the  Greek  and  Servian  lines.  There  was  no  direct 
provocation  on  the  part  of  Bulgaria's  allies. 

The  responsibility  for  precipitating  the  war  which 
brought  about  the  humiliation  of  Bulgaria  can  be 
directly  fixed.  Two  general  orders,  dated  from  the 
military  headquarters  at  Sofia  on  June  29th,  have 
been  published.  They  set  forth  an  amazing  and 
devilish  scheme,  which  stands  out  as  a  most  cold 
and  bloody  calculation,  even  among  all  the  horrors 
of  Balkan  history.  General  Savoff  stated  positively 
that  this  energetic  action  was  not  the  commence- 
ment of  a  war.  It  was  merely  for  the  purpose  of 
occupying  as  much  territory  as  possible  in  the  con- 
tested regions  before  the  intervention  of  the  Powers. 
It  had  a  two-fold  object :  to  cut  the  communications 
between  the  Greek  and  Servians  at  Veles  (Kuprulu) 
on  the  Vardar,  and  to  throw  an  army  suddenly  into 
Salonika.  The  fighting  began  in  the  night-time. 
The  Bulgarians  naturally  were  able  to  advance  into 
a  number  of  important  positions. 

330 


v;ar  between  the  balkan  allies 

When  the  news  became  known  at  Salonika  on  the 
morning  of  the  30th,  General  Hassapsieff,  on  the 
ground  that  he  was  a  diplomatic  agent,  was  allowed 
to  leave.  Before  his  departure  he  gave  an  order  to 
his  forces  to  resist,  if  they  were  attacked,  as  he  would 
return  with  the  Bulgarian  army  in  twenty-four 
hours. 

Early  in  the  afternoon  the  Greeks  sent  an  ulti- 
matum ordering  the  Bulgarians  in  Salonika  to  sur- 
render by  six  o'clock.  Their  refusal  led  to  all-night 
street  fighting.  Barricaded  in  St.  Sophia  and  several 
other  buildings,  they  were  able  to  defend  themselves 
until  the  Greeks  turned  artillery  upon  their  places  of 
refuge.  Not  many  were  killed  on  either  side.  Salo- 
nika was  calm  again  the  next  day.  One  thousand 
three  hundred  Bulgarian  soldiers  and  a  number  of 
prominent  Bulgarian  residents  of  Salonika,  under  con- 
ditions of  exceptional  cruelty  and  barbarism,  were 
sent  to  Crete.  The  Greek  forces  in  Salonika,  among 
whom  were  some  twenty  thousand  from  America, 
were  hurried  to  the  outposts  for  the  defence  of  the 
city. 

There  was  no  diplomatic  action  following  the 
treachery  of  the  Bulgarians  towards  their  allies. 
The  Greek  Foreign  Minister  stated  that  Greece 
considered  the  Bulgarian  attack  an  act  of  war,  and 
that  the  Greek  army  had  been  ordered  to  advance 
immediately  to  retake  the  positions  which  the  Bul- 
garians had  captured.  Nor  did  Servia  show  any 
disposition  to  treat  with  Bulgaria.  No  official 
communications  reached  Sofia  from  a  Great  Power. 
There   had   been   a   miscalculation.     Bulgaria   was 

331 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

compelled,  as  a  consequence  of  her  ill-considered 
act,  to  face  a  new  war.  There  was  no  withdrawal 
possible. 

From  a  purely  military  point  of  view,  it  seems 
hard  to  believe  that  the  Bulgarians  really  thought 
that  their  night  attack  would  bring  about  war.  Their 
army  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  campaign  against 
the  Turks,  and  had  suffered  terribly  during  the 
winter  spent  in  the  trenches  before  Tchatalja. 
They  were  not  in  a  good  strategic  position,  for  the 
army  was  spread  out  over  a  long  line,  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  country  made  concentration  difficult. 
Adequate  railway  communication  with  the  bases  of 
supplies  was  lacking.  The  Greeks  and  Servians, 
on  the  other  hand,  held  not  only  the  railway  from 
Salonika  to  Nish  through  the  valley  of  the  Vardar, 
but  even  were  it  successfully  cut,  had  communication 
by  railway  with  their  bases  at  Salonika,  Monastir, 
Mitrovitza,  Uskub,  and  Nish. 

General  Ivanoff,  in  command  of  the  second  Bul- 
garian army,  was  charged  with  confronting  the  whole 
of  the  Greek  forces,  in  a  line  passing  from  the  -^gean 
Sea  to  Demir-Hissar  on  the  Vardar,  between  Serres 
and  Salonika.  When  we  realize  that  General 
Ivanoff  had  less  than  fifty  thousand  men,  a  portion 
of  whom  were  recruits  from  the  region  of  Serres, 
and  that  he  had  to  guard  against  an  attack  on  his 
right  flank  from  the  Servians,  we  cannot  help  won- 
dering what  the  Bulgarian  general  staff  had  counted 
upon  in  provoking  their  allies  to  battle.  Did  they 
expect  that  the  Greeks  and  Servians  would  be  intimi- 
dated by  the  night  attack  of  June  29th,  and  would 

332 


WAR  BETWEEN  THE  BALKAN  ALLIES 

agree  to  continue  the  project  of  a  conference  at 
Petrograd?  Or  did  they  think  that  the  Greek  army 
was  of  so  little  value  that  they  could  brush  it  aside, 
and  enter  Salonika,  just  as  the  Greeks  had  been  able  to 
enter  in  November?  Whatever  hypothesis  we  adopt, 
it  shows  contempt  for  their  opponents  and  belief 
in  their  own  star.  The  proof  of  the  fact  that  the 
Bulgarians  never  dreamed  of  anything  but  the  suc- 
cess of  their  "bluff,"  or,  if  there  was  resistance,  of  an 
easy  victory,  is  found  in  the  few  troops  at  the  dis- 
posal of  General  Ivanoff ,  and  in  the  choice  of  Doiran, 
so  near  the  front  of  battle,  as  the  base  of  supplies. 
At  Doiran  everything  that  the  second  army  needed 
in  provisions  and  munitions  of  war  was  stored. 
From  the  financial  standpoint  alone,  Bulgaria  could 
not  afford  to  risk  the  loss  of  these  supplies. 

On  July  2d,  the  Greek  army,  under  the  command  of 
Crown  Prince  Constantine,  took  the  offensive  against 
the  Bulgarians,  who  had  occupied  on  the  previous 
day  the  crest  of  Beshikdag,  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Struma  to  the  plateau  of  Lahana,  across  the  road 
from  Salonika  to  Serres,  and  the  heights  north  of 
Lake  Ardzan,  commanding  the  left  bank  of  the 
Vardar.  The  positions  were  strong.  If  the  Greek 
army  had  been  of  the  calibre  that  the  Bulgarians 
evidently  expected,  or  if  General  IvanofT  had  had 
sufficient  forces  to  hold  the  positions  against  the 
Greek  attack,  there  would  undoubtedly  have  been 
pourparlers,  and  a  probable  cessation  of  hostilities 
just  as  the  Bulgarians  counted  upon. 

But  the  Greeks  soon  proved  that  they  were  as 
brave  and  as  determined  as  their  opponents.     Their 

333 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

artillery  fire  was  excellent.  There  was  no  wavering 
before  the  deadly  resistance  of  the  entrenched  Bul- 
garians. After  five  days  of  struggle,  in  which  both 
sides  showed  equal  courage,  the  forces  of  General 
Ivanoff  yielded  to  superior  numbers.  The  Bulga- 
rians were  compelled  to  retreat,  on  July  6th,  in 
two  columns,  towards  Demir-Hissar  and  Strumitza. 
The  retreat  was  effected  in  good  order,  and  the 
Greeks,  though  in  possession  of  mobile  artillery, 
could  not  surround  either  column.  Victory  had 
been  purchased  at  a  terrible  price.  The  Greek 
losses  in  five  days  were  greater  than  during  the  whole 
war  with  Turkey.  They  admitted  ten  thousand 
hors  du  combat.  The  Greeks  had  received  their  first 
serious  baptism  of  fire,  and  had  demonstrated  that 
they  could  fight.  The  Turks  had  never  given  them 
the  opportunity  to  wipe  out  the  disgrace  of  1897. 

It  is  a  tribute  to  the  quickness  of  decision  of  the 
Crown  Prince  Constantine  and  his  general  staff, 
and  to  the  spirit  of  his  soldiers,  that  this  severe  trial 
of  five  days  of  continuous  fighting  and  fearful  loss 
of  life  was  not  followed  by  a  respite.  The  Greek 
headquarters  were  moved  to  Doiran  on  the  7th. 
It  was  decided  to  maintain  the  offensive  as  long  as 
the  army  had  strength  to  march  and  men  to  fill  the 
gaps  made  by  the  fall  of  thousands  every  day.  The 
Bulgarians,  although  they  contested  desperately 
every  step,  were  kept  on  the  move.  On  the  right, 
the  Greeks  pushed  through  to  Serres,  joining  there, 
on  July  nth,  the  advance-guard  of  the  detachments 
which  the  Greek  fieet  had  landed  at  Kavalla  on  the 
9th. 

334 


WAR  BETWEEN  THE  BALKAN  ALLIES 

The  advance  of  the  Greek  armies  was  along  the 
Vardar,  the  Struma,  and  the  Mesta.  On  the  Vardar, 
the  Bulgarian  abandonment  of  Demir-Hissar,  on  the 
loth,  enabled  the  Greeks  to  repair  the  railway,  and 
establish  communication  with  the  Servian  army. 
The  right  wing,  advancing  by  the  Mesta,  occupied 
Drama.  On  July  19th,  the  Bulgarian  resistance  was 
concentrated  at  Nevrokop.  When  it  broke  here, 
the  Greek  right  wing  was  able  to  send  its  outposts 
to  the  foothills  of  the  Rhodope  Mountains,  on  the 
Bulgarian  frontier. 

The  Greeks  began  to  speak  of  the  invasion  of 
Bulgaria,  and  of  making  peace  at  Sofia.  But  the 
bulk  of  their  forces  met  an  invincible  resistance  at 
Simitli.  From  the  23d  to  the  26th,  they  attacked 
the  Bulgarian  positions,  and  believed  that  the  ad- 
vantage was  theirs.  But  on  the  27th  the  Bulgarians 
began  a  counter-attack  against  both  wings  of  the 
Greek  army  at  once.  On  the  29th,  the  Greeks  began 
to  plan  their  retreat.  On  the  30th,  they  realized 
that  the  retreat  was  no  longer  possible.  The  Bul- 
garians were  on  both  their  flanks.  It  was  then  that 
the  armistice  saved  them. 

While  the  Greek  army  was  gaining  its  victories 
in  the  hinterland  of  Macedonia,  the  ports  of  the 
^gean  coast,  Kavalla,  Makri,  Porto-Lagos,  and 
Dedeagatch  were  occupied  without  resistance  by  the 
Greek  fleet.  Detachments  withdrawn  from  Epirus 
were  brought  to  these  ports.  Some  went  to  Serres 
and  Drama.  Others  garrisoned  the  ports,  and  occu- 
pied Xanthi  and  other  nearby  inland  towns. 

The  Bulgarians  may  have  had  some  reason  to 

335 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

discount  the  value  of  the  Greek  army.  For  it  had 
not  yet  been  tried.  But  the  Servians  had  shown 
from  the  very  first  day  of  the  war  with  Turkey  that 
they  possessed  high  miHtary  qualities.  The  courage 
of  their  troops  was  coupled  with  agility.  They  had 
had  more  experience  than  the  Bulgarians  and  Greeks 
in  quick  marches,  and  in  breaking  up  their  forces 
into  numerous  columns.  There  is  probably  no  army 
in  Europe  to-day  which  can  equal  the  Servians  in 
mobility.  It  is  incredible  that  the  Bulgarians  could 
have  hoped  to  surprise  the  Servians,  and  find  a  weak 
place  anywhere  along  their  lines.  On  the  defensive, 
in  localities  which  they  had  come  to  know  intimately 
by  nine  months  in  the  field,  it  would  have  taken  a 
larger  force  than  the  Bulgarians  could  muster  to 
get  the  better  of  soldiers  such  as  the  Servians  had 
proved  themselves  to  be. 

Whether  it  was  by  scorn  for  the  Greeks,  or  by 
appreciation  of  the  Servian  concentration,  the  Bul- 
garians had  planned  to  confront  the  Servians  with 
four  of  their  five  armies.  We  have  already  seen 
that  General  Ivanoff  had  the  second  army  alone  to 
oppose  to  the  Greeks,  and  that  even  a  few  battalions 
of  his  troops  were  needed  on  the  Servian  flank. 

The  engagements  between  the  Bulgarians  and 
the  Servians  had  two  distinct  fields  of  action,  one 
in  Macedonia,  and  the  other  on  the  Bulgaro-Servian 
frontier. 

In  Macedonia,  the  Bulgarians  experienced  the 
same  surprise  in  regard  to  the  Servians  as  in  regard 
to  the  Greeks.  Their  sudden  attack  of  June  30th 
did  not  strike  terror  to  the  hearts  of  their  opponents. 

336 


WAR  BETWEEN  THE  BALKAN  ALLIES 

Instead  of  gaining  for  them  a  favourable  diplomatic 
position,  they  found  that  the  Servians  did  not  even 
suggest  a  parley.  On  July  ist,  the  Servians  started 
a  counter-attack,  and  kept  a  steady  offensive  against 
their  former  allies  for  eight  days.  Gradually  the 
Bulgarians,  along  the  Bregalnitza,  gave  ground, 
retreating  from  position  to  position,  always  with 
their  face  towards  the  enemy.  The  battle,  after  the 
first  day,  was  for  the  Bulgarians  a  defensive  action 
all  along  the  line. 

On  July  4th,  General  Dimitrieff  assumed  the 
functions  of  generalissimo  of  the  Bulgarian  forces. 
He  tried  his  best  to  check  the  Servian  offensive. 
But  the  aggressive  spirit  had  gone  out  of  the  Bul- 
garian army.  Lule  Burgas  could  not  be  repeated. 
It  was  incapable  of  more  than  a  stubborn  resistance 
to  the  Servian  advance.  By  July  8th,  the  Servians 
were  masters  of  the  approaches  to  Istip,  and  had 
cleared  the  Bulgarians  out  of  the  territory  which 
led  down  into  the  valley  of  the  Vardar.  Then  they 
stopped.  From  this  time  on  to  the  signing  of  the 
armistice,  the  Macedonian  Servian  army  was  content 
with  the  victories  of  the  first  week. 

Along  the  Servian-Bulgarian  frontier,  the  Bul- 
garian army  had  some  initial  success.  But  General 
Kutincheff  did  not  dispose  of  enough  men  to  make 
possible  a  successful  aggressive  movement  towards 
Nish.  From  the  very  first,  when  the  Macedonian 
army  failed  to  advance,  the  Bulgarians'  plans  of 
an  invasion  of  Servia  fell  to  the  ground.  They  had 
based  everything  upon  an  advance  in  Macedonia 
to  the  Vardar.     So  the  forward  movement  wavered. 

337 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

The  Servians,  now  sure  of  Rumanian  co-operation, 
advanced  in  turn  towards  Widin.  General  Kutin- 
cheff  was  compelled  to  fall  back  on  Sofia  by  the 
Rumanian  invasion.  Widin  was  invested  by  the 
Servians  on  July  23d. 

Rumania  had  watched  with  alarm  the  rise  of  the 
military  power  of  Bulgaria.  She  could  not  inter- 
vene in  the  first  Balkan  war  on  the  side  of  the  Turks. 
The  civilized  world  would  not  have  countenanced 
such  a  move,  nor  would  it  have  had  the  support  of 
Rumanian  public  opinion.  Whatever  the  menace 
of  Bulgarian  hegemony  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula, 
Rumania  had  to  wait  until  peace  had  been  signed 
between  the  allies  and  the  Turks.  But,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  during  the  first  negotiations  at  London, 
her  Minister  to  Great  Britain  had  been  instructed 
to  treat  with  Bulgaria  for  a  cession  of  territory  from 
the  Danube  at  Silistria  to  the  Black  Sea,  in  order 
that  Rumania  might  have  the  strategic  frontier 
which  the  Congress  of  Berlin  ought  to  have  given 
her,  when  the  Dobrudja  was  awarded  to  her,  without 
her  consent,  in  exchange  for  Bessarabia.  As  Ruma- 
nia had  helped  to  free  Bulgaria  in  1877-78,  and  had 
never  received  any  reward  for  her  great  sacrifices, 
while  the  Bulgarians  had  done  little  to  win  their 
own  independence,  the  demand  of  a  rectification 
of  frontier  was  historically  reasonable.  Since  Ru- 
mania had  so  admirably  developed  the  Dobrudja, 
and  had  constructed  the  port  of  Constanza,  it  was 
justified  from  the  economic  standpoint.  For  the 
possession  of  Silivria,  and  a  change  of  frontier  on 
the  Dobrudja,  was  the  only  means  by  which  Ru- 

338 


WAR  BETWEEN  THE  BALKAN  ALLIES 

mania  could  hope  to  defend  her  southern  frontier 
from  attack. 

At  first,  the  Bulgarians  bitterly  opposed  any 
compensation  to  Rumania.  They  discounted  the 
importance  of  her  neutrality,  for  they  knew  that 
she  could  not  act  against  them  as  long  as  they  were 
at  war  with  Turkey.  They  denounced  the  demands 
of  Rumania,  perfectly  reasonable  as  they  were,  as 
"blackmail."  They  were  too  blinded  with  the 
dazzling  glory  of  their  unexpected  victories  against 
the  Turks  to  realize  how  essential  the  friendship 
of  Rumania — at  least,  the  neutrality  of  Rumania — 
was  to  their  schemes  for  taking  all  Macedonia  to 
themselves.  When,  in  April,  they  signed  with 
very  ill  grace  the  cession  of  Silivria,  as  a  compromise, 
and  refused  to  yield  the  small  strip  of  territory  from 
Silivria  to  Kavarna  on  the  Black  Sea,  the  Bulgarians 
made  a  fatal  political  mistake.  It  was  madness 
enough  to  go  into  the  second  Balkan  war  in  the 
belief  that  they  could  frighten,  or,  if  that  failed,  over- 
whelm the  Servians  and  Greeks.  What  shall  we 
call  the  failure  to  take  into  their  political  calcula- 
tions the  possibility  of  a  Rumanian  intervention? 
Even  if  there  were  not  the  question  of  the  fron- 
tier in  the  Dobrudja,  would  not  Rumanian  inter- 
vention still  be  justified  by  the  consideration  of 
preserving  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Balkans? 
By  intervening,  Rumania  would  be  acting,  in  her 
small  comer  of  the  world,  just  as  the  larger  nations 
of  Europe  had  acted  time  and  again  since  the  six- 
teenth century. 

The  Rumanian  mobilization  commenced  on  July 

339 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

3d.  On  July  loth,  Rumania  declared  war,  and 
crossed  the  Danube.  The  Bulgarians  decided  that 
they  would  not  oppose  the  Rumanian  invasion. 
How  could  they?  Already  their  armies  were  on  the 
defensive,  and  hard  pressed,  by  Greeks  and  Servians. 
There  is  a  limit  to  what  a  few  hundred  thousand  men 
could  do.  It  is  possible,  though  not  probable,  that 
the  Bulgarian  armies  might  have  gained  the  upper 
hand  in  the  end  against  their  former  allies  in  Mace- 
donia. But  with  Rumania  bringing  into  the  field 
a  fresh  army,  larger  than  that  of  any  other  Balkan 
States,  Bulgaria's  case  was  hopeless.  The  Ruma- 
nians advanced  without  opposition,  and  began  to 
march  upon  Sofia.  They  occupied,  on  July  15th, 
the  seaport  of  Varna,  from  which  the  Bulgarian 
fleet  had  withdrawn  to  Sebastopol. 

It  would  have  been  easy  for  the  Rumanians  to 
have  occupied  Sofia,  and  waited  there  for  the  Servian 
and  Greek  armies  to  arrive.  The  humiliation  of 
Bulgaria  could  have  been  made  complete.  Why, 
then,  the  armistice  of  July  30th?  Why  the  assem- 
bling hastily  of  a  peace  conference  at  Bukarest? 
Political  and  financial,  as  well  as  military,  considera- 
tions dictated  the  wisdom  of  granting  to  Bulgaria 
an  armistice. 

Greece  and  Servia  were  exhausted  financially, 
and  their  armies  could  gain  little  more  than  glory 
by  continuing  the  war.  The  Greek  army,  in  fact, 
was  in  a  critical  position,  and  ran  the  risk  of  being 
surrounded  and  crushed  by  the  Bulgarians.  The 
Servians  had  not  shown  much  hurry  to  come  to  the 
aid  of  the  Greeks.     The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that, 

340 


WAR  BETWEEN  THE  BALKAN  ALLIES 

after  the  battle  of  the  Bregalnitza,  which  ended  on 
July  loth,  the  Servians  began  to  get  very  nervous 
about  the  successes  of  their  Greek  allies.  They 
knew  well  the  Greek  character,  and  feared  that  too 
easy  victories  over  the  Bulgarians  might  necessitate 
a  third  war  with  Greece  over  Monastir.  So,  on 
July  nth,  with  the  ostensible  reason  that  such  a 
measure  was  necessary  to  protect  their  rear  against 
the  Albanians,  the  Servian  general  staff  withdrew 
from  the  front  a  number  of  the  best  regiments,  and 
placed  them  in  a  position  where  they  could  act,  if 
the  Greeks  tried  to  seize  Monastir.  On  the  other 
hand,  Rumania  gave  both  Greece  and  Servia  to 
understand  that  she  had  entered  the  war,  not  from 
any  altruistic  desire  to  help  them,  but  for  her  own 
interests.  To  see  Bulgaria  too  greatly  humiliated 
and  weakened  was  decidedly  no  more  to  the  interest 
of  Rumania  than  to  see  her  triumphant. 

As  for  Montenegro,  she  had  entered  the  second 
Balkan  war  to  give  loyal  support  to  Servia,  from 
whom  she  expected  in  return  a  generous  spirit  in 
dividing  the  sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar.  Her  co-opera- 
tion, however,  as  I  am  able  to  state  from  having 
been  in  Cettinje  when  the  decision  was  taken  to  send 
ten  thousand  men  against  Bulgaria,  was  not  made 
the  subject  of  any  bargain.  So,  when  Servia  thought 
best  to  sign  the  armistice,  Montenegro  was  in 
thorough  accord. 

After  a  month  of  fighting,  in  which  the  losses  had 
been  far  greater  than  during  the  war  with  Turkey, 
and  the  treatment  of  non-combatants  by  all  the 
armies   horrible   beyond   description,    the   scene   of 

341 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

battle  shifted  from  the  blood-stained  mountains 
and  valleys  of  Macedonia  to  the  council  chamber  at 
Bukarest.  Rumania  was  to  preside  over  a  Balkan 
Congress  of  Berlin! 


342 


CHAPTER  XVII 
THE  TREATY  OF  BUKAREST 

WHEN  the  delegates  from  the  various  im- 
portant capitals  reached  Bukarest  on 
July  30th,  the  armies  were  still  fighting. 
Everyone,  however,  seemed  anxious  to  come  to  an 
understanding  as  soon  as  possible.  The  first  session 
of  the  delegates  was  held  on  the  afternoon  of  July 
30th.  Premier  Pasitch  for  Servia  and  Premier 
Venizelos  for  Greece  were  present.  But  Premier 
Daneff,  who  had  so  wanted  the  war,  did  not  have  the 
manhood  to  face  its  consequences.  The  Bulgarians 
were  represented  in  Bukarest  by  no  outstanding 
leader,  either  political  or  military.  Premier  Majo- 
resco  of  Rumania  presided  over  the  conference. 
The  first  necessity  was  the  decision  for  an  armistice. 
A  suspension  of  arms  was  agreed  upon  to  begin 
upon  July  1st  at  noon.  On  August  4th  the  armistice 
was  extended  for  three  days  to  August  8th. 

In  the  conference  of  Bukarest,  Bulgaria,  naturally, 
stood  by  herself.  It  was  necessary,  if  there  was  to 
be  peace,  that  her  delegates  should  come  to  an  under- 
standing as  to  the  sacrifices  she  was  willing  to  make 
with   each   of   her   neighbours   separately.     Conse- 

343 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

quently  the  important  decisions  were  made  in  com- 
mittee meetings.  The  general  assembly  of  delegates 
had  little  else  to  do  than  to  ratify  the  concessions 
wrimg  from  Bulgaria  in  turn  by  each  of  the  opponents. 

Rarely  have  peace  delegates  been  put  in  a  more 
painful  position  than  the  men  whom  Bulgaria  sent 
to  Bukarest.  It  will  always  be  an  open  question  as 
to  whether  the  military  situation  of  Bulgaria  on  the 
31st  of  July,  as  regards  Servia  and  Greece,  was  re- 
trievable. But  the  presence  of  a  Rumanian  army  in 
Bulgaria  made  absolutely  impossible  the  continu- 
ance of  the  war.  Consequently  there  was  nothing 
for  Bulgaria  to  do  but  to  yield  to  the  demands  of 
Greece  and  Servia.  The  only  check  upon  the  Ser- 
vian and  Greek  delegates  was  the  determination  of 
Rumania  not  to  see  Bulgaria  too  greatly  weakened. 
She  had  entered  into  line  to  gain  her  bit  of  territory 
in  the  south  of  the  Dobrudja.  But  she  had  also 
in  mind  the  prevention  of  Bulgarian  hegemony  in 
the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  she  did  not  propose  to 
see  this  hegemony  go  elsewhere.  This  explains  the 
favourable  terms  which  Bulgaria  received. 

The  Bulgarian  and  Rumanian  delegates  quickly 
agreed  upon  a  frontier  to  present  to  the  meeting  of 
August  4th.  By  this,  the  first  of  the  protocols, 
Bulgaria  ceded  to  Rumania  all  her  territory  north 
of  a  line  from  the  Danube,  above  Turtukaia,  to  the 
end  of  the  Black  Sea,  south  of  Ekrene.  In  addition, 
she  bound  herself  to  dismantle  the  present  fortresses 
and  promised  not  to  construct  forts  at  Rustchuk, 
Schumla,  and  the  country  between  and  for  twenty 
kilometres  around  Baltchik. 

344 


THE  TREATY  OF  BUKAREST 

On  August  6th,  the  protocol  with  Servia  was  pre- 
sented. The  Servian  frontier  was  to  start  at  a  line 
drawn  from  the  summit  of  Patarika  on  the  old 
frontier,  and  to  follow  the  watershed  between  the 
Vardar  and  the  Struma  to  the  Greek- Bulgarian 
frontier,  with  the  exception  of  the  upper  valley  of 
the  Strumnitza  which  remained  Servian  territory. 

The  following  day  the  protocol  with  Greece  was 
presented.  The  Greek-Bulgarian  frontier  was  to 
run  from  the  crest  of  Belashitcha  to  the  mouth  of 
the  River  Mesta  on  the  ^gean  Sea.  Bulgaria  for- 
mally agreed  to  waive  all  pretensions  to  Crete.  The 
protocol  with  the  Greeks  was  the  only  one  over  which 
the  Bulgarians  made  a  resolute  stand.  When  they 
signed  this  protocol,  they  stated  that  the  accord 
was  only  because  they  had  taken  notice  of  the  notes 
which  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  presented  to 
the  conference,  to  the  effect  that  in  their  ratification 
they  would  reserve  for  future  discussion  the  inclusion 
of  Kavalla  in  Greek  territory. 

The  Bulgarians  insisted  on  a  clause  guarantee- 
ing autonomy  for  churches  and  schools  in  the  con- 
dominium of  liberated  territories.  Servia  opposed 
this  demand  mildly,  and  Greece  strongly.  They  were 
right.  The  question  of  national  propaganda  through 
churches  and  schools  had  done  more  to  arouse  and 
keep  alive  racial  hatred  in  Macedonia  than  any 
other  cause.  If  there  were  to  be  a  lasting  peace, 
nothing  could  be  more  unwise  than  the  continuance 
of  the  propaganda  which  had  plunged  Macedonia 
into  such  terrible  confusion. 

Rumania,    however,    secured    in    the    Treaty    of 

345 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Bukarest  from  each  of  the  States  what  they  had  been 
unwilling  to  grant  each  other.  Rumania  imposed 
upon  Bulgaria,  Greece,  and  Servia,  the  obligation 
of  granting  autonomy  to  the  Kutzo-Wallachian 
churches,  and  assent  to  the  creation  of  bishoprics 
subsidized  by  the  Rumanian  Government. 

A  rather  amusing  incident  occurred  on  August 
5th  by  the  proposition  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment through  its  Minister  at  Bukarest,  that  a  pro- 
vision be  embodied  in  the  treaty  according  full 
religious  liberties  in  transferred  territories.  The 
ignorance  of  American  diplomacy,  so  frequently  to 
be  deplored,  never  made  a  greater  blunder  than 
this.  It  showed  how  completely  the  American 
State  Department  and  its  advisors  on  Near  Eastern 
affairs  had  misunderstood  the  Macedonian  question. 
Quite  rightly,  the  consideration  even  of  this  request 
was  rejected  as  superfluous.  Mr.  Venizelos  ad- 
ministered a  well-deserved  rebuke  when  he  said  that 
religious  liberty,  in  the  right  sense  of  the  word,  was 
understood  through  the  extension  of  each  country's 
constitution  over  the  territories  acquired. 

Much  has  been  written  concerning  the  intrigues 
of  European  Powers  at  Bukarest  during  the  ten 
days  of  the  conference  which  made  a  new  map  for 
the  Balkan  Peninsula.  It  will  be  many  years,  if 
ever,  before  these  intrigues  are  brought  to  light. 
Therefore  we  cannot  discuss  the  question  of  the 
pressure  which  was  brought  to  bear  upon  Rumania, 
upon  Bulgaria,  and  upon  Servia  and  Greece  to  de- 
termine the  partition  of  territories.  Germany 
looked  with  alarm  upon  the  possibility  of  a  durable 

346 


THE  TREATY  OF  BUKAREST 

settlement.  Austria  was  determined  that  Bulgaria 
and  Servia  should  not  become  reconciled. 

Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  though  for  different 
reasons,  were  right  in  their  attitude  toward  the 
matter  of  Greece's  claim  upon  Ka valla.  Greece 
would  have  done  well  had  she  been  content  to  leave 
to  Bulgaria  a  larger  littoral  on  the  ^gean  Sea,  and 
the  port  which  is  absolutely  essential  for  the  proper 
economic  development  of  the  hinterland  attributed 
to  her.  By  taking  her  pound  of  flesh,  the  Greeks 
only  exposed  themselves  to  future  dangers.  The 
laws  of  economics  are  inexorable.  Bulgaria  cannot 
allow  herself  to  think  sincerely  about  peace  until  her 
portion  of  Macedonia,  by  the  inclusion  of  Kavalla, 
is  logically  complete.  It  would  have  been  better 
politics  for  Greece  to  have  shown  herself  magnani- 
mous on  this  point.  As  George  Sand  has  so  aptly 
said:  "It  is  not  philanthropy,  but  our  own  interest, 
which  leads  us  sometimes  to  do  good  to  men  in  order 
that  they  may  be  prevented  in  the  future  from  doing 
harm  to  us." 

When  we  come  to  look  back  upon  the  second 
Balkan  war,  and  have  traced  out  the  sad  conse- 
quences and  the  continued  unrest  which  followed  the 
Treaty  of  Bukarest,  it  is  possible  that  Servia's  re- 
sponsibility may  be  considered  as  great,  if  not  greater, 
than  that  of  Bulgaria  in  bringing  about  the  strife 
between  the  allies.  In  our  sympathy  with  the  in- 
herent justice  of  Servia's  claim  for  adequate  terri- 
torial compensation  for  what  she  had  suffered  for, 
and  what  she  had  contributed  to,  the  Turkish  de- 
bdcle  in  Europe,  we  are  apt  to  overlook  three  indis- 

347 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

putable  facts:  that  Servia  repudiated  a  solemn 
treaty  with  Bulgaria,  on  the  basis  of  which  Bulgaria 
had  agreed  to  the  alliance  against  Turkey;  that  the 
territories  granted  to  Servia,  south  of  the  line  which 
she  had  sworn  not  to  pass  in  her  territorial  claims, 
and  a  portion  of  those  in  the  "contested  zone"  of 
her  treaty  with  Bulgaria,  were  beyond  any  shadow 
of  doubt  inhabited  by  Bulgarians;  and  that  since 
these  territories  were  ceded  to  her  she  has  not,  as 
was  tacitly  understood  at  Bukarest,  extended  to 
them  the  guarantees  and  privileges  of  the  Servian 
constitution. 

The  Treaty  of  Bukarest,  so  far  as  the  disputed 
territories  allotted  to  Servia  are  concerned,  has 
created  a  situation  analogous  to  that  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  after  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.  And  Servia 
started  in  to  cope  with  it  by  following  Prussian 
methods.  What  Servians  of  Bosnia  and  Herzego- 
vina and  Dalmatia  have  suffered  from  Austrian  rule, 
free  Servia  is  inflicting  upon  the  Bulgarians  who 
became  her  subjects  after  the  second  Balkan  war. 

It  would  not  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  the 
population  of  Macedonia,  as  a  whole,  of  whatever 
race  or  creed,  would  welcome  to-day  a  return  to 
the  Ottoman  rule  of  Abdul  Hamid.  The  Turkish 
"constitutional  regime^*  was  worse  than  Abdul 
Hamid,  the  war  of  "liberation"  worse  than  the 
Young  Turks,  and  the  present  disposition  of  terri- 
tories satisfies  none.     Poor  Macedonia! 

After  the  disastrous  and  humiliating  losses  at 
Bukarest,  Bulgaria  still  had  her  former  vanquished 
foe  to  reckon  with.     The  Turks  were  again  at  Adria- 

348 


THE  TREATY  OF  BUKAREST 

nople  and  Kirk  Kilisse.  Thrace  was  once  more  in 
her  power.  The  Treaty  of  Bukarest,  while  attri- 
buting Thrace  to  Bulgaria  on  the  basis  of  the  Treaty 
of  London,  actually  said  nothing  whatever  about  it. 
Nor  were  there  any  promises  of  aid  in  helping  Bul- 
garia to  get  back  again  what  she  had  lost,  without 
a  struggle,  by  her  folly  and  treachery. 

A  new  war  by  Bulgaria  alone  in  her  weakened 
military  condition  and  with  her  empty  treasury,  to 
drive  once  more  the  Turks  back  south  of  the  Enos- 
Midia  line,  was  impossible.  Bulgaria  appealed  to 
the  chancelleries  of  Europe  to  help  her  in  taking 
possession  of  the  Thracian  territory  ceded  to  her  at 
London.  The  Powers  made  one  of  their  futile  over- 
tures to  Turkey,  requesting  that  she  accept  the 
treaty  which  she  had  signed  a  few  months  before. 

But  no  one  could  blame  the  Turks  for  having 
taken  advantage  of  Bulgarian  folly.  Who  could 
expect  them  to  meekly  withdraw  behind  the  Enos- 
Midia  line?  Bulgaria  could  get  no  support  in 
applying  the  argument  of  force. 

In  the  end,  the  victors  of  Lule  Burgas  had  to  go 
to  Constantinople  and  make  overtures  directly  to 
the  Sublime  Porte.  They  fared  very  badly.  The 
Enos-Midia  line  was  drawn,  but  it  took  a  curve 
northward  from  the  Black  Sea  and  westward  across 
the  Maritza  in  such  a  way  that  the  Turks  obtained 
not  only  Adrianople,  but  also  Kirk  Kilisse  and 
Demotica.  The  Bulgarians  were  not  even  masters 
of  the  one  railway  leading  to  Dedeagatch,  their  sole 
port  on  the  JEge3.n  Sea. 

The  year  19 13  for  Bulgaria  will  remain  the  most 

349 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

bitter  one  of  her  history.  She  had  to  learn  the 
lesson  that  the  life  of  the  nations,  as  well  as  of  indi- 
viduals, is  one  of  give  as  well  as  take,  and  that  com- 
promise is  the  basis  of  sound  statesmanship.  Who 
wants  all,  most  often  gets  nothing. 


350 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
THE  ALBANIAN  FIASCO 

THE  world  has  not  known  just  what  to  do  with 
the  mountainous  country  which  comes  out  in 
a  bend  on  the  upper  western  side  of  the  Bal- 
kan Peninsula  directly  opposite  the  heel  of  Italy.  It 
caused  trouble  to  the  Romans  from  the  very  moment 
that  they  became  an  extra-Italian  power.  Inherited 
from  them  by  the  Byzantines,  fought  for  with  the 
varying  fortunes  by  the  Prankish  princes,  the  Vene- 
tians, and  the  Turks,  Albania  has  remained  a  country 
which  cannot  be  said  to  have  ever  been  wholly 
subjected.  Nor  can  it  be  said  to  have  ever  had  a 
national  entity.  Its  present  mediaeval  condition 
is  due  to  the  fact  that,  owing  to  its  high  mountains 
and  its  being  on  the  road  to  nowhere,  it  has  not, 
since  the  Roman  days  at  least,  undergone  the  influ- 
ences of  a  contemporary  civilization. 

Venice  recognized  the  importance  of  Albania 
during  the  days  of  her  commercial  prosperity.  For 
the  Albanian  coast,  with  its  two  splendid  harbours, 
of  Valona  and  Durazzo,  effectively  guards  the 
entrance  of  the  Adriatic  into  the  Mediterranean  Sea. 

But  Albania  did  not  demand  attention  a  hundred 
years  ago  when  the  last  map  of  Europe  was  being 

351 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

made  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  The  reason  for 
this  is  simple.  Italy  was  not  a  political  whole. 
The  head  of  the  Adriatic  was  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  Austria.  There  was  no  thought  at  that  time  of 
our  modem  navies,  and  of  the  importance  of  keeping 
open  the  Straits  of  Otranto.  It  was  the  Dalmatian 
coast,  north  of  Albania,  which  Austria  considered 
essential  to  her  commercial  supremacy.  Then,  too, 
Greece  had  not  yet  received  her  freedom,  and  the 
Servians  had  not  risen  in  rebellion  against  the  Otto- 
man Empire.  There  were  no  Slavic,  Hellenic,  and 
Italian  questions  to  disturb  Austria  in  her  peaceful 
possession  of  the  Adriatic  Sea. 

It  was  not  until  the  union  of  Italy  had  been  ac- 
complished, and  the  south  Slavic  nationalities  had 
formed  themselves  into  political  units,  that  Albania 
became  a  "question"  in  the  chancelleries  of  Europe. 

Austria-Hungary  determined  that  Italy  should 
not  get  a  foothold  in  Albania.  Italy  had  the  same 
determination  in  regard  to  Austria-Hungary.  Since 
the  last  Russo-Turkish  War,  Austria-Hungary  and 
Italy  have  had  the  united  determination  to  keep  the 
Slavs  from  reaching  the  Adriatic.  For  the  past 
generation,  feeling  certain  that  the  end  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire  was  at  hand,  Austria  and  Italy  through 
their  missionaries,  their  schools,  and  their  consular 
and  commercial  agents,  have  struggled  hard  against 
each  other  to  secure  the  ascendancy  in  Albania. 
Their  intrigues  have  not  ceased  up  to  this  day. 

When  Austria-Hungary  annexed  Bosnia-Herzego- 
vina, and  the  Young  Turk  oppression  of  the  Albani- 
ans aroused  the  first  expression  of  what  might  possibly 

352 


THE  ALBANIAN  FIASCO 

be  called  national  feeling  since  the  time  of  Skander 
bey's  resistance  to  the  Ottoman  conquest,  the  rival 
Powers,  instead  of  following  in  the  line  of  Russia 
and  Great  Britain  in  Persia,  and  establishing  spheres 
of  interest,  agreed  to  support  the  Albanian  national 
movement  as  the  best  possible  check  upon  Servian 
and  Greek  national  aspirations.  This  was  the 
status  of  Albania  in  her  relationship  to  the  Adriatic 
Powers,  when  the  war  of  the  Balkan  States  against 
Turkey  broke  out.  The  accord  between  Austria 
and  Italy  had  stood  the  strain  of  Italy's  war  with 
Turkey.  Largely  owing  to  their  fear  of  Russia  and 
to  the  pressure  of  Germany,  it  stood  the  strain  of 
the  Balkan  War.  But  both  Italy  and  Austria  let  it 
be  known  to  the  other  Powers  that  if  the  Turkish 
Empire  in  Europe  disappeared,  there  must  be  an 
independent  Albania. 

This  dictum  was  accepted  in  principle  by  the  other 
four  Powers,  who  saw  in  it  the  only  possible  chance 
of  preventing  the  outbreak  of  a  conflict  between 
Austria  and  Russia  which  would  be  bound  to  involve 
all  Europe  in  war.  No  nation  wanted  to  fight  over 
the  question  of  Albania.  Russia  could  not  hope  to 
have  support  from  Great  Britain  and  France  to 
impose  upon  the  Triple  Alliance  her  desire  for  a 
Slavic  outlet  to  the  Adriatic.  For  neither  France 
nor  Great  Britain  was  anxious  for  the  Russian  to 
get  to  the  Mediterranean.  The  accord  between  the 
Powers  was  shown  in  the  warning  given  to  Greece 
and  Servia  that  the  solution  of  the  Albanian  question 
must  be  reserved  for  the  Powers  when  a  treaty  of 
peace  was  signed  with  Turkey.  The  accord  weathered 
23  353 


THE  NEW  MAP  OP  EUROPE 

the  severe  test  put  upon  it  by  the  bold  defiance  of 
the  Montenegrin  occupation  of  Scutari. 

We  have  spoken  elsewhere  of  the  policy  of  the 
Young  Turks  towards  Albania.  This  most  useful 
and  loyal  comer  of  the  Sultan's  dominions  was 
turned  into  a  country  of  perennial  revolutions, 
which  started  soon  after  the  inauguration  of  the 
constitutional  regime.  In  the  winter  of  1911-1912, 
when  the  group  of  Albanian  deputies  in  the  Ottoman 
Parliament  saw  their  demands  for  reforms  rejected 
by  the  Cabinet,  and  even  the  right  of  discussion  of 
their  complaints  refused  on  the  floor  of  Parliament, 
the  Albanians  north  and  south,  Catholic  and  Moslems, 
united  in  a  resistance  to  the  Turkish  authorities 
that  extended  to  Uskub  and  Monastir.  After  the 
spring  elections  of  1912,  the  resistance  became  a  for- 
midable revolt.  For  the  Young  Turks  had  rashly 
manoeuvred  the  balloting  with  more  than  Tammany 
skill.  The  Albanians  were  left  without  representa- 
tives in  Parliament!  Former  deputies,  such  as 
Ismail  Kemal  bey,  Hassan  bey,  and  chiefs  such  as 
Isa  Boletinatz,  Idris  Sefer,  and  Ali  Riza  joined  in  a 
determination  to  demand  autonomy  by  force  of 
arms. 

When,  in  July,  the  Cabinet  decided  to  move  an 
army  against  the  Albanians,  there  were  wholesale 
desertions  from  the  garrison  of  Monastir,  and  of 
Albanian  officers  from  all  parts  of  European  Turkey. 
Mahmoud  Shevket  pasha  was  compelled  to  resign  the 
Ministry  of  War,  and  was  followed  by  Said  pasha 
and  the  whole  Cabinet.  The  Albanians  demanded 
as  a  sine  qua  non  the  dissolution  of  Parliament.     The 

354 


THE  ALBANIAN  FIASCO 

Mukhtar  Cabinet  agreed  to  the  dissolution,  and 
accepted  almost  all  the  demands  of  the  rebels  in  a 
conference  at  Pristina. 

For  the  tables  had  now  been  turned.  Instead  of 
a  Turkish  invasion  of  Albania  for  "pacification,"  as 
in  previous  summers,  it  was  a  question  now  of  an 
Albanian  invasion  of  Turkey.  In  spite  of  the  con- 
ciliatory spirit  of  the  new  Cabinet,  the  agitation 
persisted.  It  was  rumoured  that  the  Malissores  and 
the  Mirdites  were  planning  a  campaign  against 
Scutari  and  Durazzo.  I  was  in  Uskub  in  the  early 
part  of  September.  Isa  Boletinatz  and  his  band 
were  practically  in  possession  of  the  city.  A  truce 
for  Ramazan,  the  Moslem  fast  month,  had  been 
arranged  between  Turks  and  Albanians.  But  the 
Albanians  said  they  would  not  lay  down  their  arms 
until  a  new  and  honestly  constitutional  election  was 
held. 

Immediately  after  Ramazan  came  the  Balkan  War. 
Albania  found  herself  separated  from  Turkey, 
and  in  a  position  to  have  more  than  autonomy 
without  having  to  deal  further  with  the  Turks. 

During  the  Balkan  War,  the  attitude  of  the  Alba- 
nians was  a  tremendous  disappointment  to  the  Turks. 
One  marvels  that  loyalty  to  the  Empire  could  have 
been  expected,  even  from  the  Moslem  element,  in 
Albania.  And  yet  the  Turks  did  expect  that  a 
Pan-Islamic  feeling  would  draw  the  Albanian  beys 
to  fight  for  the  Sultan,  just  as  they  had  expected  a 
similar  phenomenon  on  the  part  of  the  rebellious 
Arabs  of  the  Arabic  peninsula  during  the  war  with 
Italy. 

355 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

From  the  very  beginning  the  Albanians  adopted 
an  attitude  of  opportunism.  They  did  not  hft  a 
hand  directly  to  help  the  Turks.  Had  they  so 
desired,  they  might  have  made  impossible  the  invest- 
ment of  Janina  by  the  Greeks.  But  nowhere,  save 
in  Scutari,  did  the  Albanians  make  a  stubborn 
stand  against  the  military  operations  of  the  Balkan 
allies.  Almost  from  the  beginning,  they  had  under- 
stood that  the  Powers  would  not  allow  the  partition 
of  Albania.  They  knew  that  the  retention  of  Janina 
was  hopeless  after  the  successes  of  the  allies  during 
October.  But  they  received  encouragement  from 
both  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  to  fight  for  Scutari. 

The  heroic  defence  of  Scutari,  which  lasted  longer 
than  that  of  any  of  the  other  fortified  towns  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  feat  of 
the  Turkish  arm3^  During  the  siege,  the  general 
commanding  Scutari  had  been  assassinated  by  order 
of  Essad  pasha,  who  was  his  second  in  command. 
Essad  then  assumed  charge  of  the  defence  as  purely 
Albanian  in  character.  He  refused  to  accept  the 
armistice,  and  continued  the  struggle  throughout 
the  debates  in  London.  Scutari  is  at  the  south 
end  of  a  lake  which  is  shared  between  Albania  and 
Montenegro.  Commanding  the  city  is  a  steep 
barren  hill  called  Tarabosh.  With  their  heavy 
artillery  on  this  hill,  the  Albanians  were  able  to 
prevent  indefinitely  the  capture  of  their  city. 
Servians  and  Montenegrins  found  themselves  con- 
fronted with  the  task  of  taking  Tarabosh  by  assault, 
if  they  hoped  to  occupy  Scutari.  This  was  a  feat 
beyond  the  strength  of  a  Balkan  army.     On  the 

356 


THE  ALBANIAN  FIASCO 

steep  slopes  of  this  hill  were  placed  miles  of  barbed 
wire.  The  assailants  were  mowed  down  each  time 
they  tried  to  reach  the  batteries  at  the  top.  As 
Tarabosh  commanded  the  four  corners  of  the  horizon, 
its  cannon  could  prevent  an  assault  or  bombardment 
of  the  city  from  the  plain.  The  allies  were  unable 
to  silence  the  batteries  on  the  crest  of  this  hill. 

During  the  winter,  the  principal  question  before 
the  concert  of  European  Powers  was  that  of  Scutari. 
Austria-Hungary  was  so  determined  that  Scutari 
should  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Montenegrins 
and  Servians  that  she  mobilized  several  army  corps 
in  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  on  the  Russian  frontier 
of  Galicia,  at  Christmas  time,  1912.  The  New  Year 
brought  with  it  ominous  forebodings  for  the  peace 
of  Europe.  Diplomacy  worked  busily  to  bring 
about  an  accord  between  the  Powers,  and  pressure 
upon  the  besiegers  of  Scutari.  In  the  middle  of 
March,  it  was  unanimously  agreed  that  Scutari 
should  remain  to  Albania,  and  that  Servia  should 
receive  Prizrend,  Ipek,  Dibra,  and  Diakova  as  com- 
pensation for  not  reaching  the  Adriatic,  and  the 
assurance  of  an  economic  outlet  for  a  railroad  at 
some  Albanian  port.  The  European  concert  then 
decided  to  demand  at  Belgrade  and  Cettinje  the 
lifting  of  the  siege  of  Scutari. 

Servia,  yielding  to  the  warning  of  Russia  that 
nothing  further  could  be  done  for  her,  consented  to 
withdraw  her  troops  from  before  Scutari,  and  to 
abandon  the  points  in  Albanian  territory  which  had 
been  allotted  by  the  Powers  to  the  independent 
Albanian    State    which    they    intended    to    create. 

357 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Servia  had  another  reason  for  doing  this.  Seeing 
the  hopelessness  of  territorial  aggrandizement  in 
Albania,  she  decided  to  denounce  her  treaty  of 
partition,  concluded  before  the  war,  with  Bulgaria, 
To  realize  this  act  of  faithlessness  and  treachery, 
she  had  need  of  the  sympathetic  support  of  the 
Powers  in  the  quarrel  which  was  bound  to  ensue. 
We  see  here  how  the  blocking  of  Servia's  outlet  to 
the  Adriatic  led  inevitably  to  a  war  between  the 
Balkan  Allies. 

But  with  Montenegro  the  situation  was  entirely 
different.  She  had  sacrificed  one-fifth  of  her  army 
in  the  attacks  upon  Tarabosh,  and  Scutari  seemed 
to  her  the  only  thing  that  she  was  to  get  out  of  the 
war  with  Turkey.  Perched  up  in  her  mountains, 
there  was  little  harm  that  the  Powers  could  do  to 
her.  Just  as  King  Nicholas  had  precipitated  the 
Balkan  War  against  the  advice  of  the  Powers  the 
previous  October,  he  decided  on  April  1st  to  refuse 
to  obey  the  command  of  the  Powers  to  lift  the  siege 
of  Scutari.  From  what  I  have  gathered  myself 
from  conversations  in  the  Montenegrin  capital  two 
months  later,  I  feel  that  the  King  of  Montenegro 
can  hardly  be  condemned  for  what  the  newspapers 
of  Europe  called  his  "audacious  folly"  in  refusing 
to  give  a  favourable  response  to  the  joint  note  pre- 
sented to  him  by  the  European  Ministers  at  Cettinje. 
The  Montenegrins  are  illiterate  mountaineers,  who 
know  nothing  whatever  about  considerations  of 
international  diplomacy.  If  their  King  had  listened 
to  words  written  on  a  piece  of  paper,  and  had  or- 
dered   the  Montenegrin  troops  to  withdraw  from 

358 


THE  ALBANIAN  FIASCO 

before  Scutari,   he  would   probably   have   lost   his 
throne. 

So  the  Powers  were  compelled  to  make  a  show  of 
force.  Little  Montenegro,  with  its  one  port,  and 
its  total  population  not  equal  to  a  single  arrondis- 
sement  of  the  city  of  Paris,  received  the  signal  honour 
of  an  international  blockade.  On  April  7th,  an 
international  fleet,  under  the  command  of  the  British 
Admiral  Bumey,  blockaded  the  coast  from  Antivari 
to  Durazzo.  While  all  Europe  was  showing  its  dis- 
pleasure in  the  Adriatic,  the  Montenegrins  kept  on, 
although  deserted  by  the  Servians,  sitting  in  a  circle 
around  Scutari,  only  twenty-five  miles  inland  from 
the  blockading  fleet.  An  April  23d,  after  the  Balkan 
War  was  all  finished,  Europe  was  electrified  by  the 
news  that  the  Albanians  had  surrendered  Scutari 
to  Montenegro.  The  worst  was  to  be  feared,  for 
Austria  announced  her  determination  to  send  her 
troops  across  the  border  from  Bosnia  into  Monte- 
negro. Such  an  action  would  certainly  have  brought 
on  a  great  European  war.  For  neither  at  Rome  nor 
at  Petrograd  could  Austrian  intervention  have  been 
tolerated. 

No  Power  in  Europe  was  at  that  moment  ready 
for  war.  Largely  through  pressure  brought  to  bear 
at  Cettinje  by  his  son-in-law,  the  King  of  Italy, 
King  Nicholas  decided  on  May  5th  to  deliver  Scu- 
tari to  the  Powers.  The  Montenegrins  withdrew, 
and  ten  days  later  Scutari  was  occupied  by  detach- 
ments of  marines  from  the  international  squadron. 
The  blockade  was  lifted.  The  peace  of  Europe  was 
saved. 

359 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

The  Treaty  of  London,  signed  on  May  30,  191 3, 
put  Albania  into  the  hands  of  the  Powers.  The 
northern  and  eastern  frontiers  had  been  arranged 
by  the  promise  made  to  Servia  in  return  for  her  with- 
drawal from  the  siege  of  Scutari.  But  the  southern 
frontier  was  still  an  open  question.  Here  Italy  was 
as  much  interested  as  was  Austria  in  the  north. 
With  Corfu  in  the  possession  of  Greece,  Italy  would 
not  agree  that  the  coast  of  the  mainland  opposite 
should  also  be  Hellenic.  The  Greeks,  on  the  contrary, 
declared  that  the  littoral  and  hinterland,  up  beyond 
Santi  Quaranta,  was  part  of  ancient  Epirus,  and 
inhabited  principally  by  Greeks.  It  should  therefore 
revert  logically  to  greater  Greece.  Athens  lifted 
again  the  old  cry,  "Where  there  are  Hellenes,  there 
is  Hellas."  The  Greeks  were  occupying  Santi 
Quaranta.  They  claimed  as  far  north  as  Argyro- 
kastron.  But  they  consented  to  withdraw  from  the 
Adriatic,  north  of  and  opposite  Corfu,  if  interior 
points  equally  far  to  the  north  were  left  to  them. 
An  international  commission  was  formed  to  make 
a  southern  boundary  for  Albania.  Its  task  has 
never  been  satisfactorily  completed.  The  question 
is  still  open. 

What  was  to  be  done  with  this  new  state,  foster 
child  of  all  Europe,  with  indefinite  boundaries,  with 
guardians  each  jealous  of  the  other,  and  neighbours 
waiting  only  for  a  favourable  moment  to  throw  them- 
selves upon  her  and  extinguish  her  life? 

I  visited  Albania  in  July,  1913,  during  the  second 
Balkan  War.  At  Valona,  in  the  south,  I  found  a 
provisional  government,  self-constituted  during  the 

360 


THE  ALBANIAN  FIASCO 

previous  winter,  whose  authority  was  problematical 
outside  of  Valona  itself.  At  the  head  of  the  govern- 
ment was  Ismail  Kemal,  whom  I  had  known  as  the 
champion  of  Albanian  autonomy  in  the  Ottoman 
Parliament  at  Constantinople.  He  talked  passion- 
ately of  Albania,  the  new  State  in  Europe,  with  its 
united  population  and  its  national  aspirations.  He 
was  eager  to  have  the  claims  of  Albania  to  a  generous 
southern  frontier  presented  at  London.  He  assured 
me  that  I  could  write  with  perfect  confidence  in 
glowing  terms  concerning  the  future  of  Albania, 
that  a  spirit  of  harmony  reigned  throughout  the 
country,  and  that  the  Albanians  of  all  creeds,  freed 
from  Turkish  oppression,  were  looking  eagerly  to 
their  new  life  as  an  independent  nation.  When  I 
expressed  misgivings  as  to  the  role  of  Essad  pasha, 
the  provisional  president  asserted  that  the  former 
commander  of  Scutari  was  wholly  in  accord  with 
him,  and  cited  as  proof  the  fact  that  he  had  that 
very  day  received  from  Essad  pasha  his  acceptance 
of  the  portfolio  of  Minister  of  the  Interior. 

But  that  indefinable  feeling  of  misgiving,  which 
one  always  has  over  the  enthusiasm  of  Orientals, 
caused  me  to  withhold  judgment  as  to  the  liability 
of  Albania  until  I  had  seen  how  things  were  going  in 
other  portions  of  the  new  kingdom. 

At  Durazzo,  the  northern  port  of  Albania,  the 
friends  of  Essad  pasha  were  in  control  of  the  govern- 
ment. Things  were  still  being  done  a  la  turque,  and 
there  was  a  feeling  of  great  uncertainty  concerning 
the  future.  Few  had  any  faith  whatever  in  the  pro- 
visional government  at  Valona,  and  it  was  declared 

361 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

that  the  influence  of  Essad  pasha  would  decide  the 
attitude  of  the  Albanians  in  Durazzo,  Tirana,  and 
Elbassan.  Essad  was  chief  of  the  Toptanis,  the 
most  influential  family  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Durazzo.  He  had  "made  his  career"  in  the  gendar- 
meriey  and  had  risen  rapidly  through  the  approval 
and  admiration  of  Abdul  Hamid.  This  is  an  indica- 
tion of  his  character.  He  was  credited  with  the 
ambition  of  ruling  Albania.  To  withdraw  his  forces 
and  his  munitions  of  war  intact,  so  that  he  could 
press  these  claims,  is  the  only  explanation  of  his 
"deal"  with  King  Nicholas  of  Montenegro  to  sur- 
render Scutari.  Essad  had  sacrificed  the  pride  and 
honour  of  Albania  to  his  personal  ambition. 

From  Durazzo,  I  went  to  San  Giovanni  di  Medua, 
which  was  occupied  by  the  Montenegrins,  just  as  I 
had  found  Santi  Quaranta  in  the  south  occupied  by 
the  Greeks.  Going  inland  from  this  port  (one  must 
use  his  imagination  in  calling  San  Giovanni  di  Medua 
a  port)  by  way  of  Alessio,  I  reached  Scutari,  from 
whose  citadel  flew  the  flags  of  the  Powers.  In  every 
quarter  of  this  typically  and  hopelessly  Turkish 
town,  one  ran  across  sailors  from  various  nations. 
Each  Power  had  its  quarter,  and  had  named  the 
streets  with  some  curious  results.  The  Via  Garibaldi 
ran  into  the  Platz  Radetzky.  On  the  Catholic 
cathedral  was  a  sign  informing  you  that  you  were 
in  the  Rue  Ernest  Renan. 

This  accidental  naming  of  streets  was  a  prophecy 
of  the  hopelessness  of  trying  to  reconcile  the  con- 
flicting aims  and  ideals  of  the  Powers  whose  bands 
were  playing  side  by  side  in  the  public  garden.     In 

362 


THE  ALBANIAN  FIASCO 

the  dining-room  of  the  hotel,  when  I  saw  Austrians, 
Italians,  Germans,  British,  and  French  officers  eating 
together  at  the  long  tables,  instead  of  rejoicing  at 
this  seeming  spirit  of  European  harmony,  I  had  the 
presentiment  of  the  inevitable  result  of  the  struggle 
between  Slav  and  Teuton,  to  prevent  which  these 
men  were  there.  Just  a  year  later,  I  stood  in  front 
of  the  Gare  du  Montparnasse  in  Paris  reading  the 
order  for  General  Mobilization.  There  came  back 
to  me  as  in  a  dream  the  public  garden  at  Scutari, 
and  the  mingled  strains  of  national  anthems,  with 
officers  standing  rigidly  in  salute  beside  their  half- 
filled  glasses. 

In  the  palatial  home  of  a  British  nobleman  who 
had  loved  the  Albanians  and  had  lived  long  in  Scu- 
tari, Admiral  Burney  established  his  headquarters. 
I  talked  with  him  there  one  afternoon  concerning 
the  present  and  the  future  of  Albania,  and  the  rela- 
tionship of  the  problem  which  he  had  before  him  with 
the  peace  of  Europe.  Never  have  I  found  a  man 
more  intelligently  apprehensive  of  the  possible  out- 
come of  the  drama  in  which  he  was  playing  a  part, 
and  at  the  same  time  more  determinedly  hopeful 
to  use  all  his  ability  and  power  to  save  the  peace  of 
Europe  by  welding  together  the  Albanians  into  a 
nation  worthy  of  the  independence  that  has  been 
given  to  them  by  the  European  concert.  Such  men 
as  Admiral  Burney  are  more  than  the  glory  of  a 
nation:  they  are  the  making  of  a  nation.  The  great- 
ness of  Britain  is  due  to  the  men  who  serve  her. 
High  ideals,  self-sacrifice,  ability,  and  energy  are 
the  corner-stones  of  the  British  overseas  Empire. 

363 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

There  was  little,  however,  that  Admiral  Burney, 
or  anyone  in  fact,  could  do  for  Albania.  No  nation 
can  exist  in  modern  times,  when  national  life  is  in 
the  will  of  the  people  rather  than  in  the  unifying 
qualities  of  a  ruler,  if  there  are  no  common  ideals 
and  the  determination  to  attain  them.  Albania 
is  without  a  national  spirit  and  a  national  past.  It 
is,  therefore,  no  unit,  capable  of  being  welded  into 
a  state.  The  creation  by  the  Ambassadors  of  the 
Powers  in  London  may  have  been  thought  by  them 
to  be  a  necessity.  But  it  was  really  a  makeshift. 
If  the  Albanians  had  done  their  part,  and  had  shown 
the  possibility  of  union,  the  makeshift  might  have 
developed  into  a  new  European  state.  As  things 
have  turned  out,  it  has  stayed  what  it  was  in  the 
beginning, — a  fiasco. 

Among  the  many  candidates  put  forward  for  the 
new  throne,  Prince  William  of  Wied  was  finally 
decided  upon.  He  was  a  Protestant,  and  could 
occupy  a  position  of  neutrality  among  his  Moslem, 
Orthodox,  and  Catholic  subjects.  He  was  a  German, 
and  could  not  be  suspected  of  Slavic  sympathies. 
He  was  a  relative  of  the  King  of  Rumania,  and  could 
expect  powerful  support  in  the  councils  of  the  Balkan 
Powers. 

It  would  be  wearisome  to  go  into  the  story 
of  Prince  William's  short  and  unhappy  reign.  At 
Durazzo,  which  was  chosen  for  the  capital,  he  quickly 
showed  himself  incapable  of  the  role  which  a  genius 
among  rulers  might  have  failed  to  play  successfully. 
Lost  in  a  maze  of  bewildering  intrigues,  foreign  and 
domestic,  the  ruler  of  Albania  saw  his  prestige,  and 

364 


THE  ALBANIAN  FIASCO 

then  his  dignity,  disappear.  He  never  had  any  real 
authority.  He  had  been  forced  upon  the  Albanians. 
They  did  not  want  him.  The  Powers  who  had  placed 
him  upon  the  throne  did  not  support  him.  In  the 
spring,  the  usual  April  heading,  "Albania  in  Arms," 
appeared  once  more  in  the  newspapers  of  the  world. 
Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war,  when 
Albania  was  "lost  in  the  shuffle,"  almost  daily  tele- 
grams detailed  the  march  of  the  insurgents  upon 
Durazzo,  the  useless  and  fatal  heroism  of  the  Dutch 
officers  of  the  gendarmerie,  the  incursions  of  the 
Epirote  bands  in  the  south,  and  the  embarrassing 
position  of  the  international  forces  still  occupying 
Scutari.  What  the  Albanians  really  wanted,  none 
could  guess,  mvich  less  they  themselves! 

The  European  war,  in  August,  19 14,  enabled  the 
Powers  to  withdraw  gracefully  from  the  Albanian 
fiasco.  Their  contingents  hurriedly  abandoned 
Scutari,  and  sailed  for  home.  The  French  did  not 
have  time  to  do  this,  so  they  went  to  Montenegro. 
Since  the  catastrophe,  to  prevent  which  they  had 
created  Albania,  had  fallen  upon  Europe,  what 
further  need  was  there  for  the  Powers  to  bother 
about  the  fortunes  of  Prince  William  and  his  subjects? 
Italy  alone  was  left  with  hands  free,  and  her  interests 
were  not  at  stake,  so  long  as  Greece  kept  out  of  the 
fray.  For  Prince  William  of  Wied,  Italy  felt  no 
obligation  whatever. 

Without  support  and  without  money,  there  was 
nothing  left  to  Prince  William  but  to  get  out.  He 
did  not  have  the  good  sense  to  make  his  withdrawal 
from  Albania  a  dignified  proceeding.     The  palace 

365 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

was  left  under  seals.  The  Prince  issued  a  proclama- 
tion which  would  lead  the  Albanians  to  believe  that 
it  was  his  intention  to  return.  It  may  be  that  he 
thought  the  triumph  of  the  German  and  Austrian 
armies  in  the  European  war  would  mean  his  re- 
establishment  to  Durazzo.  But  after  he  was  once 
again  safely  home  at  Neu-Wied,  he  did  what  he 
ought  to  have  done  many  months  before.  A  high- 
sounding  manifesto  announced  his  abdication,  and 
wished  the  Albanians  Godspeed  in  the  future.  After 
this  formality  had  been  accomplished,  the  former 
Mpret  of  Albania  rejoined  his  regiment  in  the  German 
army,  and  went  out  to  fight  against  the  French. 

With  Prince  William  of  Wied  and  the  international 
corps  of  occupation  gone,  the  Albanians  were  left 
to  themselves.  At  Durazzo,  a  body  of  notables, 
calling  themselves  the  Senate,  adopted  resolutions 
restoring  the  Ottoman  flag  and  the  suzerainty  of  the 
Sultan,  invited  Prince  Burhaneddin  effendi,  a  son 
of  Abdul  Hamid,  to  become  their  ruler,  and  solemnly 
decreed  that  hereafter  the  Turkish  language  should 
be  restored  to  its  former  position  as  the  official 
language  of  the  country. 

But  Essad  pasha  thought  otherwise.  The  psycho- 
logical moment,  for  which  he  had  been  waiting  ever 
since  his  surrender  of  Scutari  to  the  Montenegrins, 
had  come.  In  the  first  week  of  October,  he  hurried 
to  Durazzo  with  his  followers,  had  himself  elected 
head  of  a  new  provisional  government  by  the  Albanian 
Senate,  and  announced  openly  that  his  policy  would 
be  to  look  to  Italy  instead  of  to  Austria  for  support. 
After  rendering  homage  to  the  Sultan  as  Khalif, 

366 


THE  ALBANIAN  FIASCO 

asking  the  people  to  celebrate  the  happy  spirit  of 
harmony  which  now  reigned  throughout  Albania, 
and  prophesying  a  new  era  of  peace  and  prosperity 
for  Europe's  latest-born  independent  state,  the 
former  gendarme  of  Abdul  Hamid  entered  the  palace, 
broke  the  seals  of  th?  international  commission,  and 
went  to  sleep  in  the  bed  of  Prince  William  of  Wied. 
One  wonders  whether  the  new  ruler  of  Albania 
will  have  more  restful  slumbers  than  his  predecessor. 
In  spite  of  all  protests,  Greece  is  still  secretly  en- 
couraging the  Epirotes  in  their  endeavour  to  push 
northward  the  frontier  of  the  Hellenic  kingdom. 
Italy  has  two  army  corps  at  Brindisi  waiting  for  a 
favourable  moment  to  occupy  Valona.  The  Mon- 
tenegrins and  Servians  are  planning  once  more  to 
reach  the  Adriatic  through  the  valleys  of  the  Boyana 
and  Drin,  after  they  have  driven  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  armies  from  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Only 
an  Austrian  triumph  could  now  save  Albania  from 
her  outside  enemies.  But  could  anything  save  her 
from  her  inside  enemies?  When  I  read  of  Essad 
Pasha  in  Durazzo,  self-chosen  Moses  of  his  people, 
there  comes  back  to  me  a  conversation  with  the 
leading  Moslem  chieftain  of  Scutari,  whose  guest 
I  had  the  privilege  of  being,  in  his  home  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1 91 3.  When  I  mentioned  Essad  pasha,  he 
rose  to  his  feet  before  the  fire,  waved  his  arms,  and 
cried  out:  "When  I  see  Essad,  I  shall  shoot  him  like 
a  dog!" 


367 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ULTIMATUM 
TO  SERVIA 

IN  discussing  the  relations  of  the  Austrians  and 
Hungarians  with  their  south  Slavic  subjects, 
and  the  rivalries  of  races  in  Macedonia,  the 
general  causes  behind  the  hostile  attitude  of  Austria- 
Hungary  to  the  development  of  Servia  have  been 
explained.  Specific  treatment  of  the  Servian  atti- 
tude towards  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina was  reserved  for  this  chapter,  because  the 
events  of  the  summer  of  19 14  are  the  direct  sequence 
of  the  events  of  the  winter  of  1 908-1 909. 

On  October  3,  1908,  Marquis  Pallavicini,  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  notified 
verbally  the  Sublime  Porte  that  Austria-Hungary 
had  annexed  the  Turkish  provinces  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  whose  administration  was  entrusted  to 
her  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  just  thirty  years  before. 
Austria-Hungary  was  willing  to  renounce  the  right 
given  her  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  to  the  military 
occupation  of  the  sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar  (a  strip  of 
Turkish  territory  between  Servia  and  Montenegro), 
if  Turkey  would  renounce  her  sovereignty  of  the 
annexed  provinces. 

368 


AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SERVIA 

This  violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  by  Austria- 
Hungary  aroused  a  strong  protest  not  only  in  Servia 
and  in  Turkey,  but  also  among  the  other  Powers 
who  had  signed  at  Berlin  the  conditions  of  the  main- 
tenance of  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
The  protest  was  especially  strong  in  London  and 
Petrograd.  But  Austria-Hungary  had  the  backing 
of  Germany,  whose  Ambassador  at  Petrograd, 
Count  de  Pourtales,  did  not  hesitate  several  times 
during  the  winter  to  exercise  pressure  that  went  almost 
to  the  point  of  being  a  threat  upon  the  Russian  Foreign 
Office  to  refrain  from  encouraging  the  intractable 
attitude  of  Servia  towards  the  annexation. 

With  Germany's  support,  Austria-Hungary  did 
not  have  much  difficulty  in  silencing  the  protests  of 
all  the  Great  Powers.  She  had  a  free  hand,  thanks 
to  Germany,  in  forcing  Turkey  and  Servia  to  accept 
the  fait  accompli  of  the  annexation. 

Turkish  protests  took  the  form  of  the  boycott  of 
which  we  have  spoken  elsewhere.  On  November 
22d,  Austria-Hungary  threatened  to  put  the  whole 
status  of  European  Turkey  into  question  by  con- 
voking the  European  congress  to  revise  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin.  This  is  exactly  what  Austria-Hungary 
herself  did  not  want.  But  neither  did  Turkey. 
Both  governments  had  a  common  interest  in  prevent- 
ing outside  intervention  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 
The  boycott,  as  evidencing  anti-Austrian  feeling, 
was  rather  a  sop  to  public  opinion  of  Young  Turkey, 
and  a  blind  to  the  Powers  to  hide  the  perfect  accord 
that  existed  between  Germany  and  Turkey  at  the 
moment,  than  the  expression  of  hostility  to  Austria- 
24  369 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Hungary.  After  several  months  of  pourparlers  an 
agreement  was  made  between  Constantinople  and 
Vienna  on  February  26,  1909.  Turkey  agreed  to 
recognize  the  annexation  in  return  for  financial 
compensation.  The  negotiations  at  Constantinople 
concerning  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  are  a  monument 
to  the  diplomatic  finesse  and  skill  of  the  late  Baron 
Marschallvon  Bieberstein  and  of  Marquis  Pallavicini. 

To  lose  something  that  you  know  you  can  no 
longer  keep  is  far  different  from  losing  the  hope  of 
possession.  It  is  always  more  cruel  to  be  deprived 
of  an  anticipation  than  of  a  reality.  Turkey  gave 
up  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  with  her  usual  fatalistic 
indifference.  Her  sovereignty  had  been  only  a 
fiction  after  all.  But  Servia  saw  in  the  action  of 
Austria- Hungary  a  fatal  blow  to  her  national  aspira- 
tions. The  inhabitants  of  the  two  Turkish  provinces 
on  her  west  were  Servian :  Bosnia-Herzegovina  formed 
the  centre  of  the  Servian  race.  Montenegro  on 
the  south  was  Servian.  Dalmatia  on  the  west  was 
Servian,  Croatia  on  the  north  was  Servian.  Every- 
thing was  Servian  to  the  Adriatic  Sea.  And  yet 
Servia  was  land-locked.  The  Servians  determined 
they  would  not  accept  this  annexation.  They  ap- 
pealed to  the  signatory  Powers  of  Berlin,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  arousing  a  sentiment  in  Europe  favourable 
to  a  European  conference.  They  threatened  to 
make  Austrian  and  Hungarian  sovereignty  intoler- 
able, not  only  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  but  also 
in  Croatia  and  Dalmatia. 

Austria- Hungary  was  more  than  irritated;  she 
was  alarmed.     She  appealed  to  her  ally,  and  pictured 

370 


AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SERVIA 

the  danger  to  the  Drang  nach  Oesten.  The  powerful 
intervention  of  the  German  ambassadors  in  the 
various  European  capitals  succeeded  in  isolating 
Belgrade.  Russian  support  of  Servia  would  have 
meant  a  European  war.  Rather  than  risk  this, 
France  begged  Russia  to  yield.  Russia,  not  yet 
recovered  from  the  Manchurian  disaster,  ordered 
Servia  to  yield.  Austria-Hungary  was  allowed  to 
force  Servia  into  submission. 

Friendless  in  the  face  of  her  too  powerful  adversary, 
Servia  directed  her  Minister  at  Vienna  on  March  31, 
1909,  to  make  the  following  formal  declaration  to 
the  Austro- Hungarian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs : 

"Servia  declares  that  she  is  not  affected  in  her 
rights  by  the  situation  established  in  Bosnia,  and 
that  she  will  therefore  adapt  herself  to  the  decisions 
at  which  the  Powers  are  going  to  arrive  in  reference 
to  Art.  25  of  the  Berlin  Treaty.  By  following  the 
councils  of  the  Powers,  Servia  binds  herself  to  cease 
the  attitude  of  protest  and  resistance  which  she  has 
assumed  since  last  October,  relative  to  the  annexa- 
tion, and  she  binds  herself  further  to  change  the 
direction  of  her  present  policies  towards  Austria- 
Hungary,  and,  in  the  future,  to  live  with  the  latter 
in  friendly  and  neighbourly  relations." 

The  crisis  passed.  Servia' s  humiliation  was  the 
price  of  European  peace.  Germany  had  shown  her 
determination  to  stand  squarely  behind  Austria- 
Hungary  in  her  dealings  with  Servia.  It  was  a 
lesson  for  the  future.  Five  years  later  history 
repeated  itself — except  that  Russia  did  not  back 
down! 

371 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

We  have  already  told  the  story  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary's dealings  with  Servia  after  the  first  victorious 
month  of  the  Balkan  War  with  Turkey:  how  Servia 
was  compelled,  owing  to  lack  of  support  from  Russia, 
to  give  satisfaction  to  Austria-Hungary  in  the  Pro- 
chaska  incident,  to  withdraw  her  troops  from  Durazzo 
and  from  before  Scutari;  and  how  the  Powers  saved 
the  peace  of  Europe  in  May,  1913,  by  compelling 
Montenegro  to  abandon  Scutari. 

Ever  since  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest,  Austria-Hun- 
gary watched  Servia  keenly  for  an  opportunity  to 
pick  a  quarrel  with  her.  It  is  marvellous  how  the 
Servians,  elated  as  they  naturally  were  by  their 
military  successes  against  Turkey  and  Bulgaria, 
avoided  knocking  the  chip  off  the  shoulder  of  their 
jealous  and  purposely  sensitive  neighbour. 

It  was  one  thing  to  be  able  to  keep  a  perfectly 
correct  official  attitude  towards  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  Government.  This  the  Servian  Government 
had  promised  to  do  in  the  note  wrung  from  it  on 
March  31,  1909.  This  it  did  do.  But  it  was  a 
totally  different  thing  to  expect  the  authorities  at 
Belgrade  to  stifle  the  national  aspirations  of  twelve 
million  Servians,  the  majority  of  whom  were  outside 
of  her  jurisdiction.  Even  if  it  had  been  the  wiser 
course  for  her  to  pursue — and  this  is  doubtful, — 
could  Servia  have  been  able  to  repress  the  thoroughly 
awakened  and  triumphant  nationalism  of  her  own 
subjects  who  had  borne  so  successfully  and  so  hero- 
ically the  sufferings  and  sacrifices  of  two  wars  within 
one  year? 

Individual  Servians,  living  within  the  kingdom  of 

372 


AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SERVIA 

Servia,  were  irredentists,  but  without  official  sanc- 
tion. They  were  undoubtedly  in  connection  with 
the  revolutionaries  created  by  Austrian  and  Hunga- 
rian methods  in  the  Servian  provinces  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy.  There  was  undoubtedly  a  dream  of 
Greater  Servia,  and  a  strong  hope  in  the  hearts  of 
nationalists  on  both  sides  of  the  frontiers  that  the 
day  would  dawn  by  their  efforts  when  Greater  Servia 
would  be  a  reality.  No  government  could  have 
continued  to  exist  in  Servia  which  tried  to  suppress 
the  Narodna  Odbrana.  I  make  this  statement 
without  hesitation.  King  Peter  did  not  intend  to 
become  another  Charles  Albert. 

Ought  the  Vienna  and  Berlin  statesmen  to  have 
expected  Servia  to  do  so?  What  answer  would 
Switzerland  or  Holland  or  Belgium  or  Brazil  receive, 
were  their  ministers  to  present  a  note  at  Wilhelm- 
strasse  or  Ballplatz,  calling  attention  to  the  menace 
to  their  independence  of  the  Pan-Germanic  move- 
ment, citing  speeches  delivered  by  eminent  professors 
in  universities,  books  written  by  officials  of  the 
imperial  Governments,  and  asking  that  certain 
societies  be  suppressed  and  certain  geographies  be 
removed  from  use  in  German  schools?  Their  cause 
would  have  been  as  just,  and  their  right  as  clear, 
for  exactly  the  same  reasons,  as  that  of  the  Austrian 
Government  in  its  attitude  towards  Servia.  The 
only  difference  between  Pan-Servianism  and  Pan- 
Germanism — and  you  must  remember  that  the  latter 
is  not  only  encouraged,  but  also  subsidized,  by  the 
Berlin  and  Vienna  governments — is  that  the  former 
is  the  aspiration  of  twelve  millions  while  the  latter 

373 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

is  the  aspiration  of  ninety  millions.  Is .  not  the 
answer  the  old  Bismarckian  formula  that  might 
makes  right? 

During  the  winter  following  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest 
the  Austro-Hungarian  agents  and  police  continued 
their  careful  surveillance  of  the  Narodna  Odhrana, 
and  followed  all  its  dealings  with  Servians  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  nationality.  But  it  could  find  no  casus 
belli.  The  attitude  of  the  Servian  Government  was 
perfectly  correct  at  all  times.  Traps  were  laid,  but 
Servian  officials  did  not  fall  into  them.  The  occasion 
for  striking  Servia  came  in  a  most  tragic  way. 

It  seems  like  tempting  Providence  to  have  sent 
the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  his  wife  to 
Sarajevo  on  the  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  Kossova. 
Things  had  been  going  from  bad  to  worse  in  Bosnia. 
Flags  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  had  been  burned  in 
Sarajevo  and  Mostar,  and  the  garrisons  called  upon 
to  intervene  to  restore  order.  The  Constitution  of 
1 910  had  been  modified  in  191 2,  so  that  the  military 
Governor  was  invested  with  civil  power.  The  local 
Bosnian  Diet  had  been  twice  prorogued.  In  May, 
1913,  the  constitution  was  suspended,  and  a  state 
of  siege  declared  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Through- 
out the  winter  of  1913-1914,  incipient  rebellions 
had  to  be  checked  by  force  in  many  places.  It  was 
known  to  the  police  that  Servian  secret  societies 
were  active,  and  that  the  provinces  were  in  a  state 
of  danger  and  insecurity.  The  Servian  Govern- 
ment was  apprehensive  concerning  the  announced 
visit  of  the  heir  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  throne. 
In  fact,  so  greatly  was  it  feared  that  some  attempt 

374 


AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SERVIA 

might  be  made  against  the  life  of  Franz  Ferdinand, 
and  that  this  would  be  used  as  an  excuse  for  an 
attack  upon  Servia,  that  the  Servian  Minister  at 
Vienna,  a  week  before  the  date  announced  for  the 
visit,  informed  the  Government  that  there  was 
reason  to  fear  a  plot  to  assassinate  the  Archduke. 

On  June  28,  19 14,  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand 
and  his  wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg,  were  assas- 
sinated in  the  streets  of  Sarajevo.  Austria-Hungary 
realized  that  her  moment  had  come.  Germany 
was  sounded,  and  found  to  be  ready  to  prevent 
outside  interference  in  whatever  measures  Vienna 
might  see  fit  to  take  with  Belgrade. 

In  the  spring  of  19 14,  the  Pasitch  Cabinet  had 
almost  succumbed  in  the  struggle  between  civil  and 
military  elements.  Premier  Pasitch  retained  his 
power  by  agreeing  to  a  dissolution  of  Parliament, 
and  binding  himself  to  the  necessity  of  following  the 
leadership  of  the  military  part.  So  far  were  the 
chiefs  of  the  military  party  from  being  in  a  mood 
to  consider  the  susceptibilities  of  Austria-Hungary 
that  they  were  actually,  according  to  a  telegram  from 
a  well-informed  source  in  Agram  on  June  26,  1914, 
debating  the  means  of  uniting  Servia  and  Monte- 
negro. The  difficult  question  of  dynasties  was  in  the 
way  of  being  solved,  and,  despite  Premier  Pasitch's 
misgivings,  the  hallon  d'essai  of  the  project  of  union 
had  been  launched  in  Europe.  It  was  at  this  critical 
and  delicate  moment  for  the  Belgrade  Cabinet  that 
the  storm  broke. 

I  was  surprised  by  the  spirit  of  optimism  which 
seemed   to   pervade   the   French   press   during   the 

375 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

period  immediately  following  the  assassination  of 
Franz  Ferdinand.  For  three  weeks  the  telegrams 
from  Vienna  repeated  over  and  over  again  the  state- 
ment that  the  ultimatum  which  Austria-Hungary 
intended  to  present  at  Belgrade  as  a  result  of  the 
Sarajevo  assassination  would  be  so  worded  that 
Russia  could  not  take  offence.  This  optimistic 
opinion,  which  seems  to  have  been  given  almost 
official  sanction  by  the  Ballplatz,  was  shared  by  the 
French  Government.  France  is  a  country  in  which 
the  inmost  thoughts  of  her  statesmen  are  voiced  freely 
in  the  daily  newspapers  of  Paris.  If  there  had  been 
any  serious  misgivings,  the  protocol  for  the  visit  of 
President  Poincare  to  Petrograd  and  to  the  Scan- 
dinavian capitals  would  certainly  have  been  modified. 
The  President  of  France  sailed  for  the  Baltic  on 
July  15th.  At  six  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  23d, 
the  note  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
concerning  the  events  of  the  assassination  of  Sarajevo 
was  given  to  the  Servian  Government.  It  com- 
menced by  reproducing  the  text  of  the  Servian  de- 
claration of  March  31,  1909,  which  we  have  quoted 
above.  Servia  was  accused  of  not  having  fulfilled 
the  promise  made  in  this  declaration,  and  of  permit- 
ting the  Pan-Servian  propaganda  in  the  newspapers 
and  public  schools  of  the  kingdom.  The  assassina- 
tion of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  was  stated 
to  be  the  direct  result  of  Servian  failure  to  live  up 
to  her  declaration  of  March  31,  1909.  Austria- 
Hungary  claimed  that  the  assassination  of  the  heir 
to  her  throne  had  been  investigated,  and  that  ample 
proof  had  been  found  of  the  connivance  of  two  Ser- 

376 


AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SERVIA 

vians,  one  an  army  officer  and  the  other  a  functionary 
who  belonged  to  the  Narodna  Odbrana;  that  the 
assassins  had  received  their  arms  and  their  bombs 
from  these  two  men,  and  had  been  knowingly  allowed 
to  pass  into  Bosnia  by  the  Servian  authorities  on 
the  Serbo-Bosnian  frontier.  Being  unable  to  endure 
longer  the  Pan-Servian  agitation,  of  which  Belgrade 
was  the  foyer  and  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  a  direct 
result,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  found 
itself  compelled  to  demand  of  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment the  formal  assurance  that  it  condemned  this 
propaganda,  which  was  dangerous  to  the  existence 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  because  its  final  end  was  to 
detach  from  Austria- Hungary  large  portions  of  her 
territory  and  attach  them  to  Servia. 

After  this  preamble,  the  note  went  on  to  demand 
that  on  the  first  page  of  the  Journal  Officiel  of  July 
26th  the  Servian  Government  publish  a  new  de- 
claration, the  text  of  which  is  so  important  that 
we  quote  it  in  full. 

"The  Royal  Servian  Government  condemns  the 
propaganda  directed  against  Austria-Hungary,  i.  e., 
the  entirety  of  those  machinations  whose  aim  it  is 
to  separate  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
territories  belonging  thereto,  and  she  regrets  sincere- 
ly the  ghastly  consequences  of  these  criminal  actions. 

''The  Royal  Servian  Government  regrets  that 
Servian  officers  and  officials  have  participated  in 
the  propaganda  cited  above,  and  have  thus  threat- 
ened the  friendly  and  neighbourly  relations  which  the 
Royal  Government  was  solemnly  bound  to  cultivate 
by  its  declaration  of  March  31,  1909. 

"The  Royal  Government,  which  disapproves  and 

377 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

rejects  every  thought  or  every  attempt  at  influencing 
the  destinies  of  the  inhabitants  of  any  part  of 
Austria-Hungary,  considers  it  its  duty  to  call  most 
emphatically  to  the  attention  of  its  officers  and 
officials,  and  of  the  entire  population  of  the  kingdom, 
that  it  will  hereafter  proceed  with  the  utmost  severity 
against  any  persons  guilty  of  similar  actions,  to 
prevent  and  suppress  which  it  will  make  every 
effort." 

Simultaneously  with  the  publication  in  the  Journal 
Officiel,  Austria-Hungary  demanded  that  the  declara- 
tion be  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Servian 
army  by  an  order  of  the  day  of  King  Peter,  and  be 
published  in  the  official  organ  of  the  army.  The 
Servian  Government  was  also  asked  to  make  ten 
promises : 

1.  To  suppress  any  publication  which  fosters 
hatred  of,  and  contempt  for,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  and  whose  general  tendency  is  directed 
against  the  latter's  territorial  integrity ; 

2.  To  proceed  at  once  with  the  dissolution  of 
the  society  Narodna  Odbrana,  to  confiscate  its  entire 
means  of  propaganda,  and  to  proceed  in  the  same 
manner  against  the  other  societies  nnd  associations 
in  Servia  which  occupy  themselves  with  the  pro- 
paganda against  Austria-Hungary,  and  to  take  the 
necessary  measures  that  the  dissolved  societies  may 
not  continue  their  activities  under  another  name  or 
in  another  form ; 

3.  To  eliminate  without  delay  from  the  public 
instruction  in  Servia,  so  far  as  the  teaching  staff  as 
well  as  the  curriculum  is  concerned,  whatever  serves 
or  may  serve  to  foster  the  propaganda  against 
Austria-Hungary ; 

4.  To  remove  from  military  service  and  public 

378 


AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SERVIA 

office  in  general  all  officers  and  officials  who  are 
guilty  of  propaganda  against  Austria-Hungary  and 
whose  names,  with  a  communication  of  the  evidence 
which  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  pos- 
sesses against  them,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment reserves  the  right  to  communicate  to  the 
Royal  Government; 

5.  To  accept  the  collaboration  in  Servia  of  mem- 
bers of  the  official  machinery  (organes)  of  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Government  in  the  suppression 
of  the  movement  directed  against  Austro-Hungarian 
territorial  integrity; 

6.  To  commence  a  judicial  investigation  (enquete 
jiidiciaire)  against  the  participants  of  the  conspiracy 
of  June  28th,  who  are  on  Servian  territory — members 
of  the  official  machinery  {organes)  delegated  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  will  take  part  in  the 
researches  (recherches)  relative  thereto; 

7.  To  proceed  immediately  to  arrest  Major  Voija 
Tankositch  and  a  certain  Milan  Ciganovitch,  a 
functionary  of  the  Servian  State,  who  have  been 
compromised  by  the  result  of  the  preliminary  in- 
vestigation at  Sarajevo; 

8.  To  prevent,  by  effective  measures,  the  partici- 
pation of  the  Servian  authorities  in  the  smuggling 
of  arms  and  explosives  across  the  frontier,  to  dismiss 
and  punish  severely  the  functionaries  at  the  frontier 
at  Shabatz  and  at  Loznica,  guilty  of  having  aided 
the  authors  of  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  by  facilitating 
their  crossing  of  the  frontier ; 

9.  To  give  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
explanations  concerning  the  unjustifiable  remarks 
of  high  Servian  functionaries,  in  Servia  and  abroad, 
who,  in  spite  of  their  official  position  have  not 
hesitated,  after  the  crime  of  June  28th,  to  express 
themselves  in  interviews  in  a  hostile  manner  against 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy ; 

379 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

10.  To  notify  without  delay  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  the  execution  of  the  meas- 
ures included  in  the  preceding  points. 

Annexed  to  the  note  was  a  memorandum  which 
declared  that  the  investigation  of  the  police,  after 
the  assassination  of  the  Archduke  and  his  wife,  had 
established  that  the  plot  had  been  formed  at  Bel- 
grade by  the  assassins  with  the  help  of  a  commandant 
in  the  Servian  army,  that  the  six  bombs  and  four 
Browning  pistols  with  their  ammunition  had  been 
given  at  Belgrade  to  the  assassins  by  the  Servian 
functionary  and  the  Servian  army  officer  whose 
names  were  cited  in  the  note,  that  the  bombs  were 
hand  grenades  which  came  from  the  Servian  army 
headquarters  at  Kragujevac,  that  the  assassins 
were  given  instruction  in  the  use  of  the  arms  by 
Servian  officers,  and  that  the  introduction  into  Bos- 
nia and  Herzegovina  of  the  assassins  and  their  arms 
was  facilitated  by  the  connivance  of  three  frontier 
captains  and  a  customs  official. 

The  wording  of  this  note  seemed  to  have  been 
entirely  unexpected.  The  intention  of  the  ulti- 
matum was  clear.  It  was  understood  that  Russia 
would  not  accept  an  attack  upon  the  integrity  of 
Servia.  Six  years  had  passed  since  1908,  and  two 
since  1912.  Russia  had  recuperated  from  the  Japan- 
ese War,  and  her  Persian  accord  with  Great  Britain 
had  borne  much  fruit.  She  was  sure  of  France. 
Was  this  not  a  deliberate  provocation  to  Russia? 

Forty-eight  hours  had  been  given  to  Servia  to 
respond.     Russia  and  France  had  both  counselled 

380 


AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SERVIA; 

Servia  to  give  an  answer  that  would  be  a  general 
acceptance  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum. 
Neither  France  nor  Russia  wanted  war.  So  anxious 
were  they  to  avoid  giving  Austria-Hungary  the 
opportunity  to  precipitate  the  crisis  before  they  were 
ready  for  it  that  for  the  third  time  in  six  years  Servia 
was  asked  to  swallow  her  pride  and  submit.  On  the 
night  of  July  24th,  a  memorable  council  was  held  in 
Belgrade.  The  Premier  and  the  leaders  of  the 
opposition,  together  with  some  members  of  the  Na- 
rodna  Odhrana  were  shown  clearly  what  course  they 
must  follow,  if  they  expected  the  loyal  support  of 
Russia.  The  answer  to  the  ultimatum  must  be 
worded  in  such  a  way  that  Austria-Hungary  would 
have  no  ground  upon  which  to  stand  in  forcing  im- 
mediately the  war.  Servia  must  once  more  "eat 
humble  pie."  But  this  time  the  promise  of  Russian 
support  was  given  to  defend  the  territorial  integrity 
and  the  independence  of  Servia. 

The  Servian  answer  was  far  more  conciliatory  than 
was  expected.  The  allegations  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian preamble  were  denied,  but  the  publication 
of  the  declaration  in  the  Journal  Officiel  and  in  the 
army  bulletin,  and  its  incorporation  in  an  order  of 
the  day  to  the  army,  were  promised.  But  there  were 
to  be  two  changes  in  the  text  of  the  declaration. 
Instead  of  "the  Royal  Servian  Government  con- 
demns the  propaganda  against  Austria-Hungary,"  the 
Servians  agreed  to  declare  that  "the  Royal  Servian 
Government  condemns  every  propaganda  which  should 
be  directed  against  Austria-Hungary,"  and  instead  of 
"the  Royal  Government  regrets  that  Servian  officers 

381 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

and  officials  .  .  .  have  participated  in  the  pro- 
paganda cited  above,"  the  Servian  King  could 
say  no  more  than  "the  Royal  Government  regrets 
that  according  to  a  communication  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  certain  officers  and  function- 
aries .  .  .  etc." 

The  German  White  Book  makes  a  special  point  of 
the  bad  faith  of  Servia  in  altering  the  text  of  the 
declaration  in  this  way.  But  what  government 
could  be  expected  to  admit  what  was  only  a  supposi- 
tion, and  what  king  worthy  of  the  name  would  de- 
nounce as  a  regicide  openly  before  his  army  one  of  his 
officers  upon  the  unsupported  statement  of  a  political 
document?  The  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum  had 
given  no  proof  of  its  charges  against  the  man  named 
in  its  note,  and  forty-eight  hours  was  too  short  a 
time  for  the  Servian  Government  to  investigate  the 
charges  to  its  own  satisfaction. 

In  order  to  make  clear  just  what  was  the  nature 
of  the  demands  which  Austria-Hungary  made  upon 
Servia,  I  have  cited  the  ten  articles  in  full. 

One  can  readily  see  that  the  demands  of  Articles 
1,2,  and  3,  in  their  entirety,  meant  the  extinction  of 
the  Pan-Servian  movement  and  Servian  nationalism. 
Austria-Hungary  was  asking  of  Servia  something 
that  neither  member  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  had  suc- 
ceeded in  accomplishing  in  its  own  territories!  The 
German  White  Book  attempts  to  sustain  the  justice 
of  the  demands  of  its  ally  in  striking  at  the  press,  the 
nationalist  societies,  and  the  schools.  The  methods 
of  arousing  a  nationalistic  spirit  in  the  Servian  people 
through  the  press,  through  the  formation  of  societies, 

382 


AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SERVIA 

and  through  the  teaching  of  irredentism  by  school- 
books,  were  borrowed  from  Germany,  But  Servia 
agreed  to  make  her  press  laws  more  severe,  to  dis- 
solve the  Narodna  Odbrana  and  other  societies;  and 
"to  eliminate  from  the  public  instruction  in  Servia 
anything  which  might  further  the  propaganda 
directed  against  Austria-Hungary,  provided  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  furnishes  actual 
proofs." 

Article  4  was  agreed  to  only  so  far  as  it  could  be 
actually  proved  that  the  officers  and  officials  in 
question  had  been  "guilty  of  actions  against  the 
territorial  integrity  of  the  monarchy."  To  promise 
to  remove  all  who  were  "guilty  of  propaganda  against 
Austria-Hungary"  would  have  meant  the  disband- 
ing of  the  Servian  army  and  the  Servian  Government ! 
Is  there  any  man  with  red  blood  in  his  veins  who  can 
be  prevented  from  having  hopes  and  dislikes,  and 
expressing  them?  Could  Servia  prevent  Servians 
from  stating  how  they  felt  about  the  political  status 
of  their  race  in  Croatia  and  in  Bosnia  ?  Did  Austria- 
Hungary  ever  make  a  similar  request  to  her  ally, 
Italy,  about  irredentist  literature  and  speeches? 

Articles  5  and  6  are  open  to  discussion.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  the  newspapers  of  nations  hostile  to 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  have  been  unfair  in 
their  interpretation  and  in  their  translation  of  these 
two  articles.  The  Servian  answer  deliberately  gives 
a  false  meaning  to  the  Austrian  request  here,  and 
represents  it  as  an  attack  upon  the  independence  of 
her  courts.  Servia  had  enough  good  grounds  for 
resistance  to  the  ultimatum  without  equivocating 

383 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

on  this  point.  In  her  answer  she  refused  what  had 
not  been  actually  demanded,  a  co-operation  in  the  en- 
quete  judiciaire  of  Austro-Hungarian  organes.  What 
Austria-Hungary  demanded  was  the  co-operation 
of  her  police  officials  in  the  recherches. 

Articles  7  to  lo  were  accepted  by  Servia  in  toto. 
As  a  proof  of  her  good  faith,  the  Servian  answer 
declared  that  Major  Tankositch  had  been  arrested 
on  the  evening  of  the  day  on  which  the  ultimatum 
was  received. 

In  conclusion,  Servia  offered,  if  her  response  to  the 
ultimatum  were  found  insufficient,  to  place  her  case 
in  the  hands  of  the  Hague  Tribunal  and  of  the 
different  Powers  at  whose  suggestion  she  had  signed 
the  declaration  of  March  31,  1909,  after  the  excite- 
ment over  the  Austro-Hungarian  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

The  answer  to  the  ultimatum  was  taken  by  Premier 
Pasitch  in  person  to  the  Minister  of  Austria-Hungary 
at  Belgrade  before  six  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  July 
25th.  Without  referring  the  response  to  his  Govern- 
ment, the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister,  acting  on 
previous  instructions  that  no  answer  other  than  an 
acceptance  in  every  particular  of  the  ultimatum  would 
be  admissible,  replied  that  the  response  was  not 
satisfactory.  At  half -past  six,  he  left  Belgrade  with 
all  members  of  the  legation. 

While  the  European  chancelleries  were  trying  to 
find  some  means  to  heal  the  breach,  Austria-Hungary 
formally  declared  war  on  Servia  on  the  morning  of 
July  28th.  The  same  evening,  the  bombardment 
of   Belgrade    from    Semlin    and  from  the  Danube 

384 


AUSTRIA'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SERVIA 

was  begun.     The  Servian  Government  retired  to 
Nish. 

Only   the   intervention   of   Germany  could   now 
prevent  the  European  cataclysm. 


as 


385 


CHAPTER  XX 

GERMANY  FORCES  WAR  UPON  RUSSIA 
AND  FRANCE 

THE  title  of  this  chapter  seems  to  indicate  that  I 
have  the  intention  of  taking  sides  in  what 
many  people  believe  to  be  an  open  question. 
But  this  is  not  the  case.  The  German  contention, 
that  Russia  caused  the  war,  must  be  clearly  distin- 
guished from  the  contention,  that  Russia  forced  the 
war.  There  is  a  great  deal  of  reason  in  the  first 
contention.  No  impartial  student,  who  has  written 
with  sympathy  concerning  Great  Britain's  attitude 
in  the  Crimean  War,  can  fail  to  give  Germany  just 
as  strong  justification  for  declaring  war  on  Russia 
in  1914  as  Great  Britain  had  in  1854.  But,  when  we 
come  down  to  the  narrower  question  of  responsibility 
for  launching  the  war  in  which  almost  all  of  Europe 
is  now  engaged,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  was 
deliberately  willed  by  the  German  Government,  and 
that  the  chain  of  circumstances  which  brought  it 
about  was  carefully  woven  by  the  officials  of  Wilhelm- 
strasse  and  Ballplatz.  There  may  be  honest  differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  to  whether  Germany  was  justified 
in  forcing  the  war.  But  the  facts  allow  no  difference 
of  opinion  as  to  whether  Germany  did  force  the  war. 

386 


GERMANY  FORCES  THE  WAR 

A  war  to  crush  France  and  Russia  has  for  many 
years  been  accepted  as  a  necessary  eventuaHty  in  the 
evolution  of  Germany's  foreign  policy.  That  when 
this  war  came,  Great  Britain  would  take  the  oppor- 
tunity of  joining  in  order  to  strike  at  German  com- 
merce, which  had  begun  to  be  looked  upon  by  British 
merchants  as  a  formidable  rival  in  the  markets  of 
the  world,  was  thought  probable.  The  leading  men 
of  Germany,  especially  since  the  passing  of  Morocco 
and  Persia,  have  felt  that  this  war  was  vital  to  the 
existence  of  the  German  Empire.  During  recent 
years  the  questions,  "Ought  there  to  be  a  war?" 
and  "Will  there  be  a  war?"  ceased  to  be  debated  in 
Germany.  One  heard  only,  "Under  what  circum- 
stances could  the  war  be  most  favourably  declared?" 
and  "How  soon  will  the  war  come?" 

Germany  has  believed  that  the  events  of  the  past 
decade  have  shown  the  unalterable  determination 
of  Great  Britain  and  France  to  make  impossible  the 
political  development  of  the  Weltpolitik,  without 
which  her  commercial  development  would  always 
be  insecure.  This  determination  has  been  consist- 
ently revealed  in  the  hostility  of  her  western  rivals 
to  her  colonial  expansion  in  Africa  and  Asia.  The 
world  equilibrium,  already  decidedly  disadvan- 
tageous to  the  overseas  future  of  Germans  at  the 
time  they  began  their  career  as  a  united  people,  has 
been  disturbed  more  and  more  during  the  past  forty 
years. 

The  Balkan  wars,  resulting  as  they  did  in  the 
aggrandizement  of  Servia,  threatened  the  equilibrium 
of  the  Near  East,  where  lay  Germany's  most  vital 

387 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

and  most  promising  external  activities.  We  must 
remember,  when  we  are  considering  the  reasons  for 
the  consistent  backing  given  to  Austria-Hungary 
by  Germany  in  her  treatment  of  Servian  aspirations, 
the  words  of  Wirth:  "  To  render  powerful  the  Servian 
people  would  he  the  suicide  of  Germany.''* 

Germany  has  had  as  much  reason,  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  present  crisis,  for  regarding  Servia  as 
the  outpost  of  Russia  as  had  Great  Britain  for  award- 
ing this  r61e  to  Bulgaria  in  1876.  Germany  has  had 
as  much  reason  for  declaring  war  on  Russia  to  prevent 
the  Russians  from  securing  the  inheritance  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  as  had  Great  Britain  and  France  to 
take  exactly  the  same  step  in  1854.  The  extension, 
in  1 914,  of  Russian  influence  in  what  was  until  re- 
cently European  Turkey  would  be  just  as  disastrous 
to  the  interests  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
— far  more  so — than  it  would  have  been  to  Great 
Britain  and  France  sixty  years  ago.  What  she  has 
in  Asia-Minor  to-day  is  as  great  a  stake  for  Germany 
to  fight  for  as  what  Great  Britain  had  in  India  in  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

There  is,  however,  this  important  difference. 
Germany,  in  supporting  the  Austro-Hungarian 
ultimatum,  was  not  responding  to  the  overt  act  of 
an  enemy.  She  calculated  carefully  the  cost,  waited 
for  a  favourable  moment,  and,  when  she  decided 
that  the  favourable  moment  had  come,  deHberately 
provoked  the  war. 

Germany,  looking  for  the  opportunity  to  strike 
her  two  powerful  neighbours  on  the  east  and  west, 
believed  that  the  propitious  moment  had  come  in  the 

388 


GERMANY  FORCES  THE  WAR 

summer  of  19 14.  Her  rivals  were  facing  serious 
internal  crises.  Russia  was  embarrassed  by  the 
menace  of  a  widely-spread  industrial  strike.  But 
Russia  did  not  count  for  much  in  the  German  calcula- 
tions. It  was  the  situation  in  France  that  induced 
the  German  statesmen  to  take  advantage  of  the  assassi- 
nation of  Franz  Ferdinand.  The  spring  elections 
had  revealed  a  tremendous  sentiment  against  the 
law  recently  voted  extending  military  service  for 
three  years.  The  French  Parliament  had  just 
overthrown  the  admirable  Ribot  Cabinet  for  no 
other  reason  than  purely  personal  considerations  of 
a  bitter  party  strife.  An  eminent  Parliamentarian 
had  exposed  publicly  from  the  tribune  the  alarming 
unpreparedness  of  France  for  war.  The  trial  for 
murder  of  the  wife  of  the  former  Premier  Caillaux 
bade  fair  to  complicate  further  internal  Parliamen- 
tary strife. 

These  were  the  favourable  circumstances  of  the 
end  of  June  and  the  beginning  of  July. 

But  the  decision  had  wider  grounds  than  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  moment.  The  German  Government 
was  finding  it  more  and  more  difficult  every  year 
to  secure  the  credits  necessary  for  the  maintenance 
and  increase  of  her  naval  and  military  establish- 
ments. Socialism  and  anti-militarism  were  making 
alarming  progress  in  the  German  Reichstag.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Russian  military  reorganization, 
commenced  after  the  Japanese  War,  was  beginning 
to  show  surprising  fruits.  And  was  France  to  be 
allowed  time  for  the  spending  of  the  eight  hundred 
and  five  million  francs  just  borrowed  by  her  in  June 

389 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

to  correct  the  weak  spots  in  her  fortifications  and  war 
material,  and  for  the  appHcation  of  the  loi  des  trois 
ans  to  increase  her  standing  army? 

Furthermore,  would  Great  Britain  be  able  to 
intervene  on  behalf  of  France  and  Russia?  The 
crisis  over  the  Home  Rule  Bill  seemed  to  have 
developed  so  seriously  that  civil  war  was  feared. 
Sir  Edward  Carson,  leader  of  the  Protestant  irre- 
concilables  in  the  north  of  Ireland,  had  formed  an 
army  that  was  being  drilled  in  open  defiance  of  the 
Government. 

The  assassination  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdi- 
nand and  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg  came  at  this  ad- 
vantageous moment.  A  casus  belli  against  Servia, 
so  provokingly  lacking,  had  at  last  been  given. 
Austria-Hungary  was  only  too  ready  for  the  chance 
to  crush  Servia.  If  there  were  any  misgivings  about 
the  risk  of  doing  this,  they  were  immediately  allayed 
by  Germany,  who  assured  Austria-Hungary  that  she 
would  not  allow  Russia  even  to  mobilize.  Austria- 
Hungary  was  given  by  Germany  carte  blanche  in  the 
matter  of  her  dealings  with  Servia.  It  is  possible, 
as  the  German  Ambassador  at  Petrograd  declared  to 
M.  Sasonow,  that  the  text  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
ultimatum  had  not  been  submitted  beforehand  for 
the  approval  of  Wilhelmstrasse.  But  the  general 
tenor  of  the  ultimatum  had  certainly  been  agreed 
upon.  Germany  knew  well  that  the  ultimatum 
would  be  so  worded  as  to  be  a  challenge  to  Russia. 
Either  Russia  would  accept  once  more  the  humilia- 
tion of  a  diplomatic  defeat  and  see  Servia  crushed,  or 
she  would  intervene  to  save  Servia.     In  the  latter 

390 


GERMANY  FORCES  THE  WAR 

contingency,  Germany  could  declare  war  upon 
Russia  on  the  ground  that  her  ally,  Austria-Hungary, 
had  been  attacked.  The  Franco-Russian  Alliance 
would  then  be  put  to  the  test,  as  well  as  whatever 
understanding  there  might  be  between  Great  Britain 
and  France. 

Subsequent  events  proved  that  Germany  left  no 
means,  other  than  complete  submission  to  her  will, 
to  France  and  Russia  for  avoiding  war.  Negotia- 
tions were  so  carried  on  that  there  would  be  no  loop- 
hole for  escape  either  to  Servia,  or  to  the  Great 
Powers  that  were  her  champions.  She  did  not  even 
wait  for  Russia  to  attack  Austria-Hungary,  or  for 
France  to  aid  Russia.  As  for  Great  Britain,  it  is 
not  yet  clear  whether  Germany  really  thought  that 
she  was  making  an  honest  effort  to  keep  her  out 
of  the  war! 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  Servian  crisis, 
Germany  associated  herself  "for  better  or  for  worse 
with  Austria-Hungary."  On  the  day  that  the  ulti- 
matum to  Servia  was  delivered,  Chancellor  von  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg  wrote  to  the  German  Ambassadors 
at  London,  Paris,  and  Petrograd,  requesting  them  to 
call  upon  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  governments 
to  which  they  were  accredited  and  point  out  that  the 
ultimatum  was  necessary  for  the  "safety  and  in- 
tegrity "  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  to  state  with  special 
"emphasis"  that  '^in  this  question  there  is  concerned 
an  affair  which  should  he  settled  absolutely  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  the  limitation  to  which 
it  must  be  the  earnest  endeavour  of  the  Powers  to  ensure. 
We  anxiously  desire  the  localization  of  the  conflict, 

391 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

because  any  intercession  by  another  Power  would 
precipitate,  on  account  of  the  various  alHances, 
inconceivable  consequences." 

The  position  of  Germany  is  admirably  stated  in 
these  instructions,  which  I  quote  from  Exhibit  I  of 
the  German  official  White  Book.  To  this  position, 
Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  consistently  held 
throughout  the  last  week  of  July.  In  the  four  words 
*' localization  of  the  conflict^  ^  the  intention  of  Germany 
was  summed  up.  There  was  to  be  a  conflict  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Servia.  That  could  not  be 
avoided.  The  only  thing  that  could  be  avoided  was 
the  intervention  of  Russia  to  prevent  the  approaching 
attack  of  Austria-Hungary  upon  Servia.  If  the 
Powers  friendly  to  Russia  did  not  prevail  upon  the 
Czar  to  refrain  from  interfering,  there  would  be, 
*'on  account  of  the  various  alliances,  inconceivable 
consequences  y 

The  next  day,  July  24th,  a  telegram  from  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Petrograd  to  the  Chancellor 
stated  that  M.  Sasonow  was  very  much  agitated, 
and  had  "declared  most  positively  that  Russia  could 
not  permit  under  any  circumstances  that  the  Servo- 
Austrian  difficulty  be  settled  alone  between  the 
parties  concerned." 

There  was  still  time  for  Germany,  warned  by  the 
attitude  taken  by  Russia,  to  counsel  her  ally  to  accept 
whatever  conciliatory  response  Servia  might  give. 
But  this  was  not  done.  As  we  have  already  seen  in 
the  previous  chapter,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister 
at  Belgrade,  without  communicating  with  his  Govern- 
ment, declared  the  Servian  response  unsatisfactory, 

392 


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J=*«ijUS^'Y,"'Vaw'sl.uV 


GERMANY  FORCES  THE  WAR 

even  though  it  gave  an  opening  for  further  negotia- 
tions, and  withdrew  from  Belgrade  with  all  the 
members  of  the  legation  staff. 

This  precipitate,  and,  in  view  of  the  gravity  of 
the  international  situation,  unreasonable  action  could 
have  been  avoided,  had  Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  telegraphed  the  word  to  Vienna. 

Not  only  was  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister 
allowed  to  leave  Belgrade  in  this  way,  but,  after 
three  days  had  elapsed,  Austria-Hungary  took  the 
irrevocable  step  of  declaring  war  on  Servia. 

During  these  three  days.  Sir  Edward  Grey  re- 
quested the  British  Ambassadors  at  Rome  and  Vienna 
and  Berlin  to  make  every  possible  effort  to  find 
groimd  for  negotiation.  On  the  morning  of  July 
27th,  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador 
at  Vienna,  submitted  to  Count  Berchtold  the  pro- 
position of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  which  was  made 
simultaneously  at  Petrograd,  that  the  question  at 
issue  be  adjusted  in  a  conference  held  at  London. 
In  the  meantime,  after  a  conversation  with  Sir 
Rennell  Rodd,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  the 
Italian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  telegraphed  to 
Berlin,  suggesting  that  Germany,  France,  Great 
Britain,  and  Italy  mediate  between  Austria-Hungary 
and  Russia.  In  sharp  contrast  to  the  efforts  being 
made  by  the  British  Ambassadors,  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Paris,  in  an  interview  with  Premier 
Viviani,  insisted  upon  the  impossibility  of  a  confer- 
ence of  mediation,  and  announced  categorically  that 
the  only  possible  solution  of  the  difficulty  was  a  common 
French  and  German  intervention  at  Petrograd.     In 

393 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

other  words,  France  could  avoid  war  by  assisting 
her  enemy  in  humiHating  her  ally ! 

On  July  28th,  the  German  position  was:  "That 
Austria-Himgary  must  be  left  a  free  hand  in  her 
dealings  with  Servia,  and  that  it  must  be  pointed 
out  to  Russia,  if  France  and  Great  Britain  really 
wanted  to  save  the  peace  of  Europe,  that  she  should 
not  mobilize  against  Austria-Hungary."  Diplo- 
matic intervention,  then,  could  do  nothing  except 
attempt  to  force  Russia  to  refrain  from  interfering 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia.  Germany 
would  aid  the  other  Powers  in  coercing  Russia,  but 
she  would  not  urge  herself,  or  aid  them  in  urging, 
upon  Austria-Hungary,  who  had  started  the  trouble, 
the  advisability  of  modifying  her  attitude  towards 
Servia,  and  postponing  hostilities  that  were  bound  to 
lead  to  a  European  war. 

Germany  had  refused  all  intervention  at  Vienna. 
She  agreed,  however,  to  prove  her  good- will  by  letting 
it  be  known  that  Austria-Hungary  was  willing  to 
make  the  promise  to  seek  no  territorial  aggrandize- 
ment in  her  war  with  Servia,  but  to  limit  herself  to 
a  "punitive  expedition."  But  this  suggestion  did 
not  come  until  Russia  had  already  committed  herself  to 
defend  Servia  against  invasion. 

There  was  another  way  in  which  the  peace  of 
Europe  could  have  been  saved,  and  that  was  by  a 
declaration  on  the  part  of  Germany  that  she  would 
allow  Russia  and  Austria-Himgary  to  fight  out  the 
question  of  hegemony  in  south-eastern  Europe.  But 
there  was  no  proposition  from  Germany  to  France 
suggesting  a  mutual  neutrality.     On  the  other  hand, 

394 


GERMANY  FORCES  THE  WAR 

Germany  let  it  be  known  that  she  would  stand  by 
Austria-Hungary  if  Russia  attacked  her,  and,  in  the 
same  breath,  warned  France  against  the  danger  of 
being  loyal  to  the  Russian  alliance! 

On  July  29th,  it  was  announced  from  Petrograd 
that  a  partial  mobilization  had  been  ordered  in  the 
south  and  south-east.  The  German  Ambassador 
in  Petrograd,  in  an  interview  with  M.  Sasonow, 
pointed  out  "very  solemnly  that  the  entire  Austro- 
Servian  affair  was  eclipsed  by  the  danger  of  a  general 
European  conflagration,  and  endeavoured  to  present 
to  the  Secretary  the  magnitude  of  this  danger.  It  was 
impossible  to  dissuade  Sasonow  from  the  idea  that 
Servia  could  now  be  deserted  by  Russia."  On  the 
same  day.  Ambassador  von  Schoen  at  Paris  was 
directed  by  the  German  Chancellor  to  "call  the 
attention  of  the  French  Government  to  the  fact 
that  preparation  for  war  in  France  would  call  forth 
counter-measures  in  Germany."  An  exchange  of 
telegrams  on  the  29th  and  30th  between  the  Kaiser 
and  the  Czar  showed  the  irreconcilability  between  the 
Russian  and  German  points  of  view.  The  idea  of 
the  Kaiser  was  that  the  Czar  should  give  Austria- 
Hungary  a  free  hand.  The  idea  of  the  Czar  was 
that  the  attack  by  Austria-Hungary  upon  Servia 
absolutely  demanded  a  Russian  mobilization  "di- 
rected solely  against  Austria-Hungary." 

On  July  31st,  the  German  Ambassador  at  Petro- 
grad was  ordered  to  notify  Russia  that  mobilization 
against  Austria-Hungary  must  be  stopped  within 
twel.e  hours,  or  Germany  would  mobilize  against 
Russia.     At  the  same  time  a  telegram  was  sent  to 

395 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris,  ordering  him 
to  "ask  the  French  Government  whether  it  intends 
to  remain  neutral  in  a  Russo-German  war." 

On  August  1st,  at  7.30  P.M.,  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor at  Petrograd  handed  the  following  declaration 
of  war  to  Russia: 

"The  Imperial  Government  has  tried  its  best  from 
the  beginning  of  the  crisis  to  bring  it  to  a  peace- 
ful solution.  Yielding  to  a  desire  which  had  been 
expressed  to  Him  by  His  JMajesty  the  Emperor  of 
Russia,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Germany,  in 
accord  with  England,  was  engaged  in  accomplishing 
the  role  of  mediator  between  the  Cabinets  of  Vienna 
and  of  Petrograd,  when  Russia,  without  awaiting 
the  result  of  this  mediation,  proceeded  to  the 
mobilization  of  its  forces  by  land  and  sea. 

"As  a  result  of  this  threatening  measure,  which 
was  actuated  by  no  military  preparation  on  the  part 
of  Germany,  the  German  Empire  found  itself  facing 
a  grave  and  imminent  danger.  If  the  Imperial 
Government  had  failed  to  ward  off  this  danger,  it 
would  compromise  the  security  and  very  existence 
of  Germany.  Consequently  the  German  Govern- 
ment saw  itself  forced  to  address  itself  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  His  Majesty,  the  'Emperor  of  all  the 
Russias,  insisting  upon  the  cessation  of  the  said 
military  acts.  Russia  having  refused  to  accede, 
and  having  manifested  by  this  refusal  that  this 
action  was  directed  against  Germany,  I  have  the 
honour  of  making  known  to  Your  Excellency  the 
following  order  from  my  Government : 

"His  Majesty,  the  Emperor,  my  august  Sovereign, 
in  the  name  of  the  Empire,  accepts  the  challenge, 
and  considers  himself  in  the  state  of  war  with 
Russia." 

396 


GERMANY  FORCES  THE  WAR 

The  same  afternoon,  President  Poincare  ordered 
a  general  mobilization  in  France.  What  Ambassador 
von  Schoen  tried  to  get  from  Premier  Viviani,  and 
what  he  did  get  was  expressed  in  his  telegram  sent 
from  Paris  three  hours  before  the  call  to  mobilization 
was  issued : 

"Upon  the  repeated  definite  enquiry  whether 
France  would  remain  neutral  in  the  case  of  a  Russo- 
German  War,  the  Premier  declared  that  France 
would  do  that  which  her  interests  dictated." 

Germany  violated  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg 
on  August  2d,  and  of  Belgium  on  August  3d,  after 
vainly  endeavouring  to  secure  permission  from 
Belgium  for  the  free  passage  of  her  troops  to  the 
French  frontier.  On  Sunday  morning,  August  2d, 
French  soil  was  invaded.  But  Ambassador  von 
Schoen  stayed  in  Paris  until  Monday  evening  "wait- 
ing for  instructions."  Then  he  called  at  the  Quai 
d'Orsay,  and  handed  the  following  note  to  Premier 
Viviani,  who  was  acting  also  as  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs : 

"The  German  civil  and  military  authorities  have 
reported  a  certain  number  of  definite  acts  of  hostility 
committed  on  German  territory  by  French  military 
aviators.  Several  of  these  have  clearly  violated 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  in  flying  over  the  territory 
of  this  country.  One  of  them  tried  to  destroy 
structures  near  Wesel;  others  have  been  seen  in  the 
region  of  Eiffel,  another  has  thrown  bombs  on  the 
railway  near  Karlsruhe  and  Niimberg. 

"I  am  charged,  and  I  have  the  honour  to  make 
known  to  Your  Excellency  that,  in  the  presence  of 
these   aggressions,    the   German   Empire   considers 

397 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

itself  in  state  of  war  with  France  by  the  act  of  this 
latter  Power. 

"I  have  at  the  same  time  the  honour  to  bring  to 
the  knowledge  of  Your  Excellency  that  the  German 
authorities  will  detain  the  French  merchant  ships 
in  German  ports,  but  that  they  will  release  them  if 
in  forty-eight  hours  complete  reciprocity  is  assured. 

"My  diplomatic  mission  having  come  to  an  end, 
there  remains  to  me  no  more  than  to  beg  Your 
Excellency  to  be  willing  to  give  me  my  passports  and 
to  take  what  measures  you  may  judge  necessary  to 
assure  my  return  to  Germany  with  the  staff  of  the 
embassy,  as  well  as  with  the  staff  of  the  legation  of 
Bavaria  and  of  the  German  Consulate-General  at 
Paris." 

In  communicating  this  declaration  of  war  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  on  the  following  morning, 
August  4th,  Premier  Viviani  declared  formally  that 
"at  no  moment  has  a  French  aviator  penetrated  into 
Belgium;  no  French  aviator  has  committed  either  in 
Bavaria  or  in  any  part  of  the  German  Empire  any 
act  of  hostility." 


398 


CHAPTER  XXI 
GREAT  BRITAIN  ENTERS  THE  WAR 

THE  balance  of  power  in  European  diplomacy 
led  inevitably  to  a  rapprochement  between 
France  and  Russia  and  Great  Britain  to  offset 
the  Triple  Alliance  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
and  Italy. 

The  Triple  Alliance,  however,  while  purely  de- 
fensive, was  still  an  alliance.  It  had  endured  for 
over  thirty  years,  and  the  three  Powers  generally 
sustained  each  other  in  diplomatic  moves.  Their 
military  and  naval  strategists  were  in  constant  com- 
munication, and  ready  at  any  time  to  bring  all  their 
forces  into  play  in  a  European  war. 

France  and  Russia  had  also  entered  into  a  defen- 
sive alliance.  This  had  not  been  accomplished  with- 
out great  difficulty.  Were  it  not  for  the  constant 
menace  to  France  from  Germany,  the  French  Parlia- 
ment would  not  have  ratified  the  alliance  in  the  first 
place,  nor  would  it  have  stood  the  strain  of  increas- 
ing Radicalism  in  French  sentiment  during  the  last 
decade.  While  there  is  much  intellectual  and  tem- 
peramental affinity  between  Gaul  and  Slav,  there  is 
no  political  affinity  between  democratic  France  and 
autocratic  Russia. 

The   commercial   rivalry   of   Great   Britain   and 

399 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

Germany  led  to  a  rivalry  of  armaments.  The  struggle 
of  German  industry  for  the  control  of  the  world 
markets  is  the  real  cause  of  the  creation  and  rapid 
development  of  the  German  navy  to  threaten  the 
British  mastery  of  the  seas.  It  is  possible  that  the 
statesmen  of  Great  Britain,  by  a  liberal  policy  in 
regard  to  German  colonial  expansion  in  Africa  and 
Asia  and  in  regard  to  German  ambitions  in  Asiatic 
Turkey,  might  have  diverted  German  energy  from 
bending  all  its  efforts  to  destroy  British  commerce. 
It  is  possible  that  such  a  policy  might  have  enabled 
the  German  democracy  to  gain  the  power  to  prevent 
Prussian  militarism  from  dominating  the  Confedera- 
tion. But  that  would  have  been  expecting  too  much 
of  human  nature.  Nations  are  like  individuals. 
There  never  has  been  any  exception  to  this  rule. 
What  we  have  we  want  to  keep.  We  want  more  than 
we  have,  and  we  try  to  get  it  by  taking  it  away  from 
our  neighbour.  Thus  the  world  is  in  constant  struggle. 
Until  we  have  the  millennium,  and  by  the  millennium 
I  mean  the  change  of  human  natiire  from  selfishness 
to  altruism,  we  shall  have  war.  Then,  too,  the 
British  have  seen  in  themselves  so  striking  an  illus- 
tration of  the  proverb  that  the  appetite  grows  with 
eating  that  they  could  hardly  expect  anything  else  of 
the  Germans,  were  they  to  allow  them  voluntarily 
"a  place  in  the  sun." 

The  rapid  growth  of  Germany  along  the  lines 
similar  to  the  development  of  Great  Britain  has 
made  the  two  nations  rivals.  As  a  result  of  this 
rivalry.  Great  Britain  has  been  forced  to  prepare  for 
the  eventuality  of  a  conflict  between  herself  and 

400 


GREAT  BRITAIN  ENTERS  THE  WAR 

Germany  by  giving  up  the  policy  of  "splendid 
isolation,"  and  seeking  to  enter  into  friendly  re- 
lationship with  those  European  Powers  that  were 
the  enemies  of  her  rival.  The  first  decade  of  the 
twentieth  century  saw  British  diplomacy  compound- 
ing colonial  rivalry  with  France  in  Africa  and  with 
Russia  in  Asia.  The  African  accord  of  1904  and  the 
Asiatic  accord  of  1907  marked  a  new  era  in  British 
foreign  relations.  Since  their  conclusion,  Great  Brit- 
ain has  drawn  gradually  nearer  to  France  and  Russia. 

But  British  statesmen  have  had  to  reckon  with  the 
development  of  Radical  tendencies  in  the  British 
electorate.  These  tendencies  have  become  more  and 
more  marked  during  the  very  period  in  which  British 
foreign  policy  found  that  its  interests  coincided  with 
those  of  Russia  and  France.  British  democracy  had 
the  same  antipathy  to  a  Russian  alliance  as  had 
French  democracy.  But  the  menace  of  Germany, 
which  threw  France  into  the  arms  of  Russia,  has  not 
seemed  as  real  to  the  British  electorate.  There  was 
also  the  sentiment  against  militarism,  which  has 
made  it  difficult  for  the  Liberal  Cabinet  to  secure 
from  Parliament  sufficient  sums  for  the  maintenance 
of  an  adequate  naval  establishment,  and  has  blocked 
every  effort  to  provide  even  a  modified  form  of 
compulsory  military  service  and  military  training  in 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

When  one  considers  all  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  has 
had  to  contend  with  during  the  years  that  he  has  held 
the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  British  Cabinet, 
admiration  for  his  achievements  knows  no  limits.  It 
is  never  safe  to  make  comparisons  or  form  judgments 
36  401 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

in  the  appreciation  of  contemporary  figures  in  his- 
tory. But  I  cannot  refrain  from  stating  my  behef 
that  British  foreign  policy  has  never  passed 
through  a  more  trying  and  critical  period,  and 
British  interests  have  never  been  more  ably  served, 
than  during  the  years  since  the  conference  of 
Algeciras. 

The  menace  of  a  war  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  has  disturbed  Europe  several  times  during 
the  past  decade.  There  has  not  been,  however,  a 
direct  crisis,  involving  the  interests  of  the  two  rival 
nations,  to  make  an  appeal  to  arms  inevitable,  or 
even  probable.  But,  although  British  public  senti- 
ment might  have  been  slow  in  supporting  the  inter- 
vention of  the  Cabinet  in  favour  of  France,  had 
Germany  attacked  France  in  1905,  in  1908,  or  in  191 1, 
to  have  stayed  out  of  the  war  would  have  been 
suicidal  folly,  and  Great  Britain  would  soon  have 
awakened  to  this  fact. 

The  crisis  over  the  ultimatum  of  Austria-Hungary 
to  Servia  became  acute  after  the  terms  of  the  ulti- 
matum were  known.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  seconded  by 
as  skilful  and  forceful  ambassadors  as  have  ever 
represented  British  interests  on  the  continent  of 
Europe,  honestly  tried  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of 
war.  It  was  not  to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain  that 
this  war  should  be  fought.  All  sentimental  con- 
siderations to  one  side,  the  moment  was  peculiarly 
unfavourable  on  purely  material  grounds.  The 
British  Parliament  was  facing  one  of  the  most  ser- 
ious problems  of  its  history.  The  confidence  of  the 
country  in  the  wisdom  of  the  measures  in  Ireland 

402 


GREAT  BRITAIN  ENTERS  THE  WAR 

that  the  Government  seemed  determined  to  carry 
out  was  severely  shaken.  The  interest  of  the  British 
pubHc  in  the  troubles  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Servia  was  not  great  enough  to  make  the  war  popular. 
The  efforts  of  Lord  Haldane  had  done  much  to  im- 
prove the  relationship  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany.  Sympathy  with  Russia  had  been  alien- 
ated by  the  increasingly  reactionary  policy  of  the 
Czar's  government  towards  the  Poles,  the  Finns,  and 
the  Jews.  The  British  press  was  disgusted  by  the 
overthrow  of  the  Ribot  Ministry  and  by  the  revela- 
tions of  the  Caillaux  trial. 

As  there  was  no  actual  alliance  between  Great 
Britain  and  France,  and  no  understanding  of  any 
nature  whatever  with  Russia,  French  public  opinion 
was  far  from  being  certain  that  British  aid  would  be 
given  in  the  approaching  war,  and  British  public 
opinion  was  far  from  being  certain  as  to  whether  it 
would  be  necessary  to  give  this  aid,  or  whether  it 
wanted  to  do  so.  I  am  speaking  here  of  the  feeling 
among  the  electorate,  which,  accurately  represented 
by  Parliament,  is  the  final  court  of  appeal  in  Great 
Britain.  There  was  no  doubt  about  the  opinion 
of  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the  majority  of  his  col- 
leagues in  the  Cabinet,  as  well  as  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Opposition.  There  was,  however,  very  serious  doubt 
as  to  the  attitude  of  Parliament.  Would  it  sustain 
France  and  Russia  over  the  question  of  Servia,  at  a 
time  when  there  was  so  serious  a  division  in  the 
nation  concerning  the  Home  Rule  Bill — even  the 
open  menace  of  civil  war? 

When  Germany  decided  to  declare  war  on  Russia, 

403 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

and  it  was  seen  that  France  would  be  drawn  into 
the  struggle,  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  de- 
clared to  Sir  Edward  Goeschen,  British  Ambassador 
to  Germany,  that  "the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain 
once  guaranteed,  every  assurance  would  be  given  to 
the  Cabinet  at  London  that  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment did  not  have  in  view  territorial  acquisitions  at 
the  expense  of  France. "  Sir  Edward  questioned  the 
Chancellor  about  the  French  colonies,  "the  portions 
of  territories  and  possessions  of  France  situated 
outside  of  the  continent  of  Europe."  Herr  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  answered  that  it  was  not  within 
his  power  to  make  any  promise  on  that  subject. 

There  was  no  hesitation  or  equivocation  in  the 
response  of  the  British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  to  this  proposition.  He  said  that  neutrality 
under  such  conditions  was  impossible,  and  that 
Great  Britain  could  not  stand  by  and  see  France 
crushed,  even  if  she  were  left  her  European  territory 
intact,  for  she  would  be  reduced  to  the  position  of 
a  satellite  of  Germany.  To  make  a  bargain  with 
Germany  at  the  expense  of  France  would  be  a  dis- 
grace from  which  Great  Britain  would  never  recover. 
It  was  pointed  out  to  the  Chancellor  that  the  only 
means  of  maintaining  good  relations  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  would  be  for  the  two  Powers  to 
continue  to  work  together  to  safeguard  the  peace  of 
Europe.  Sir  Edward  Grey  promised  that  all  his 
personal  efforts  would  be  directed  towards  guarantee- 
ing Germany  and  her  Allies  against  any  aggression 
on  the  part  of  Russia  and  France,  and  hoped  that,  if 
Germany  showed  her  good  faith  in  the  present  crisis, 

404 


GREAT  BRITAIN  ENTERS  THE  WAR 

more  friendly  relations  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  would  ensue  than  had  been  the  case  up  to 
that  moment. 

This  dignified  and  manly  response  could  have  left 
no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  German  statesmen  as  to  the 
stand  which  the  British  Cabinet  intended  to  take. 
Did  they  believe  that  Parliament  and  the  people 
would  not  support  Sir  Edward  Grey? 

The  position  of  Great  Britain  was  explicitly  put 
before  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  evening  of 
August  3d.  Because  of  her  naval  agreement  with 
France,  by  which  the  French  navy  was  concentrated 
in  the  Mediterranean  in  order  that  the  British  Ad- 
miralty might  keep  its  full  forces  in  home  waters, 
Great  Britain  was  bound  in  honour  to  prevent  an 
attack  of  a  hostile  fleet  upon  the  Atlantic  seacoast  of 
France.  If  Germany  were  to  make  such  an  attack. 
Great  Britain  would  be  drawn  into  the  war  without 
any  further  question.  There  had  also  been  since 
November,  191 2,  an  understanding  between  the 
British  and  French  military  and  naval  authorities 
concerning  common  action  on  land  and  sea  "against 
an  enemy. "  But,  at  the  time  this  understanding  was 
made,  it  was  put  in  writing  that  it  was  merely  a 
measure  of  prudence,  and  did  not  bind  Great  Britain 
in  any  way  whatever  to  act  with  France  either  in  a 
defensive  or  offensive  war. 

Great  Britain  was  drawn  into  the  war  by  the 
German  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

On  Sunday  evening,  August  2d,  at  seven  o'clock, 
Germany  gave  the  following  ultimatum  to  Belgium: 

**The  German  Government  has  received  sure  news, 
405 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

according  to  which  the  French  forces  have  the  inten- 
tion of  marching  on  the  Meuse  by  way  of  Givet  and 
Namur;  this  news  leaves  no  doubt  of  the  intention  of 
France  to  march  against  Germany  by  way  of  Belgian 
territory.  The  Imperial  German  Government  cannot 
help  fearing  that  Belgium,  in  spite  of  its  very  good 
will,  will  not  be  able  to  repulse,  without  help,  a 
forward  march  of  French  troops  which  promises 
so  large  a  development. 

"In  this  fact  we  find  sufficient  certitude  of  a 
threat  directed  against  Germany;  it  is  an  imperious 
duty  for  self-preservation  for  Germany  to  forestall 
this  attack  of  the  enemy. 

"The  German  Government  would  regret  exceed- 
ingly should  Belgium  regard  as  an  act  of  hostility 
against  it  the  fact  that  the  enemies  of  Germany 
oblige  her  to  violate,  on  her  side,  the  territory  of 
Belgium.  In  order  to  dissipate  every  misunder- 
standing, the  German  Government  declares  as  fol- 
lows: 

"i.  Germany  has  in  view  no  act  of  hostility 
against  Belgium,  if  Belgium  consents,  in  the  war 
which  is  going  to  commence,  to  adopt  an  attitude  of 
benevolent  neutrality  in  regard  to  Germany.  The 
German  Government,  on  its  side,  promises,  at  the 
moment  of  peace,  to  guarantee  the  kingdom  and  its 
possessions  in  their  entire  extent.  2.  Germany 
promises  to  evacuate  Belgian  territory,  under  the  con- 
dition above  pronounced,  immediately  peace  is  con- 
cluded. 3.  If  Belgium  observes  a  friendly  attitude, 
Germany  is  ready,  in  accord  with  the  authorities  of 
the  Belgian  Government,  to  buy,  paying  cash,  all 
that  would  be  necessary  for  her  troops,  and  to 
indemnify  the  losses  caused  to  Belgium.  4.  If  Bel- 
gium conducts  herself  in  a  hostile  manner  against 
the  German  troops  and  makes  in  particular  difficul- 
ties for  their  forward  march  by  an  opposition  of  the 
fortifications  of  the  Meuse  or  by  the  destruction  of 

406 


GREAT  BRITAIN  ENTERS  THE  WAR 

roads,  railways,  tunnels,  or  other  constructions,  Ger- 
many will  be  obliged  to  consider  Belgium  as  an 
enemy. 

"In  this  case,  Germany  will  make  no  promise  in 
regard  to  the  kingdom,  but  will  leave  the  subsequent 
adjustment  of  the  relations  of  the  two  states  one 
toward  the  other  to  the  decision  of  arms. 

"The  German  Government  has  the  hope  with 
reason  that  this  eventuality  will  not  take  place,  and 
that  the  Belgian  Government  will  know  how  to  take 
the  necessary  measures  suitable  for  preventing  it 
from  taking  place. 

"In  this  case,  the  relations  of  friendship  which 
unite  the  two  neighbouring  states  will  become 
narrower  and  more  lasting." 

Belgium  did  not  hesitate  to  respond  promptly  as 
follows : 

"By  its  note  of  August  2,  1914,  the  German  Gov- 
ernment has  made  known  that  according  to  sure  news 
the  French  forces  have  the  intention  of  marching  on 
the  Meuse  by  way  of  Givet  and  Namur,  and  that 
Belgium,  in  spite  of  her  very  good  will,  would  not  be 
able  to  repulse  without  help  the  forward  march  of  the 
French  troops. 

"The  German  Government  would  believe  itself 
under  the  obligation  of  forestalling  this  attack  and 
of  violating  the  Belgian  territory.  In  these  condi- 
tions, Germany  proposes  to  the  Government  of  the 
King  to  adopt  in  regard  to  her  a  friendly  attitude, 
and  she  promises  at  the  moment  of  the  peace  to 
guarantee  the  integrity  of  the  kingdom  and  of  its 
possessions  in  their  entire  extent. 

"The  note  adds  that  if  Belgium  makes  difficulty 
for  the  forward  march  of  the  German  troops,  Ger- 
many will  be  obliged  to  consider  her  as  an  enemy 
but  will  leave  the  subsequent  adjustment  of  the 

407 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

relations  of  the  two  states  one  towards  the  other  by 
the  decision  of  arms. 

"This  note  has  aroused  in  the  Government  of 
the  King  a  deep  and  grievous  astonishment.  The 
intentions  that  it  attributes  to  France  are  in  con- 
tradiction with  the  formal  declarations  which  have 
been  made  to  us  on  August  ist,  in  the  name  of  the 
Government  of  the  Republic. 

"However,  if  in  opposition  to  our  expectation 
a  violation  of  the  Belgian  neutrality  is  going  to  be 
committed  by  France,  Belgium  would  fulfil  all  her 
international  duties,  and  her  army  would  oppose 
itself  to  the  invader  with  the  most  vigorous  re- 
sistance. The  treaties  of  1839,  confirmed  by  the 
treaties  of  1870,  make  sacred  the  independence  and 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
Powers  and  notably  of  the  Government  of  His 
Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia. 

"Belgium  has  always  been  faithful  to  her  inter- 
national obligations ;  she  has  accomplished  her  duties 
in  a  spirit  of  loyal  impartiality,  she  has  neglected  no 
effort  to  maintain  and  to  make  respected  her  neu- 
trality. The  attack  upon  her  independence  with 
which  the  German  Government  menaces  her  would 
constitute  a  flagrant  violation  of  international  law. 

"No  strategic  interest  justifies  the  violation  of 
international  law.  The  Belgian  Government  in 
accepting  the  propositions  of  which  it  has  received 
notice  would  sacrifice  the  honour  of  the  nation  at 
the  same  time  as  it  would  betray  its  duties  toward 
Europe.  Conscious  of  the  role  that  Belgium  has 
played  for  more  than  eighty  years  in  the  civilization 
of  the  world,  it  does  not  allow  itself  to  believe  that 
the  independence  of  Belgium  can  be  preserved  only 
at  the  price  of  the  violation  of  her  neutrality.  If 
this  hope  is  deceived,  the  Belgian  Government  is 
firmly  decided  to  repulse  by  every  means  in  its 
power  every  attack  upon  its  rights. " 

408 


GREAT  BRITAIN  ENTERS  THE  WAR 

As  I  record  these  two  statements,  there  is  before 
me  a  cartoon  from  a  recent  issue  of  Punch.  The 
Kaiser,  with  a  leer  on  his  face,  is  leaning  over  the 
shoulder  of  King  Albert,  who  is  looking  out  with 
folded  arms  upon  the  smoking  ruins  of  his  country, 
and  the  long  defile  of  refugees.  The  Kaiser  says, 
"See,  you  have  lost  all."  King  Albert  answers, 
"Not  my  soul." 

To  be  just  to  Germany,  is  necessary  for  us  to  quote 
the  explanation  of  this  action  made  by  Chancellor 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg  to  the  Reichstag,  on  August 
4th,  when  Germany  had  commenced  to  carry  into 
execution  her  threat : 

"Here  is  the  truth.  We  are  in  necessity,  and 
necessity  knows  no  law. 

"Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg,  and 
have  perhaps  already  put  their  foot  upon  Belgium 
territory. 

"It  is  against  the  law  of  nations.  The  French 
Government  has,  it  is  true,  declared  at  Brussels  that 
it  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  so  long  as 
the  enemy  respected  it.  We  knew,  however,  that 
France  was  ready  for  the  aggression.  France  could 
wait ;  we,  no.  A  French  attack  upon  our  flank  in  the 
Lower  Rhine  might  have  been  fatal  to  us.  So  we 
have  been  forced  to  pass  beyond  the  well-founded 
protestations  of  Luxemburg  and  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment. We  shall  recompense  them  for  the  wrong 
that  we  have  thus  caused  them  as  soon  as  we  shall 
have  attained  our  military  end. 

"When  one  is  as  threatened  as  we  are  and  when 
one  fights  for  that  which  is  most  sacred  to  him,  one 
can  think  only  of  one  thing,  that  is,  to  attain  his  end, 
cost  what  it  may. 

409 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

"I  repeat  the  words  of  the  Emperor;  'It  is  with 
pure  conscience  that  Germany  goes  to  the  combat.  *  " 

On  the  afternoon  of  August  3d,  as  Sir  Edward  Grey 
was  leaving  for  ParHament  to  make  his  expose  of 
Great  Britain's  position  in  the  European  crisis,  he 
received  from  the  King  a  telegram  that  had  just 
arrived  from  King  Albert  of  Belgium: 

"Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  friendship 
of  Your  Majesty  and  of  Your  predecessor,  and  the 
friendly  attitude  of  Great  Britain  in  1870,  as  well  as 
of  the  new  gage  of  friendship  that  she  has  just  given 
me,  I  address  a  supreme  appeal  to  the  diplomatic 
intervention  of  Your  Majesty  to  safeguard  the 
integrity  of  Belgium. " 

Sir  Edward  Grey  read  this  telegram  to  Parliament, 
and  explained  that  the  diplomatic  intervention  asked 
for  had  already  been  made  both  at  Paris  and  Berlin, 
for  this  eventuality  had  been  foreseen.  To  the  ques- 
tions of  the  British  Ambassadors  concerning  their 
intentions  towards  Belgium,  to  respect  and  maintain 
the  neutrality  of  which  each  of  these  Powers  was  equally 
bound  with  Great  Britain  by  the  treaty  of  i8jQ,  France 
responded : 

"The  French  Government  is  resolved  to  respect 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  it  would  be  only  in 
the  case  where  some  other  Power  would  violate  the 
neutrality  that  France  might  find  herself  in  the 
necessity  of  acting  otherwise. " 

Germany  answered: 

"The  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  is  in 

410 


GREAT  BRITAIN  ENTERS  THE  WAR 

the  impossibility  of  giving  a  response  before  having 
consulted  the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor. " 

When  Sir  Edward  Goeschen  expressed  the  hope 
that  the  answer  would  not  be  delayed,  Herr  von 
Jagow  gave  him  clearly  to  understand  that  he 
doubted  whether  he  could  respond,  "for  any  response 
on  his  part  would  not  fail,  in  case  of  war,  to  have  the 
regrettable  effect  of  divulging  a  part  of  the  German 
plan  of  campaign!" 

There  was  no  doubt  about  the  sentiment  of  Parlia- 
ment. The  Cabinet  saw  that  party  lines  had  been 
obliterated,  and  that  the  country  was  behind  them. 
The  following  day,  August  4th,  Great  Britain  pre- 
sented an  ultimatum  to  Germany,  demanding  an 
assurance  that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  should  be 
respected.  Germany  gave  no  answer.  Her  army 
had  already  invaded  Belgium.  A  few  hours  after  the 
reception  of  the  British  ultimatum,  the  advance  on 
Liege  was  ordered.  After  waiting  until  evening. 
Great  Britain  declared  war  on  Germany. 

It  is  probable  that  Germany  counted  the  cost 
before  she  invaded  Belgium.  Whatever  may  have 
been  said  at  Berlin,  the  intervention  of  Great  Britain 
was  not  the  surprise  that  it  has  been  represented  to 
be.  In  deciding  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  in 
spite  of  the  British  ultimatum,  the  German  argu- 
ment was:  It  is  morally  certain  that  Great  Britain 
will  intervene  if  we  enter  Belgium.  But  what  will 
this  intervention  mean  ?  She  has  no  army  worth  the 
name.  Her  navy  can  do  practically  nothing  to  harm 
us  while  we  are  crushing  France  and  Russia.     The 

411 


THE  NEW  MAP  OF  EUROPE 

participation  of  Great  Britain  in  the  war  is  a  cer- 
tainty a  few  weeks  later.  By  precipitating  her  in- 
tervention, we  are  less  harmed  than  we  would  be 
by  refusing  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  advantage  of 
attacking  France  through  Belgium. 

In  believing  that  the  eventual  participation  of 
Great  Britain  was  certain,  even  if  there  were  no 
Belgian  question,  Germany  was  right.  The  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  not  the  cause,  but 
the  occasion,  of  Great  Britain's  entry  into  the  war. 
It  was,  however,  a  most  fortunate  opportunity  for 
the  British  Cabinet  to  secure  popular  sympathy  and 
support  in  declaring  war  upon  Germany.  For  it  is 
certain  that  Great  Britain  ought  not  to  have  delayed 
entering  the  war.  The  nation  might  have  awakened 
too  late  to  the  fact  that  the  triumph  of  Germany  in 
Europe  would  menace  her  national  existence.  There 
is  no  room  in  the  world  for  the  amicable  dwelling 
side  by  side  of  British  idealism  and  German  mili- 
tarism.   One  or  the  other  must  perish. 

In  August,  1 914,  the  only  way  to  have  avoided  the 
catastrophe  of  a  general  European  war  would  have 
been  to  allow  Germany  to  make,  according  to  her 
own  desires  and  ambitions,  the  new  map  of  Europe. 


412 


